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1. Domestic Transformation 
in the Global Context
Ross Garnaut, Ligang Song, Cai Fang and Lauren Johnston
Introduction
China is experiencing its most persistent substantial slowdown in economic 
growth since the early years of reform. Annual growth has sagged from an 
average of 10 per cent per annum in the first decade of the century to just more 
than 7 per cent in 2014. As we discussed in the China Updates for 2006 and 
2013, some slowing was inevitable and welcome to authorities. The slowdown 
anticipated in 2006 and 2013 is auspicious—driven by structural factors 
and necessary to sustain economic growth. The question now is whether we 
are observing the slowdown that is anticipated, and necessary to establish a 
foundation for a drive towards the productivity frontiers of the world economy, 
or a slowdown that has other causes. 
There are two candidates for something else. One is a cyclical slump from 
withdrawal of the extraordinary fiscal and monetary stimulus to maintain growth 
after the global financial crisis (GFC). This prospect is rendered more severe 
by associated weaknesses in the financial system revealed by the withdrawal 
of stimulus, and from continuing weakness in the developed world’s economy 
and therefore in demand for Chinese exports. The second is a less auspicious 
structural slowdown, deriving not from productive structural change within 
a new model of economic growth, but from the accumulation of uncorrected 
structural weaknesses from the old model of growth that become more and more 
damaging as China moves closer to the world’s productivity frontiers. 
The main focus of this year’s China Update is on the detail of structural change 
within the new model of growth. Many chapters take a close look at one or other 
area of the economy in which change is required to sustain growth. The authors 
generally record nascent progress and grounds for hope, but rarely evidence that 
China is well on its way to the structural change that would see its emergence in 
the next decade as a high-income modern economy. 
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There has nonetheless been productive structural change in two areas. One is 
the structural change driven by the labour market transformation associated 
with the shift from abundance to scarcity of unskilled labour. The other is the 
substantial and continuing change in the relationship between growth and 
pressure on the natural environment that is being driven by policy. 
The past two growth slowdowns in China occurred in response to the Asian 
Financial Crisis (1998–99) and the GFC (2008–09). Now, as then, there have 
been suggestions that the deceleration of the actual economy is greater than 
has been recorded in the official statistics. It was common during the two 
previous slowdowns to point to much slower growth in partial indicators, such 
as electricity demand or freight volumes, as evidence that the actual economy 
had slowed more than the official statistical economy. Premier Li Keqiang, in an 
earlier provincial role, once suggested that the partial indicators were more 
reliable than the statistical aggregates. Significance has therefore been attached 
to the recent absolute declines in electricity use (1.1 per cent in April 2015 
compared with the previous April) and rail freight volume (down 9 per cent 
in the first quarter of 2015 compared with the corresponding period of 2014). 
Huang (2015) has suggested that the real growth in output could have been 
something like 5 per cent rather than the official statistical 7 per cent in the year 
to early 2015. 
Analysis at the time of the two preceding growth slowdowns suggested some 
basis for downgrading the official statistical aggregates at times of slower growth. 
These related to difficulties of calculating price deflators in conditions of weak 
demand and tendencies to deflation. There could be some overestimation in the 
recent data. Structural change, especially related to use of energy, has, however, 
been large enough for us to expect fundamental shifts in the old relationships 
between the favourite partial indicators and actual growth. The 5.6 per cent 
decline in energy intensity of economic activity, to which the decline in 
electricity consumption is related, is only a small extension of the rate of 
decline in 2014. This in turn is only moderately above the 4 per cent per annum 
decline envisaged in the Twelfth Five-Year Plan. In these circumstances, a small 
decline in electricity consumption, while unlikely to continue for long, is not 
hopelessly inconsistent with a 7 per cent increase in total output. Similarly, coal 
accounts for a high proportion of rail freight in China, so the large movement 
away from coal as a source of energy associated with the new environmental 
objectives—leading to coal use in the first quarter of 2015 being well below the 
corresponding quarter of the previous year—accounts for much of the slump 
in freight volumes.
The slowdown could be a bit larger than measured by official data, and in any 
case is substantial. More importantly, the weakness so far of structural change 
associated with the new model of growth means that some powerful headwinds 
Domestic Transformation in the Global Context
3
will be felt more strongly in future than now. In the best of circumstances, 
a period of lower growth has still to be experienced before a foundation has 
been laid for China’s drive towards high-income status. 
Chapters 2, 3 and 9 discuss how some of the slowing of growth has been driven 
by demographic and labour market change, and how much of the remainder has 
cyclical or inauspicious structural causes. The inauspicious structural causes are 
mostly related to imbalances that emerged in the fiscal and monetary response 
to the GFC. 
Our 2006 Update highlighted the consequences of the demographic and labour 
market changes summed up as ‘the turning period in economic growth’. Unskilled 
labour in the countryside ceased to be abundant and available in large amounts 
at fairly steady wages from the middle of the first decade of the new century, 
soon causing wages to grow more rapidly than output. Other  changes were 
driven by the turning period in the labour market: increased wages led to the 
reversal of the longstanding increase in the investment share of output, and the 
slow beginnings of a rise in the consumption share. The rise in the wages share 
of income led to reversal of the longstanding tendency for inequality in income 
distribution to increase over time. This could be expected to incrementally 
reduce the investment share of domestic expenditure, so that slower growth in 
the capital stock would join the decline in the labour force to place downward 
pressure on the rate of growth (Garnaut and Song 2006). How far that decline 
went would depend on policies to make the economy more flexible and better 
able to allocate resources to their most productive uses—that is, productivity-
raising economic reform. 
The 2013 volume introduced the idea that China was working within a new 
model of economic growth, driven by policy change to promote new objectives 
as well as by the economic pressures from the labour market (Garnaut et al. 
2013). The new objectives include more equitable income distribution; higher 
household consumption, especially of services and especially in rural areas; 
acceptance of a moderately lower rate of growth; and a reduction in the pressure 
applied by each increment in economic activity on the natural environment. 
The new model of economic growth was judged to be necessary to sustain 
growth so that China could join the minority of countries so far that, having 
attained upper middle-income status, as China has now done, go on to join the 
high-income countries. A further doubling of output per person after 2010 was 
required for China to achieve this outcome. Reform of many institutions and 
policies was necessary for this to be possible. These new priorities and model 
of growth were embodied in the reform decisions of the Third Plenary meeting 
of the Chinese Communist Party’s Eighteenth Central Committee late in 2013. 
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The view that recent declines in economic growth reflect stronger influence from 
cyclical than structural policies is supported in Chapters 2 and 3. The slowdown 
so far has clear footprints from the turning point in the labour market. However, 
beyond important changes in the relationship between growth and pressure on 
the environment, there is so far little evident influence of new policies designed 
to bring economic outcomes more closely in line with community objectives and 
to lay the foundations for transition to an advanced modern economy. 
The continuation of the deceleration in growth that has been evident for several 
years into the first quarter of 2015 is more than a ‘regression to the mean’ 
(Pritchett and Summers 2014). It reflects the overlapping of three tendencies: 
the changing of gears associated with the new model of growth, which is 
necessary to keep growth going; the painful adjustment associated with the 
removal of external and internal imbalances from the old growth model; and 
the absorption of the excesses hanging over from the extraordinary fiscal and 
monetary stimulus that powered China through the aftermath of the GFC. 
The third, cyclical set of influences includes high debt levels, especially at the 
local government level, and overcapacity in many industrial sectors, both of 
which increase risks in China’s financial sector. 
What we called ‘China’s new model of economic growth’ has since been 
described by the government and others in China as the ‘new normal’. New 
normal growth requires extensive institutional reform, including changes in the 
hukou system to remove artificial impediments to efficient use of rural labour in 
urban areas; in the financial system, to allow capital to be allocated to its most 
productive use; in land management, to ensure that the opportunity cost of 
scarce land is reflected in its use and that peasants are adequately compensated 
for transfer of land to more economically valuable uses; in increased investment 
and better use of resources in education, especially in rural areas, to increase 
opportunities for all citizens in an expanding modern economy; in removal of 
barriers to innovation and effective use of intellectual capital by strengthening 
property rights and facilitating the exchange of knowledge; and in removal or 
economically efficient regulation of state monopolies to raise efficiency in goods 
and services markets. Reforms in these areas can increase productivity, generating 
a ‘reform dividend’ partially to compensate for the loss of the ‘demographic 
dividend’ and for lower contributions to growth from increase in the capital 
stock (Lu and Cai 2014). Stronger impetus to growth from productivity-raising 
reform could be augmented in the longer term by relaxation of population 
policy, although the actual effect of changing the one-child policy at this stage 
of Chinese development is uncertain.
China’s drive towards high-income status needs mutually reinforcing 
contributions from reform in many areas. Productivity has to be raised in 
all activities, and resources must be encouraged to move from less to more 
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productive uses. The structural change from less to more productive uses of 
resources has many dimensions: from less to more profitable firms; from low-
value to high-value goods and services; from rural to urban locations; and 
from less to more productive regions. As Kuznets (1961) noted more than half 
a century ago, resources need to continue to shift from low-productivity areas 
such as agriculture to high-productivity areas such as industry—just as they 
did under the old model of growth, within which more than 250 million rural 
workers migrated into cities. China has to accept ‘creative destruction’ wherever 
it increases economic value, and needs to reform institutions and policies to 
allow creative destruction to do its work.
There are several risks to China right now continuing to shift resources from 
relatively low to high-productivity activities (Cai 2015). First, there may not 
be enough new migrant workers moving from rural areas to towns to replace 
migrant workers returning to rural areas from now on. This risk arises from 
demographic change as well as from institutional barriers that prevent migrant 
workers from settling permanently in cities. The annual growth rate of migrant 
workers flowing into cities has fallen from 4 per cent in the period 2005–10 to 
about 1.3 per cent in 2014. The continuation of this trend would undermine 
an important source of productivity growth, since rural–urban migration is 
estimated to have contributed about half of China’s total factor productivity 
(TFP) improvement over considerable periods in the reform era.
Second, the rate of urban growth is bound to fall, and unless there is timely 
downward adjustment in rates of urban infrastructure investment, capital will 
be wasted in overcapacity. 
Third, upgrading of the industrial structure associated with the new model of 
growth requires increasingly educated and experienced labour. Current rural 
education standards and incentives for migrants to accumulate and apply skills 
in urban employment may not make this more sophisticated labour available to 
expanding urban industries. In these circumstances, rural migrant workers are 
particularly vulnerable to structural unemployment when they are not covered 
by urban insurance for unemployment and other social security provisions. 
At the same time, they cannot easily be re-employed in the agricultural sector 
because of changes in their own preferences and in technology applied in 
increasingly productive agriculture. The resulting structural unemployment 
could be a potential source of social instability. 
Fourth, China’s rebalancing towards a rising share of services and falling 
share of secondary industry could lower the overall rate of productivity 
improvement. Secondary industry in general has higher labour productivity 
than tertiary industry. For example, average labour productivity (defined as 
the ratio of industrial value added over total employment) in China was 1.45 for 
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secondary industry and 1.22 for tertiary industry in 2013. However, the impact 
on productivity depends on whether secondary industry is progressing towards 
producing higher value-added products and the service industries, including 
research and development (R&D), design, marketing and post-sales services, 
which support them. In that case, overall productivity could be enhanced by 
the development of the service sector. However, industrial restructuring that 
mainly involves shifting workers from low-end manufacturing production to 
low-end services could have a negative impact on productivity growth. 
These risks highlight the importance of reform to direct resources continually 
into more productive areas. An important requirement for continuous structural 
economic upgrading is creative destruction (Schumpeter 1934). This allows 
inefficient or unproductive activities to depart from the market, so saving 
resources for use in more efficient, innovative and productive activities. 
For creative destruction to succeed, governments, especially local governments, 
should desist from seeking to save industries making losses and losing 
comparative advantage. Instead, they should nurture market competition and 
minimise the social costs of structural transition.
The arrival of the Lewis turning period has weakened the competitiveness of 
China’s traditional labour-intensive industries. China’s revealed comparative 
advantage (RCA) index for labour-intensive goods (the ratio of China’s labour-
intensive exports to total exports, relative to the same ratio for the world as 
a whole) fell from 4.4 in 2003 to 3.4 in 2013. The downward trend continues.
China’s integration into the global economy has forced a worldwide reallocation 
of economic activities. China’s massive labour-intensive industries have started 
moving from the coastal regions to inland regions and at the same time to 
other countries, especially in South-East and South Asia but also in Africa. 
This ‘flying geese’ or ‘flying dragon’ pattern is potentially positive for global 
as well as Chinese development, alongside the upgrading of China’s industrial 
production towards high value-added manufacturing products. 
China’s State Council unveiled a national plan recently, which is called ‘Made in 
China 2025’. It is a 10-year action plan designed to transform China from a 
low-end to a high-end manufacturing giant. It covers 10 sectors (People’s Daily 
online, 22 May 2015): new information technology; numerical control tools 
and robotics; aerospace equipment; ocean engineering equipment and high-
tech ships; railway equipment; energy-saving and new energy equipment and 
vehicles; power equipment; new materials; biological medicine and medical 
devices; and agricultural machinery. This new strategy, coupled with the 
international strategy of ‘one belt and one road’, supported by the formation 
of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), reflects a comprehensive 
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approach to a new growth model. If successfully implemented, China’s exports 
of manufactured goods at a higher level will dominate a changing global division 
of labour, supporting productive structural change in China itself.
Comprehensive success requires a favourable international environment. This is 
increasingly problematic. There is increasing concern about the sustainability 
of the export-oriented growth model in China and other East Asian economies, 
against a weakening of the multilateral trading system and the proliferation of 
preferential arrangements. These are likely soon to be joined by the formation of 
a large preferential trading area that excludes the large Asian countries: China, 
India and Indonesia. Optimists see this as being a stepping stone to comprehensive 
free trade in the Asia-Pacific. Realists see risks in the immense gains from free 
multilateral trade that have underpinned Asia-Pacific development in the past 
half-century.
Outside Asia, the capacity and willingness of developed countries to accept the 
structural change required for absorption of large quantities of exports from 
newly competitive suppliers of high-value products are diminished by slow 
economic growth and the increase in protectionist instincts that this inspires. 
Continued deepening of international integration would help all countries to meet 
the economic challenges they face; a reversal of the globalisation process would 
make life harder for everyone. China’s circumstances provide an opportunity 
for gains from global leadership (Garnaut and Song 2006). China’s leadership 
role in championing a new wave of globalisation is present in some areas but 
not in others. The establishment of the AIIB is a good sign: new mechanisms 
to support capital outflow alongside increased export of capital goods from the 
higher-income countries to support infrastructure for development in lower-
income countries are needed now to restore momentum for economic growth in 
developed and developing countries alike. China would do global development 
as well as its own development a good turn by demonstrating similar leadership 
in unilateral trade liberalisation, which is the most likely way out of the 
increasingly dense maze of preferential trading arrangements in the Asia-Pacific. 
The rebalancing from exports to consumption as a source of growth within 
China’s new economic model also reduces adjustment pressures in the rest of 
the world. This creates a different set of opportunities for export expansion 
in the rest of the world than the old model of growth, which favoured exports 
of minerals and energy commodities, with all of the challenges of resource-led 
growth in the exporting countries (Collier 2007; Sachs and Warner 1997). 
The next five years of transition are crucial to the success of the new model of 
growth. Success would deliver the targeted doubling of per capita income by 
2020 from the 2010 level. That would lift China across the income threshold 
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of a developed country. There is a good chance but no certainty of success. 
Reforms  must be deepened to lift productivity and to make growth more 
inclusive and environmentally sustainable. 
This year’s China Update offers both domestic insight and global context into 
this challenging new phase of China’s economic transformation. The following 
chapters shine a light on policy reform, institutional change and economic 
performance in a number of specialised areas of the Chinese economy. Many are 
important in themselves, and all provide insights into the complex process of 
transition through which China is seeking to make its way from middle income 
into the ranks of the developed countries.
A complex set of institutional changes covering political rather than narrowly 
economic transition will help to determine the fate of China’s advance into the 
ranks of developed economies. Inductive logic would draw from the experience 
of the countries that are now developed: the conclusion that all high-income 
countries have (more or less) competitive political systems in which the votes 
of citizens can change the political party of government. It would draw the 
conclusion that all high-income countries provide freedom of exchange of 
information among citizens and between citizens and other people that extends 
well beyond common practice in China.
It is in the nature of inductive logic that a new set of observations can transform 
our knowledge. Nassim Taleb (2007) in his classic book about financial 
irrationality notes that the swan was synonymous with whiteness until Willem 
de Vlamingh sailed through the heads of what is now Fremantle Harbour in 
1696. He then observed the black swans that were of sufficient note for him 
to give the name Swan to the river that opened before him. If China achieves 
advanced-economy status without fundamental political change, a majority of 
people living in high-income countries will live under authoritarian and not 
democratic governments. The world will see another black swan.
Inductive logic raises some questions about whether China can reach the 
status of a high-income country without large changes in political institutions. 
This book does not cover these important matters. They have been discussed by 
economists elsewhere (Dollar 2015; Huang 2015), and will be part of the agenda 
of the China Update on future occasions.
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Structure of the book
Chapters 2, 3 and 9 take a closer look at the macroeconomic story, focusing on 
the influences on the growth slowdown and the policies proposed to remedy it.
In Chapter 2, Ross Garnaut examines structural change within China’s 
economic growth. Change is being driven by pressures endogenous to economic 
development, and by new objectives and policy. The former include rising wages 
and changes in the relative priorities of increases in income and the quality of 
health, longevity and the natural environment that come with higher incomes. 
The new model of growth that accepts the growing scarcity and value of labour, 
and the higher priority of equity in income distribution and environmental 
amenity are necessary to sustain growth so that China can enter the ranks of 
high-income countries. The transition to a new model of growth, and, if that 
transition is successful, to an advanced economy, could be smooth or rough. 
Smooth adjustment would see investment falling and consumption rising by 
a commensurate amount—and productivity growth rising so as partially to 
balance the declining contribution to growth of increase in the amount of labour 
and capital deployed in the economy. 
There are some positive signs suggesting progress in applying the new model 
of growth. Real wages are rising at a faster rate than gross domestic product 
(GDP). Inequality as measured by the Gini coefficient is falling after many 
years of moving in the opposite direction. Trends in the share of investment 
and household consumption of GDP are in the right direction, but almost 
imperceptible in size. There is so far only a weak footprint of the new growth 
model in the economic indicators. 
The slowdown in growth is larger than the limited progress in implementing the 
new model of growth would lead us to expect. That suggests large cyclical and 
unproductive structural causes of the slowdown in growth since 2011. Growth 
in TFP is falling markedly—although the experience of other countries suggests 
that the causes may not all be specific to China. This suggests little progress in 
the qualitative reforms that are at the heart of the new model of growth—and of 
the decisions of the Third Plenum in 2013. 
One area in which the new model does have bite is in changes in the relationship 
between economic growth and pressure on the environment. Use of low-
emissions energy is rising rapidly, and the early twenty-first-century explosion 
in the use of coal and other fossil fuels has come to an abrupt end. Changes in the 
intensity and composition of energy use are being driven by domestic concerns 
for health and longevity as well as international concerns about climate change 
and desires to limit insecurity derived from dependence on imported fossil 
fuels. Implementation of the more narrowly economic dimensions of the new 
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model of growth—for example, through the decline in the investment share of 
expenditure—would accelerate progress on environmental objectives, and can 
be expected in future with success in China’s transition to a developed country.
In Chapter 9, Rod Tyers explains how the GFC forced China to confront the 
economic imbalances that are the legacy of three decades of rapid growth. For 
one-quarter of a century into the reform era, until about 2005, China’s abundant 
and cheap labour kept labour costs low and increased consumer choice and 
welfare in high-income economies. The gains within China and in its trading 
partners favoured the owners of capital, and in some industries had adverse 
consequences for workers. What will be the consequences of China’s new 
growth model for high-income economies? 
Tyers explores that question using a global macroeconomic model that allows 
for rebalancing of national asset portfolios and endogenous representation of 
unconventional monetary policy. Modelling results suggest that high-income 
countries could see modest increases in inflation, but the associated adverse 
fall in the terms of trade could help to restore employment levels. Those results 
also suggest that successful Chinese transition towards higher consumption and 
lower savings should reverse the impact on high-income economies of China’s 
old model of growth. 
In Chapter 3, Guonan Ma makes the case for monetary easing in China—a policy 
shift that began in late 2014. The international context of Chinese monetary easing 
is the post–financial crisis monetary easing by the central banks of Japan, the 
United States, the European Union and the United Kingdom. One consequence 
of the developed countries’ monetary policies was an unintended tightening 
of Chinese policy. Ma argues that this is a cause of Chinese growth in recent 
years being slower than would be optimal. This carries risks and increases the 
difficulties of reform. 
Ma’s chapter makes a compelling case for monetary reform around three 
perspectives: the Taylor rule for the domestic monetary expansion; China’s 
tight monetary conditions in the face of unconventional monetary policy 
operations by the central banks of the big four economies; and the relationship 
between Chinese and fiscal policies in determining the exchange rate. Ma sees 
monetary easing as being important for short-term stability as well as to provide 
a congenial context for economic reform to the new model of growth.
In Chapter 4, Meiyan Wang and Cai Fang explore one area of untapped consumer 
potential: China’s vast pool of migrant workers. The hukou residency registration 
system—which limits cross-provincial and urban–rural cross-worker access to 
social security, health and education—forces higher levels of precautionary 
savings than are considered acceptable by local peers.
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Meiyan Wang and Cai Fang use data from the China Urban Labour Survey to 
analyse consumption patterns among migrant and local households in six cities 
in China. Finding the difference between migrant and local consumption to be 
statistically significant, the authors extrapolate the consumption potential were 
migrant workers to enjoy the same benefits and rights as locals. The chapter 
concludes that reform that empowers China’s migrant workers to consume at 
the level of their local peers would support China’s new economic strategy by 
unlocking massive untapped consumer potential.
In Chapter 5, Ran Li, Xiang Li, Wen Lei and Yiping Huang debate the options 
for accelerating reform and opening of China’s banking sector. Since shortly 
after China joined the World Trade Organization (WTO), foreign banks have 
dramatically expanded their absolute presence in China, with their assets 
growing at an average annual rate of 20 per cent. Contrary to earlier fears, they 
have failed to crowd out Chinese banks and have encountered many difficulties 
in operating in China. Their shares of total banking assets have fallen. Chinese 
banks seem to have benefited from the learning and competition spillovers 
generated by foreign banks in China without losing business to them.
The authors seek to quantify the impact of foreign banks on competition in 
China’s banking sector. Exploring a subset of China’s banking sector—the non-
state banking sector at the provincial level—the authors find that foreign banks 
are associated with positive competition effects in China. Net interest margins 
and non-interest expenses as a share of total earnings are both lower where 
foreign banks are active.
Reform is delivering efficiency advantages without obviously damaging 
established Chinese interests. 
In Chapter 6, Qing King Guo, Chi Keung Marco Lau, Kunwang Li and Ligang Song 
explore whether the efficiency of coal, gasoline and gas markets is increasing in 
China. They do this by focusing on changes in price differentials across regions. 
Recent advances in the collection of spot-price data allow the ‘law of one price’ 
to be tested. The chapter also assesses progress in the integration of markets 
across China’s regions. The massive increase in demand for energy in the past 
few decades makes this an interesting area for testing changes in the efficiency 
of markets. 
There is little support for the law of one price in China in the analysis of energy 
price changes across the regions and years that were studied. An average 
convergence rate of 40 per cent is calculated. Diesel prices converged most, 
with 60 per cent of the diesel sample suggesting convergence in price across 
regions over time. Electricity prices remained most divergent. There were also 
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indications of the extent of convergence varying within category groupings, 
especially with respect to coal products. The results were attributed to price 
protection, geographic barriers and other government policies. 
In Chapter 7, Xunpeng Shi and Hari Malamakkavu Padinjare Variam explore 
the case of liberalisation of China’s gas market, which began a decade ago. 
Those  reforms include the creation of gas trading hubs and gas benchmark 
pricing—intended to improve the infrastructure and liquidity of the gas market. 
Since China is now a net gas importer, the world’s third-largest consumer of gas 
and intends to increase the role of gas in its energy mix, understanding gas 
market liberalisation in China is important to the global gas industry. The first 
part of the chapter provides a qualitative summary of these trends and changes, 
and of the powerful role of China’s three large state-owned gas companies. 
The chapter then applies an empirical model to examine the impact of China’s 
gas liberalisation on trade flows and gas prices. An Asian gas trade model 
utilises a dataset covering 2006 and projections forward to 2035. China would 
lose if it was alone among East Asia’s major gas importers in deregulating its gas 
market. A unique study of China–Australia gas ties finds that Australia is likely 
to do best under the continuation of a long-term contract system. For China, the 
optimal scenario is one of a mixed-economy model: a combination of long-term 
contracts and spot-price purchasing. 
In Chapter 8, Stephen Wilson, Yufeng Yang and Jane Kuang outline the complex 
challenges facing China’s electricity producers. After suffering persistent 
blackouts in the 1980s, by the first decade of the new century, the electricity 
sector instead had a ‘golden decade’, characterised by rising growth in demand 
and generation capacity. China now has the world’s largest hydropower sector, 
the world’s largest and most rapid nuclear plant construction program and the 
largest installed capacity for wind and solar power. Managing this sector against 
demand for power, environmental concerns, industrial competitiveness and, 
finally, equality and livelihood concerns necessitates continuous reforms. 
The main focus of the chapter is on models of price deregulation and their 
relevance to China. The authors extract lessons from the experiences of major 
electricity-consuming countries for China’s own electricity reforms. Early this 
century, China’s electricity reforms were most influenced by the UK example 
of separation of power generation and the grid, parallel with establishing an 
electricity supervision council. Benchmarking against different international 
experience continues. The period 2020–50 is cited as expected to produce major 
milestones in energy, the economy and the environment for China, and thus 
future trends in China’s electricity market could be future trends in the global 
electricity market. Most of the data end in 2010, so the insights from the chapter 
are of historical relevance. 
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In Chapter 10, Liqing Zhang and Qin Gou lay out alternative approaches for 
China’s prospective opening of the capital account. An extreme choice is to open 
with a ‘big bang’. This could be efficient in terms of capital allocation and risk 
diversification but is subject to large financial volatility risks. The  choice of 
opening model is complicated by the need for synchronisation with decisions 
on reform of the banking sector, liberalisation of finance and floating the 
national currency. Consequences of reform are affected by the international 
business cycle. 
Zhang and Gou review the theoretical and empirical literature, which explores 
both the mode and the sequencing of capital account opening. They add a random 
effects probit model to that literature, and utilise a sample of 50 countries to 
explore how different scenarios of reform sequencing and opening mode affect 
the likelihood of a financial crisis in China. Under no scenario does the risk 
exceed 15 per cent. The risk is lowest in the case of China incrementally opening 
its capital account in tandem with undertaking broader financial reforms. 
In Chapter 11, Will Nixon, Eden Hatzvi and Michelle Wright unravel and explain 
China’s cautious and policy-driven approach to internationalising the renminbi 
(RMB). They describe the prevailing view that RMB internationalisation can 
only move in tandem with broader capital account liberalisation. The latter, 
however, is being served by the gradual rise of offshore RMB trading, for it is 
increasing the international flow of China’s currency. This experience provides 
insight for Chinese central bankers seeking to understand how greater openness 
to currency trade might work.
Nixon, Hatzvi and Wright explain the motivations for China proceeding with 
these sensitive monetary reforms, and the important role of the Bank of China 
and the Bank of Hong Kong to that process. By early 2015 the local branches 
of Chinese banks in 15 cities outside mainland China had been granted 
official RMB clearing bank status. Some 28 central banks have signed bilateral 
currency swap agreements with China, while 40 invest a proportion of their 
foreign-exchange reserves in renminbi. The experience of the central banks and 
investors utilising the increasing number of RMB-denominated stock investor 
programs is increasing understanding of influences on the RMB exchange rate.
In Chapter 12, Kevin Zhang ponders differences in industrial goods production 
and industrial competitiveness, in a comparative study of China’s changing 
industrial strength. A UN Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) dataset 
of industrial competitiveness indicators provides the basis for assessing China’s 
relative total and per capita international strength in production and exports of 
manufacturing value added over time. 
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Zhang finds that China has come a long way in terms of capacity and intensity. 
China’s industrial intensity now exceeds that of some industrialised economies, 
but it has a long way to go in quality. Similarly, since much of the progress 
in industrial capacity and intensity was driven by foreign-invested firms and 
processing trade, China has a long way to go to reach its goal of more indigenous 
industrial strength.
In Chapter 13, Mei (Lisa) Wang, Zhen Qi and Jijing Zhang draw our attention to 
the massive rise in China’s outbound investment activity. Of the four phases of 
China’s outbound investment development, the first two cover the years 1980–
2000, and were of modest dimension. Since 2002, however, official statistics 
suggest that China’s outbound investment has increased 45 times, reaching 
US$116 billion in 2014. Since the GFC, average annual outbound foreign direct 
investment (FDI) has reached US$74 billion. 
Unlike China’s slowing ‘new normal’ domestic growth rate, the new normal 
for outbound investment carries annual growth projections in the range of 
20 per cent to 2020. Growth could be volatile. The scale of China’s investment is 
daunting. The unique and complicated institutional structure of China’s state-
owned enterprises present new and challenging territory for investor recipient 
countries. 
Chunlai Chen in Chapter 14 uses a provincial-level panel dataset and employs the 
fixed-effects model to investigate empirically the inter-regional spillovers from 
coastal FDI on inland provinces. The study finds that FDI in the northern and 
eastern coastal provinces (which are moderately engaged in processing trade) 
has positive spillovers on the economic growth of inland provinces, while FDI in 
southern coastal provinces (those heavily engaged in processing trade) has had 
a negative effect on the economic growth of inland provinces. The explanation 
for this could be that processing trade has no industrial linkages with inland 
regions and cannot generate backward and forward knowledge spillovers to 
firms in inland provinces. China should redesign processing trade policies to 
focus on increasing local sourcing and enhancing industrial linkages through 
economic structural reform and industrial upgrading.
In Chapter 15, Fan He and Xiaoming Pan shed light on the emerging complexities 
of fragmenting world trade negotiations. Ostensibly in direct response to 
the decade-long stalemate in the multilateral Doha negotiations of the WTO, 
selective country groupings have now initiated more exclusive mega-regional 
negotiations. The fragmenting of global trade with the rise of trade-in-parts 
makes old trade rules less relevant. China has joined the race to update 
international trade rules. The chapter reveals an absence of clarity in the goals 
of the race. Some of the proposed new arrangements, especially the US-led 
Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), appear designed to exclude China. 
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In Chapter 16, Lauren Johnston writes of the evolution of China–Africa 
economic ties over time. Explaining the interdependent trends in flows of trade, 
investment and aid, Johnston notes that while today China is Africa’s largest 
trading partner, China’s investment plans offer most insight into the direction 
of these ties.
As a result of China’s slower growth within its new model, there has been 
a dramatic decline in the price of many energy and metals commodities. 
For  commodities exporters in Africa, this means a painful readjustment. 
In contrast, for net commodities importers, China’s new model of growth is good 
news for the terms of trade. The chapter outlines how China plans to greatly 
increase investment in infrastructure, labour-intensive manufacturing and 
steelmaking in Africa. The precedents for sustainable growth across time and 
countries suggest that the prospects for growth of China’s outbound investment 
to facilitate industrialisation in Africa are especially important in coastal 
economies experiencing an improvement in terms of trade, such as Kenya and 
Tanzania.
In Chapter 17, Gao Xiang and Huiqin Jiang explore China’s new foreign 
investment legal regime, which took effect in September 2013. Changes to that 
regime centre on the China (Shanghai) Pilot Free Trade Zone (SPFTZ), and are 
part of China’s efforts to modernise the financial sector and to move closer to the 
industrial frontier. 
Innovations within the new investment law regime include the adoption of pre-
establishment national treatment, and a negative list. The latter has attracted 
significant attention, and includes gambling industries and a list of national 
products such as types of tea. The reporting and filing system for foreign investors 
has also been simplified. The new systems adopted in the SPFTZ for foreign 
investment differ greatly from those applied previously in China, demonstrating 
the Chinese Government’s efforts to integrate into the international economic 
market and adopt generally accepted international rules. 
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2. The New Model of Growth 
and the Global Resources 
Economy
Ross Garnaut1
We said in the introductory chapter to the 2013 China Update book that 
contemporary changes in economic policy and structure were so comprehensive 
and profound that they represented a new model of Chinese economic growth 
(Garnaut et al. 2013a). We called the volume China: A New Model of Growth and 
Development.
The new model had conventional economic and more subtle institutional 
dimensions. Cai Fang, Ligang Song and I (Garnaut et al. 2013b) and Huang et al. 
(2013) explored the former, and Dwight Perkins (2013) explored the institutional 
changes. 
We noted in 2013 that these changes in China would have large international 
consequences. The changes were particularly important for trade in resource-
based commodities. The old model of growth produced, in the world’s most 
populous country, the strongest, most resource-intensive economic growth the 
world has ever seen. This gave rise to the extraordinary resources boom of the 
early twenty-first century. This was of immense importance to development in 
Australia and many other resource-rich countries.
How is the new model going and how is its progress affecting the global resources 
economy? This chapter briefly explores the more straightforward economic 
dimensions of progress so far, and the impact of those changes on some aspects 
of global resources trade of importance to Australia. 
From old to new: The changing character 
of growth
The old model of economic development was built on high and rapidly 
increasing levels of investment, especially in industrial activity and urban 
infrastructure. It was supported by the movement of huge numbers of workers 
from the countryside to the towns and cities, allowing strong growth in urban 
1  I am grateful for research support from Ligang Song, Ran Li, Derek Cheng and Veronica Webster.
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employment with modest increases in real wages. With wages growing less 
rapidly than the value of output, the profit share of income rose continually, in 
turn supporting increases in savings. Much of the massive increase in savings 
was committed to investment, reinforcing the process of investment-led growth.
Investment-led growth was accompanied by relatively high total factor 
productivity (TFP) growth, encouraged by deep and deepening integration into 
the global economy. The internationally oriented growth saw China contributing 
the majority of the increase in world trade in the early twenty-first century, and 
a majority of the increase in the surplus of domestic savings over investment 
that was available for international investment. 
Chinese growth in the early twenty-first century was the most rapid over a 
sustained period in any country since modern economic growth emerged in the 
United Kingdom a quarter of a millennium ago. It was also the most investment 
intensive and therefore the most metals intensive and energy intensive the 
world has ever seen. 
The high investment share of expenditure in the reform era was reinforced by the 
Chinese policy response to massive recessionary shocks from abroad. The first 
of these was the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997–99 (McLeod and Garnaut 1998). 
The Chinese Government chose to maintain the exchange value of the renminbi 
(RMB) against the US dollar despite massive currency depreciation in all of 
its Western Pacific trading partners. To maintain a reasonable if diminished 
rate of growth in economic output, employment and incomes through a huge 
deceleration of export growth and fall in net exports, the authorities engaged 
in a large Keynesian monetary and fiscal expansion. The second shock was from 
the global financial crisis (GFC) of 2008. The immediate effects on China were 
even larger and potentially more destabilising than those of the Asian Financial 
Crisis. Again, the response was to maintain a fixed exchange rate against the US 
dollar despite large currency depreciation in other Western Pacific economies, 
and massive monetary and fiscal expansion to maintain growth in output and 
employment. Fiscal and monetary expansions were applied on a much larger 
scale in 2008–09 than during and after the Asian Financial Crisis. 
The Keynesian expansions of 1998–99 and 2008–09 were brilliantly successful in 
supporting the continuation of strong economic growth. They were implemented 
principally through expansion in the resources made available through state-
connected entities—through local, provincial and national governments as 
suppliers of infrastructure, and through state-owned enterprises (SOEs), which 
were disproportionately active in heavy industry—all drawing large amounts of 
finance from the state-owned banks. 
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The outcome was an intensification of the role of investment in the growth 
process. Investment is much more metals intensive and energy intensive than 
consumption, so development in the early twenty-first century and especially 
after the GFC further increased the extraordinary pressure that Chinese growth 
was placing on world energy and metals markets. 
The extraordinary rates, investment intensity, energy intensity and metals 
intensity of growth in the world’s most populous country generated the 
largest, longest and most broadly based increase in commodity demand that the 
world economy has ever experienced. Figures 2.1 and 2.2 illustrate how China 
contributed most of the strong increase in global demand from the beginning 
of the new century to 2011 for the energy source (thermal coal, Figure 2.1) 
and metal (steel, Figure 2.2) that were most important in Chinese growth. The 
central role of China was especially pronounced after the GFC, when growth in 
demand for energy and metals accelerated in China and decelerated in the rest 
of the world.
Figure 2.1 Coal consumption of China compared with other countries
Source: BP (2015); and author’s estimation.
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Figure 2.2 Steel consumption of China compared with other countries
Source: World Steel Association (2015); and author’s estimation.
The increase in China’s demand took suppliers of metals and energy by surprise. 
Investment in expanding mining capacity lagged a long way behind demand for 
all metals and major energy sources. Prices rose to or close to their highest levels 
ever in real terms (see Figures 2.3, 2.4 and 2.5 for thermal coal, oil and copper, 
respectively).
Figure 2.3 Thermal coal price index (US$/Mt; 2007 prices, 2007=100)
Note: FOB Newcastle/Port Kembla.  
Source: Index Mundi (2014). Reproduced from Garnaut (forthcoming 2015).
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Figure 2.4 Crude oil price index (US$/bbl; 2007 prices, 2007=100)
Source: Price data from World Bank and EIA; US goods deflator from IMF International Financial 
Statistics (2007$). Reproduced from Garnaut (forthcoming 2015).
Figure 2.5 Copper price index (US$/Mt; 2007 prices, 2007=100)
Source: Price data from London Metal Exchange via Datastream; US Goods Deflator from IMF 
International Financial Statistics (2007$). Reproduced from Garnaut (forthcoming 2015).
Two separate forces are driving the transition to the new model of economic 
growth. One is straightforwardly economic: pressures that emerge naturally 
from successful economic development. The other is the change in national 
objectives and policy, towards more equitable distribution of income and less 
damaging impacts on the domestic and international natural environment. 
The changes in objectives and policy are themselves partly a response to rising 
incomes, which reduce the priority of higher material living standards relative 
to other dimensions of the quality of life.
China’s Domestic Transformation in a Global Context
24
The economic pressures from successful development come from the raising 
of the wage at which people are prepared to leave the countryside for work 
in urban areas (Cai 2010; Garnaut 2010; Garnaut and Song 2006; Huang and 
Cai 2013; Huang and Jiang 2010). The movement of people from the countryside 
to urban employment reduces pressures on agricultural resources and raises 
rural material standards of living. The people who remain in rural villages after 
the early decades of rapid economic growth tend to have better opportunities 
at home and require greater inducements to migrate to the towns than those 
who went before them. To the extent that some of the fruits of economic 
development are allocated by government as transfers to rural residents and to 
rural services such as health, education, telecommunications and transport, the 
urban wage required to induce migration increases. A long history of fertility 
well below replacement levels eventually causes the number of new entrants 
into the labour force each year to fall. And the increase in urban demand for 
labour with sustained rapid growth increases demand for labour at a steady 
wage (Huang et al. 2013).
Scarcity of low-skilled labour and a tendency for wages to rise more rapidly 
than the value of output were evident in the major coastal cities from about 
2005 and became more widespread with each passing year until the disruption 
of the GFC. The tendency was broken briefly by the GFC, but returned late in 
2009 as the powerful monetary and fiscal expansion became effective. It has 
continued since then, despite the slowing of economic growth.
These pressures from the labour market began to force profound change in the 
composition and rate of growth. Sooner or later, they were bound to be associated 
with a rise in the consumption and fall in the savings and investment shares of 
national income. The reduction in the investment share of expenditure, in turn, 
could be expected to reduce the rate of growth of the capital stock and therefore 
the aggregate rate of growth. The rate of growth of the labour contribution fell 
to near zero with the stagnation and then decline of the working-age population 
from about 2012. The decline in the rate of growth in the capital and labour 
contributions might be expected to reduce over time the overall rate of growth 
by several percentage points, from about 10 per cent per annum to about 
7 per cent, and eventually lower still.
The changes in objectives and policy emerged gradually, but had taken full 
shape by 2012. Implementation of policy took longer but now has considerable 
momentum. 
The widening of the dispersion of income distribution was a source of comment 
and growing concern among economists and parts of the population and 
leadership from the early years of the century. Policies to increase rural incomes 
and services and to expand consumption especially of services were defined 
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and gradually strengthened throughout the Hu–Wen period of government. 
They were eclipsed during the slowdown after the GFC, but were back on the 
agenda by 2010 and were central in the Twelfth Five-Year Plan 2011–15. 
The energy-intensive pattern of growth of the early twenty-first century placed 
immense pressure on the global environment through growing greenhouse 
gas emissions. It was also causally important in the deterioration of air and 
water quality to an extent that was seriously damaging to human health and 
life expectancy. Both global and local environmental costs were especially high 
because of the exceptionally large role of coal as an energy source in power 
generation and industry. 
China contributed a majority of the global increase in greenhouse gas emissions 
through the first decade of the century. This attracted increasing disquiet within 
the Chinese scientific community, which had access to the premier and other 
leading policymakers. It also attracted critical comment from the governments 
of developed countries as the international community geared up for stronger 
action to mitigate human-induced climate change in the lead-up to and after the 
Copenhagen conference of the United Nations in December 2009. China made 
commitments on reductions in the emissions intensity of economic activity 
to the international community at Cancun in 2010 that required a substantial 
change in the structure of economic growth.
Concern over local environmental effects has risen in a number of steps since the 
GFC. The focus on dangerously high concentrations of small carbon particulates 
in the air in cities of eastern and northern China has intensified with scientific 
study of their effects on health and increasing attention in popular media 
(Chen et al. 2013). This has been a major focus of popular concern at least since 
early 2013 (Chai 2015). It has become a separate and powerful driver of policy 
to diminish the energy intensity of economic activity and the dominant position 
of coal in energy use. 
Official policy continues to elevate the priority of reductions in energy intensity 
and the substitution of all of the low-emission alternatives for coal. 
Smooth and rough adjustment
The new model of economic growth embodies structural change at an immense 
scale and pace.
One can define a possible path of smooth adjustment that would see rapid but 
gradual offsetting changes in the main growth parameters that together ensure 
the continuation of reasonably strong growth in output, employment and 
incomes of most people. But one can also identify the possibility of investment 
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falling more than consumption is rising and productivity failing to rise to 
compensate for lower contributions from other sources of growth in output and 
incomes. The latter possibility would involve disruption of growth in output and 
incomes. Disruption would introduce risks of financial or political dislocation, 
compounding the initial loss of growth momentum. 
Smooth adjustment would see the maintenance or even some acceleration of 
TFP growth as the contributions of growth in the capital stock and labour 
force declined. Rising real wages introduce pressure to raise productivity. 
There is an opportunity to lift productivity growth to an extent that 
moderates considerably the decline in the rate of output growth within the 
new development model. The  focus on improvement of the institutions for 
market regulation and exchange can raise productivity. The focus on increased 
investment in education within the new model of growth combines with the 
large decline in the school-age population to introduce prospects for greatly 
improved labour quality, which shows up as increased TFP. Success in raising 
productivity growth depends especially on the institutional reforms discussed 
by Perkins (2013) in his contribution to this series two years ago. It depends on 
maintenance of openness to the international economy in all of its dimensions. 
It requires far-reaching financial system reform to allow capital to move quickly 
and in large quantities to its most productive uses. Strong growth in TFP requires 
acceptance of rapid changes in the composition of economic activity in line with 
rapidly changing comparative advantage. It requires improvement of market 
institutions, including through increased transparency and reliability of state 
mechanisms for regulating legal relations between the state and private entities 
and among private businesses. These improvements require strengthening 
of rights to intellectual and real property. Success in maintaining and lifting 
productivity growth requires heavy investment in education and training. 
It requires easy and low-cost transfers of economic information within China 
and between Chinese and overseas individuals and enterprises. 
Adjustment to the new model of growth requires an absolute reduction in total 
investment and not just a fall in the investment share of expenditure. Changes 
in the required level of investment—and therefore demand for inputs into 
investment—depend not on the rate of growth in the economy, but on changes 
in the rate of growth. Here we have the old-fashioned Keynesian accelerator 
at work. The rate of growth of output is expected to fall by about one-third 
within the new model of growth—from about 10 per cent per annum to about 
7 per cent (and eventually to lower levels). In the absence of changes in the 
productivity-related influences that determine the capital–output ratio, the 
level of investment can be expected to fall by a similar proportion. Consumption 
has to rise quickly and by a large amount to maintain domestic demand that is 
consistent with maintenance of the new, lower potential rate of growth. 
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Smooth adjustment would see consumption rising as investment falls. 
Rising  consumption shares of a more slowly growing national output and 
income—reversing many years of falling consumption shares—could see the 
rate of growth in consumption remaining as strong or stronger than in earlier 
years under the old growth model. But the absence of timely and large increases 
in consumption introduces the risk of disturbingly large slumps in the growth 
of incomes, expenditure and output. 
The decline in the share and level of investment has massive effects on the 
inter-industrial structure of demand. In particular, investment uses metals and 
energy far more intensively than consumption, so that sharply lower investment 
means a slump in demand for the products of heavy industry that had central 
roles in the old model of growth. Coal and steel are the most prominent of 
the industries subject to lower demand growth—with coal being affected as 
well by the shift to low-emission sources of power generation that follows the 
elevation of environmental amenity among national objectives. The slowing 
rate of urbanisation after the turning period of Chinese economic development 
induces deceleration in growth in demand for all of the infrastructure required 
by a growing urban population, including housing and transport infrastructure. 
As with demand for investment goods, this induces an absolute fall in demand 
for many goods that occupied a large place within the old model of growth. 
This is an important part of the current anxiety about oversupply of housing in 
many Chinese cities—an oversupply that is transmitted with acceleration into 
supplying industries. 
The massive structural adjustment required by the new model of growth 
compounds risks of disruption that emerged in the mature stage of the old 
model of growth. The unprecedentedly high investment shares of gross domestic 
product (GDP) channelled disproportionately through state agencies led to 
overinvestment in some areas of heavy industry and infrastructure. Provincial 
and local government sponsorship of real estate developments in particular was 
associated with strong growth in revenue during the later years of the old model 
of growth. Financial institutions that had provided funds for infrastructure 
and heavy industry are vulnerable to the deterioration in the fortunes of these 
mainstays of the old growth model—as are provincial and local governments, 
whose revenues came to depend excessively on new urban development 
during the period of rapid, investment-led growth. The pullback in investment 
in urban development and heavy industry under the new model has led to 
severe imbalances in local government finances and vulnerability in the balance 
sheets of many financial institutions (Wong 2015; Yu 2009). Financial reform is 
necessary for success in transition to the new model of economic growth, but 
is inhibited by the fragility of financial institutions deriving from the lending 
patterns of the era of investment-led growth.
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The materialisation of severe macroeconomic or financial sector imbalances 
would affect the state’s capacity to implement in a timely way policies to secure 
transition to the new model of growth. The possibility of smooth adjustment is 
surrounded by risks of a much rougher ride. The large fall in real estate activity 
and therefore demand for steel and cement in early 2015 contain elements of 
temporary disruption on top of the tendencies to secular decline.
Changes in growth so far
These are early years in the change of policy in a great state and the change of the 
trajectory of economic development in an immense economy—now the world’s 
largest in purchasing power terms. The natural economic pressures driving 
the new model of growth have been working consistently since the recovery 
from the GFC in 2010. The policy changes have been applied in more and more 
areas since 2011. Anticipated changes in economic structure are apparent in the 
statistical record, but mostly weakly. 
Here I focus on the conventional economic dimensions of change. The qualitative, 
institutional changes required by the new model were emphasised in the 
elaborate decisions of the Third Plenum of the Eighteenth Central Committee in 
2013. They are being taken seriously, without so far being applied consistently 
and effectively. Institutional change takes time in the best of circumstances 
and it will be some years before sound judgments can be made about reform 
achievements in these areas. 
The rate of growth has slowed decisively—consistent with the requirements of 
the new model (Figure 2.6). Recent expressions of goals for the rate of growth 
by leading members of the government have gathered around 7 per cent with 
acknowledgement that outcomes may turn out to be weaker. Major easing of 
monetary policy so far in 2015 is directed at supporting growth near these 
levels, modest as they are by the standards of the reform era. 
Real wages rose well above output growth for the first time in 2009. Since then, 
wage growth has remained much stronger than output as the latter has eased in 
recent years.
The standard measure of inequality, the Gini coefficient, rose to a peak in 2008 
and has eased steadily, if slowly, since then (Figure 2.7). The change in trajectory 
of the Gini coefficient reflects the acceleration of increases in wages relative to 
output as well as the introduction of policies designed to reduce inequality.
The New Model of Growth and the Global Resources Economy
29
Figure 2.6 Real growth rate of GDP and wage of low-skilled workers
Note: Average wage in the construction industry is used as a proxy for that in low-skilled industries.  
Sources: IMF-IFS; National Bureau of Statistics.
Figure 2.7 Gini coefficient of China
Source: National Bureau of Statistics.
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The investment share of output continued to rise, to a peak of nearly 50 per cent 
in 2011, as the fiscal and monetary expansion in response to the GFC worked its 
way through the economy (Figure 2.8). This is extraordinarily high compared 
with the experience of China in earlier times and of other economies at any 
time. The consumption share fell to its lowest point a year or so before that 
(2009 for government and 2010 for household consumption) and has slowly 
lifted itself from the floor since then. The fall in the investment share and rise 
in consumption are in the directions suggested by the new model but so far are 
weak to the point of imperceptibility. 
Figure 2.8 Consumption and investment share of GDP
Source: National Bureau of Statistics.
The rapid increase in domestic expenditure in the recovery from the crisis was 
driven much more by investment than by consumption. This was the major 
influence behind the rapid reduction of China’s trade and current account 
surpluses through the post-2008 expansion (Figure 2.9).
So far, we have seen only a weak structural footprint from the new model 
of economic growth. This becomes clearer in Figure 2.10, which sets out 
The Conference Board’s Beijing estimates of the contributions of growth in the 
labour stock, capital stock and TFP so far this century.
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Figure 2.9 Trade balance and current account balance 
Source: World Bank (various years).
Figure 2.10 Contributions of components of GDP growth
Notes: All growth rates are calculated as the difference in the log of the levels of each variable. 
GDP is measured in constant 2012 US dollars. It is updated from 2005 Elteto-Köves-Szulc (EKS) 
procedure purchasing power parity (PPP) with GDP deflator changes. These 2005 EKS PPPs 
are from Penn World, which are benchmarked on 2005 PPPs from the International Comparisons 
Project (ICP) at the World Bank (2005).  
Source: The Conference Board (2014).
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The labour supply contribution to growth was small but positive early in the 
century and has since shrunk to negligible levels. That it remains slightly positive 
in the face of a declining population in the age cohorts that are conventionally 
considered to be the years of employment reflects some increase in labour force 
participation rates. 
The growth in the capital stock has been the major contributor to growth in 
output through this century so far, except in 2003. It reached a high plateau 
of about 7 percentage points’ contribution in 2006 and has remained there ever 
since. 
While quantitatively less important than the capital contribution to growth in 
all but one year, the increase in TFP has made contributions to growth that are 
exceptionally large by the standards of other countries. Or, more accurately, 
it has made exceptionally large contributions until recently. The contribution 
fell markedly after the GFC in 2008 to almost negligibly low levels in 2012, and 
disappeared in 2013. There has been no sign of a decisive lift since then.
So, economic development since 2011 has been characterised by greater reliance 
on increases in the capital stock than at any time in the reform period from 1978.
This is such a striking and important piece of information that it is worth being 
cautious about its use. The April 2015 World economic outlook of the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF 2015) examines on a global scale the powerful tendency 
for TFP growth to proceed at historically low rates in many countries and 
regions in the twenty-first century so far, and especially in the aftermath of the 
GFC (Figure 2.11). It calculates ‘growth potential’ for many countries and sets 
of countries, and analyses the respective contributions to that growth potential 
in the labour and capital stocks and TFP. It therefore undertakes a different but 
similar exercise to that of The Conference Board for China. 
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Figure 2.11 Contributions of components of potential output growth, 2006–14: 
Developed countries (per cent)
Source: IMF (2015).
Figure 2.12 Contributions of components of potential output growth, 2006–14: 
China (per cent)
Source: IMF (2015).
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Figure 2.13 Contributions of components of potential output growth, 2006–14: 
Other emerging market economies (per cent)
Source: IMF (2015).
The IMF’s conclusions for China are set out in Figure 2.12. They are similar 
to The Conference Board’s results in two respects and different in two. 
Like  The  Conference Board, the IMF attributes to capital a large and steady 
contribution to growth potential. Like The Conference Board, it attributes a 
large contribution to TFP growth early in the century, and sees that contribution 
declining sharply during and since the GFC. However, the IMF sees TFP 
continuing to make a substantial if falling contribution to growth of factor 
productivity. And the IMF sees the capital stock continuing to make the main 
contribution to growth potential, but not an overwhelming one.
Part of the difference between the IMF and The Conference Board calculations 
derives from one looking at potential growth and the other at actual growth. 
If actual growth falls below potential growth, the difference will come out in the 
calculations as a smaller contribution from productivity growth in the former 
but not in the latter. In addition, there are large measurement challenges in the 
calculation of growth in the capital stock and therefore in calculating TFP as a 
residual. Differences in assumptions about rates of depreciation of the capital 
stock can lead to large differences in measurement of the capital stock and 
inversely in large differences in productivity. 
We should not concern ourselves with details in the calculations. It is more 
useful to focus on the main general conclusions. The proportionate contribution 
of increase in the capital stock to growth was expected to decline over time 
within the new model of growth. To date, there is little sign of it having done so. 
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In a scenario of smooth adjustment to China’s new model of growth, steady or 
rising contributions from increased productivity could have offset a decline in 
the capital contribution. Here the evidence points to the reverse: since the GFC 
in 2008, productivity growth has declined markedly and economic growth is 
now more reliant than ever on growth in the capital stock.
We cannot avoid the conclusion that China so far has made little progress towards 
the macroeconomic structural changes that are necessary for success. Most of 
the structural change required within the new model of growth lies ahead.
The recent IMF report provides some global perspective on the recent decline 
in total productivity growth in China. The productivity growth decline since 
the GFC is also significant in the developed countries (Figure 2.12; but the 
decline is larger when we go back to earlier years in the current century) and 
other ‘emerging market’ economies (Figure 2.13)—larger than it is in China. 
This adds another note of caution about the outlook for economic growth in 
China. Productivity growth everywhere faces stronger headwinds in the early 
twenty-first century, and especially since the GFC. Growth strategies that rely 
on return to rates of productivity growth of earlier years could turn out to be 
impractical. China may have to make the structural changes required for the 
new model of development with lower overall rates of growth than would once 
have been expected and that would be helpful to smooth adjustment.
Effects on the global resource sector so far
The period in which China’s growth dominated world demand for energy and 
metals and lifted global commodities prices to unprecedented levels has come to 
an end. The end of the era is most decisive for commodities for which production 
or use has large negative effects on local and global environmental amenity. 
The end of the era is illustrated in Figures 2.1 (coal) and 2.2 (steel). China accounted 
for most of the global increase in demand for coal and steel from early in the 
century and more than the whole from the GFC of 2008 until 2011. By 2011, 
China accounted for close to half of global use of each of these commodities. 
Chinese demand growth for both commodities decelerated sharply in 2012 and 
2013, and became negative in 2014. This caused growth in global demand for 
both commodities to turn negative in 2014.
The reduction of the local and global environmental impact of Chinese economic 
growth has been assisted by the structural changes associated with the new 
model of growth. The greater immediate effects, however, have come from 
the focus on environmental priorities in the new model of growth, and from 
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transitional adjustment challenges left over from the old growth model. The main 
contributions from the new model of growth lie ahead, as the diminution of the 
investment share of expenditure gathers pace. 
Many elements of Chinese policy aimed at directly changing the relationship 
between economic growth and pressure on the natural environment have been 
introduced since 2011. Many policy interventions have had multiple objectives: 
to reduce Chinese dependence on potentially unreliable external sources of 
resource supply; to moderate the huge deterioration in Chinese terms of trade 
between 2003 and 2011; to reduce and then reverse the deterioration of local 
air and water quality and so to diminish detrimental impacts on health and 
longevity; to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and therefore to contribute to 
the global effort to mitigate climate change; and, in a world in which ‘green’ 
outcomes are going to be increasingly important in future, to establish China 
as a competitive supplier of the capital goods and services that will become 
important in the emerging global economy.
All of these causal influences have been at work for coal and several of them for 
steel. 
The moderation in growth and then decline in demand for coal began with 
commitments to reduce the intensity of economic activity from 2006. This goal 
was strengthened as a commitment to reduce energy intensity of economic activity 
by an average of 4 per cent per annum in the Twelfth Five-Year Plan. The energy 
intensity of economic output fell at an increasing rate in each year from 2011, 
reaching nearly 5 percentage points in 2014. Chinese developments within the 
old growth model used energy with unusual profligacy. The  improvements 
in energy efficiency since the GFC are part of a global tendency but go well 
beyond developments elsewhere because they are correcting earlier excesses. 
The reduction in energy intensity in China in recent years has proceeded more 
rapidly than in any other economy. 
The developments in the electricity sector are particularly important. Electricity 
demand grew more rapidly than economic output through the first decade of the 
century. Growth in economic activity has run ahead of demand for electricity 
since then. In 2014, when economic output increased by 7.4 per cent, demand 
for electricity grew by only 3.8 per cent. The whole of the diminished demand 
growth plus several percentage points of total electricity supply came from zero-
emissions sources: in diminishing quantitative order, hydro-electricity, wind, 
nuclear and solar (Table 2.1). Growth in solar electricity supply has been most 
rapid from a base near zero four years ago. The absolute contribution of solar to 
the increase in electricity supply was similar to wind and nuclear in 2014, and 
is set to exceed them in the years immediately ahead. 
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Table 2.1 Electricity generation by source, 2010–14
Quantity (million Mwh)
Year Total Thermal Hydro Nuclear Wind Solar
2010 4,228 3,416 687 75 49 0
2011 4,731 3,900 668 87 74 1
2012 4,986 3,925 856 98 103 4
2013 5,372 4,222 892 112 138 9
2014 5,550 4,205 1,070 126 156 23
Rise over previous year (%)
Year Total Thermal Hydro Nuclear Wind Solar
2010 14.9 13.4 20.1 6.7 78.9 74
2011 11.9 14.2 –2.7 16.7 49.9 459
2012 5.4 0.6 28.1 12.7 39.1 412
2013 7.7 7.6 4.2 14.3 34 125
2014 3.3 –0.4 20 12.5 13 156
Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China and China’s National Energy Administration.
Thermal electricity output fell in 2014. Within the diminishing total, the share 
of zero-emission (biomass) and low-emission (gas) sources of thermal electricity 
rose rapidly from a low base. Thermal coal consumption fell by 2.9 per cent. 
The early months of 2015 have seen an accelerated decline in thermal power 
generation from coal. Thermal coal use was 10 per cent lower in the March 
quarter than in the corresponding period of the previous year. Chinese imports 
of coal, which became the largest in the world through the period of strong, 
energy-intensive growth, fell by 42 per cent in the first quarter of 2015 compared 
with the previous year. 
Many and varied policy interventions have been applied to moderate demand 
for electricity and to shift supply away from use of coal. The most powerful early 
interventions were regulatory: the forced closure or transformation of facilities 
that failed to meet increasingly high emissions standards. Propaganda played 
an important role in changing behaviour. Many subsidies for production and 
use of low-emission technologies were influential. Increased taxes and reduced 
subsidies on fossil fuels had large effects. 
For the future, the government has heralded a shift towards greater reliance on 
market-based mechanisms. It has announced that the pilot emissions trading 
schemes in five cities and two provinces will be merged into a national emissions 
trading scheme from 2016. Regulatory interventions, taxes and subsidies are 
likely to remain important in maintaining momentum in the transformation of 
the local and global environmental impact of the Chinese energy sector. 
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Steel demand also decelerated markedly from 2012. It fell absolutely in 2014, 
and again in the first quarter of 2015. Production has also fallen but by smaller 
amounts as part of the Chinese supply has been exported with losses by the 
steelmaking enterprises. 
For steel, the long-term structural effects of the new model of growth are 
large, but have been eclipsed for the time being by more immediate challenges. 
Steel  demand has been affected powerfully by the cutback in infrastructure 
and real estate investment in response to oversupply and the associated fragility 
of financial institutions. The focus on environmental amenity, especially near 
the great urban regions of coastal China—Beijing–Hebei–Tianjin, Shanghai–
Jiangsu–Zhejiang and the Pearl River Delta—has led to early closure of many 
steelmaking facilities. The effects of reduced investment shares of output lie 
ahead.
The deceleration of growth in Chinese steel demand after 2011, and the absolute 
decline in 2014 and early 2015, has been the main factor behind the absolute 
fall in global steel demand since 2012 (Figure 2.2). Chinese steel demand can be 
expected to continue to fall with the investment share of expenditure within 
the new model of growth. Production of new steel and demand for primary 
steelmaking raw materials can be expected to fall more rapidly than steel 
demand, as the proportion of scrap available as an input into steel production 
rises towards the normal levels of the developed countries with the maturation 
of Chinese development.
Global supply of energy and metals was slow to recognise and then respond to 
the acceleration of Chinese demand growth from the beginning of the century. 
That contributed to the extraordinary increase in global prices for almost all 
metals and energy. Global supply eventually responded to higher prices and 
prospects for increased demand; but the largest expansion in supply, from 2011, 
coincided with the deceleration of and then decline in Chinese demand.
The global price profiles for coal, oil and copper in Figures 2.3, 2.4 and 2.5 are 
similar to those for nickel, iron ore, gas and most other commodities: sharp 
increases from 2003 to the eve of the GFC in 2008; large falls in late 2008 and 
2009; a rise to near or beyond pre-GFC heights in 2010 and 2011; and declines 
from 2011 with the coincidence of deceleration of demand growth in China and 
increased global supply. The global resources industries are left with a problem 
of oversupply and the challenge of adjustment of historic dimension.
China, like other resource-importing countries, has benefited from oversupply of 
metals and energy through a large improvement in its terms of trade. Continued 
gains from this source will ease the costs of adjustment to the new model of 
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growth. Low and declining prices can be expected to continue until enough old 
or new supply capacity has been removed to establish a global balance between 
supply and demand at a lower level of Chinese demand. 
The improvement of Chinese terms of trade since 2011 has already been of large 
dimension and has further to go. It is the other side of the coin to the large fall 
in the terms of trade, adjustment challenges and setbacks to economic growth 
in resource-exporting countries. Australia has been experiencing slow growth 
in incomes and employment since Chinese demand and global prices for metals 
and energy began to fall in 2011, and will be grappling with the consequences 
of the end of the resources boom for many years (Garnaut 2013). Indonesian 
policy dampened the supply response to the higher metals and energy prices for 
all commodities except coal, but the supply response in coal was strong enough 
to leave the country with a major adjustment problem in the aftermath of the 
boom (Garnaut forthcoming 2015). Johnston has drawn attention to the sharp 
deceleration of growth in West African countries with the fall in export prices 
for metals and energy (Johnston this volume). 
China’s increased prominence in the global economy in the twenty-first century 
has made adjustment to its new model of growth a major challenge for the rest 
of the world.
The prospects for Chinese growth and the 
global resources sector
The lower rates of growth in China since 2011 seem to reflect the effects of 
structural problems inherent in the old model of growth as much or more than 
the effects of transition to the new model of growth. While the long, upward 
movement in the investment share of output and the fall in the consumption 
share have been brought to an end, the reversal of the old trends has barely 
begun. While the upward adjustment in domestic expenditure relative to 
income has secured the necessary moderation of the immense pre-crisis trade 
and current account surpluses, it did this through increasing investment more 
than consumption. There has been considerable moderation in investment in 
industries excessively favoured by the old model of growth—so far without 
significant moderation of overall rates of investment. And the large decline 
in productivity growth is reducing the prospects for the eventual decline in 
the capital contribution to growth being substantially offset from this source, 
at least in the early stages of transition.
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China has made a start on the transition to its new model of growth. It has made 
a big start in reduction of the environmental impact of economic growth; but all 
elements of transition have a long way to go. 
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This chapter makes a strong case for Chinese monetary policy easing, contributing 
to the debate over whether China’s latest monetary policy shift is warranted and 
desirable. Chinese monetary policy was excessively tight in 2014 but started 
loosening more meaningfully from late 2014, in an attempt to cushion growth, 
facilitate rebalancing, support reform and mitigate financial risk. 
There are three main reasons justifying this shift in monetary policy stance. 
First, there is evidence that the Chinese economy has been operating below 
its potential capacity. Second, among the big-five (G5) economies, both China’s 
monetary policy stance and its broader financial condition tightened the most in 
the wake of the global financial crisis (GFC). This weighed on Chinese domestic 
demand. Third, a mix of accommodative monetary policy and neutral fiscal 
policy would serve China the best now, as the country opens up its capital 
account and moves away from its dollar peg, while restructuring its local 
government finance. 
However, such a warranted shift in monetary policy faces challenges of uncertain 
potential growth, a more liberal financial system, an evolving monetary policy 
framework, a legacy of excess leverage and a politicised policy debate.
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. Section two highlights the two 
competing schools of thought in the heated debate over Chinese monetary policy 
that took place in mid-2014. Sections three to five lay out the three arguments 
for monetary policy easing: a Taylor rule perspective, a global perspective 
and an optimal monetary policy mix perspective. Section six concludes, 
suggesting that a timely and sensible monetary accommodation could be the 
best course of policy action for China in terms of growth, reform, rebalancing 
and financial stability.
1  The views expressed in this chapter are those of the author only and not of the affiliated institutions. 
The author wishes to acknowledge Warren Lu for his excellent research assistance. Any errors are mine.
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The Chinese monetary policy debate
Monetary policymaking can be tough and controversial, as illustrated by 
discussions about whether and how the European Central Bank (ECB) ought 
to pursue quantitative easing (Claeys et al. 2014), and whether and when the 
US Federal Reserve (US Fed) should start normalising. 
Similar discussions started heating up in mid-2014 about China’s monetary 
policy stance (Ma 2014a). They centred on whether Chinese monetary policy 
was excessively tight at that time and thus ought to ease in a timely and 
meaningful way. From late 2014, the People’s Bank of China (PBC) started to act 
more decisively to ease its monetary policy—most notably, its three rate cuts 
and another broad reserve requirement ratio (RRR) cut during late 2014 and 
early 2015. Did the PBC make a big policy mistake, perhaps by succumbing to 
political pressure from vested interests? The short answer is no, and the rest of 
this chapter will make a case for Chinese monetary accommodation. 
This policy debate also broadened, sometimes in a confusing manner, to 
encompass the related question of whether China should persist with painful 
but eventually rewarding economic reform or ease monetary policy to stabilise 
growth. 
There are two views on this (Sina Finance 2014). One camp believes that monetary 
accommodation hampers economic reform, worsens structural imbalances in the 
Chinese economy and promotes unsustainable short-term pseudo-growth at the 
expense of sustainable long-term development. This camp’s main arguments 
appear to be that reforms and structural adjustments are necessarily painful and 
that the recent economic slowdown is simply structural and healthy. According 
to this view, demand-side factors matter little in the recent Chinese growth 
slowdown. Thus, an accommodative monetary policy is unwarranted and at 
odds with reform and restructuring. Instead, monetary easing is not only a show 
of no confidence in reform but also an attempt to sabotage reform. In short, no 
pain, no gain. 
The less ideologically driven argument points to a still buoyant Chinese labour 
market in spite of weaker growth as evidence of an economy near its lower 
growth potential. A shrinking Chinese labour force, a possible Lewis turning 
point, a bigger job-intense service sector and the attendant slower total 
productivity growth might all combine to trim underlying growth potential 
consistent with non-inflationary full employment (Ma et al. 2012). Therefore, 
slower headline gross domestic product (GDP) growth can still be compatible 
with an economy operating at or near full capacity, questioning any need for 
monetary accommodation. Such concerns are valid and will be addressed in 
this chapter.
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The opposite, pro-easing camp thinks that sensible, nimble monetary easing 
complements economic reform, cushions growth, facilitates structural adjustment 
and mitigates financial risk. Reform, while imperative, is not a sacred cow but 
a means to improve living standards for the majority of the Chinese population. 
And economic reform calls for a sensible shift in the monetary policy stance in 
response to business cycles. The Chinese economy is unbalanced, but one does 
not need to strangle it in order to rebalance it. On the contrary, an excessively 
tight monetary policy could aggravate structural imbalances.
According to the easing camp, the Taylor rule, the global beauty contest of 
monetary easing among the G5 central banks—the US Fed, the PBC, Bank of 
Japan (BoJ), ECB and Bank of England (BoE)—and the Mundell–Fleming model 
all suggest an excessively tight monetary policy stance for most of 2014, and 
thus a need for a meaningful Chinese monetary relaxation. Both cyclically 
and structurally, the case for timely and measured monetary accommodation 
is compelling. 
This controversy in China looks odd, especially when viewed through the lens 
of the United States, the euro area and Japan, where the consensus view among 
policymakers is that aggressive demand-support policy measures and strong 
structural reforms on the supply side should go hand-in-hand. And why not? 
The puzzling question is why one should have to make a stark choice between 
them instead of sensibly combining the two. A healthy Chinese economy needs 
both structural reforms on the supply side to enhance potential growth and 
a nimble monetary policy to exploit potential and mitigate possible cyclical 
headwinds on the demand side.
It is important to note that this debate takes place in a wider domestic and 
international context that includes issues such as diverging global monetary 
policies, volatile cross-border capital flows, slower domestic economic growth, 
falling domestic inflation, painful economic rebalancing, a gathering pace 
of financial liberalisation, signs of increased financial stress and an evolving 
monetary policy framework. So we first briefly sketch this background before 
discussing the debate itself.
After three decades of double-digit growth from 1980 to 2010, the Chinese 
economy embarked on a transition to a new phase of its development in the 
wake of the GFC (Ma et al. 2012). This transition features a slower pace of 
growth, a shrinking current account surplus and a service sector in the process 
of catching-up. GDP growth slowed from 10 per cent averaged during 2000–10 
to 8 per cent during 2011–14, and is expected to decelerate further, to 7 per cent 
in 2015, while the current account surplus fell from 10 per cent of GDP in 2007 
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to 2 per cent in 2014. Such external rebalancing is attained mostly through an 
even more lopsided internal imbalance of a higher investment ratio and rising 
leverage. 
In the midst of the heated monetary policy debate, the PBC, since mid-2014, 
has started loosening its monetary policy, initially tentatively and then more 
forcefully. Is such a policy shift warranted and desirable? I will make a strong 
case for meaningful Chinese monetary easing based on the following three 
arguments. 
First, the standard Taylor rule suggests an excessively tight Chinese monetary 
policy stance for most of 2014. Second, after the GFC, the PBC’s monetary policy 
stance tightened the most among the G5 central banks, and Chinese financial 
conditions also became most restrictive among these economies. Third, the 
classical Mundell–Fleming model suggests a sensible mix of accommodative 
monetary policy and neutral fiscal policy, as China is moving towards greater 
currency flexibility, incremental capital opening and tighter local fiscal 
conditions. 
A Taylor rule perspective
First, we look at the case for monetary easing in terms of inflation, output 
and financial stability objectives within the standard Taylor rule framework. 
There is broad consensus among economists that Chinese growth has been 
losing momentum in recent years (Figure 3.1). There have been clear signs of 
rising inventories, slumping property sales, falling consumer price index (CPI) 
inflation, deepening producer price deflation, weakening corporate earnings, 
slowing investment and anaemic industrial production. Fortunately, private 
consumption is still holding up—but just barely—and could show early 
signs of weakening. If anything, some market commentators even suspect that 
the Chinese official headline GDP numbers overstate the underlying growth 
momentum (Nakamura et al. 2015). 
An immediate question therefore is if Chinese monetary policy was too tight for 
most of 2014, relative to what was it too tight? 
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 Inflation rates (YoY %) Industrial profit and inventory (YoY %)
Figure 3.1 Chinese inflation, industrial profit and inventory
Source: CIEC. 
As a starting point, most economists and central bankers use the well-known 
Taylor rule to assess the central bank’s policy stance (Taylor 1993). A standard 
Taylor rule essentially links a short-term nominal policy rate to two gaps for a 
given inflation target and real long-run equilibrium interest rate consistent with 
trend growth: the gap between actual and targeted inflation (‘the inflation gap’) 
and the gap between actual and potential output (‘the output gap’). A positive 
output or inflation gap, or both, suggests a need to tighten by hiking the policy 
rate. If the actual policy rate is below that implied by the Taylor rule, the policy 
stance is considered too accommodating. If the actual policy rate is above that 
implied by the Taylor rule, the policy stance is considered too restrictive. 
In reality, many factors help to shape this ‘Taylor rate’—hence the controversy in 
China over how tight the PBC’s monetary policy was before the latest monetary 
relaxation. In light of this, three useful questions can be highlighted. What 
weight does the PBC attach to inflation? Has the Chinese economy been operating 
near full capacity? How should one gauge the PBC’s monetary policy stance? 
First, how important is inflation relative to other policy objectives? The PBC is 
officially not of inflation targeting type, flexible or otherwise. The 1994 Chinese 
central bank law explicitly stipulates four policy objectives for the PBC: price 
stability, employment, economic growth and balance of payments. In practice, 
financial stability and credit allocation are also high on the PBC’s agenda. 
However, Girardin et al. (2014) estimate the PBC’s monetary policy reaction 
function and conclude that inflation has been given greater weight relative to 
output from the 2000s. This was more so after the start of Zhou Xiaochuan’s 
governorship of the PBC in 2001. 
Chinese CPI inflation fell noticeably—from an average 2.5 per cent in 2013 to 
2.2 per cent in the first half of 2014, and to 1.8 per cent in the second half of 2014, 
below the official 2014 target of 3.5 per cent. It even sank to about 1 per cent in 
the first quarter of 2015—the lowest level in five years. Retail prices also paint 
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a broadly disinflationary picture. Producer prices have even registered outright 
and persistent deflation for more than two years (Figure 3.1). The pronounced 
disinflationary pressure emerged well before the collapse of international oil 
prices starting from the third quarter of 2014. Inflation in China is probably 
now too low for comfort. According to the Taylor rule, therefore, the PBC ought 
to ease monetary policy, all other things being equal.
Indeed, the intensified disinflation or even outright deflation pressure since 
early 2014 helped push up real interest rates even as the nominal policy rate 
stood still at a time of weakening growth. The first half of 2014 even witnessed 
rising nominal Chinese government bond yields. One can debate whether the 
deflation pressure is good or bad, but by doing nothing the PBC would imply 
a de facto tightening of its monetary policy, which might have contributed to 
slower economic growth on the demand side beyond what is justified by the 
structural trends on the supply side. 
Second, is the Chinese economy operating near full employment or potential? 
This is a tricky question. The recent economic slowdown might simply 
reflect lower potential growth, which could arise from rebalancing pains, 
demographic headwinds, less low-hanging fruit in market liberalisation and a 
less accommodating global economy (Ma et al. 2012). Unfortunately, Chinese 
growth potential, while likely trending lower, is not directly observable, and 
estimates of it can be elusive and have big margins of error (Blagrave et al.  2015; 
Ma  and Hong 2015; Morley 2014). Some Chinese labour statistics seem to 
suggest that employment has held up well, as wages are still rising. Thus, weaker 
growth might not necessarily imply a widening negative output gap and rising 
unemployment, and hence there would be no case for policy easing.
In the absence of more consistent, reliable and accurate estimates of the 
underlying Chinese potential growth rate, what can help inform us about the 
likely output gap? The persistent and intensifying disinflationary and even 
deflationary pressures at a time of marked deceleration of economic growth 
are the most telling signs that the Chinese economy is operating well below 
its potential capacity. It adds to the already high real corporate debt burden, 
especially for Chinese manufacturing borrowers.
Nevertheless, rapid wage hikes and an apparent lack of corporate pricing power 
could also combine to hurt corporate earnings, resulting in declining returns on 
capital and thus weaker private investment spending. Rising real interest rates 
will tend to punish the most productive and interest rate-sensitive sector in 
the Chinese economy—small, private firms—as well as consumers. Thus, lower 
rather than higher nominal and real interest rates are warranted.
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Moreover, it is not clear whether the reported buoyancy of the headline Chinese 
job market is mainly in the unskilled segment or the broader labour market. 
Labour market data are known to be the weakest link in Chinese statistics 
(Amstad et al. 2014; Ma et al. 2012). In addition, the starting salary for Chinese 
university graduates has been stagnant in recent years. Further, the latest 
Chinese Purchasing Manager Index (PMI) employment subindex shows early 
cooling signs in the labour market. In fact, the first quarter of 2015 saw a sharp 
slowdown in new non-farm jobs. One might reasonably expect a much softer 
Chinese labour market for the rest of 2015. Therefore, monetary policymakers 
ought to anticipate rather than wait, as it takes a few quarters for monetary 
policy actions to affect the labour market. 
Whichever way one argues, slower potential economic growth should ultimately 
point to a lower real equilibrium or natural rate of interest, as assumed by the 
Taylor rule. Yet, oddly, what we witnessed was rapidly rising real borrowing 
costs for Chinese firms and home buyers amid slowing growth, until the PBC 
acted more decisively to ease its policy stance from late 2014 (Figure 3.2). 
This  rise in the ‘risk-free’ interest rate was the combined result of falling 
inflation and rising government bond yields: between 2012 and mid-2014, the 
10-year Chinese government bond yield rose from 2.5 per cent to 4.5 per cent, 
as CPI fell from 4 per cent to 2.5 per cent. Therefore, a less stringent monetary 
policy stance is called for, whether the recent growth slowdown is structural or 
cyclical. 
 Real GDP growth rate (YoY %) Real Chinese treasury yields (%) 
Figure 3.2 Real Chinese GDP growth and government bond yields
Sources: Bloomberg and CEIC. 
In short, on the grounds of both the inflation gap and the output gap, the Taylor 
rule recommends a shift towards a less restrictive monetary policy stance. 
This case would have closed, unless financial stability concerns rank higher 
on the PBC’s agenda. An interest rate that is too low could fuel unsustainable 
shadow banking expansion, excess leverage and asset price booms. China has 
experienced a massive credit binge since 2007, with total credit to the non-
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financial private sector, including the rapidly expanding shadow banking sector, 
rising from 120 per cent of GDP in 2007 to 180 per cent in 2014 (Figure 3.3). 
If central and local government debts are included, the overall leverage in China 
could approach 250 per cent of GDP. Thus, an excessively loose monetary policy 
could potentially add to the already growing financial imbalances. 
Nevertheless, excessively tight monetary conditions could also run the risk of 
disorderly deleveraging. First, our knowledge about the effects of monetary 
policy on financial stability is still limited, which may involve complex 
dynamics of intertemporal cost–benefit trade-offs (Ajello et al. 2015; Svensson 
2015). Second, macro-prudential measures rather than monetary policy might 
be a better instrument to deal with financial stability issues in most cases (Claeys 
and Darvas 2015). Third, as nominal GDP slowed from the 15–20 per cent 
range in the 2000s to some 10 per cent this decade and below 8 per cent lately 
(Figure  3.3), an excessively restrictive monetary policy could aggravate the 
already rising debt-service pressures rather than mitigating them and indeed 
could instigate a dangerous debt deflation spiral. 
In any case, while the standard Taylor rule is silent on the weight placed on 
financial stability relative to that on both output and inflation, the increased 
financial stress, as witnessed by rising non-performing loans, more credit events 
and increased last-minute bailouts of troubled borrowers, intuitively calls for a 
more accommodative monetary policy to assist the tricky deleveraging process. 
Sticking to a tight policy in the face of increased financial fragility makes little 
sense. 
 Annual GDP growth (%) Non-financial private sector debt (% of GDP) 
Figure 3.3 Nominal and real GDP growth and private-sector debt in China
Sources: BIS and CEIC. 
Third, how can one tell whether the PBC has in fact loosened its stance or 
not? Gauging the Chinese monetary policy stance is far from straightforward 
(Girardin et al. 2014; Ma et al. 2012). Essentially, the PBC has pursued a three-
pronged target of money supply, interest rate and exchange rate, defying any 
simple interpretation of its policy stance. Also, in contrast with most central 
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banks in advanced economies, its policy rate is but one of many instruments 
in the PBC’s toolkit. The PBC traditionally deployed multiple tools, including 
window guidance, soft loan quotas, regulatory rules, reserve requirements, 
issuance of PBC bills, open market operations, relending and interest rates, both 
market and administered—the interactions of which could reinforce or offset 
the policy effect (Ma et al. 2012).
Moreover, for most of 2014, the PBC shunned most of its traditionally favoured 
instruments and instead experimented with new policy tools. It suspended new 
issuance of PBC bills altogether from the end of 2013, stopped conducting regular 
open market operations for more than a year, and tested a few new weapons in 
its arsenal—probably in an attempt to influence market-based interest rates in 
an environment of volatile two-way capital flows and more liberalised interest 
rates.2 The pros and cons of these new instruments aside, most PBC watchers 
find it harder than before to read its underlying monetary policy stance. 
Further, the PBC often communicates its policy stance in a confusing manner. 
Its policy statements are opaque and difficult to decode even for seasoned PBC 
watchers. The PBC has a history of intentionally surprising and sometimes even 
misleading the market, which should be taken as a sign of low confidence on 
the part of the Chinese central bank. While many Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) central banks now provide ‘forward 
guidance’ to reinforce and amplify the impact of monetary policy on the full 
market yield curve, by communicating to the public about the expected future 
path of the policy rate, the PBC often appears to dilute what it has just done, by 
issuing puzzling ‘backward guidance’, cautioning the market not to interpret 
its latest rate and RRR cuts as monetary easing (Ma 2015).
Nevertheless, the signs of monetary easing since mid-2014 have been numerous 
and beyond doubt. Initially, the PBC selectively lowered its RRR and extended 
loans to small banks and policy banks via its refinancing facilities. It has even 
leaned on commercial banks to lend more to first-time homebuyers at official 
mortgage rates. Liquidity has also been injected via its new facilities in an 
apparent attempt to keep a lid on interbank interest rates. From late 2014, the 
PBC finally acted more decisively, by cutting outright benchmark bank deposit 
and lending interest rates as well as the RRR. Some of these belated moves aimed 
to offset the tighter domestic liquidity arising from increased dollar outflows 
and thus may not be as expansionary as they look. Nevertheless, in combination, 
these moves must be interpreted as meaningful monetary relaxation.
2  The PBC has in less than two years introduced and tested a number of new policy instruments, such 
as ‘short-term liquidity operations’, the ‘standing lending facility’, ‘medium-term lending facility’, 
‘pledged supplementary lending’ and ‘pledged relending’. A detailed discussion of the pros and cons 
of these new tools is beyond the scope of this chapter.
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The PBC can be more forthright in communicating its desire to hit lower and 
steadier short-term or even mid-term rates, paving the way for the transition 
to a new monetary policy regime. A clear and firm PBC policy signal could 
also help flatten and stabilise the Chinese yield curve, which matters more for 
investment and consumption decisions. As a minimum, the PBC should avoid 
diluting the signalling effect of its own new policy moves.
Also, lowering the benchmark 18.5 per cent RRR would help nudge down 
long yields by adding permanent liquidity into the system and offsetting the 
tightening effect of the capital outflows seen in the fourth quarter of 2014 
and the first quarter of 2015, and would also go some way towards mitigating 
distortions and containing shadow banking by bringing some off-balance-sheet 
lending back onto the books. Failures to sterilise capital outflows would result 
in de  facto monetary tightening at a time of weakening growth and falling 
inflation. 
More importantly, by acting swiftly and decisively, the PBC can be in a stronger 
position to tighten again when the cycle turns. 
Monetary policy measures need to be taken early in order to counter the 
headwinds that the Chinese economy faces, because it typically takes two to 
four quarters for a change in policy stance to take effect. Indeed, timely policy 
response is the best way to avoid excessive monetary stimulus. Some academics 
and investors tend to underappreciate the fact that the mind-boggling credit 
binge in late 2008—mostly related to local government borrowing—was in 
part a poor response to the already emerging panic partially triggered by the 
late monetary policy actions at that time (Tanaka 2010). Much of this belated, 
massive monetary expansion funded quasi-fiscal spending rather than helping 
cushion the Chinese economy via standard channels, so this time, China ought 
to ease in a timely way. 
To sum up, in light of growth, inflation and financial stability, the standard 
Taylor rule suggests that China ought to ease its monetary policy in a timely 
and confident manner. 
A global perspective
So far, this chapter has made a domestic case for monetary relaxation, as the 
discussion has been framed mostly within a closed-economy version of the 
Taylor rule. Can a similar case be made for Chinese monetary relaxation from a 
global perspective? While China’s capital control still binds (Ma and McCauley 
2008, 2013) and central banks set monetary policy mainly to cater for domestic 
needs in most economies, the question is still meaningful, because China is the 
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top trader, second-largest economy and third-largest creditor nation globally. 
Of course, China, known for its export-led growth model, hardly qualifies as 
a closed economy. 
Reserve Bank of India Governor Raghuram Rajan recently raised concerns about 
the international spillovers from ‘competitive monetary easing’ among major 
central banks (Rajan 2014). Rajan’s concerns make sense. By definition, the 
world is a closed economy and is often dominated by a few major central banks 
that behave more like price setters than price takers. ‘Price’ in this context 
used to be some benchmark short rate only, but in the wake of the GFC it also 
included the fuller yield curve. Thus, strong policy measures taken by major 
central banks ought to produce global repercussions. 
This, in turn, poses the interesting question of how loose or tight China’s 
monetary policy might be relative to its major international peers. In particular, 
how did the PBC fare in the global race towards monetary accommodation after 
the GFC? Has the PBC outdone its global peers in the monetary loosening game? 
This is a question of global perspective, and there is no better benchmark than 
the club of the central banks that issue the four constituent currencies of the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) Special Drawing Rights (SDRs): the Fed, the 
ECB, BoJ and BoE. 
We know that most of these major central banks have substantially expanded 
their balance sheets in recent years (Iwata and Takenaka 2012). We also know 
that China has experienced a massive credit binge since 2007. However, to assess 
the relative monetary policy stances of these four major central banks and the 
PBC, we need to compare apples with apples more directly. 
One way to do so is to look at two key price indicators—the real policy rate and 
the real effective exchange rate—taking into account three considerations. First, 
the Taylor rule suggests that the real policy rate should relate to the deviation 
of actual from target inflation, the output gap and the short-term rate consistent 
with non-inflationary full employment. Second, the best measure of the global 
strength of a currency is the real effective exchange rate. Third, these two 
price indicators interrelate and define the two core aspects of a central bank’s 
monetary policy operations and stance. 
Both the real policy rate and the real effective exchange rate used here are ex 
post. I define the real policy rate as the policy rate less concurrent CPI inflation. 
I also use the CPI-based real effective exchange rate compiled by the Bank 
for International Settlements (BIS). To examine the relative monetary policy 
tightness of the G5 central banks since the GFC, I focus on the period between 
January 2007 and March 2014 before the PBC finally started easing and the 
US Fed hinted at normalising.
China’s Domestic Transformation in a Global Context
54
The left-hand panel of Figure 3.4 shows that all G5 central banks except the 
PBC have negative real policy rates. Indeed, the US Fed, the ECB and the BoE 
persistently maintained negative real policy rates during the period, financial 
repression or otherwise. Even the BoJ managed to push its real policy rate into 
negative territory after 2013, as inflation rose in the wake of its ‘quantitative and 
qualitative easing’. Some other central banks—the National Bank of Denmark, 
ECB and Swiss National Bank—even imposed outright negative nominal policy 
rates. In any case, China no doubt had the highest real policy rates among the 
five major central banks during this period. 
 Real policy ratesa Real effective exchange ratesb
 January 2007 = 100 Annual per cent
Figure 3.4 Real policy rates and real effective exchange rates for G5 central 
banks
a Policy rate less actual CPI inflation. The official ceiling for the one-year deposit rate is taken as the 
policy rate of the PBC.  
b CNY = Chinese renminbi; USD = US dollar; EUR = euro; JPY = Japanese yen; and GBP = British 
pound.  
Sources: Datastream and BIS.
Of course, unconventional monetary policy went one step further to influence 
the long end of the yield curve. The exchange rates of the big four SDR currencies 
were thus indirectly influenced. In China’s case, the PBC directly manages both 
its interest rate and its exchange rate, to some extent, given the still binding 
capital controls frustrating cross-border arbitrage (Ma and McCauley 2008, 
2013). Either way, the real effective exchange rate serves to highlight another 
important aspect of monetary policy; and sustained and large movements in 
currencies redistribute growth across the globe. 
The BIS real effective exchange rate data reveal that among the G5 currencies, 
only the Chinese renminbi (RMB) showed sizeable appreciation (35 per cent) 
from 2007 to mid-2014 (the right-hand panel of Figure 3.4). Meanwhile, 
the other four SDR member currencies (the dollar, euro, yen and sterling) had 
registered 5 per cent to 15 per cent real effective depreciation. Note that the yen 
appreciated noticeably between 2007 and 2012 until the start of the so-called 
‘Abenomics’, but by March 2014 had weakened by 30 per cent from its peak 
in 2011. Since mid-2014, the divergent monetary policies of major central 
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banks have led to broad and marked US dollar strength, pushing a still loosely 
dollar-anchored RMB even stronger in broad real effective terms (not shown in 
Figure 3.4). A much stronger and potentially overvalued RMB likely further 
redistributed growth away from China to the rest of the world. 
Therefore, both the real policy rate and the real effective exchange rate suggest 
that the PBC maintained the most restrictive policy stance among the G5 central 
banks after the GFC. Among them, the BoE appears to have pursued the most 
aggressive monetary easing to date, and the PBC was by far the most restrained, 
until it more decisively embarked on a cycle of monetary relaxation from 
mid-2014 and the US Fed stopped its asset purchases. 
What are the implications of a marked monetary tightening by the PBC relative 
to the four SDR central banks before its latest monetary policy shift? There are 
at least three as far as China is concerned. 
First, China bore the brunt of the global demand and current account rebalancing 
from 2007 to 2014. Both rising domestic real interest rates and a strengthening 
real effective exchange rate have produced considerable pressures on the twin 
external and internal rebalancing. This tighter Chinese monetary policy stance 
has no doubt added significant deflationary headwinds to a slowing Chinese 
economy already experiencing a rapidly shrinking current-account surplus 
(Ma et al. 2012) and a marked weakening in domestic demand. Indeed, such a 
rapid adjustment in the Chinese current account balance itself could have been 
one important factor behind China’s leveraging up in the past decade.
Second, this deflationary headwind was only partially countered by a massive 
credit binge that can be best viewed more as a quasi-fiscal stimulus than a proper 
monetary accommodation. China’s relative monetary tightening thus could have 
aggravated its domestic imbalance, because much of this de facto fiscal stimulus 
funded hasty investment projects often undertaken by local governments and 
state firms. A timely and measured shift towards monetary relaxation would 
better cushion growth through those more market-based, though sometimes not 
very smooth, transmission channels. 
Third, China’s relatively tight monetary policy has probably absorbed much of 
the international spillover from the competitive monetary easing implemented 
by other major central banks, by not adding to the massive global monetary 
stimulus. This should in turn help dampen the volatility of those highly 
pro-cyclical capital flows to emerging markets and ease the competitive 
devaluation pressure globally. China has so far endured external deflationary 
shocks, acting as a source of global financial stability.
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The bottom line is that in the wake of the GFC, the PBC’s stance was the most 
restrictive among the G5 central banks. In other words, the PBC was quite 
restrained, while the other big four central banks pursued more aggressive 
monetary accommodation. There is little doubt that the relatively tight Chinese 
monetary policy both redistributed global demand away from domestic to 
foreign products and weighed on Chinese domestic demand. Therefore, China 
ought to loosen its relatively tight monetary policy. 
This global comparative framework can be taken one step further through 
the construction of a broader financial conditions index (FCI) for the same G5 
economies and by asking whether China’s financial conditions will be another 
suspect contributing to its marked growth slowdown on the demand side. 
The rationale is that whether a given monetary policy stance will have a similarly 
meaningful effect on economic agents depends in part on the transmission 
channels. An expansionary monetary policy might or might not help deliver a 
more relaxed financial environment for business and consumers. 
Given a particular monetary policy stance, the functioning of a financial system 
itself matters for growth performance. Europe’s half-asleep banking sector 
is a case in point. If the recent Chinese economic slowdown was primarily 
structural, more lax financial conditions would not help and might even worsen 
the structural problems that dragged down economic growth in the first place. 
Indeed, China in the past few years has witnessed weaker growth and rising 
credit as a ratio to GDP, in contrast with a ‘credit-less recovery’ in the euro area 
(Darvas 2013). 
To this end, my proposed crude and simple FCI aims to capture the broader 
financial environment that could influence the behaviour of agents in the 
Chinese and big-four SDR economies, by focusing on the price aspect of the 
financial environment. It is a weighted sum of five key financial asset prices: 
policy rate, one-year treasury yield, 10-year treasury yield, effective exchange 
rate and benchmark stock market index. Higher readings denote tightness 
owing to the first three rates and the effective exchange rate, so I use the inverse 
of the stock market index to capture changes in equity prices. 
I place an equal weight of 20 per cent on each of the z-scores of these five financial 
prices. Thus, increases in interest rates, the effective exchange rate and the 
inverse stock market index all result in a rise in the FCI, indicating a tightening 
of financial conditions. As in the discussion of G5 central bank monetary policy, 
I will focus on the post-crisis period from January 2007 to March 2014 before 
the latest Chinese monetary easing. A positive FCI reading thus suggests tighter 
financial conditions than the period average, while a negative reading indicates 
loosening. I consider two versions of the FCI: one based on nominal interest 
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rates and the effective exchange rate, and the other on their real (ex post) 
counterparts. In this way, the Chinese FCI can be compared directly both over 
time and with its international peers, in real and nominal terms. 
The central message from these G5 FCIs is that China’s financial conditions 
tightened the most of the major economies from the start of the GFC (Figure 3.5). 
Also, China started with relatively lax financial conditions on the eve of the GFC, 
but post-2011 tightened considerably, at least until about mid-2014 when the 
PBC started loosening. In contrast, the financial conditions in the G4 generally 
became less stringent in the same period, as shown by both their nominal and 
their real FCIs. 
 Nominala Realb
 Weighted average of five z-scores Weighted average of five z-scores
Figure 3.5 Financial condition indices (FCI) for G5 economies
a A rise suggests tightening. A positive number indicates tighter than the sample average. The official 
ceiling for the one-year deposit rate is taken as the policy rate of the PBC. The benchmark stock 
market indices are Shanghai Stock Exchange Composite Index for China, S&P 500 for the United 
States, Nikkei 225 for Japan, FTSE 100 for the United Kingdom, and a market cap weighted average 
of CAC 40, DAX 30, IBEX 35, FTSE Mid and AEX (January 2007=100) for the euro area.  
b The real interest rate and exchange rate are nominal rates adjusted for current CPI inflation.  
Sources: Datastream; BIS and author’s calculation.
Moreover, all of the five asset prices underlying the Chinese FCI indicate an 
unmistakable financial tightening in this period: rising short and long-term 
interest rates, a strengthening RMB, and a languishing Shanghai stock market 
that lost 27 per cent of its value during this episode before its latest strong 
resurgence and stabilising government bond yields from the second half of 2014. 
Finally, the paths of the nominal and real FCIs have differed somewhat among 
these big-five economies in the post-2007 period, but all indicate tighter financial 
conditions in China over time and relative to its international peers between 
2007 and mid-2014. While the real FCIs of the five major economies have shown 
noticeable swings, their nominal counterparts, except China, display steady, 
large and synchronised declines, indicating considerable easing of the financial 
conditions outside China. 
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In sum, China’s financial conditions were clearly the most restrictive during 
2007–14 among the G5 economies. Intuitively, this revealed financial 
tightening—over  time and relative to its international peers—could have 
meaningfully weighed on China’s economy. Interestingly, our price-based FCI 
contrasts sharply with the observed Chinese credit surge in the wake of the GFC.
The tighter Chinese financial conditions could in part be policy-induced and 
in part relate to other institutional and fundamental changes in the Chinese 
economy, potentially contributing to slower economic growth. In any case, 
Chinese policymakers ought to take notice of such marked, sustained and 
broad-based tightness of the financial conditions. It would be very brave for 
anyone to claim that the tighter broad Chinese financial conditions had little 
to do with the recent Chinese economic slowdown. Suffice to say that a tighter 
broad financial environment tends to hurt private firms more and add to the 
financial woes of heavily indebted local governments in China. Therefore, as an 
insurance policy, China ought to ease its monetary policy.
Much more needs to be learned about the underlying causes of the more 
restrictive Chinese financial conditions against a background of falling growth 
and more liberal market environments. This task is beyond the scope of this 
chapter. For instance, a rigid 75 per cent regulatory cap on the bank loan-to-
deposit ratio and a punitive 20 per cent reserve requirement ratio might have 
added to financial tightness in the Chinese economy, prompting policymakers 
in Beijing to tweak these rules in an attempt to loosen the domestic financial 
conditions (Ma 2014b). Another, complementary possibility is that the PBC’s 
easing remained behind the curve, as indicated by the Chinese business cycle. 
All said, in the wake of the GFC, not only did the Chinese monetary policy stance 
tighten the most among the big-five central banks, but also the broader Chinese 
financial conditions became the most restrictive among the G5 economies. Thus, 
the case for Chinese monetary easing is also compelling in the global context. 
A perspective of optimal policy mix 
Finally, I will make a case for Chinese monetary easing within the framework 
of optimal monetary and fiscal policy. Two arguments are put forward—one 
from the perspective of an open macroeconomic model and the other from the 
perspective of domestic fiscal and monetary policy interaction. 
First, a standard Fleming–Mundell model (Dornbusch 1976) postulates that 
under the assumptions of open capital account and exchange-rate flexibility, 
a combination of loose monetary policy and neutral fiscal policy would be the 
A Compelling Case for Chinese Monetary Easing
59
best way for China to contain external deflationary shocks, cushioning growth 
while introducing two-way market expectations and volatility of the RMB 
exchange rate and incremental capital opening. 
Since mid-2014, the PBC has considerably scaled down its routine foreign 
exchange interventions and widened the onshore daily trading band of the 
RMB. Moreover, the Chinese capital account has become more open over 
time (Ma and McCauley 2008, 2013). The recent gathering pace of the RMB 
internationalisation can be viewed as capital opening by stealth (Cheung et al. 
2011). Increased financial openness implies greater sensitivity of cross-border 
financial flows to price signals, which in turn will be influenced by the mix of 
monetary and fiscal policies. 
So, what would be a sensible mix of fiscal and monetary policies in the context of 
a more open capital account, effectively appreciating and more flexible currency, 
weakening domestic demand and broad strength of the US dollar? As discussed 
below, China’s overall central and local government fiscal policy stance is 
unlikely to be meaningfully expansionary in the next few years (Zhu  2015), 
therefore, a key policy choice is whether one should pursue relatively tight or 
loose monetary policy. 
According to the classical Fleming–Mundell model, given a neutral fiscal 
policy, an expansionary monetary policy would discourage capital inflows and 
slow the broad-based appreciation of the RMB in today’s global environment. 
A  less appreciated RMB would therefore discourage swings in capital flows 
and support the ongoing difficult domestic rebalancing, while monetary easing 
directly cushions domestic demand. Thus, to facilitate growth, rebalancing and 
currency flexibility at the same time, China ought to ease monetary policy.
Therefore, an accommodative monetary policy and neutral fiscal policy can 
combine to best promote both economic growth and fuller exchange rate 
flexibility of the RMB, especially against a global backdrop of near-zero interest 
rates at major central banks. 
What about the global environment of broad dollar strength that could trigger 
capital outflows from China, putting depreciation pressure on the RMB vis-a-
vis an almighty US dollar? At the time of writing, the RMB has repeatedly been 
testing the weak side of the daily trading band, despite serious efforts by the 
PBC to signal a steadier RMB–US dollar rate via its daily fixing (Figure 3.6). 
If managed properly, this is a healthy adjustment in a substantially appreciated 
RMB for three reasons. 
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 RMB per US$a The US dollar index and the RMB–US$ rateb
Figure 3.6 The RMB daily trading band and the US dollar index
a The daily trading band was ±1 per cent before March 2014 and ±2 per cent afterwards.  
b The US dollar index is the US Fed narrow basket index. The RMB–US dollar is the number of RMB 
per US dollar. 
Source: Bloomberg. 
First, a very strong RMB should loosen its link to the US dollar. The RMB will 
probably continue strengthening on a broad real effective basis, despite the 
prospect of some near-term weakness vis-a-vis a strong US dollar. In 2014, the 
RMB depreciated 2.5 per cent against the dollar but gained 7 per cent in trade-
weighted terms, according to BIS statistics. But the Chinese currency is likely 
to again outperform most advanced and emerging market currencies in 2015, 
remaining a source of global financial stability. More importantly, China should 
move further away from its loose dollar peg to gain policy autonomy under an 
increasingly open capital account.
Second, greater two-way volatility vis-a-vis the US dollar is a crucial step to 
move further away from the already loose dollar peg, which has historically 
served China well as a credible nominal anchor. Indeed, the Chinese inflation 
record has fared better under the dollar peg since 1994 than during 1978–93 
(Amstad et al. 2014). But its time is up, as the Chinese economy has simply 
become too big to be anchored to the US dollar or any single currency alone, 
even in a loose fashion. Effective stability of the RMB better serves China’s long-
term interests (Ma and McCauley 2011). 
Third, some dollar outflows would facilitate orderly currency movements, 
allowing Chinese corporations to hedge and extinguish their dollar liabilities 
and the official sector to trim its dollar assets. McCauley et al. (2015) estimate that 
the dollar debts of Chinese corporations could exceed US$1.1 trillion. Shifting 
currency expectations owing to a mighty US dollar, a narrower than expected 
policy interest rate differential because of monetary policy divergence between 
China and the United States and possibly higher currency volatility given a 
less interventionist PBC have combined to result in a lower Sharpe ratio—an 
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indicator of risk-adjusted returns. This in turn could prompt some unwinding 
of Chinese corporate carry trade to be funded in part by an orderly drawdown 
of the official reserves. 
The next argument concerns the role fiscal policy can play in sharing the burden 
of cushioning economic growth and mitigating financial risk. My take is that a 
neutral fiscal policy stance might be the best course of action for policymakers 
in Beijing in the next few years, thus necessitating reasonable monetary 
accommodation. 
With a slowing economy and weaker property market, the official fiscal policy 
should aim to avoid excessive tightening. First, the fiscal automatic stabilisers 
have already kicked in, as witnessed by a marked slowdown in overall Chinese 
tax revenues. Second, the Chinese Government has also undertaken selective tax 
and capital expenditure measures to fund infrastructure and affordable housing 
projects. Third, the Chinese official 2015 budget targets a deficit of 2.3 per cent 
of GDP compared with a 2014 out-turn of 1.8 per cent, and could actually reach 
a budget deficit of 2.6 per cent of GDP if the 2014 leftover budgetary funds are 
all to be spent in 2015. 
However, despite a low level of central government debt, of 15 per cent of GDP, 
the combined overall fiscal position of central and local governments has been 
much more challenging, with their combined debt level tripling to 45 per cent. 
There is a real moral hazard risk associated with China’s high and unsustainable 
level of local government debt. Local government officials have strong incentives 
to borrow, from both banks and the shadow banking sector, to fund their 
pet investment projects, but then leave messy debts to their successors. With 
rising local government debts since the GFC, the pressure to restructure local 
government finance has also been mounting. 
This trend has been aggravated by a structural mismatch between fiscal revenues 
and expenditure obligations between the central and local governments. 
The financing needs of local government have been an important driver of the 
expansion of shadow banking in recent years, partially offsetting the potential 
benefits promised by the ongoing interest rate deregulation. In the longer run, 
China needs to rebalance the fiscal revenue sharing and outlay obligations 
between the central and local governments (Ma and Wang 2010). In the short 
term, some practical ways must be found to balance ongoing financing needs 
and moral hazard concerns.
Since late 2013, most local governments in China have come under mounting 
cash-flow pressures, which are in part market-driven and in part policy-induced. 
First, a cooler Chinese property sector since 2013 has significantly slowed 
proceeds from land sales, which mostly accrue to local governments. Indeed, 
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some localities might face the stark new reality of diminished availability of land 
for sale. Nationwide, the growth of government land sale proceeds has plunged 
since mid-2014.3 
Second, the policy of the central government has been to gradually tighten 
local government budget constraints, by curtailing their borrowing via various 
financing vehicles, demanding greater transparency and disclosure of local 
fiscal conditions, and enhancing regulation of shadow banking. 
These two factors have nevertheless combined and translated into a de facto 
sizeable but necessary fiscal contraction in the short term, which may not be 
fully offset by a slightly more expansionary 2015 official budget. This fiscal 
tightening most likely shows up as weaker local investment expenditure, 
whatever the official ‘proactive’ fiscal policy means. Thus, the overall de facto 
Chinese fiscal policy stance might still be somewhat contractionary and at best 
neutral in 2015, calling for reasonable monetary relaxation to partially offset the 
possible contractionary effects of reduced local government borrowing on the 
Chinese economy. This picture is unlikely to become brighter in the next two 
to three years. 
Although concerns over fiscal dominance remain real, tighter monetary policy 
is neither a credible nor a helpful response to the risks of moral hazard and 
soft budget constraints related to Chinese local governments. On the contrary, 
monetary accommodation should help mitigate the contractionary impact of the 
tighter local government budgetary constraints in the short term and facilitate 
gradual restoration of fiscal discipline and rebalancing of central and local fiscal 
resources and responsibility in the longer term.
In sum, both the insights from the Fleming–Mundell model and the need to 
mitigate contractionary impacts of tighter local government financing call for a 
sensible policy mix of monetary relaxation and a neutral fiscal stance. Therefore, 
the latest monetary easing by the PBC is well justified—and more can be done. 
Conclusions
Since mid-2014, the PBC has embarked on a cycle of monetary easing in an 
attempt to mitigate slowing growth, emerging deflationary pressure, tight 
domestic financial conditions, waning net capital inflows and the contractionary 
consequences of local fiscal restructuring. This chapter makes a strong case 
3  Proceeds from land sales accrue mostly to local governments and have plummeted from 40 per cent year-
on-year in the first quarter of 2014 to 26 per cent in the second quarter, 17 per cent in the third and just 
3 per cent in the final quarter. The first quarter of 2015 witnessed a plunge of 43 per cent (Zhu 2015).
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that this shift in the Chinese monetary policy stance is warranted and desirable. 
Of course, whether Chinese monetary policy achieves its intended effects will 
depend on many factors outside the scope of this chapter, such as functioning 
transmission mechanisms. 
Nevertheless, contrary to the view that monetary easing is a show of no 
confidence in reform, an act of sabotaging reform and/or a policy move that 
could worsen structural imbalances, a timely, measured but serious monetary 
policy accommodation is the best course of policy action that will serve the 
Chinese economy well in both the short term and the long term. Specifically, 
meaningful monetary easing helps cushion growth, support reform, facilitate 
rebalancing and mitigate financial stress. 
First, prompt monetary relaxation, not tightening, supports domestic demand, 
reduces the headwinds from de facto fiscal contraction emanating from local 
government deleveraging, eases the relatively tight Chinese financial conditions 
and deflects global deflationary shocks. It helps mitigate adverse demand 
shocks, which have been non-trivial, and as a minimum, avoids rubbing salt 
into the wound.
Second, China’s monetary policy accommodation can help accelerate 
liberalisation, by winning both broader political support and gaining greater 
headroom for implementing difficult reforms. While monetary policy is neither 
a magic bullet nor a substitute for the necessary institutional and structural 
reforms, monetary easing could provide the reform-minded PBC a window 
of opportunity to accelerate financial liberalisation. In contrast, maintaining 
tight monetary and fiscal policies as an ill-advised tactic to force through tough 
reform programs could be counterproductive, if not reckless.
Third, a timely monetary relaxation should help cushion an orderly slowdown 
of the Chinese economy, in turn facilitating the structural rebalancing task. The 
credit binge witnessed during the GFC was partially the consequence of the 
unmistakably late monetary policy response to collapsing domestic and external 
demand at that time. And this rapid credit expansion mostly funded local 
government investment, likely worsening domestic imbalances. Moreover, most 
of the credit allocation and industrial policy responsibilities burdening the PBC 
should be decommissioned, because monetary policy is not an apt instrument 
with which to address such structural issues.
Fourth, financial stability concerns have likely come to figure more prominently 
on the PBC’s agenda because a key challenge is how to manage the legacy of 
excess leverage and increased financial imbalances in China. One sensible 
response is measured monetary accommodation to maintain steady nominal 
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growth. This would help pre-empt a potentially vicious debt deflation cycle and 
dampen excess volatility in the financial system, while facilitating the tricky 
deleveraging process, not vice versa. 
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4. Consequences of China’s 
Opening to Foreign Banks
Ran Li, Xiang Li, Wen Lei and Yiping Huang
Introduction
China’s government has recently implemented additional reforms to relax 
the regulatory environment for foreign banks. Specifically, State Council 
Order No. 657, signed by Premier Li Keqiang, announced a decision to revise 
the Regulations of the People’s Republic of China on the Administration of 
Foreign-Funded Banks, effective from 1 January 2015. Implications of the 
revised regulations include removal of the requirement that a minimum of 
RMB100  million operating capital be transferred unconditionally from the 
overseas parent bank to the newly opened Chinese branch. In addition, in terms 
of the conditions attached to the right to carry out RMB-denominated activity, 
foreign banks are now eligible to apply to undertake local currency business 
after operating in China for one year—down from the previous three years. 
The requirement for two consecutive years of profit will be scrapped as well.
The opening-up of the Chinese banking sector dates back to 1980, when the first 
international branch of a foreign bank, from Japan, was established in Beijing. 
World Trade Organization (WTO) accession in late 2001 instigated a ‘great leap 
forward’, with China agreeing to undertake a series of financial liberalisation 
policies. 
Among the points of agreement was that, on accession, earlier geographic and 
client restrictions on foreign currency business as applied to foreign financial 
institutions would be removed. For local currency business, geographic 
restrictions would be phased out within five years of accession. Any existing 
non-prudential measures restricting the ownership, operation and juridical form 
of foreign financial institutions (including internal branching and licences) were 
to be eliminated by the end of 2006. Subsectors including insurance, securities 
and investment fund management were also opened up, in a limited fashion, 
to foreign financial service providers.
Those commitments and associated incentives saw a range of seemingly 
panicked responses from Chinese financial market participants. Before accession 
to the WTO, there was a pervasive lack of confidence in Chinese financial 
markets, owing especially to a weak banking sector. During the Asian Financial 
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Crisis of the late 1990s, the ratio of non-performing loans (NPLs) of Chinese 
banks reached as high as 30–40 per cent. Although a series of reforms was 
implemented, including cleaning up NPLs and public capital injections, banks’ 
corporate governance capacity remained low. 
In this environment, commentators had two major concerns about foreign banks 
entering China’s financial market. The first was that foreign banks possessed 
advantages over domestic banks, including greater product variety, broader 
international networks and more advanced risk-management skills. It was not 
implausible to think that domestic banks would be crowded out of the market, 
or even collapse once foreign banks enjoyed ‘national treatment’. In addition, 
unlike domestic banks, foreign banks in China were under the control of their 
parent corporations, which some feared could ultimately become a source of 
financial instability for China.
Amid these fears, Bonin and Huang (2001) conducted research on the Chinese 
financial market, which suggested that these fears were unlikely to materialise 
in most cases. In particular, their research suggested that foreign banks 
should not be considered a destabilisation risk, mainly because establishing 
the branch of a foreign bank was no different from foreign direct investment 
(FDI) in other sectors. Both, for example, aim for long-term returns and not 
short-term profits—a contrast with speculative capital movement. Moreover, 
financial stability in China would be a point of common interest. Furthermore, 
the operations of foreign bank branches would be subject to the supervision of 
Chinese authorities. As for the competitiveness of the domestic banking system, 
this was less a concern than the possibility that foreign banks would encounter 
various policy restrictions, including of the scale of foreign ownership of major 
domestic banks. 
Almost 15 years later, foreign banks have not contributed to financial risk and 
neither has their market share advanced greatly. In fact, the contrary is true, as 
Bonin and Huang (2001) expected. Foreign banks have found it very difficult 
to operate in the domestic Chinese market. Despite newly adopted opening-
up policies—especially after China’s accession to the WTO—little material 
improvement has been made in banking sector liberalisation. In some areas, we 
can even observe retrogression. 
Total assets of foreign banks have expanded dramatically since 2003 (Figure 4.1). 
In the decade to 2013, the average annual rate of growth of foreign bank total 
assets was 19.9 per cent. Closer investigation shows that the relative size of 
foreign banks in China is negligible—less than 2 per cent of total banking assets 
in 2013. And that asset share has been declining in the past five years. Indeed, 
by 2013, the total asset share of foreign bank assets in total banking assets was 
just 1.5 per cent. This level is only slightly higher than the level of 10 years ago.
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Figure 4.1 Development of foreign banks in China
Sources: CEIC China Premium Database; and authors’ estimations.
Despite the fact the nightmare of a foreign bank invasion did not come to pass, 
discussions in China about banking sector liberalisation remain heated, and 
concerns persist. In this context, this chapter explores the impacts of banking 
sector liberalisation: what will and should happen in the future? To explore 
possible liberalisation scenarios, we first investigate the background of banking 
sector opening-up and related literature in the second and third sections. In 
the following two sections, we then explore two specific aspects of foreign 
bank entry—one for the domestic banking sector and another for domestic 
enterprises—so as to facilitate understanding of banking sector liberalisation, 
before concluding.
Foreign banks: Theory and reality 
Foreign banks affect the local environment both directly and indirectly, and 
influence domestic economies and financial markets by interacting with 
domestic enterprises, including domestic banks. Direct impacts include lending, 
interbank trading and the influence of foreign investment considerations on local 
decision-making. As in the case of FDI more generally, foreign banks can also 
generate indirect spillovers through channels such as demonstration, personnel 
training and competition. Considering the small relative size of foreign banking 
in China, any interaction effects with local firms must be analysed carefully, as 
is the case for our study in section four.
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In contrast with firms in other sectors, domestic banks, and in particular state-
owned banks (SOBs), have more bargaining power when dealing with foreign 
competitors, because of the less competitive banking market. To that end, despite 
revisions to regulations to allow foreign banks national treatment, invisible 
barriers to China’s banking sector mean that foreign banks are disadvantaged. 
For example, language and cultural barriers in reality often force foreign banks 
to focus on elite clients—the ‘cream-skimming’ effect. Another example is 
that when a foreign bank applies for a new business licence, they often find a 
domestic bank will be granted that licence. 
In the early years of the century, foreign strategic investment played an 
important role in listings of state banks. Recently, however, most such investors 
have sold down those investments. There is a variety of explanations for this 
visible exit of foreign investors from China’s banking sector. Financial difficulty 
in the aftermath of the 2008 global financial crisis (GFC) pressed some foreign 
banks to sell overseas assets. Declining returns on investments and rising risks 
for Chinese banks also drove foreign exits. Further, since foreign banks are only 
permitted to own minority shares in established domestic banks, they often find 
themselves unable to materially affect the decision-making process of that bank. 
Moreover, since all listed banks operate as SOBs, the board must include at least 
one official representative of the ruling Communist Party.
For China, a well-acknowledged benefit of banking sector liberalisation is 
that it could force domestic financial reforms. Despite that potential, and the 
scale of reforms already undertaken, China’s financial sector remains relatively 
impenetrable, according to a financial liberalisation index designed by Abiad et 
al. (2008). For the index of ‘financial institution entry barriers’, China scores 35, 
against an average for middle-income countries of 85 and 100 for high-income 
countries (Figure 4.2). 
Analysis of a more recent dataset reveals a similar result. According to 
The Heritage Foundation’s ‘2015 Index of Economic Freedom’, China’s financial 
freedom index ranking is far behind that of other emerging markets, let alone 
high-income countries. Surprisingly, the index ranking for China fell in 2001 
and the gap has widened since then. 
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Figure 4.2 Financial freedom index, 2005
Note: The classifications of high-income countries and emerging markets are according to the World 
Bank and International Monetary Fund, respectively. 
Source: Miller et al. (2015); and authors’ estimation.
These data suggest that, despite China’s progress in opening up its banking 
sector, little progress has been made in levelling the playing field for foreign 
banks. To understand the cause of this, it is important to further analyse what 
theory says about what should happen and compare this with the literature for 
the case of China. 
Survey of the literature
The research question of this chapter is related to at least three branches of the 
literature. The first examines the spillover effects of foreign direct investment 
(FDI) (for example, Caves 1974; Dunning 1980, 1983; Hymer 1960). Blomström 
and Kokko (1998) found that in order to overcome disadvantages of operating 
overseas, such as cultural and language barriers, multinational corporations 
must possess some firm-specific advantages, including superior production 
technologies and advanced management skills. They argued that operation of 
such multinational corporations can generate productivity spillovers for the 
local industry through channels such as demonstration, personnel training and 
competition.
Some studies applied this spillover argument to the financial sector. For instance, 
Levine (1996) suggested two possible channels by which FDI can positively affect 
the domestic banking sector: the first is by directly bringing new and better 
skills, management techniques, training procedures, technology and products 
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to the domestic market; and the second is through indirectly stimulating 
competition in domestic financial markets, which, in turn, puts pressure on 
profit and overhead expenses and enhances domestic banking efficiency.
The second branch of the literature concerns foreign bank entry as a special 
case of FDI, which can influence domestic firms through both direct and 
indirect channels. Foreign banks may directly provide services to local firms, 
and they may also indirectly affect firms by changing the domestic banking 
sector. The  latter includes increasing competition in the banking sector and 
improving local banks’ operating efficiency.
Some empirical studies focus on the interest rate spread, cost base and competition 
in the banking sector. By analysing bank-level data from 80 countries, Claessens 
et al. (2001) found that foreign bank entry narrowed interest rate spread and 
lowered management costs of local banks. Several other studies arrived at very 
similar conclusions: Unite and Sullivan (2003) for the Philippine case; Clarke et 
al. (1999) for the Argentine case; and Barajas et al. (2000) for the Colombian case. 
In the meantime, Petersen and Rajan (1995) argued that banking development is 
critical for alleviating financing constraints. Shen et al. (2009) pointed out that 
competition among banks is important for private firms obtaining loans.
Several papers dealt with the direct effect of foreign bank entry on firms. Some 
confirmed the cream-skimming effect, where foreign banks compete mainly 
with domestic banks for profitable and wealthy clients. Giannetti and Ongena 
(2009) found that foreign bank entry was beneficial for capital allocation in 
Eastern Europe, particularly for younger and larger firms. Sarma and Prashad 
(2013) provide evidence of the cream-skimming effect in India, arguing that 
foreign banks actually reduced the possibility of smaller firms obtaining bank 
loans.
The third branch of the literature analyses foreign bank entry in the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC) as a critical component of financial liberalisation. 
Leung and Chan (2006) found that local banks actually improved efficiency in 
response to foreign bank entry. Berger et al. (2009) concluded that foreign capital 
significantly helped four big SOBs improve efficiency. Xu (2011) confirmed the 
positive effect of the existence of foreign banks on domestic bank competition 
and efficiency. And Mao et al. (2010) estimated the quadratic relationship 
between credit provided by foreign banks and total credit in the PRC.
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China’s banking sector liberalisation: Financial 
market effects
The Chinese banking sector has undergone significant changes in recent 
decades, especially since joining the WTO at the end of 2001. The China 
Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) once outlined four important principles 
for opening up the Chinese banking sector: 1) meeting the ongoing needs of 
domestic economic development; 2) improving competitiveness of the Chinese 
banking sector; 3) honouring commitments made to the WTO and creating 
an environment for fair competition between Chinese and foreign banks; and 
4) maintaining financial stability (CBRC 2006). 
Foreign banks were first allowed to open representative offices in China 
in 1979 and to set up branches in special economic zones (SEZs) from 1982. 
This geographical restriction was relaxed in 1994, after which foreign banks 
were allowed to operate in 23 cities after being selectively granted a licence to 
do so by central authorities. Foreign banks granted that licence were, however, 
limited in the scope of business they were allowed to conduct—to foreign 
currency loans and deposits for foreign-invested firms and foreign individuals 
in China. Four years later, in 1998, the People’s Bank of China (PBC) granted 
eight foreign banks the right to use local currency funding; but even those 
foreign banks remained prohibited from conducting any consumer banking 
transactions in RMB with mainland residents for the duration of the 1990s. 
China’s joining of the WTO in late 2001 marked the beginning of a new set 
of rules concerning the operation of foreign banks in China. From 2002, 
foreign banks were allowed to conduct business with Chinese residents and 
enterprises in foreign currency. In addition, local currency services were also 
allowed in designated cities. By 2006, five years after China joined the WTO, 
geographic and customer restrictions on RMB businesses of foreign banks were 
lifted comprehensively, in accordance with the WTO accession commitments. 
The government also then encouraged foreign banks to incorporate locally, 
and those that were granted that licence did enjoy national treatment in terms 
of registered capital, branch opening rights, required operating capital and 
regulatory standards. 
In 2006, most foreign banks granted national treatment banking terms in China 
were from Asia (Figure 4.3). Specifically, 186 foreign banks from 41 countries 
and regions had opened 242 representative offices in China. Of that total, the 
56 per cent from Asia included 99 from Hong Kong, 19 from Japan and 17 from 
Singapore. From Europe, the top two countries are the United Kingdom (21) and 
France (15). From the United States, the number is 26. 
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Figure 4.3 Distribution of host countries of foreign banks in 2006
Source: CBRC (2006).
In response to this gradual opening of the financial sector after China’s WTO 
accession, the number of locally incorporated foreign banks with a presence in 
China increased significantly—from a low base. In parallel, the number of cities 
where locally incorporated foreign banks were present also increased rapidly. 
From the outbreak of the GFC in 2008 to the end of 2011, more than 40 foreign 
banks made additional capital (or working capital) replenishment equivalent to 
RMB27.1 billion in their Chinese operations (CBRC 2011), which shows strong 
confidence in the Chinese banking market.
By the end of 2013, banks from 51 countries and regions had established 42 locally 
incorporated entities, 92 foreign bank branches and 187 representative offices in 
China (CBRC 2013). Of the above listings, 36 locally incorporated foreign banks 
and 57 foreign bank branches were also approved to conduct RMB business. 
Six locally incorporated foreign banks—Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi, Mizuho 
Corporate Bank, Bank of East Asia, Development Bank of Singapore, Standard 
Chartered Bank and HSBC—had even been granted permission to issue RMB-
denominated bonds, and the Bank of East Asia, Citibank, Nanyang Commercial 
Bank and Standard Chartered Bank obtained approval in 2014 to issue credit 
cards. Geographically, locally incorporated foreign banks had a presence in 
69 cities and 27 provinces.
The response of foreign banks to the incremental liberalisation of China’s 
banking sector after its WTO accession in 2001 can be understood by inspection 
of four trends: 1) the rise in the number of foreign banks operating in China; 
2) the one-off transition of foreign banks in China from net providers of capital 
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to non-financial institutions and residents to net receivers of capital, in 2010; 
3) source funding coming from the host country and thus the limited role of 
the interbank market to financial banks; and 4) under government policy and 
for risk-management purposes, foreign banks were mostly engaged in low-risk 
banking activities. 
On the first point, the number of foreign bank operating entities in China rose 
from 192 in 2003 to 419 in 2013 (Figure 4.4). The total China-based assets of 
those foreign banks almost doubled every four years, rising to RMB2.563 trillion 
in 2013 (Figure 4.5). Despite that increase in total assets, the foreign share in 
total banking assets in China remained low. Specifically, that share climbed 
between 2003 and 2007, but has fallen since the GFC—from 2.4 per cent in 2007 
to 1.7 per cent in 2013. 
Figure 4.4 Development of foreign banks in China
Note: Operating banking entities include head offices, branches and subsidiaries of locally 
incorporated foreign banks and foreign bank branches. 
Source: CBRC (2013).
The transition of foreign banks from net providers of capital to non-financial 
institutions and residents in China to net receivers of capital is demonstrated in 
Figure 4.5, where the net asset indicates the assets to non-financial institutions 
and residents less the liability to them, and foreign liability indicates the foreign 
liabilities of foreign banks (national level for both). Before 2010, foreign banks 
extended more loans than deposits collected. The situation that arose in 2010 has 
since reverted to the norm, possibly because RMB business with local residents 
was largely constrained by government regulation in the early years and the 
main business of foreign banks was foreign currency loans for enterprises. 
China’s Domestic Transformation in a Global Context
76
Figure 4.5 Foreign banks turning into net takers of capital
Source: CEIC.
On the third point, the main source of funding for locally incorporated foreign 
banks in China has come from their headquarters and subsidiaries in other host 
countries, and the role played in the local interbank market by foreign banks 
has been limited. Technically the government has made the local funding market 
available to foreign banks since 1998, but the conditions of that access, such as 
constrained lending amounts and limited loan period horizons, have limited the 
freedom of access to local funding pools that such banks can utilise.
The final point characterising foreign bank activity in China since it joined 
the WTO is that foreign banks have tended to engage in operations that are 
characterised by relatively low risk. For example, the share of foreign bank 
exposure to China’s NPL portfolio is estimated to be below 1 per cent, and is 
consistently lower than the average ratio of the whole commercial banking 
system in China (Figure 4.6). Researchers have pointed out that, apart from 
traditional banking business, such as following existing customers in trade and 
investment, the main focus of foreign banks was on the niche markets and fee-
based banking business where their comparative advantages lay (Xu 2011), and 
where they have also enjoyed consistent regulatory permission to operate.
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Figure 4.6 NPL ratio of commercial banks and foreign banks
Source: WIND.
In summary, the opening up and liberalisation process helped foreign banks 
penetrate the Chinese market and provide more sophisticated banking services 
to local customers. That said, the asset share of foreign banks remains low, and 
the main funding source of foreign banks is still from overseas. The business 
range of services provided by foreign banks has also not developed extensively, 
in part thanks to the incremental progress in areas of the banking sector that 
have been liberalised. 
In this context, further investigation could shed light on how theoretical views 
of the benefits associated with foreign bank entry hold in the applied case of 
a transitional economy. This could include the potential of a foreign banking 
presence to increase competition within the domestic banking system, thus 
increasing the efficiency of local banks, and helping to more efficiently allocate 
capital through improved evaluation and pricing of credit risks. Our empirical 
analysis focuses, first, on the impact of foreign bank penetration on efficiency 
and competition in the domestic banking system, and second, on its influence 
on credit allocation.
There are several methods used to estimate the degree of competition in a banking 
system. First, bank-level indicators of net interest margins and costs, which 
will be affected if competition levels change. For example, when competition is 
strengthened, domestic banks are forced to lower lending rates or to increase 
deposit rates to retain market share. This in turn narrows net interest margins. 
Similarly, in the first instance, domestic banks often incur costs when competing 
with large international banks with better reputations. Without considering 
the increased efficiency benefits, these banks’ operational costs will increase. 
Second, we also use provincial data on the share of deposits in non-state-owned 
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financial institutions, to measure the effect of foreign bank entry on provincial 
deposit competition. The logic here is that if the presence of locally incorporated 
foreign banks in a province is accompanied by a larger share of deposits in the 
non-SOB sector, we can interpret this to mean that foreign bank entry could be 
associated with competition in the domestic banking system. 
Net interest margins (NIM) are interest incomes minus interest expenses divided 
by total earnings, where expenses refer to non-interest expenses divided by total 
earnings (COST). We explore the effects of foreign bank entry (FEI), representing 
the asset share of foreign banks in the whole banking system, on net interest 
margins and cost by running two regressions in which the dependent variables 
are NIM (Equation 4.1) and COST (Equation 4.2), respectively. We control for 
a bank’s book value of equity over total earning assets (EQT) and national 
economic conditions including annual GDP growth rate (gdp), inflation (inf) 
and lending rate (lendrate). Bank-level data come from Bankscope and national 
economic data from the World Development Indicators (WDI) (World Bank 
various years). There are 303 bank-year observations in our unbalanced panel 
dataset, covering 75 commercial banks from 1999 to 2013. Like Xu (2011), we 
run the following two regressions with fixed effect (Equations 4.1 and 4.2). 
Equation 4.1
Equation 4.2
Results from Equations 4.1 and 4.2 are shown in Table 4.1. The results suggest 
a statistically significant negative effect on net interest margins and a positive 
effect on non-interest costs are associated with foreign bank entry. These results 
are in line with most existing theoretical literature that supports the hypothesis 
that the increased competition associated with foreign bank penetration comes 
from domestic banks facing a narrowed interest margin, and also that their costs 
rise by having to spend proportionately more on operations and services against 
their market share. It also suggests, at least as far as the sample applies—for 
1999–2013 and to the impact of foreign banks on the local provincial privately 
owned banking sector (which is tiny within the scheme of China’s banking 
system)—that foreign banks appear to be associated with increased competition.
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Fixed effect Yes Yes
R2 0.90 0.90
N 303 303
*** p < 0.01 
** p < 0.05 
* p < 0.1  
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses.
In a recent study, Li and Huang (forthcoming) use provincial data to run 
regressions of the bank competition index (BankCompt) on foreign bank entry 
(Foreign) (Equation 4.3). Following Fan et al. (2003, 2004, 2007, 2010), they 
compute the NERI Index of Marketisation for provinces in China to proxy bank 
competition. The index is the share of deposits in non-state-owned financial 
institutions. Since almost all financial institutions in China are banks, they use 
this index to reflect the competiveness of the banking sector. 
Equation 4.3
The datasets used in this study were constructed by the National Bureau of 
Statistics (NBS) and collected through annual surveys of all large-scale industrial 
firms in the PRC. On average, they cover close to 190,000 enterprises, from 
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37 two-digit manufacturing industries and 31 provinces every year. Given that 
China’s WTO accession took place at the end of 2001, we employ post-accession 
data for the period 2002–07.
Table 4.2 summarises the estimation results. Foreign bank entry actually 
intensifies banking competition based on the significantly positive coefficient 
estimates, which implies that the share of deposits in SOBs declines because 
the entry of foreign banks increases competition and weakens their dominance. 
To check if the conclusion is model-dependent, Li and Huang also include 
provincial GDP and provincial population (both in log form) as control variables 
and add a time trend to the equation. In all these exercises, the main finding 
remains unchanged.
Table 4.2 Foreign bank entry and bank competition
Level Linear trend
Foreign 0.857** 0.887** 0.509* 0.508**
(0.359) (0.331) (0.271) (0.249)
Trend 0.365* 0.399*
(0.214) (0.219)
Log(provincial GDP) 4.515* 4.792**
(2.37) (2.168)
Log(provincial population) 0.48 –0.269
(2.923) (2.921)
Constant 3.253*** –34.23 3.259*** –30.29
(0.384) (25.25) (0.377) (24.05)
Observations 400 400 400 400
R-squared 0.557 0.584 0.57 0.599
Number of provinces 31 31 31 31
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
*** p < 0.01 
** p < 0.05 
* p < 0.1 
Notes: The dependent variable is the bank competition index (BankCompt). Robust standard errors 
in parentheses.
More than 35 years since China’s great reform and opening-up policy, and more 
than a decade since China became a formal member of the WTO, the achievements 
of that opening-up are unquestionable, and have led to China becoming a 
leading member of the global economic community. The degree of reform and 
liberalisation observed in its financial systems is remarkable compared with the 
early years. Based on the WTO’s agenda, China has implemented its promised 
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policy changes. The real progress since that accession has, however, been 
slow and conservative, especially from the perspective of foreign bank entry. 
Although the number of active foreign banks has expanded, many fields (such 
as the local funding market and business expansion) are still under regulation, 
explicitly or implicitly. There are even signs of reversal in market entry, judging 
from the asset share of foreign banks (Figure 4.1). Despite this, the entry of 
foreign banks has had an important influence on the domestic banking system. 
The presence of more experienced (in terms of customer management) and 
more knowledgeable (in terms of organisation efficiency) foreign banks, who 
furthermore have easier access to international funding, has increased the degree 
of competition in the domestic banking industry—an assertion supported by 
our empirical evidence, from both the bank level and the provincial level. For a 
full picture of the effects of banking sector liberalisation, the next section will 
focus on the impact of foreign bank entry on the allocation of firm credit. 
China’s banking sector liberalisation: Real 
economy effects
As mentioned, although the total asset share of foreign banks in the Chinese 
banking industry dropped to 1.9 per cent in 2013 (compared with 2 per cent 
in 2001), the scale of foreign bank assets has been rapidly increasing, with the 
average annual growth rate once reaching as high as almost 20 per cent during 
the decade since 2001. Their business lines, coverage of target customers, as 
well as business area have also been expanding. In addition, it has become 
a prevalent phenomenon in China for foreign banks to hold stakes in state-
owned and joint stock banks, or even city commercial banks. Now that foreign 
bank entry has evolved, what substantive change will it bring to the Chinese 
economy? This section intends to analyse the impact on domestic enterprises, 
which are vital components of the real economy. 
It is widely acknowledged that despite more than 30 years of successful reform, 
the Chinese economy still exhibits typical features of repressive financial policies, 
which protect the state sector but discriminate against private enterprises. 
Could the entry of foreign banks—taken as an important step in financial 
liberalisation—work on the efficiency of domestic enterprises and exert some 
effects on discriminatory policies? The existing literature on this issue has 
controversial conclusions. On the one hand, conventional theory suggests that 
foreign bank entry can enhance competition in and improve the efficiency of 
the domestic banking system, thus increasing credit supply to enterprises; on 
the other hand, banking theory incorporating information asymmetry argues 
that some firms’ access to credit could be reduced due to the high information 
cost and greater competition (Petersen and Rajan 1995). High information costs 
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can also induce foreign banks to do business with the most profitable local firms 
(Dell’Ariccia and Marquez 2004; Sengupta 2007). Combining these various 
predictions with the situation in China, we expect foreign banks will work on 
domestic firms through indirect channels rather than directly providing loans, 
as their share in China remains quite low so far.
In fact, China’s gradual opening up to foreign banks since 2001 has created an 
excellent laboratory in which to study the effects of foreign bank entry. Li and 
Huang (forthcoming) have conducted a case study based on this unique policy 
experiment. Since the policy plan is exogenous, they construct a counterfactual 
using the ‘difference in differences’ (DID) approach, in which the control group 
consists of firms located in regions where foreign bank credit is unavailable 
and which are therefore plausibly unaffected by foreign bank entry, and the 
treatment group comprises firms with access to foreign bank lending. They then 
apply a basic DID fixed-effect model, with the log of total factor productivity 
(TFP)1 as the dependent variable, employing a panel dataset constructed by the 
NBS that covers close to 190,000 enterprises in 31 provinces. They choose data 
from 2002 to 2007 given that the PRC’s accession to the WTO took place at the 
end of 2001. A dummy variable (Foreign) is introduced to represent whether 
foreign bank loans are available in the region in which the firm is located. 
In addition, they use the age of the firm (Age), and, in log form, total assets 
(Log(Assets)), GDP (Log(GDP)) and the population of the city in which the firm 
is located (Log(Population)) as independent variables to explain productivity. 
The model is estimated using both the full sample and subsamples, which are 
classified by different ownership types as defined by the largest shareholder2 
(Table 4.3). The results reveal several important findings. First, financial opening 
does exert an overall positive impact on TFP since the coefficient for foreign 
bank entry is significantly positive in the full sample estimation; however, as 
the coefficients of Foreign in subsample estimations indicate, the effects on TFP 
vary across ownership groups: negative for state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and 
collectively owned enterprises (COEs), positive for privately owned enterprises 
(POEs) and insignificant for foreign-invested firms (FIEs). These findings seem 
to be at odds with the information asymmetry and cream-skimming effect 
mentioned in previous sections. The strong policy implication behind these is 
that foreign bank entry does play an essential role in reversing the financial 
repression that favours SOEs and COEs but discriminates against POEs. Due to 
1  They estimated TFP by the consistent semi-parametric method developed by Olley and Pakes (1996), 
and also provided robustness checks by calculating TFP using the Solow residual.
2  An alternative definition of ownership is also used to check the robustness of the estimation results in 
Li and Huang (forthcoming).
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such a vital component of financial liberalisation, SOEs and COEs, which 
previously enjoyed more policy support from the Chinese Government, are now 
worse off; while POEs, previously discriminated against, now become better off.
Table 4.3 The basic model (TFP)
Full sample SOEs COEs POEs FIEs
Foreign 0.0251** –0.0339*** –0.0366*** 0.0464*** –0.000450
(0.0116) (0.0130) (0.0137) (0.0132) (0.0228)
Age –0.00128*** –0.000398 –0.000855 6.10e-05 0.00312**
(0.000347) (0.000681) (0.000700) (0.000412) (0.00140)
Log(Assets) 0.0430*** 0.0282* 0.0659*** 0.0256** 0.187***
(0.0115) (0.0156) (0.0188) (0.0114) (0.0229)
Log(GDP) –0.0109 0.0391 0.00209 0.0122 0.0517
(0.0762) (0.0556) (0.0834) (0.0939) (0.0617)
Log(Population) –0.0461 –0.177*** –0.0841 –0.0776 –0.0268
(0.0473) (0.0501) (0.0667) (0.0637) (0.0211)
Constant 0.956*** 0.915*** 0.846* 1.077** –1.288**
(0.347) (0.303) (0.503) (0.485) (0.548)
Observations 1,202,245 68,418 93,784 860,188 179,855
R-squared 0.006 0.004 0.007 0.007 0.033
Number of firms 318,167 25,382 43,287 252,404 53,519
Clustered at Region Region Region Region Region
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
COEs = collectively owned enterprises. 
FIEs = foreign-invested enterprises. 
GDP = gross domestic product. 
POEs = privately owned enterprises. 
SOEs = state-owned enterprises. 
*** p < 0.01 
** p < 0.05 
* p < 0.1  
Notes: The dependent variable is the log of TFP. Robust standard errors in parentheses.  
Source: Li and Huang (forthcoming).
But how does foreign bank entry affect firms’ productivity? What are the 
detailed mechanisms through which the policy takes effect? Since POEs in 
China are widely considered to be subject to lack of credit, one possible channel 
could be its role in the improvement of financing conditions. Li and Huang 
(forthcoming) further exploit this by introducing an index used in Rajan and 
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Zingales (1998),3 which represents the demand for external funds of the industry 
of which the firm is part. In addition, they construct its interaction term with 
the dummy variable Foreign to capture the different impact that foreign bank 
entry could exert on enterprises with different levels of demand for external 
financing. With other control variables staying the same as those in Table 4.3, 
they estimate the model using the full sample as well as subsamples again, and 
the results are presented in Table 4.4. As expected, the significantly positive 
coefficient of the interaction term for POEs indicates that the impact of foreign 
bank entry on POEs’ TFP will be larger in industries that have more demand 
for external funds. In other words, one possible channel is that foreign bank 
entry enhances POEs’ TFP by easing their credit constraints. The insignificant 
coefficients in the other three groups are a natural consequence since SOEs and 
COEs generally do not suffer from financing constraints, and FIEs are neither 
substantially discriminated against nor substantially favoured under the 
financial repression in China. 
The case study of Li and Huang (forthcoming) above lends strong support 
to the positive effects foreign bank entry has on industrial efficiency at the 
aggregate level, which conforms to prior expectations. Additionally, this policy 
takes effect through easing the financing constraints on private firms, which are 
heavily discriminated against by banks and have limited access to credit before 
foreign bank entry. Combined with the analysis in the previous section that 
shows foreign bank entry can improve bank efficiency, this easing effect could 
be ascribed to the fact that by competing for the same businesses with local 
banks, foreign banks force local banks to deflect their services to those clients 
not previously covered, and thus improve the financing conditions of private 
firms.
Therefore, the introduction of foreign banks to China benefits domestic 
enterprises by enhancing overall productivity, and it improves POEs’ efficiency 
by easing their credit constraints. As a result, the previous effects of financial 
repression can be reduced or even reversed. We could gain some insights—
though admittedly there are some limitations when applying this specific case 
study to a more general case—that this reversal effect will play an essential 
role in leading Chinese financial reform to a more market-oriented stage and 
facilitating the healthy development of the Chinese real economy, of which 
domestic enterprises, especially POEs, are important driving forces. 
3  The index was originally used to capture the dependence of US firms on external financing, but is also 
justified as a reasonable proxy for external financing dependence in developing countries (Rajan and 
Zingales 1998).
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Table 4.4 Financial constraints and foreign bank entry (TFP)
SOEs COEs POEs FIEs
Foreign×Index 0.107 –0.00472 0.0493** 0.0182
(0.0668) (0.0380) (0.0201) (0.0232)
Foreign 0.000327 –0.0272* 0.0460*** –0.00534
(0.0147) (0.0146) (0.0131) (0.0236)
Index –0.138* 0.0917* 0.0314 –0.0162
(0.0724) (0.0470) (0.0203) (0.0282)
Age 0.000690 –0.000610 0.000306 0.00223
(0.000863) (0.000767) (0.000415) (0.00141)
Log(Assets) –0.101*** –0.0976*** –0.0699*** 0.00428
(0.0156) (0.0147) (0.00748) (0.0138)
Log(GDP) 0.0151 –0.0269 –0.00111 0.0506
(0.0679) (0.102) (0.0948) (0.0663)
Log(Population) –0.156** –0.0771 –0.0640 –0.0314
(0.0635) (0.0707) (0.0612) (0.0243)
Constant 1.607*** 2.086*** 1.663*** 0.686*
(0.371) (0.599) (0.463) (0.367)
Observations 41,192 73,705 761,091 164,304
R-squared 0.018 0.012 0.009 0.012
Number of firms 15,969 33,598 218,458 48,377
Clustered at Region Region Region Region
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
COEs = collectively owned enterprises. 
FIEs = foreign-invested enterprises. 
GDP = gross domestic product. 
POEs = privately owned enterprises. 
SOEs = state-owned enterprises. 
*** p < 0.01 
** p < 0.05 
* p < 0.1  
Notes: The dependent variable is the log of TFP. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
Source: Li and Huang (forthcoming).
Conclusion
Since China’s accession to the WTO in late 2001, the Chinese Government has 
been incrementally relaxing restrictions on foreign banks—a process that 
continues. Initially, this raised some concerns among participants in the Chinese 
financial sector. The fear was that foreign banks would crowd out domestic 
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banks, and also that foreign banks would be under the control of their parent 
corporations rather than responsive to China’s monetary authorities, and 
this would be a source of financial instability for China. Would incremental 
liberalisation of the banking sector prove to be a case of ‘barbarians at the gate’ 
or a positive opportunity for China?
Our empirical analysis shows that liberalising foreign bank lending benefits 
China’s economy, at least in the case of the non-state banking sector. Despite 
their small market share in China, foreign banks help to improve the efficiency 
and competition of the Chinese banking sector. This in turn alleviates the 
financial constraints of firms, especially private firms that are less connected to 
the government—a finding that is consistent with the literature. The evidence 
above lends some support to the view in favour of achieving greater financial 
openness. 
Liberalisation, however, is never a single-edged sword. Although foreign banks 
are under domestic regulation and rely on Chinese financial stability to generate 
profits, risk regulation should be undertaken with care. The right framework by 
which to rationalise the generally positive policy effects above is that of financial 
repression. In an economy with seriously repressive financial policies—which 
is a reasonable depiction of the current situation in China—the state sector is 
often strongly favoured, while the private sector (the focus of this study) is 
discriminated against. 
Research has identified that the arrival of foreign banks in China appears to be 
associated with reduced repression in the banking sector, and therefore should 
reverse earlier adverse policy effects. This could mean hurting state enterprises 
while benefiting private enterprises, other things being equal. Reform programs 
should be designed with caution to ensure a smooth transition. While the case 
of foreign bank entry is useful for thinking about future reform steps, it is 
important to remember that our case study of opening-up foreign banks’ RMB 
business is quite different from opening up the entire banking sector. However, 
this risk–reward framework and the positive results for competition in the 
banking sector offer the basis for broader policy deliberation.
Another crucial question for future research is that, although foreign bank entry 
can be beneficial in the current stage, will it be different if foreign banks are 
ever to take a much larger share of the financial market? Our answer is: possibly. 
The size of foreign banks in China will increase dramatically in the future and 
the domestic banking sector will face great challenges. 
The decline of the size of foreign banks in China since 2008 was largely due to 
the GFC and the increasing liquidity challenges facing foreign parent companies. 
The current Chinese Government has shown great determination to implement 
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reforms. Even though economists expect China’s ‘new normal’ growth rate to be 
7 per cent, well down from the first decades of the reform era, this still points 
to a vast opportunity given the size of China’s economy. Moreover, the Chinese 
Government has a sound fiscal system. An economic crush is unlikely to happen 
in the near future. Foreign banks will most likely seize this opportunity.
If our prediction of a big advance of foreign banks turns out to be true, domestic 
banks, especially large SOBs, will face the biggest challenges. Preparing the 
domestic banking sector is especially critical for China, a bank-centred economy. 
But reform in the banking sector is deeply intertwined with reforms in other 
areas. The NPLs of SOBs are largely from SOEs and local government financing 
vehicles. The new ‘one belt and one road’ policy could induce more long-term 
loans backed up by the government. The ongoing interest rate liberalisation 
further decreases banks’ profit margins, leaving them less room to handle the 
challenges. The situation is tough, but the appropriate timing and sequencing 
of comprehensive reforms will help the Chinese economy smoothly adapt to its 
new normal. 
However, foreign banks in China will also face tough competition; their Chinese 
counterparts are giants, and there is a large, established domestic customer base. 
Similarly, Chinese banks have rich experience in screening and monitoring 
Chinese customers. Without further reforms, implicit discrimination against 
foreign banks will persist. 
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5. Destination Consumption 
Enabling migrants’ propensity to consume
Meiyan Wang and Cai Fang
Introduction
The 2014 Central Economic Working Conference emphasised that China’s 
economy has a ‘new normal’, characterised mainly by slower growth. 
One approach to fostering new sources of growth is to enable consumption to 
play a more significant role in boosting economic development in China. That 
potential is large, as the proportions of final consumption expenditure and 
household consumption expenditure in gross domestic product (GDP) have 
significantly declined since the period of reform and opening-up. In 2013 these 
two proportions were 48.2 per cent and 34.1 per cent respectively. In comparison, 
the proportions of final consumption expenditure and household consumption 
expenditure in GDP in the United States and Japan are both higher and have 
been increasing. For the United States in 2013, these rates were 83 per cent and 
68 per cent and for Japan 82 per cent and 61 per cent, respectively.1
There are many possible approaches to achieving the target of expanding 
consumption in China. Releasing migrant consumption potential is one of the 
most important. This relates, first, to the fact that the number of migrants and 
migrant income per capita have recently increased rapidly (Cai and Du 2011; 
Cai and Wang 2013; DRS NBS 2014; Li 2013). The resulting total migrant income 
pool is huge, and this offers large potential consumption. Second, the new 
generation of migrants has a higher marginal propensity to consume than the 
previous generation of migrants (Project Team on ‘New Generation of Migrant 
Workers’ 2011; Wang 2013). In this way, migrants are an emerging new consumer 
group whose impact on the shape of the new normal could be significant.
A number of factors could, however, be suppressing migrant consumption. 
The leading factor is that compared with urban residents, migrants are 
disadvantaged in employment conditions, income levels and access to social 
welfare and public services. Specifically, they usually do not have stable jobs, 
they earn lower incomes and they have fewer social security and public service 
entitlements (China Development Research Foundation 2010; Fan et al. 2013). 
1  Data are from World Bank (various years).
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Yet microeconomics informs us that income is the fundamental determinant of 
consumption. Less directly, employment conditions, social security and public 
services have also been shown to affect consumption.2
This gulf between urban residents and migrants is driven by the strictures of 
China’s hukou system, which has been hindering migration from rural to urban 
areas. Migrants do not have equitable access to education, health care, social 
welfares and public services with urban residents (Fan et al. 2013; Research 
Group of Development Research Center of the State Council 2010), though 
many reforms of the hukou system have been implemented in the past three 
decades (Cai 2011b). The gulf in migrants’ rights could also be indicative of the 
potential to increase urban consumption levels via migrants. Cai (2011a) found 
that migrants’ propensity to consume would increase were they able to obtain 
permanent and full rights in their adopted urban home.
Comparative analysis of migrant consumption potential requires micro-survey 
data from both migrants and urban residents. Unfortunately, most studies use 
the data compiled from surveys that exclusively sample migrants (for example, 
Cao et al. 2012; Kong and Su 2013; Su and Kong 2012). The work of Song et 
al. (2010) is an exception. Macroeconomic linkages between migrant rights 
and consumption demand and economic development were explored using a 
computable general equilibrium (CGE) model (Research Group of Development 
Research Center of the State Council 2010). Unfortunately, the macroeconomic 
focus hid microeconomic considerations. The CGE model also forces a lot of 
assumptions.
This study uses micro-survey data that include migrants and urban residents 
to explore the consumption potential of migrants if they enjoy comprehensive 
urban rights, taking urban residents as the reference group. It compares the 
consumption level and patterns of migrants and urban residents and explores 
the determinants of consumption for the two groups. The study also estimates 
the consumption potential of migrants if they are granted equivalent status to 
and consume the same as urban residents. Migrants in cities can be divided into 
rural-to-urban migrants and urban-to-urban migrants. This study focuses on 
rural-to-urban migrants.
The rest of this study is organised as follows: the second section introduces the 
data used for this analysis and analyses empirical trends in the consumption 
level and patterns of migrants, using urban residents as the benchmark. 
The third section examines the determinants of consumption for migrants and 
2  For example, many studies show that social security coverage can promote consumption (Feldstein 
1974; Munnell 1974; Zhang 2008). In contrast, a lower social security coverage rate generates unstable 
expectations for the future, which can restrict consumption.
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urban residents and estimates both the income elasticity of consumption and 
the marginal propensity to consume for the two groups. The fourth section 
estimates the consumption level and consumption pattern of migrants in the 
case of this group enjoying comprehensive urban rights; and the last section 
offers conclusions and policy suggestions.
Consumption levels and consumption patterns 
of migrants and urban residents
This section introduces the data used for the analysis, describing the sampling 
method for the data and the main information included, as well as discussing the 
advantage of using these data for the analysis. It also analyses the consumption 
level and pattern of migrants, taking urban residents as the reference group.
The data
This study uses the data from the China Urban Labour Survey (CULS). The CULS 
was conducted in 2010 in six cities—Shanghai, Wuhan, Shenyang, Fuzhou, 
Xi’an and Guangzhou—by the Institute of Population and Labour Economics 
of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. There are two advantages of using 
these survey data. First, the survey includes both migrants and urban residents, 
which can be used for comparative analysis and prediction of the consumption 
potential of migrants using urban residents as the reference group. Second, the 
survey includes detailed information on employment, income, consumption 
and social security, which offers the possibility of examining the determinants 
of consumption for migrants and urban residents.
The CULS used population-sampling techniques to identify 700 representative 
urban households in each city, and then applied a two-stage interview procedure. 
First, each household head was questioned about the household and then all 
household members were interviewed individually. In each city, that process 
was repeated in interviews with 600 migrant households. Migrants included 
those who had moved from rural areas and those who had moved from one 
urban hub to another—that is, migrants in the survey held both agricultural 
and non-agricultural hukou. This study exclusively utilises the survey results 
of the migrant households holding an agricultural hukou. In other words, this 
study analyses rural-to-urban migrants.
Information captured by the survey can be divided into two categories: individual 
information of household members and household information. The individual 
information includes the basic demographics of household members such as 
human capital characteristics, employment situation, income and consumption 
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at the individual level, and social security situation. The household information 
includes housing, income and consumption at the household level and some 
other information. This study focuses on consumption results, which are very 
detailed. Samples from 4,148 urban households and 2,428 migrant households 
from the CULS are used.
Comparative descriptive analysis of migrant consumption
The categories of consumption involved in the CULS study include food, 
clothing, household facilities, articles and services, health care and medical 
services, transport and communications, education, culture and recreation, and 
other articles and services. For simplicity, we combine these categories as follows. 
First, clothing, transport and communications, and cultural and recreation 
consumption are combined into work-related consumption; second, household 
facilities, articles and services and other articles and services are combined into 
facilities and services; third, health care and medical services and education are 
combined into human capital consumption. The four categories of consumption 
used in this study are thus food consumption, work-related consumption, 
facilities and services consumption, and human capital consumption.
The average yearly consumption per capita of migrants is RMB8,627, which 
is, on average, 22 per cent lower than that of urban residents (Table 5.1). 
The gap may relate to differences in facilities, services and human capital 
consumption between migrants and urban residents. Migrant facilities and 
services consumption is 37.6 per cent lower than that of urban residents, while 
human capital consumption is 47.9 per cent lower than that of urban residents. 
The difference between migrants and urban residents for food and work-related 
consumption is smaller. Migrants’ food consumption is lower than that of 
urban residents by 14.7 per cent, and migrants’ work-related consumption is 
19.6 per cent lower than that of urban residents.











Food 4,620 5,416 –796 –14.7
Work-related 2,707 3,367 –660 –19.6
Facilities and services 554 888 –334 –37.6
Human capital 747 1,433 –686 –47.9
Total 8,627 11,104 –2,477 –22.3
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the China Urban Labour Survey (CULS) (2010).
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For both migrants and urban residents, the proportion of food consumption 
in total consumption is about 50 per cent. The proportion of work-related 
consumption ranks second, and the proportions of other categories of 
consumption are all relatively low (Table 5.2). The proportions of work-related 
consumption and that of facilities and services are similar for migrants and urban 
residents, but there are some differences in the consumption patterns between 
the two groups. For example, the proportion of migrants’ food consumption 
is higher than that of urban residents by 4.8 percentage points, while the 
proportion of migrants’ human capital consumption is lower than that of urban 
residents by 4.2 percentage points.
Table 5.2 Consumption patterns of migrants and urban residents






Food 53.6 48.8 4.8
Work-related 31.4 30.3 1.1
Facilities and services 6.4 8.0 –1.6
Human capital 8.7 12.9 –4.2
Total 100 100 0.0
Source: Authors’ calculations from CULS (2010).
The analysis above reveals differences in the consumption levels and patterns 
of migrants and urban residents. Descriptive analysis, however, cannot reveal 
if these differences are significant. The consumption level and patterns of a 
household are affected by many factors, such as household income level, social 
security coverage rate of household members, household size, age structure 
of household members, gender of household head, age of household head and 
educational level of household head. Use of an econometric model enables 
better exploration of the determinants of consumption for migrants and urban 
residents.
The determinants of consumption for migrants 
and urban residents
This section uses an econometric model to analyse the determinants of 
consumption for migrants and urban residents. Specifically, it examines 
whether there is a significant difference in consumption level, income elasticity 
of consumption and marginal consumption propensity between the two groups. 
The model utilised is ordinary least squares (OLS).
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Income elasticity of consumption for migrants and urban 
residents: Sub-sample analysis
The household is the unit of analysis. The dependent variable is the log of 
consumption per capita of a household. Income is the fundamental factor 
affecting consumption, which is first included among independent variables in 
the model. The rate of coverage of social security of household members is an 
important factor affecting consumption, which is also included in the model. 
In addition, household size, the age structure of household members, individual 
characteristics of the household head and city dummy variables are included in 
the model. The model is specified as follows (Equation 5.1).
Equation 5.1
In Equation 5.1, lnconpc is the log of consumption per capita of a household; 
lnincpc is the log of disposable income per capita of a household; β (the coefficient 
of lnincpc) is the income elasticity of consumption; ssp is the pension coverage 
rate of household members; hhsize is household size; pold is the proportion 
of household members aged 65 and above; HEAD is a vector of individual 
characteristics of the household head (including gender, age and years of 
schooling); CITY is a group of city dummy variables (the reference group is 
Shanghai); and u is the error term. The independent variables in the model are 
listed in Table 5.3.
Table 5.3 Independent variables in the model
Independent variable Variable type Explanation
Disposable income per capita Continuous Household disposable income per capita 
Coverage rate of pension Continuous Coverage rate of pension among household 
members aged 16 and above
Household size Continuous Number of household members
Proportion of household aged 
65 and above
Continuous Proportion of household members aged 65 
and above
Household head is female Dummy Household head is female=1; household 
head is male=0
Age of household head Continuous Age of household head
Years of schooling of 
household head
Continuous Years of schooling of household head
Wuhan Dummy Wuhan=1, otherwise=0
Shenyang Dummy Shenyang=1, otherwise=0
Fuzhou Dummy Fuzhou=1, otherwise=0
Xi’an Dummy Xi’an=1, otherwise=0
Guangzhou Dummy Guangzhou=1, otherwise=0
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Income level is the fundamental factor affecting consumption. Disposable 
income per capita is included in the model to capture the effect of income on 
consumption. The positive effect of income on consumption has been proven by 
previous studies (for example, Feldstein 1974; Song et al. 2010). We can expect 
that income has affected consumption positively.
The coverage rate of social security has also affected consumption (Munnell 
1974; Zhang 2008). We include the pension coverage rate of household members 
aged 16 and above in the model to capture the effect of social security coverage 
on consumption, which could be mixed. On the one hand, people covered by 
social security might have more stable expectations of future income, which 
could increase current consumption. On the other hand, expenditure on social 
security reduces current disposable income, which could reduce current 
consumption.
Variables relating to household size and the age structure of household members 
could also affect consumption. Household size is included in the model to capture 
whether there are economies of scale in household consumption. The proportion 
of those aged 65 and above is included in the model to capture the effects on some 
categories of consumption. For example, households with a higher proportion of 
members aged 65 and above might have higher levels of consumption of health 
care and medical services and less consumption of education.
A vector of variables of individual characteristics of the household head, 
including gender, age and years of schooling, is included in the model. 
These are all important characteristics of the household head, which could affect 
consumption decisions. For example, households whose head has more years 
of schooling might have greater consumption. Finally, a group of city dummy 
variables is included to reflect the city where the sample points were collected: 
Wuhan, Shenyang, Fuzhou, Xi’an and Guangzhou. This captures the regional 
factors that could affect consumption, and takes Shanghai as the reference 
group. The descriptive statistics on the independent variables are in Table 5.4.
Table 5.4 Descriptive characteristics of migrants and urban residents
Independent variable Migrants Urban residents
Disposable income per capita (RMB) 19,559 20,995
Coverage rate of pension 0.11 0.70
Household size 2.29 2.89
Proportion of household aged 65 and above 0.01 0.16
Proportion of households whose head is female 0.33 0.31
Age of household head 35 52
Years of schooling of household head 9.7 11.1
Source: Authors’ calculations from CULS (2010).
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Table 5.5 presents the regression results. From the descriptive analysis, we saw 
that food consumption is an important part of total consumption, occupying 
about 50 per cent of total consumption. We thus run regressions on total 
consumption and food consumption. The R squared for all regression models 
is above 20 per cent, and the regression results are basically in line with our 
expectations.
Table 5.5 Income elasticity of consumption for migrants and urban residents (sub-
sample)
Dependent variable:
Log of consumption 
per capita
Total consumption Food consumption
Migrants Urban residents Migrants Urban residents
Log of disposable income 
per capita
0.247 0.279 0.189 0.201
(10.21)*** (18.35)*** (8.55)*** (14.29)***
Coverage rate of pension 0.109 0.020 0.078 0.002
(2.89)*** (0.91) (1.81)* (0.09)
Household size –0.033 –0.087 –0.053 –0.124
(3.01)*** (11.74)*** (4.64)*** (16.17)***
Proportion of household 
aged 65 and above
0.149 0.037 –0.094 0.045
(0.81) (1.09) (0.72) (1.30)
Household head is 
female
0.048 0.045 –0.006 0.031
(2.05)** (2.84)*** (0.23) (1.85)*
Age of household head –0.004 –0.002 0.001 –0.000
(3.60)*** (2.86)*** (0.63) (0.17)
Years of schooling of 
household head
0.031 0.028 0.025 0.018
(7.97)*** (11.47)*** (6.00)*** (6.99)***
City dummy variables Omitted Omitted Omitted Omitted
Constant term 6.515 6.559 6.507 6.852
(25.49)*** (42.49)*** (26.86)*** (47.74)***
R squared 0.29 0.36 0.23 0.31
Number of observations 2428 4148 2428 4148
*** significant at 1 per cent. 
** significant at 5 per cent. 
* significant at 10 per cent. 
Note: t statistics in parentheses. 
Source: Authors’ calculations from CULS (2010).
The dependent variable of the model is log of consumption per capita. 
The coefficient of log of disposable income per capita is income elasticity of 
consumption. The income elasticity of total consumption for migrants is 0.247, 
which indicates that, if migrants’ income per capita increases by 1 per cent, 
0.247 per cent of this will be used for consumption. Similarly, the income 
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elasticity of food consumption for migrants is 0.189, which indicates that, if 
migrants’ income per capita increases by 1 per cent, 0.189 per cent of this will 
be used for food consumption. For migrants and urban residents, both income 
elasticity of total consumption and income elasticity of food consumption are 
significantly positive.
The pension coverage rate has a positive effect on both total consumption and 
food consumption for migrants, but almost no effect on total consumption 
and food consumption for urban residents. This implies that pension coverage 
expansion would promote migrants’ consumption. This is consistent with 
conclusions of the existing literature (for example, Feldstein 1974; Munnell 
1974). Therefore, expanding pension coverage is an important way to promote 
migrants’ consumption.
Household size has a negative effect on total consumption and food consumption 
for both migrants and urban residents. This indicates that total consumption 
per capita and food consumption per capita are lower in larger households. 
This  suggests that households enjoy economies of scale in total consumption 
and food consumption. For example, the coefficient on household size for 
migrants’ total consumption is –0.033, which indicates that migrants’ total 
consumption per capita decreases by 3.3 per cent with one additional household 
member. The coefficient of household size for migrants’ food consumption is 
–0.053, which indicates that migrants’ food consumption per capita decreases 
by 5.3 per cent with each additional household member.
Compared with households whose heads are males, in households whose heads 
are females total consumption per capita is higher, for both migrant and urban 
households. The age of the household head has a consistent effect also, but this 
is negative, which indicates that the total per capita consumption of households 
whose head is older is less. The age of the household head does not, however, 
have a significant effect on food consumption.
The years of schooling of the household head have a positive effect on total 
consumption and food consumption, for both migrants and urban residents. 
This  indicates that, after controlling for other factors, total consumption per 
capita and food consumption per capita of households whose heads have had 
more years of schooling are higher for both migrants and urban residents. 
Therefore, improving educational levels is an important way to promote 
consumption.
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Income elasticity of consumption for migrants and urban 
residents: Pooled sample
As has been pointed out, due to the different characteristics of migrants and 
urban residents, migrant attitudes to consumption could be different from those 
of urban residents. In order to examine this prospective difference, we pool the 
samples of migrants and urban residents and add a dummy variable, M (M=1 
if migrant, M=0 otherwise) to run the regressions. This model is specified as 
follows (Equation 5.2).
Equation 5.2
Furthermore, to examine for any difference in the income elasticity of 
consumption of migrant and urban residents, we add a term (M*lnincpc) to 
Equation 5.2, which is the interaction of M and the log of disposable income per 
capita, forming Equation 5.3. 
Equation 5.3
If the coefficient of the interaction term (ω) is significant, it means there is a 
difference in income elasticity of consumption between migrants and urban 
residents. Positive ω means the income elasticity of consumption for migrants is 
higher than for urban residents, and negative ω means the income elasticity of 
consumption for migrants is lower than for urban residents.
The regression results of Equations 5.2 and 5.3, which use pooled samples 
of migrants and urban residents on total consumption per capita and food 
consumption per capita, respectively, are shown in Table 5.6. The regressions 
results are basically in line with our expectations.
For Equation 5.2, we focus on the dummy variable M. The coefficient of M is 
negative for both total consumption and food consumption. This means that, 
compared with urban residents, for migrants, total consumption per capita 
and food consumption per capita are both less. Specifically, total consumption 
per capita for migrants is lower than for urban residents by 24.4 per cent, and 
food consumption per capita for migrants is lower than for urban residents by 
14.5 per cent.
In Equation 5.3, we focus on the interaction term of M and log of disposable 
income per capita. If the coefficient of the interaction term is significant, it 
means there is a difference in the income elasticity of consumption of migrants 
and urban residents. The regression results show that the coefficient of the 
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interaction term is not significant for total consumption and food consumption, 
which means there is no difference in income elasticity of consumption between 
migrants and urban residents.
Table 5.6 Income elasticity of consumption for migrants and urban residents 
(pooled sample)
Dependent variable:
Log of consumption 
per capita









Migrant –0.244 –0.145 0.106 –0.000
(12.47)*** (7.14)*** (0.45) (0.00)
Log of disposable 
income per capita
0.266 0.195 0.281 0.201
(19.93)*** (16.03)*** (19.29)*** (14.94)***
Interaction term  –0.036  –0.015
(1.48) (0.67)
Coverage rate of pension 0.046 0.023 0.047 0.024
(2.50)** (1.21) (2.55)** (1.24)
Household size –0.064 –0.094 –0.065 –0.094
(10.37)*** (14.50)*** (10.41)*** (14.49)***
Proportion of household 
aged 65 and above
0.076 0.058 0.072 0.056
(2.41)** (1.80)* (2.25)** (1.73)*
Household head is 
female
0.047 0.015 0.047 0.014
(3.58)*** (1.01) (3.57)*** (1.00)
Age of household head –0.003 0.000 –0.003 0.000
(4.25)*** (0.58) (4.32)*** (0.56)
Years of schooling of 
household head
0.030 0.021 0.029 0.020
(14.49)*** (9.52)*** (14.29)*** (9.39)***
City dummy variables n.a.1 n.a. n.a. n.a
Constant term 6.605 6.748 6.473 6.694
(47.86)*** (52.13)*** (44.05)*** (48.73)***
R squared 0.36 0.28 0.36 0.28
Number of observations 6576 6576 6576 6576
1 n.a. = not applicable. 
*** significant at 1 per cent. 
** significant at 5 per cent. 
* significant at 10 per cent. 
Notes: t statistics in parentheses. 
Source: Authors’ calculations from CULS (2010).
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Marginal consumption propensities for migrants and urban 
residents: Sub-sample
In the previous sections, we discussed income elasticity of consumption for 
migrants and urban residents. In addition, we would like to understand the 
marginal propensity to consume of the two groups. From Equation 5.1, if both 
log of consumption per capita and log of disposable income per capita are 
changed to their original values but other variables remain as they are, Equation 
5.4 is formed as follows, in which the coefficient of disposable income per capita 
(β) is marginal consumption propensity (Equation 5.4).
Equation 5.4
We run regressions on migrants and urban residents respectively, using 
Equation 5.4. The regression results are shown in Table 5.7 and are basically 
in line with our expectations. We focus on the variable capturing disposable 
income per capita and its coefficient, the marginal consumption propensity. 
We do not discuss results of other independent variables in detail.




Total consumption Food consumption
Migrants Urban residents Migrants Urban residents
Disposable income per 
capita
0.161 0.102 0.065 0.024
(5.64)*** (3.23)*** (4.16)*** (2.75)***
Coverage rate of pension 1,214.369 71.024 774.982 40.777
(1.50) (0.18) (1.54) (0.18)
Household size –426.084 –1,314.904 –406.435 –945.193
(2.54)** (8.37)*** (5.23)*** (9.88)***
Proportion of household 
aged 65 and above
1,556.470 935.788 –558.701 404.275
(1.18) (1.55) (1.01) (1.32)
Household head is female 282.475 368.961 –19.287 –52.010
(0.75) (1.34) (0.12) (0.37)
Age of household head –71.971 –24.857 –13.790 –0.897
(4.14)*** (1.84)* (1.56) (0.11)
Years of schooling of 
household head
221.350 390.871 96.130 135.229
(4.15)*** (7.09)*** (3.32)*** (6.26)***





Total consumption Food consumption
Migrants Urban residents Migrants Urban residents
Constant term 7,424.812 10,555.847 4,425.996 7,309.175
(5.38)*** (9.29)*** (5.53)*** (11.54)***
R squared 0.19 0.22 0.19 0.14
Number of observations 2428 4148 2428 4148
*** significant at 1 per cent.  
** significant at 5 per cent.  
* significant at 10 per cent. 
Notes: t statistics in parentheses. 
Source: Authors’ calculations from CULS (2010).
The marginal propensities of total consumption and food consumption are 
positive for both migrants and urban residents. The marginal propensity of total 
consumption for migrants is 0.161, which means that RMB0.161 is used for 
total consumption if migrants’ disposable income per capita increases by RMB1. 
Marginal propensity of food consumption for migrants is 0.065, which means 
that RMB0.065 is used for food consumption if migrants’ disposable income per 
capita increases by RMB1.
Marginal consumption propensities of migrants and urban 
residents: Pooled sample
To further examine marginal propensity of consumption, we pool together 
the samples of migrants and urban residents and add a dummy variable (M) 
to examine the differences in consumption of migrants and urban residents to 
Equation 5.4, which forms Equation 5.5.
Equation 5.5
In order to examine whether there is a difference in the marginal consumption 
propensities of migrants and urban residents, we add a term (M*incpc) to 
Equation 5.5, which is the interaction of M and disposable income per capita, 
forming Equation 5.6. If the coefficient of the interaction term (ω) is significant, 
this means there is a difference in marginal consumption propensities between 
migrants and urban residents. A positive ω means that the marginal consumption 
propensity for migrants is higher than for urban residents, while a negative ω 
means that the marginal consumption propensity of migrants is lower than that 
of urban residents.
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Equation 5.6
The regression results of Equations 5.5 and 5.6 are shown in Table 5.8. 
We use pooled samples of migrants and urban residents to run regressions on 
total consumption per capita and food consumption per capita, respectively. 
The regression results are basically in line with our expectations.




Equation 5.5 Equation 5.6
Total Food Total Food
Migrant –2,500.342 –750.115 –3,473.584 –1,537.236
(7.32)*** (3.87)*** (4.38)*** (5.04)***
Disposable income per 
capita
0.119 0.035 0.107 0.026
(4.16)*** (3.36)*** (3.32)*** (2.85)***
Interaction term 0.044 0.036
(1.12) (2.14)**
Coverage rate of pension 446.476 331.065 352.477 255.042
(1.24) (1.52) (1.01) (1.26)
Household size –964.451 –738.352 –945.096 –722.699
(7.73)*** (11.20)*** (8.05)*** (11.28)***
Proportion of household 
aged 65 and above
1,316.799 521.165 1,413.048 599.008
(2.35)** (1.93)* (2.55)** (2.22)**
Household head is female 237.770 –108.936 262.247 –89.140
(1.08) (0.96) (1.19) (0.79)
Age of household head –39.120 –3.900 –39.296 –4.043
(3.68)*** (0.63) (3.71)*** (0.66)
Years of schooling of 
household head
333.261 119.996 340.017 125.460
(7.81)*** (6.34)*** (7.95)*** (7.01)***
City dummy variables Omitted Omitted Omitted Omitted
Constant term 10,162.353 6,397.481 10,338.443 6,539.897
(9.91)*** (11.39)*** (10.01)*** (12.17)***
R squared 0.22 0.15 0.22 0.16
Number of observations 6576 6576 6576 6576
*** significant at 1 per cent.  
** significant at 5 per cent.  
* significant at 10 per cent. 
Notes: t statistics in parentheses. 
Source: Authors’ calculations from CULS (2010).
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In Equation 5.5, we focus on the dummy variable M. The coefficient of M is 
negative for both total consumption and food consumption. This means that, 
compared with urban residents, for migrants, total consumption per capita and 
food consumption per capita are both less.
In Equation 5.6, we focus on the interaction term of M and disposable income 
per capita. If the coefficient of the interaction term is significant, it means there 
is a difference in marginal consumption propensity between migrants and urban 
residents. The regression results show that the coefficient of the interaction 
term is not significant for total consumption; however, the coefficient of the 
interaction term is significant and positive for food consumption. This means 
that there is no difference in the marginal propensities of total consumption 
between migrants and urban residents, but the marginal propensity of food 
consumption for migrants is higher than for urban residents.
Consumption potential of migrants: Taking 
urban residents as a reference group
The analysis above informs us that across all categories of consumption migrant 
consumption is lower than that of urban residents. After controlling for other 
factors, however, there is no significant difference in the marginal propensity 
of total consumption between migrants and urban residents, but the marginal 
propensity of food consumption for migrants is higher than for urban residents. 
Since migrant incomes have been increasing rapidly in recent years, we can 
expect that, if migrants are able to enjoy resident rights in terms of access to 
services and facilities, social security and so on in their adopted urban home, 
their consumption potential is huge.
To estimate how huge, we assume that migrants will follow the same consumption 
patterns as urban residents when they have access to the same rights and 
benefits. We can use the regression model of consumption for urban residents 
(Equation 5.4) to calculate the consumption of migrants under that assumption 
(Table 5.9). 
If migrants consume like urban residents, their consumption level will become 
similar to that of urban residents. Examining by category, we find that 
migrants’ estimated consumption of food and of facilities and services will be 
very similar to those of urban residents. Estimated work-related consumption 
for migrants will be higher than that of urban residents, by 9.1 per cent. 
Meanwhile, the estimated human capital consumption for migrants will be 
much lower—28.4 per cent lower—than that for urban residents.
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Table 5.9 Estimation of consumption potential of migrants










Food 5,393 5,416 –23 –0.4
Work-related 3,674 3,367 307 9.1
Facilities and services 868 888 –20 –2.3
Human capital 1,026 1,433 –407 –28.4
Total 10,960 11,104 –144 –1.3
Note: Estimates for migrants refer to migrants’ yearly consumption per capita if they follow the same 
paths to consumption as urban residents. 
Source: Authors’ calculations from CULS (2010).
If migrants consume the same as urban residents, their consumption will increase 
by a large extent—compared with their actual consumption (Table  5.10). 
Specifically, total consumption per capita of migrants will increase by RMB2,333, 
or by about 27 per cent. Food consumption will increase by 16.7 per cent, 
which is the lowest increase among all categories of consumption. Work-related 
consumption and human capital consumption will increase by 35.7 per cent and 
37.3 per cent, respectively. Facilities and services consumption will increase by 
a massive 56.7 per cent.









Food 5,393 4,620 773 16.7
Work-related 3,674 2,707 967 35.7
Facilities and services 868 554 314 56.7
Human capital 1,026 747 279 37.3
Total 10,960 8,627 2,333 27.0
Note: ‘Estimated’ refers to migrants’ yearly consumption per capita if they follow the same paths to 
consumption as urban residents. ‘Actual’ refers to migrants’ actual yearly consumption per capita. 
Source: Authors’ calculations from CULS (2010).
A monitoring survey of migrants conducted in 31 provinces by the National 
Bureau of Statistics of China (NBS) shows that the number of those having 
migrated beyond their home township for a period longer than six months 
reached 145 million in 2009 (DRS NBS 2014). Our analysis shows that migrants’ 
yearly consumption per capita is RMB8,627. Total consumption of migrants was 
thus RMB1.251 trillion in 2009. 
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Similarly, our analysis finds that if migrants consume the same as urban residents, 
their consumption per capita will increase by RMB2,333. The total consumption 
of migrants will also increase, by RMB338.3 billion, and reach RMB1.589 trillion. 
Since GDP was RMB34.090 trillion in 2009, total consumption of migrants thus 
occupied 4.7 per cent of GDP.
Estimation of migrants’ consumption potential in this chapter is based on the 
assumption that migrants’ characteristics remain as they are. The regression 
results show that income, pension coverage and educational level can promote 
migrants’ consumption levels. For migrants, income has been increasing rapidly, 
pension coverage has been expanding and the educational level has been 
improving in recent years. If improvements in these aspects are considered, the 
potential consumption of migrants is more substantial.
Conclusions and policy suggestions
This study used China Urban Labour Survey data from 2010 to compare the 
consumption level and patterns of migrants and urban residents. It analysed 
the determinants of consumption and examined the income elasticity of 
consumption and the marginal propensity to consume of the two groups. Using 
the regression results, it estimated the consumption potential of migrants under 
the assumption that migrants achieve full residency and access rights in their 
adopted home and that their characteristics are otherwise unchanged. 
This study shows that migrants’ total consumption per capita is 22 per cent 
lower than that of urban residents. The income elasticity of total consumption 
and the income elasticity of food consumption are positive for both migrants 
and urban residents. There is no difference between the two groups in income 
elasticity of total consumption and income elasticity of food consumption. 
Factors affecting consumption include pension coverage, which has a positive 
effect on total consumption per capita and food consumption per capita 
for migrants. Household size negatively affects total consumption and food 
consumption per capita, for both migrants and urban residents, possibly 
due to scale effects. The years of schooling of the household head affect total 
consumption and food consumption per capita positively for both migrants and 
urban residents. The marginal propensities of total consumption and of food 
consumption are positive for both migrants and urban residents. There is no 
significant difference between migrants and urban residents in the marginal 
propensity of total consumption. The marginal propensity of food consumption 
is higher for migrants than for urban residents.
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If migrants are granted equivalent status and consume the same as urban 
residents, and other characteristics are held constant, total migrant consumption 
per capita will increase by 27 per cent—to a level similar to that of urban 
residents. The regression results suggest that increases in income, pension 
coverage and educational attainment can promote migrant consumption. 
Through the urbanisation process of recent years, these characteristics have 
been improving rapidly for migrants. The combination of implied changes in 
consumption levels that would be enabled through improvements in areas of 
these demographic characteristics could in turn produce an enormous lift to 
aggregate consumption—that is, migrants have the potential to become a huge 
emerging consumer group and to play an important role in boosting domestic 
demand and promoting China’s economic development.
Therefore, granting migrants full residency rights, such as access to education, 
health care and social security, is not only an important task and challenge 
of urbanisation, but also appears to be an intrinsic requirement for China’s 
economic development. In recent years, China has made great efforts to provide 
more and better public services and social welfare for migrants (Cai 2011b; China 
Development Research Foundation 2010). Several documents have been issued 
to elaborate issues concerning rural-to-urban migrants since 2014. Continued 
promotion of migrant livelihoods is crucial to further tap the economic benefits 
of their consumption potential.
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6. National Energy 
Market Integration 
A study of energy price convergence in China
Qing King Guo, Chi Keung Marco Lau, Kunwang Li and Ligang Song
Introduction
Energy price convergence is one of the leading indicators for understanding 
market liberalisation and integration. The first contribution to the literature on 
the success of Chinese market reform and market integration is Young (2000). 
The author uses simple trends in the regional variance of prices to quantify 
market liberalisation and integration. Fan and Wei (2006), however, cast doubt 
on Young’s controversial finding that China’s internal markets became less rather 
than more integrated during the reform period. Fan and Wei used a nonlinear 
panel unit root test and found ‘strong evidence of price convergence and hence 
market integration in China. Such a finding is in favour of the view that China’s 
transition to a market economy has been quite successful during the last two 
decades’ (2006: 692). 
Following the method of Fan and Wei (2006), Ma et al. (2009) use a linear panel 
unit root test and focus on the energy market; they found evidence that energy 
prices are mostly converging to the national average price. They further suggested 
that ‘if policymakers actually want to control energy markets in the future, they 
need to devise new ways to intervene in the energy sector, otherwise the reforms 
they have introduced have clearly led to a more market-oriented energy sector’ 
(Ma et al. 2009: 4848). The work of Fan and Wei (2006) and Ma et al. (2009) links 
price convergence to market liberalisation and internal market integration by 
adopting the ‘law of one price’ (LOP) and arbitrage behaviour. 
The LOP implies that identical goods sold in different locations tend to converge 
to the same price if markets for those goods are fully developed and transport 
costs are controlled for, indicating purchasing power parity (PPP) in the 
international context. In the 1980s, a vast literature studied price convergence 
and the speed of adjustment for international markets, using unit root and 
cointegration techniques. In the 1990s, researchers shifted their focus and 
interest from international to intra-national studies of price convergence, in part 
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because the latter are subject to less restrictive assumptions for PPP1 (Parsley 
and Wei 1996). Many intra-country studies have examined whether the LOP 
holds (for example, Fan and Wei 2006; Lan and Sylwester 2010). 
It is the conventional view that arbitrage opportunity among regions exists such 
that for the same good, trade will take place for agents to make a profit. In the long 
run, prices in different regions should converge to a single level, assuming zero 
or negligible transaction costs—say, transportation costs. In the literature, only 
nonlinear unit root tests can release the non-zero transaction cost assumption. 
Some recent examples of convergence studies that link convergence phenomena 
and policy reform, market integration and marketisation include Lau  et al. 
(2015) for military expenditure convergence for the world; Lau et al. (2014) for 
healthcare expenditure in the European Union; Bilgin et al. (2010) for rental price 
convergence in Turkey; Akhmedjonov et al. (2013) for income convergence in 
Russia; and Suvankulov et al. (2012) for gasoline price convergence in Canada. 
Empirical literature devoted to price convergence of energy markets in China 
remains limited (Ma et al. 2010). Fan and Wei (2006) are the first to investigate 
internal market integration in China using the unit root test. Their empirical 
results provide evidence for the proposition that gradualist reform has been 
quite successful in effecting the transformation from a planned to a market-
oriented economy.2 
Since a free and competitive market with a price mechanism underlies efficient 
resource allocation, this is of central concern for a transitional and per capita 
resource-poor economy such as China. The price dynamics of China’s energy 
sector in particular are critical to market integration, not only because the 
energy market has been closely associated with manufacturing activities and 
environmental issues, but also because these are exposed to international 
energy price fluctuations. Moreover, China has 30 provinces and provincial-
level municipalities, and each of these is unique in terms of demographic 
structure, geography and level of development. This also suggests that these 
characteristics may affect the market integration for goods and energy products, 
and vice versa.3
1  For example, the theory assumes that the transaction for mobile goods takes place converging towards 
PPP only under competitive market conditions for both countries without incurring transportation 
costs, barriers to trade and other transaction costs. It can be argued that these conditions are more valid 
in intra-national than international settings.
2  In this chapter, we denote the success of this transformation as ‘marketisation’.
3  Fan and Wei (2006) found evidence of a higher degree of market integration for major cities in the coastal 
region for commodities including raw industrial materials, processed industrial materials, durable goods 
and vehicles, and services. Moreover, we cannot exclude the possibility that a higher degree of market 
integration (that is, allocative efficiency) affects the development level. 
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The purpose of this chapter is to examine price convergence among key energy 
products, such as gasoline, diesel, coal and gas across different regions in China 
over the sample period. This exercise helps shed light on the marketisation 
process in China, which has been being introduced incrementally for some 
three decades now. In addition, understanding whether domestic energy 
markets are more integrated across different regions can retrospectively and 
prospectively inform the reform process in China. Where a lack of evidence of 
price convergence is found for key energy products between regions in China, 
this could imply that Chinese domestic markets are not closely integrated, and 
that central and local governments should persist in extending relevant policy 
designs and implementation. Finally, a clear understanding of the price dynamic 
is important for designing economic policies, such as setting the level of the 
minimum wage in different locations across China. 
China’s industrialisation massively increased demand for energy. By 2005, and 
immediately following the annual growth of 3 per cent in energy intensity of 
gross domestic product (GDP) (the ratio of energy consumption per unit of GDP) 
during 2002–05 (Zhou et al. 2010), the government reached a consensus that 
rapid increases in energy demand were unsustainable. A decision was taken to 
reduce the energy intensity of GDP, via improved energy efficiency, and this in 
turn would be driven in part by marketisation of energy prices. With the energy 
intensity of China’s GDP in 2007 being almost three times higher than the world 
average (Ma  et al. 2009),4 a series of goals was set to improve China’s energy 
efficiency levels. 
Table 6.1 Recent key energy policies supporting China’s 20 per cent reduction goal
Energy policies Date effective Responsible agency
Fuel consumption limits for passenger cars 2004
Medium and long-term plan for energy conservation 2005 National Development and 
Reform Commission (NDRC)
Renewable Energy Law 2005
Government procurement program 2005 NDRC and Ministry of 
Finance (MoF)
National energy efficient design standard for public 
buildings
2005 Ministry of Construction 
(MoC)
Eleventh Five-Year Plan 2006 NDRC
State Council decision on strengthening energy 
conservation
2006 State Council
Reduced export tax rebates for many low value-
added but high energy-consuming products
2006 MoF
Top 1,000 Energy-Consuming Enterprise program 2006 NDRC
4  For China, the energy intensity was 0.91 tonnes of oil equivalent per US$1,000 GDP (at 2000 prices) in 
comparison with 0.32 for the world average and 0.19 in Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) countries as reported by NBS (2007).
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Energy policies Date effective Responsible agency
‘Green Purchasing’ program 2006 Ministry of Environment 
Protection (MEP) and MoF
Revision of Energy Conservation Law 2007 National People’s Congress 
and NDRC
Allocation of funding on energy efficiency and 
pollution abatement
2007 MoF and NDRC
China energy technology policy outline 2007 NDRC and the Ministry of 
Science and Technology
Government Procurement program 2007 NDRC and MoF
National Phase III Vehicle Emission Standards 2007
Interim administrative method for incentive funds for 
heating and metering and energy efficiency retrofit 
for existing residential buildings in China’s northern 
heating area
2007 MoF
Law on Corporate Income Tax (preferential tax 
treatment for investment in energy-saving and 
environmentally friendly projects and equipment)
2008 NDRC
Allocation of funding on energy efficiency and 
pollution abatement
2008 MoF and NDRC
Appliance standards and labelling Various years General Administration 
of Quality Supervision, 
Inspection and Quarantine
Source: Zhou et al. (2010). 
The reforms instigated in 2005 were both broad and deep. Table 6.1 outlines 
a selection of the key policies, providing background to the direction of those 
reforms and also to the governance of that reform element. Energy-related 
quantitative goals agreed in November 2005 included a 20 per cent reduction of 
energy intensity of GDP by 2010, part of which could be achieved by closing 
small plants and phasing out outdated capacity in high-consumption industry 
sectors.5 Subsequent measures were designed and implemented, including laws, 
regulations and tax incentives to increase energy efficiency (Table 6.1) (Zhou et 
al. 2010). For such market-oriented measures to work effectively, parallel energy 
market reforms are required to allow energy product prices to move towards 
market-determined prices—a process that would also reduce differences in 
energy prices across different regions. This study explores that process of energy 
price convergence within China.
A sample period spanning 2006–12 is chosen for the study. This period begins 
one year after the initial set of energy pricing reforms began, in 2005, allowing 
for a time lag in policy outcomes. The time structure also implicitly allows 
for study of the impact of the energy pricing mechanism on energy efficiency 
(Ma et al. 2009) in testing the spatial convergence of energy prices during the 
5  The 10 industries of iron, steel, cement, coal-fired power, coking, ferrous metal, glass, paper, ethanol and 
coal production.
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key period in which energy reform policies applied, and especially the target of 
20 per cent energy efficiency improvement by 2012 as set in 2005. The rationale 
for analysing the energy price convergence trend between Chinese regions is 
that segmentation of energy markets across the country is likely to undermine 
energy-related reforms. 
Further, to date there has been insufficient attention in the literature to China’s 
energy markets. This means there is insufficient evidence on energy price 
convergence in China and, accordingly, little is known about the efficiency of 
reforms. Ma et al. (2009), for example, studied the spot price for four energy 
products—coal, electricity, gasoline and diesel—but only covering 35 provincial 
(or autonomous region and municipality) capital cities across one decade from 
1995. This study utilises a richer and updated dataset, and studies the energy 
market landscape following recent reforms.
Data 
Data used are collected from the Price Supervision Centre of the National 
Development and Reform Commission (NDRC). These data cover 20 types of 
energy products from the five key energy product categories: coal, gasoline, 
diesel, electricity and gas. Moreover, these data were collected at 10-day intervals, 
on the 5th, 15th and 25th of each month, from 2006 to 2012. The advantage of 
high-frequency data is that they contain more information regarding arbitrage 
opportunities and convergence speed (Bachmeier and Griffin 2006; Ma et al. 
2009; Taylor 2001). Setting the sample period to coincide with the key energy 
market reform era also provides scope to examine the degree of regional energy 
price convergence during the implementation phase of important energy policies 
in China. Detailed descriptions of data and the number of cities and provinces 
involved in each energy product are provided in the Appendix for this chapter.
Finally, the sample period coincides with the large fiscal stimulus package 
implemented by China’s government in response to the global financial crisis 
(GFC). This sought to boost demand, impacting both energy prices and energy 
efficiency. If substantial variation in energy prices between regions in China in 
the post-crisis period is uncovered, this could be related to the large scale of 
the fiscal stimulus package. In this case, the stimulus may have been effective in 
boosting domestic demand, but it could also have served to undermine energy 
market integration in the process. The design of this study is expected to reveal 
useful information on energy markets in China, and also on the wider issues 
within that market of spatial convergence or divergence over time and between 
locations.
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Preliminary analysis: Historical average energy 
product price trend
Gasoline and diesel
We first individually examine the pattern of price change over time for each 
energy product. Figure 6.1 shows the trend in average price—the mean of spot 
price at time ‘t’ across all regions—for each product. We observe that after 2009 
the average price of gasoline products was more volatile. From 2009 to 2012, 
that price also rose far more sharply than from 2006 to 2008. Specifically, from 
2009 to 2012, the average price climbed by RMB4,000 per tonne—double the 
rate of the earlier period, 2006–08. 
Price movement of diesel products is similar to that of gasoline products. This could 
relate to the oil price reform launched in 2009, under which domestic fuel prices 
were adjusted over a 22-day working period in response to a 4 per cent increase 
in Brent, Dubai and Cinta crude oil prices. A policy of explicit market response 
was linked to participants being free to set prices below the maximum retail price 
regulated by the government. This could also have contributed to higher price 
volatility after 2009. Finally, in 2013 the market was liberalised further and the 
prices of oil products were allowed to be adjusted every 10 working days, instead 
of every 22 days, to better reflect global oil price movement. 
Figure 6.1 Historical average prices of energy products in China
Source: Plotted using the survey data.
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Gas, electricity and coal
There is less movement in the gas price than in the prices of gasoline and diesel. 
Price changes that did take place in 2007 and 2010 are probably attributable to 
reform policies, including the 2007 price adjustment policy and energy intensity 
reduction reforms that were adopted in 2010. 
Coal product prices show a similar pattern of gradual increase before 2007, 
followed by a dramatic increase, and finally a substantial drop during the GFC. 
Since the beginning of 2009, all coal product prices remained steady, until the 
second half of 2011, when prices tended to decrease gradually.
Preliminary analysis: Comparison of energy 
price trend 
Table 6.2 presents the average spot prices and their changes for 20 energy 
products. The price of coal shows higher volatility than other energy products. 
For many coal products, the price in 2012 was double that in 2006—the result 
of an annual growth rate for coal products that was mostly above 11 per cent 
across the sample period. For diesel products, the price in 2012 was about 
67 per  cent more than the price in 2006. For gasoline products, the price in 
2012 was 57 per cent more than the price in 2006, reflecting an annual average 
growth rate of 7.8 per cent.6 Finally, compared with coal, gasoline and diesel, 
the prices of gas and electricity rose less rapidly. Gas increased by 40 per cent 
and electricity increased by an annual rate of 3.4 per cent, or 22 per cent over 
the sample period.
In addition to such price variation between different energy categories, price 
variation within energy product category groups is phenomenal. Coal and gas 
in particular have many subcategory products, and these have different growth 
rates. In the case of coal, the 2006–12 change in the price of ‘coal_mixed5000-
5500’7 was a striking 1,275 per cent, while that for ‘coal fertiliser’ was only 
35 per cent. Similar observations are found within gas product prices; however, 
this is not the case for gasoline or diesel products. The price changes of all 
gasoline and diesel subcategories are the same. This could imply that the markets 
for gasoline, diesel and electricity are subjected to greater regulation than the 
markets for coal and gas.
6  By coincidence, China’s growth trajectory depending on political calibrations is also 7.8 per cent GDP 
growth. 
7  ‘5000-5500’ refers to the calorific value; this category belongs to the ‘sub-bituminous’ rank and the 
moisture content is 20–40 per cent. For more information, see: www.coalmarketinginfo.com/coal-basics.
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Preliminary analysis: Trend for coefficient of 
variation
The coefficient of variation is defined as the standard deviation over the mean 
price over each region at time ‘t’, and shows the extent of price variability 
across regions. Figure 6.2 shows coefficients of variation for energy products in 
China, which we explored next.
Gasoline 
Panel B of Figure 6.2 shows the trend for the coefficient of variation attached 
to gasoline products. First, we observe more frequent regional variation after 
2009, which may be attributable to market reform policies launched in 2009 
that allowed greater arbitrage activity in the gasoline products market. Second, 
after mid-2009, the coefficient was not only subject to more variation, but also 
demonstrated a consistent pattern of increase. 
Figure 6.2 Coefficient of variation for energy products in China
Source: Plotted using the survey data.
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Diesel
For product line ‘diesel 10#’, the coefficient of variation stabilised after 2009. 
As in the case of gasoline products, this could be the result of oil price reforms 
that were launched in 2009. There were differences, however, between the 
variation of gasoline products and that of diesel products. The coefficients 
of variation for diesel and gasoline were both about 0.03 in 2009. For diesel 
products, price divergence across major cities is not obvious; however, the price 
variation of gasoline products started to climb after 2009, indicating that the 
price stabilisation program is not very efficient. 
Gas and electricity
For both service gas and manufacturing gas, the coefficient of variation jumped 
in 2007, and continued to rise slowly until the end of 2010, when it began to 
fall. These turning points in 2007 and 2010 could be attributed to government 
price adjustment in 2007 and broader price reforms in 2010. The coefficient 
of variation attached to electricity decreased slowly from 2006 to 2010, and 
remained relatively stable thereafter. 
Coal 
Several observations can be made about the coefficient of the variation trend 
attached to coal products. First, the coefficient had more frequent ups and downs 
after 2008 than before 2008; also from 2008, the level of the coefficient was 
higher than before 2008. Second, the gap in the coefficient of variation between 
different coal products became larger after 2008. These observations could be 
linked to reforms in 2008 that deregulated the market for coal by allowing 
prices to better reflect supply and demand. Third, it is interesting to see the 
coefficient for fertiliser coal hitting zero from 2009.8 Fourth, we note that prices 
for coal, gasoline and diesel all became more volatile after the reform period, 
implying that market reforms in the energy sector in general have produced 
more frequent arbitrage activities. 
Finally, we observe that the coefficient of variation attached to coal product 
prices changed substantially after the GFC. This could reflect outcomes attached 
to government fiscal stimulus policy that sought to boost crisis-affected demand. 
8  For details, see: www.fertmarket.com/newsabout.aspx?id=37. The reason for this trend is not clear; 
however, fertiliser coal is the raw material for most of China’s nitrogen fertiliser, and nitrogen fertiliser 
received subsidies of about US$7.46 billion during 2008–09 (Heffer and Olegario 2010). 
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In sum, these preliminary observations provide evidence of price change within 
energy product markets in China between 2006 and 2012. In the next section, we 
test to see if the direction of these energy price changes is towards convergence 
or divergence across different regions in China and over the sample period. 
Testing for energy price convergence: A series-
specific nonlinear panel unit root test
We use a nonlinear panel unit root test that is series specific (see Breuer et al. 2002; 
Kapetanios et al. 2003; Lau et al. 2012; Wu and Lee 2009). This series-specific 
nonlinear panel unit root test model (hereinafter NNSS) has several advantages 
over the conventional panel unit root tests. The NNSS is advantageous in testing 
for stationarity for each city, while the model itself accounts for nonlinearity and 
contemporaneous correlation among cross-section series—statistical features 
that are widely identified in financial and economic datasets. 
In the case of our dataset, cross-sectional dependence is a distinctive feature. 
Cities are heterogeneous—that is, in the culture of doing business, local 
governmental policies, languages, consumer preferences, and market structure 
and international exposure—but to some extent they are affected by common 
factors, such as using the same currency, the same time zone and the same written 
language. External shocks to the foreign exchange rate and the international oil 
price, for example, will in turn uniquely influence energy prices in different 
cities. 
The most significant common factors between Chinese cities—but which differ 
from other major economies—are China’s unique political institutions. China 
operates with a unique intra-provincial political system known as the Regionally 
Decentralised Authoritarian System (Xu 2011). Most influentially, this serves to 
link regional economic performance to the career promotion of officials—that 
is, regional competition provides incentives to sub-national officials to initiate 
and implement market-oriented reforms (Xu 2011). Under this institutional 
arrangement, sub-national officials tend to accept and implement (rather than 
resist and initiate) policies formulated by the central government. These policies 
work as common factors that influence every city to a certain degree. When 
conducting research in this political institutional setting, the issue of cross-
sectional dependence should not be ignored.
We use the seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) method in this study, with 
N cities and T time periods. The following simultaneous equations form the 
nonlinear SUR model, as in Equation 6.1.
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Equation 6.1
In Equation 6.1, t=1, 2, …, T; pk,t is the original price of a specific good for city 
k at time t; yk,t is the relative price defined as ; and  is the average 
price of a specific good for all cities at time t.   is thus 
the number of augmentations or lags for goods k. The null and alternative 
hypotheses to be tested are in Equation 6.2.
Equation 6.2
The critical values are generated using a bootstrapping method because of 
the non-standard distribution of the test statistics.9 Here we modify the Gauss 
code provided by Wu and Lee (2009),10 and for each series, yk,t, report t-statistic 
(  statistic) results and the critical values at 5 per cent and 10 per cent. If the 
t-statistic is less than the 5 per cent  critical value, the null hypothesis 
of having a unit root is rejected; results reported in Table 6.3 are based on the 
10 per cent  significance level.11 
The rejection of the unit root hypothesis, , implies that the time series of price 
differentials is stationary; if tests fail to reject the null hypothesis, the price 
differentials follow a random walk. This means we can proceed to calculate the 
price differentials. To do this, we use the group average price (the mean of all 
the regions concerned for each product) as the benchmark. Hypothesis tests 
9  A bootstrap-after-bootstrap method (Berkowitz and Kilian 2000) is applied to obtain the effective 
empirical sizes of bootstrap tests given the nominal size of 5 per cent.
10  We thank Jyh-Lin Wu for making the Gauss code available online. A sample code can be downloaded 
from Jyh-Lin Wu’s homepage: econ.nsysu.edu.tw/files/11-1124-1326-1.php. 
11  Detailed convergence test results for all energy products and regions are available on request. 
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are conducted for a spot price panel dataset relating to each energy product. 
There  are 20 energy products within five energy categories: gasoline, diesel, 
coal, gas and electricity. 
This approach enables us to use time series analysis to test whether each 
region is converging to group average price. We can use some major cities as 
benchmarks—for example, we can examine whether prices in different cities 
converge with those in Shanghai or Guangzhou. We use a cross-sectional mean 
as the benchmark in our chapter because the coverage of reform policy is 
nationwide, and we intend to provide a more complete picture of the impact 
of reform policy on energy price convergence. More importantly, it was 
suggested in the literature that using a cross-sectional mean as the benchmark 
is preferable from an econometrics point of view for consistency (for details, see 
Akhmedjonov et al. 2013; Evans 1998; Lau 2010). 
The study makes a unique contribution to the literature on energy price 
convergence as follows: first, the econometric model captures the characteristics 
of nonlinearity and cross-sectional dependence across regions; second, the 
study applies to a wider coverage of energy products than has previously been 
explored. On the latter, Fan and Wei (2006) tested only two energy products: 
gasoline and diesel. Ma et al. (2009) extended this to four energy products: 
gasoline, coal, diesel and electricity. This research covers 20 energy products 
from the five broad energy categories: gasoline, coal, diesel, electricity and 
gas. Third, this study covers the period after 2005, which is during the energy 
reform process. All previous studies were undertaken before 2005. Finally, 
earlier studies covered only 35 Chinese provinces, while ignoring the effects of 
energy prices in non-capital cities. Ours is not only the most recent such study 
undertaken, it is also the most comprehensive in terms of city coverage, and is 
unique in being able to capture the effects of ongoing energy reforms since 2006.
Empirical results
Price convergence by energy category and product
Table 6.3 summarises the share of cities showing evidence of nonlinear 
convergence to the average cross-regional energy price for all energy products. 
These suggest that, on average, 39.2 per cent of the sample cities exhibit 
nonlinear convergence and hence imply a level of energy price integration 
across regions in China. An earlier study concluded that more than 80 per cent 
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of regions showed price convergence (Fan and Wei 2006).12 That study, however, 
only included gasoline and diesel products, and also covered only 36 major 
cities. The present study is more comprehensive along regional and product 
lines, and the results are thus more convincing that while energy market reforms 
are progressing, they are not yet effective enough to lead to more widespread 
convergence in energy prices. 
A study by Ma et al. (2009), meanwhile, suggested that convergence applied 
to a lower share of cities: only 26 per cent. Unfortunately, their conclusion 
was based on a univariate augmented Dickey–Fuller (ADF) test. This is widely 
criticised for its lack of statistical power in rejecting the null hypothesis of a unit 
root. The empirical findings of this research—that 39.2 per cent of cities exhibit 
convergence—are more reliable as our testing method incorporates panel data, 
nonlinearity and cross-sectional dependence. 
Table 6.3 Percentage of nonlinear convergence by product type
All Coal Diesel Electricity Gas Gasoline 
39.2% 28.3% 67.7% 11.1% 26.0% 44.8%
Source: Authors’ own calculations.
Table 6.4 presents the results by significant region by the five category types. 
The results show that the price of diesel is converging most, specifically across 
67.7 per cent of regions sampled. The remaining products by order of degree 
of convergence are gasoline, coal, gas and electricity—a result that merges 
perfectly with Ma et al. (2009). 
For the above results, we conclude that coal and gas markets are less integrated 
than those of diesel and gasoline, leaving the electricity market as the least 
integrated of the five categories. According to these results, we cannot conclude 
that China’s energy markets are well integrated. In contrast, these results 
highlight the limited convergence achieved by the energy reform agenda. 
12  The authors claimed that 31 of 35 cities (88.6 per cent) were convergent for gasoline and 30 of 34 cities 
(88.2 per cent) for diesel, which suggests some degree of market integration for gasoline and diesel. 
Meanwhile, the study of Ma et al. (2009) and our current research suggest that the diesel market is much 
more integrated than the gasoline market. 
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An additional contribution of this study is that we provide detailed information 
on the percentage of converging major cities for each subcategory of energy 
product. These results are presented in Table 6.4, several observations from 
which are worth highlighting. First, the prices of some products demonstrate a 
far higher level of regional convergence than for other products. At the extreme, 
price convergence is taking place among 93.5 per cent of cities for ‘gasoline90#’, 
where that level of convergence is 0 per cent for ‘coal_plant_10th’. 
Second, the level of price convergence across products in the same energy 
category is different across each of the five energy categories. For example, 
within the gas category, ‘gasoline93#’ and ‘gasoline97#’ show a similar degree 
of regional price integration, but that level is much lower for ‘gasoline90#’. 
This could be because ‘gasoline93#’ and ‘gasoline97#’ display a similar degree of 
market integration, while ‘gasoline90#’ exhibits the highest level of integration 
in this energy category. 
Overall, our empirical findings suggest China’s energy market is characterised 
by a low degree of domestic price integration. This implies that despite the 
implementation of a number of policies and reform mechanisms to encourage 
reform of the energy sector, the reform process is either incomplete or not 
comprehensive. It is also possible that significant transaction costs due to 
institutional factors, such as local protection, may contribute to this phenomenon 
of price divergence.13 
Coal products, for example, dominate China’s energy market. Coal met some 
70 per cent of China’s energy needs in 2009, and thanks to energy reforms 
this level of dependence is expected to fall to 62 per cent by 2035 (EIA 2012). 
In China’s case, coalmine methane (CMM) recovery projects across the country 
have been playing an important role in coal-related power generation, town gas 
projects, as well as energy efficiency enhancement programs (US EPA 2012). 
CMM is, however, according to the US Environmental Protection Agency 
(US  EPA), also associated with cross-regional integration barriers, including 
low-quality drained CMM, and explosive gas mixtures that make handling and 
transportation risky. In addition, there are inconsistent laws between provinces 
in terms of the level of methane concentration required for the use of CMM, 
which typically pivots about 30 per cent. Such factors reduce the ease with 
which energy reforms can stimulate cross-regional energy market integration 
in China. 
13  For instance, the band of inaction could be widened by recent increases in salaries and transportation 
costs in China, especially in coastal regions. 
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Overall energy marketisation by province
A final area of analysis of this chapter is to shed light on the literature on overall 
energy marketisation at the province level. Previous research examines the 
marketisation of certain energy categories or the general marketisation for a 
given province, as shown in column 7 in Table 6.5 (Fan et al. 2011). However, 
the criteria for assessing the general marketisation index published by Fan et al. 
(2011) is not transparent. There is limited evidence for energy marketisation at the 
province level. We therefore propose a new index for measuring marketisation 
within the energy industry for each province, as follows (Equation 6.3).
Equation 6.3
In Equation 6.3, MI is the proposed index to proxy the degree of marketisation, 
as Fan and Wei (2006) also use the proportion of converging cities to quantify 
the effectiveness of transformation from a planned to a market-oriented 
economy for a specific commodity category in a particular city. NTR is the 
number of times convergence is detected (that is, the number of times the unit 
root test rejects the null of having a unit root test), and NTT is the number 
of appearances of cities in our study. Therefore MI (as shown in column C in 
Table 6.5) is the measure to proxy, and quantifies the effectiveness of market 
reform for the energy sector.14 A high index result thus implies a high level of 
marketisation in terms of a more market-oriented energy sector, as suggested by 
Ma et al. (2009). A high index ratio indicates that a province’s energy market 
is characterised by a higher degree of marketisation in terms of a more market-
oriented energy sector, and this is quantified, proxied by the province’s average 
fuel price convergence level. 
Table 6.5 Comparison of energy marketisation with general marketisation by 
province
ID Province Aa Bb Cc Dd Ee Ff
1 Jilin 13 10 77% 1 18 17
2 Qinghai 9 6 67% 2 30 28
3 Guizhou 17 11 65% 3 26 23
4 Tianjin 8 5 63% 4 6 2
5 Hebei 17 10 59% 5 17 12
6 Liaoning 16 9 56% 6 9 3
14  Ma et al. (2009) is the first study to use the unit root test methodology to examine the effect of policy 
reforms on energy price convergence, and they conclude that reforms have led to a more market-oriented 
energy sector in China (p. 4848).
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ID Province Aa Bb Cc Dd Ee Ff
7 Ningxia 13 6 46% 7 25 18
8 Hunan 11 5 45% 8 16 8
9 Chongqing 7 3 43% 9 10 1
10 Heilongjiang 14 6 43% 10 22 12
11 Henan 7 3 43% 11 12 1
12 Guangdong 12 5 42% 12 4 –8
13 Shanghai 8 3 38% 13 2 –11
14 Beijing 6 2 33% 14 5 –9
15 Gansu 6 2 33% 15 29 14
16 Jiangxi 9 3 33% 16 15 –1
17 Shandong 33 11 33% 17 8 –9
18 Yunnan 9 3 33% 18 24 6
19 Shanxi 16 5 31% 19 23 4
20 Guangxi 10 3 30% 20 21 1
21 Jiangsu 10 3 30% 21 3 –18
22 Sichuan 10 3 30% 22 13 –9
23 Anhui 11 3 27% 23 11 –12
24 Fujian 8 2 25% 24 7 –17
25 Hainan 4 1 25% 25 19 –6
26 Hubei 12 3 25% 26 14 –12
27 Zhejiang 16 4 25% 27 1 –26
28 Inner Mongolia 22 5 23% 28 20 –8
29 Xinjiang 5 1 20% 29 28 –1
30 Shaanxi 12 2 17% 30 27 –3
31 Tibet 1 0 0% 31 31 0
a Number of times cities appear. 
b Number of times convergence is detected. 
c Percentage (= column B, column A). 
d Energy marketisation ranking using MI indicator. 
e General marketisation index ranking, 2006–09 (Fan et al. 2011).  
f Difference between ranking of energy marketisation and that of general marketisation (= column 
E – column D). 
Notes: There are 31 provinces investigated. The Province column lists all the provinces. The data in 
column A indicate how many times they appear in all 352 hypothesis tests. The data in column B 
indicate how many times the corresponding hypothesis testing rejects the null hypothesis. Column C 
is generated as the ratio of column B over column A. Take Jilin Province as an example: it appears 
13 times (see column A) in all 352 hypothesis tests among which 10 times found evidence of 
convergence (see column B). Column C is equal to 10, 13 or 77 per cent. Column D ranks all 
provinces based on the data in column C. Column E lists the ranking of the general marketisation 
based on the average marketisation index (2006–09) created by Fan et al. (2011). The lower the data 
are, the higher is the level of general marketisation. In column D, the datum for Zhejiang Province is 1, 
which means the general market of Zhejiang is most developed during the period 2006–09. Column F 
is equal to column E minus column D. 
Source: Authors’ own calculations. 
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The overall indices ranks derived for each province are presented in column C 
of Table 6.5, and the ranking of general marketisation for each province is 
presented in column D. Jilin Province, in China’s far north-east on the border 
with North Korea, and which experiences severe cold weather, is ranked first 
among China’s provinces as the most market-oriented energy market. The reason 
for this observation is not clear, but it is interesting to note that the top 10 
regions in terms of MI measures are all coastal provinces located north of the 
Yangtze River,15 and are classified as ‘severely cold’ heating zones. One reason 
for their successful implementation of price reform could be local government 
prioritisation as heating is required by law. Heating consumption in these 
regions accounts for about 7 per cent of aggregate gas demand compared with 
a national average of 2 per cent (Chen 2014). In contrast, Zhejiang Province, a 
coastal frontier south of Shanghai, was identified as the overall most integrated 
market using the published ranking of Fan et al. (2011). 
Table 6.5 demonstrates that there is a lack of correlation between energy market 
convergence and the overall degree of commodity marketisation—the latter as 
identified by Fan et al. (2011), which fills the last column of Table 6.5. For example, 
one of China’s most economically advanced provinces, Zhejiang, ranks first 
in terms of general marketisation, but 27th for energy sector marketisation. 
Similar results are identified for developed markets such as Shanghai, Jiangsu, 
Guangdong and Beijing. In contrast, provinces considered to have the highest 
level of market integration in the energy sector are mostly on the coast north 
of the Yangtse River, and are classified as ‘severely cold’ heating zones—such 
as Hebei, Tianjin, Liaoning, Jilin and Heilongjiang—where heating supply is 
required by law. 
There may be several reasons for divergence between the marketisation process 
of the energy market and the general market across regions of China. First, our 
definition of ‘marketisation’ is different from that used by Fan et al. (2011): 
we use an econometrics test to define marketisation, while Fan et al.’s (2011) 
definition is comprehensive but ambiguous. Second, the source of a high degree 
of price convergence for less-developed provinces could be the intervention 
from the central government, rather than free-market arbitrage activities. 
Energy products are among the most important inputs for economic 
development. Recent studies argue that local governments in China, especially 
those of more developed provinces, have incentives to control the price in the 
energy sector (Young 2000; Xu 2011). Further research is needed, however, to 
examine why these more developed regions are not exhibiting a high degree 
of price convergence, and hence a market-oriented energy sector. The lack of 
correlation between the results of our indices for energy and general market 
15  They are Hebei, Tianjin, Liaoning, Jilin and Heilongjiang. 
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integration also calls for further research so as to better understand the role of 
energy markets in the general marketisation index ranking constructed by Fan 
et al. (2011). It could also be useful to calculate the same marketisation index of 
this study for single durable goods, non-durable goods and services in China, 
so as to have a better understanding of the marketisation process for different 
products across different cities and provinces. 
Conclusion
Energy price convergence is one of the leading indicators for understanding 
market liberalisation and integration. Studies examining energy price 
convergence in China are limited in both quantity and findings. This study has 
added to the existing literature in several aspects. First, the dataset used here 
covers a previously unstudied period, despite its centrality within ongoing 
energy market reforms. Our dataset also offers higher data frequency and has 
wider regional coverage. Second, the methodology used in this study is more 
robust in capturing nonlinearity and cross-sectional dependence of the pricing 
process. Third, this research extends the range of energy products investigated 
to cover all the critical energy categories in the economy. It thus provides the 
most comprehensive analysis to date of pricing in China’s energy sector. 
We find little evidence of price convergence, as measured by convergence to the 
average price across provinces, between cities in Chinese energy markets from 
2006–12. We take this to mean that China’s domestic energy market is not well 
integrated across the country’s cities. Examination of detailed energy categories 
finds few cities are moving towards price convergence for electricity, gas and 
coal. There is greater price convergence in gasoline and diesel, but these markets 
are far from perfectly integrated as far as the existence of a unified price would 
indicate. 
The study also finds that the level of market integration varies between different 
products within the same broader energy type category. Similarly, the coefficients 
of variation in the price of some key energy products, such as gasoline, diesel, 
coal and gas, have changed substantially since the GFC. This could indicate that 
the combination of international volatility in prices and the large domestic fiscal 
stimulus package implemented by the Chinese Government in response to the 
GFC has caused variations in both energy prices and energy efficiency. 
Moreover, by augmenting the general marketisation index ranking constructed 
by Fan et al. (2011), we find little association between energy marketisation and 
general marketisation across numerous provinces. That is, there are cases where 
provinces considered to be highly developed and integrated in general—such as 
Zhejiang, Shanghai, Jiangsu, Guangdong and Beijing—display an unexpectedly 
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low level of energy market price integration. In contrast, provinces with a high 
level of energy market integration are mostly in areas with lower rankings in the 
general marketisation index: China’s poorer provinces, including Qinghai and 
Guizhou, in the west and south-west of the country.
One reason for this inconsistency could be that provinces with low marketisation 
are followers of the price set by the central government. That is, local governments 
cannot influence prices according to local conditions or interests. Provinces with 
a higher degree of marketisation, however, are typically more developed, and 
this comes with greater rights to intervene in—or to allow markets to decide—
local energy markets. 
Further research is required to provide more detailed explanations of the 
different levels of marketisation of different energy categories in different 
provinces in China. One suggestion would be to calculate a marketisation 
index, as proposed in this study, for single durable goods, non-durable goods 
and services across China. Only with this type of panel data study that captures 
market price integration across regions, time and products in China will it be 
possible to better understand the marketisation process in China. 
Finally, the study focuses on internal integration and does not discuss the 
impact of international integration of energy markets. With reform and opening 
one would expect price movements to be influenced by international price 
movements. The global price of coal, gas and oil varied enormously over the 
period of the study (see Figures 2.3 and 2.4 in Chapter 2 of this volume) and so 
could be expected to influence domestic movements of energy prices. This too 
would be an avenue for future research.
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Appendix
Table A6.1 Detailed description of dataset by product
Product Regions in original dataset
Natural gas manufacture 28 cities:
Beijing, Chengdu, Harbin, Haikou, Hangzhou, Hefei, Hohhot, Jinan, 
Lanzhou, Nanjing, Nanning, Ningbo, Qingdao, Xiamen, Shanghai, 
Shenyang, Shijiazhuang, Taiyuan, Tianjin, Urumqi, Wuhan, Xi’an, Xining, 
Yinchuan, Changchun, Changsha, Zhengzhou, Chongqing
Natural gas_service 28 cities:
Beijing, Chengdu, Harbin, Haikou, Hangzhou, Hefei, Hohhot, Jinan, 
Lanzhou, Nanjing, Nanning, Ningbo, Qingdao, Xiamen, Shanghai, 
Shenyang, Shijiazhuang, Taiyuan, Tianjin, Urumqi, Wuhan, Xi’an, Xining, 
Yinchuan, Changchun, Changsha, Zhengzhou, Chongqing
Gas_cokeoven 22 cities:
Dalian, Guiyang, Harbin, Hangzhou, Hohhot, Jinan, Kunming, 
Nanchang, Nanjing, Ningbo, Qingdao, Shanghai, Shenyang, 
Shijiazhuang, Taiyuan, Tianjin, Wuhan, Xi’an, Yinchuan, Changchun, 
Changsha, Zhengzhou
Electricity_manufacture_35k+ 36 cities:
Beijing, Chengdu, Dalian, Fuzhou, Guangzhou, Guiyang, Harbin, 
Haikou, Hangzhou, Hefei, Hohhot, Jinan, Kunming, Lhasa, Lanzhou, 
Nanchang, Nanjing, Nanning, Ningbo, Qingdao, Xiamen, Shanghai, 
Shenzhen, Shenyang, Shijiazhuang, Taiyuan, Tianjin, Urumqi, 
Wuhan, Xi’an, Xining, Yinchuan, Changchun, Changsha, Zhengzhou, 
Chongqing
Gasoline90# 60 cities:
Baotou, Baoji, Beijing, Chengdu, Dalian, Daqing, Datong, Fuzhou, 
Ganzhou, Golmud, Guangzhou, Guiyang, Harbin, Haikou, Hangzhou, 
Hefei, Hengyang, Hohhot, Jilin, Jinan, Jiaxing, Jiangmen, Jingmen, 
Kunming, Lhasa, Lanzhou, Liuzhou, Nanchang, Nanjing, Nanning, 
Ningbo, Qingdao, Qujing, Quanzhou, Sanya, Xiamen, Shanghai, 
Shenzhen, Shenyang, Shijiazhuang, Taiyuan, Tianjin, Tongling, Urumqi, 
Wuzhong, Wuhan, Xi’an, Xining, Xingtai, Xuzhou, Yantai, Yili, Yinchuan, 
Changchun, Changsha, Zhengzhou, Chongqing, Zhoukou, Zigong, Zunyi 
Gasoline93# 60 cities:
Baotou, Baoji, Beijing, Chengdu, Dalian, Daqing, Datong, Fuzhou, 
Ganzhou, Golmud, Guangzhou, Guiyang, Harbin, Haikou, Hangzhou, 
Hefei, Hengyang, Hohhot, Jilin, Jinan, Jiaxing, Jiangmen, Jingmen, 
Kunming, Lhasa, Lanzhou, Liuzhou, Nanchang, Nanjing, Nanning, 
Ningbo, Qingdao, Qujing, Quanzhou, Sanya, Xiamen, Shanghai, 
Shenzhen, Shenyang, Shijiazhuang, Taiyuan, Tianjin, Tongling, Urumqi, 
Wuzhong, Wuhan, Xi’an, Xining, Xingtai, Xuzhou, Yantai, Yili, Yinchuan, 
Changchun, Changsha, Zhengzhou, Chongqing, Zhoukou, Zigong, Zunyi
Gasoline97# 59 cities:
Baotou, Baoji, Beijing, Chengdu, Dalian, Daqing, Datong, Fuzhou, 
Ganzhou, Golmud, Guangzhou, Guiyang, Harbin, Haikou, Hangzhou, 
Hefei, Hengyang, Hohhot, Jilin, Jinan, Jiaxing, Jiangmen, Jingmen, 
Kunming, Lanzhou, Liuzhou, Nanchang, Nanjing, Nanning, Ningbo, 
Qingdao, Qujing, Quanzhou, Sanya, Xiamen, Shanghai, Shenzhen, 
Shenyang, Shijiazhuang, Taiyuan, Tianjin, Tongling, Urumqi, Wuzhong, 
Wuhan, Xi’an, Xining, Xingtai, Xuzhou, Yantai, Yili, Yinchuan, Changchun, 
Changsha, Zhengzhou, Chongqing, Zhoukou, Zigong, Zunyi 
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Product Regions in original dataset
Diesel_0# 60 cities:
Baotou, Baoji, Beijing, Chengdu, Dalian, Daqing, Datong, Fuzhou, 
Ganzhou, Golmud, Guangzhou, Guiyang, Harbin, Haikou, Hangzhou, 
Hefei, Hengyang, Hohhot, Jilin, Jinan, Jiaxing, Jiangmen, Jingmen, 
Kunming, Lhasa, Lanzhou, Liuzhou, Nanchang, Nanjing, Nanning, 
Ningbo, Qingdao, Qujing, Quanzhou, Sanya, Xiamen, Shanghai, 
Shenzhen, Shenyang, Shijiazhuang, Taiyuan, Tianjin, Tongling, Urumqi, 
Wuzhong, Wuhan, Xi’an, Xining, Xingtai, Xuzhou, Yantai, Yili, Yinchuan, 
Changchun, Changsha, Zhengzhou, Chongqing, Zhoukou, Zigong, Zunyi 
Diesel_10# 41 cities:
Baotou, Baoji, Beijing, Dalian, Daqing, Datong, Ganzhou, Golmud, 
Guiyang, Harbin, Hangzhou, Hefei, Hohhot, Jilin, Jinan, Jingmen, 
Jiaxing, Lhasa, Lanzhou, Liuzhou, Ningbo, Qingdao, Shanghai, 
Shenyang, Shijiazhuang, Taiyuan, Tianjin, Tongling, Urumqi, Wuzhong, 
Xi’an, Xining, Xingtai, Xuzhou, Yantai, Yili, Yinchuan, Changchun, 
Zhengzhou, Zhoukou, Zunyi
Coal_mixed4500-5000 8 provinces:
Guizhou, Hebei, Henan, Heilongjiang, Inner Mongolia, Shandong, 
Shanxi, Sichuan
Coal_mixed5000-5500 7 provinces:
Guizhou, Henan, Heilongjiang, Inner Mongolia, Shandong, Shanxi, 
Shaanxi
Coal_mixed5500-6000 6 provinces:
Guizhou, Henan, Heilongjiang, Inner Mongolia, Shandong, Shanxi
Coal_mixed6000+ 5 provinces:
Guizhou, Heilongjiang, Inner Mongolia, Shandong, Shaanxi
Coal_metallurgical_1st 5 provinces:
Guizhou, Hebei, Inner Mongolia, Shandong, Shanxi
Coal_plant_8th 4 provinces:
Guizhou, Hebei, Inner Mongolia, Shandong
Coal_plant_9th 3 provinces:
Guizhou, Inner Mongolia, Shandong
Coal_plant_10th 7 provinces:





Anhui, Guizhou, Inner Mongolia, Shandong
Coal_other 4 provinces:
Guizhou, Inner Mongolia, Shandong, Sichuan
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7. China’s Gas 
Market Liberalisation
The impact on China–Australia gas trade
Xunpeng Shi and Hari Malamakkavu Padinjare Variam
Introduction
The regional and global impacts of activity in China’s gas sector have become 
increasingly significant but are a relatively new issue for most energy researchers. 
Building on the remarkable growth of its economy since the 1980s, China has 
been an engine for the world economy. China’s impact on the global energy and 
commodity markets has also been growing and has become significant since the 
2000s. While much attention has been focused on the case of oil and minerals 
such as copper, nickel and iron ore, the emerging impact is evident in the 
world’s natural gas and liquefied natural gas (LNG) markets in the past decade. 
With current consumption of about 180 billion cubic metres (bcm), China is 
the world’s third-largest gas consumer and its gas consumption is projected to 
grow to about 600 bcm by 2035 (BP 2015). Given it is set to see the largest 
single volume of growth for any nation in the world in the next two decades, 
any swings in Chinese gas demand and supply options will affect the global 
gas market and gas trade. Thus, the Chinese gas sector should be an object for 
future energy study. 
In addition to its size and growth prospects, two other factors in the Chinese 
gas sector have earned global attention. The ongoing domestic gas market 
liberalisation, which started in the past decade, may also have a significant impact 
on the world gas market. In the effort to establish a market-orientated economy, 
significant changes have been made in the past five years aimed at liberalising 
the gas sector. With the introduction of market forces, it is possible to generate 
prices that reflect the fundamentals of China’s supply and demand. If successful, 
the ongoing efforts to create an independent pipeline operator will have 
a significant impact on future Chinese gas prices. Moreover, access to transport 
and storage infrastructure would lead to changes in Chinese market patterns at 
the national and provincial levels. Here, the literature has demonstrated that 
the evolution of market structure and organisation in gas-importing countries 
results in their domestic markets becoming increasingly subject to market forces, 
which further become a key determinant of international gas pricing. 
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The second factor is the effort to create gas trading hubs and gas benchmark 
pricing. As a result, China’s gas liberalisation will improve in terms of 
infrastructure, size and liquidity of the market, as well as regulations, which are 
some of the prerequisites for trading hub formation (IEA 2002). A deregulated 
and competitive gas market would result in competitive price formation and the 
inception of financial contracts based on hub prices. Shanghai has announced 
its plans to create the Chinese ‘Henry Hub’ (China Securities Newspaper 2015). 
These efforts will create the dynamics for hub-building efforts in other countries 
such as Singapore and Japan. Moreover, China’s gas pricing could be an important 
benchmark for the East Asian region, as it has the largest importing capacity in 
Asia, the most diversified (and relatively balanced) portfolios of supplies and 
the most diversified means of transport and transport routes (Chen 2014). 
This chapter aims to examine the liberalisation of the Chinese gas market in terms 
of its domestic, regional and global impacts. The contribution of this report is 
fourfold: 1) it is potentially the first model to address the impact of Chinese 
gas market liberalisation on both domestic and international gas markets; 2) it 
will quantify the regional impact of China’s gas market development on other 
regions, with a focus on Australia, which will be new to the literature; 3) the 
impact of the Chinese domestic market on Australia offers a new angle to study 
Chinese gas market issues; and 4) the study offers additional reference for market 
players, including policymakers, in the East Asian region as they develop their 
policy towards LNG trading hubs. 
The chapter is structured as follows. It first introduces the motivations for the 
study, with a focus on the current situation in China’s gas sector, placing it in 
a global context and its relationship with Australia’s gas sector. Section three 
explains the methodology and data for further analyses. Section four reviews 
key features of the Chinese gas market and progress in gas market liberalisation 
policies against the backdrop of creating competitive markets. Section five 
explains the modelling methods and results, followed by the conclusion. 
Motivations for the study 
Overview of China’s natural gas sector
As stated in the introduction, given its size, growth prosperity and ongoing 
efforts in liberalisation and building trading hubs, China will be a game changer 
in the regional and global gas markets. For almost four decades during China’s 
rapid industrialisation, natural gas remained a secondary consideration as an 
energy source behind coal, oil and hydropower. The growth in natural gas 
consumption was slow in the period 1980–95 (with an annual growth rate 
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of 1.5 per cent) and modest from 1996–2002 (with an annual growth rate of 
7.9 per  cent). The twenty-first century, however, witnessed an emphasis on 
developing natural gas as the ‘fuel of the future’, with stress on its environmental 
benefits and promotion of it as a solution to urban pollution. Growth in 
natural gas consumption was dramatic from 2003 (with an annual growth rate 
of 16.9 per cent). Gas consumption increased from just 24.5 bcm per year in 
2000 to 182.4 bcm in 2014. The share of China’s gas consumption experienced 
a dramatic increase in the 2000s—up to 4.8 per cent in 2013. From 2007, China 
became a net gas importer. In 2012, China became the world’s third-largest gas 
consumer after the United States and Russia (Figure 7.1). However, despite rapid 
growth in recent years, the level of gas consumption in China (5.9 per cent of 
total primary energy supply in 2014) is still below the government target and 
the international average.
Figure 7.1 Evolution of the gas sector in China
Sources: BP (2014); NBS (2015). 
According to the new Energy Development Strategy Action Plan (2014–20) 
released by the State Council (2014) in November 2014, the share of natural 
gas will be raised above 10 per cent, or 360 bcm p.a. Many observers (BP 2015; 
Reuters 2012) predict that gas consumption in 2035 will be about 608 bcm/p.a., 
with natural gas representing 12 per cent of the global energy mix by 2035.
As China’s domestic production gradually lagged behind consumption, 
importation of gas started in 2006 and grew dramatically. The first import was of 
LNG, which amounted to 20.16 megatonnes (Mt) in 2014. Pipeline gas imports 
started in 2010, bringing gas from Turkmenistan and other Central Asian 
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countries, and from Myanmar in 2014. In 2013, pipeline gas (PPG) imports 
overtook LNG imports, and in 2014 PPG accounted for 52.5 per cent of the total 
natural gas imports (Figure 7.2). 
Figure 7.2 China’s imports of natural gas, 2006–14
Source: China Customs data, cited from (Qian and Jiang 2015).
Qatar and Australia are China’s major LNG import sources. In 2014, China 
imported 19.84 Mt of LNG. Representing the largest shares of supply are the 
four countries that have signed long-term contracts with China: Australia, 
Qatar, Indonesia and Malaysia. The remaining 18 per cent of supply share was 
purchased from Yemen, Equatorial Guinea, Nigeria and other countries through 
the spot market (Figure 7.3). 
As a result of recent deals with Russia, more PPG is expected from the ‘Power of 
Siberia’ pipeline, as early as 2018. China’s pipeline import capacity is projected 
to increase from 77 bcm in 2015 to 160 bcm in 2035 (Table 7.1). In comparison 
with our estimates, Henderson (2014) estimate a total of 165 bcm pipeline import 
capacity by 2030, with increased flows from Russia (68 bcm) and less from 
Central Asia (85 bcm). Central Asia (Turkmenistan) remains the largest pipeline 
import source. Based on forecasts from the International Energy Agency (IEA), 
US Energy Information Administration (EIA) and China National Petroleum 
Corporation (CNPC), China’s LNG imports in 2030 are forecast to reach 120 bcm, 
while the assumed regasification capacity in 2030 is forecast to reach 157 bcm 
(ESI unpublished). 
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Figure 7.3 China LNG import sources, 2014
Source: Pang (2015).
Table 7.1 Pipeline gas imports into China
From 2015 2025 2035
Russia 0 38 58
Central Asia 65 90 90
Myanmar 12 12 12
Total 77 140 160
Source: ESI unpublished.
China and Australia’s gas sector 
Australia holds great potential resources for conventional gas (mainly offshore) 
and unconventional gas onshore. Estimated proven gas reserves are estimated 
to be 3.84 trillion cubic metres (tcm) (EIA 2014). Economically recoverable 
reserves of conventional gas are estimated to be 2.9 tcm. A recent study places 
technically recoverable reserves of shale gas at 12.4 tcm. If confirmed, this 
would place Australia on par with the United States, albeit with a much lower 
level of consumption: 25 bcm p.a. in Australia compared with 720 bcm p.a. in 
the United States in 2012. 
Australia was the second-largest source of China’s LNG imports as of 2014, and 
is expected to be the largest soon. China’s first LNG import was from Australia 
in 2006. Since then, Chinese LNG imports from Australia have increased 
significantly, from less than 1 bcm in 2006 to about 5.3 bcm in 2014, which makes 
it the world’s second-largest importer of Australian LNG. Moreover, China’s 
‘Big Three’ oil companies—China National Petroleum Corporation  (CNPC), 
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China Petroleum & Chemical Corporation (Sinopec) and China National Offshore 
Oil Corporation (CNOOC)—have acquired interests in Australian LNG projects 
and have secured long-term purchase agreements. The total contracted LNG 
volume between Australia and China was only 3.5 Mt in 2014, and is expected 
to increase to 13.5 Mt in 2016 and to a maximum of 16.8 Mt in 2019. LNG trade 
could be further boosted by the Chinese–Australian free trade agreement. 
Brief review of the literature 
China’s gas market and its regional impact have been intensively studied in 
recent years. Market-based pricing is a fundamental part of market liberalisation 
(IEA  2012). As a symbolic indicator of liberalisation, gas pricing was given 
particular attention. Zhang (2014) calls for a gas pricing system in which global 
pricing cues together with domestic supply and demand signals drive price 
formation. Furthermore, Chen (2014) discusses the implications of pricing reform 
for gas demand. In a report by the IEA (2002), reform in natural gas pricing and 
taxation policy was advocated as the best policy drivers in the national quest to 
increase the share of natural gas in the energy mix. The importance of supply 
diversity in price formation and supply security was addressed by Fernandez 
and Palazuelos (2011), Li and Bai (2010), Shi et al. (2010) and Lin et al. (2010), for 
whom competition between Russian gas and LNG prices relative to coal prices 
is seen as critical in price formation, creating incremental demand and the 
development of infrastructure, and attracting new investment. These studies 
can be summarised as eventual development of a pricing system based on 
market fundamentals with short-term contracts with flexible terms, influenced 
by gas and competing fuel prices in the domestic and world markets.
Gas market liberalisation is generally positive but could have a negative impact 
on some sectors. Economic theories often favour a market-pricing mechanism, as 
it is deemed to remove price distortions, improve efficiency of supply and use, 
and thus maximise the net benefits of gas. In gas markets, deregulation and gas-
on-gas competition in a key market such as Shanghai are seen as benefiting the 
policy goals of liberalisation (Manuhutu and Owen 2010). A gradual breakdown 
of monopoly power in the three national oil and gas corporations in production, 
exploration, imports and transportation of gas was also seen as beneficial. 
Experience from studying liberalisation in other sectors has demonstrated that 
market liberalisation could have both positive and negative impacts. In  the 
study of the deregulation of electricity markets in China, Chen and He (2013) 
demonstrated that deregulation has improved the efficiency of electricity 
production, employment and social welfare, but has also caused job disruption. 
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However, studies on the future of gas market liberalisation in China and its 
regional and global impacts are rare in the literature. The market-based discovery 
of natural gas prices and deregulated gas markets are extensively covered in 
the North American and European context, but are rare in terms of East Asian 
perspectives. No efforts have been made to simulate the impact of China’s 
domestic market reforms on the regional and global gas markets. The lack of 
study on competitive pricing, however, is expected, as competitive pricing of 
natural gas is yet to be seen in China and even East Asia. Further studies of 
China’s gas market liberalisation and associated issues would be valuable to the 
literature and to policymakers inside and outside China. 
Given the likelihood of creating a competitive gas market and competitive prices 
in China, it would be interesting to examine the following questions: 
1. What is the effect of a liberalised Chinese market on China’s imports? 
2. What is the effect of China’s gas market liberalisation on Chinese spot market 
prices and key benchmark spot gas prices (Henry Hub, National Balancing 
Point, Australia Spot and Japan Spot)? Will the ‘Asian premium’ decline? 
3. Will Australian LNG remain competitive against other major producers in 
a hub-indexed pricing system in China?
4. Will gas market liberalisation in China provide incentive for domestic 
production? Will the marginal cost of extraction of domestic gas increase in 
a liberalised market? 
Methodology and data
This chapter consists of two main interrelated parts. The first part is a qualitative 
study. Here, relevant policies that have been implemented in the past decade are 
carefully surveyed to capture the development of gas sector policy. An analytical 
framework for studying the competitive market is proposed based on an IEA 
report. This analytical framework is employed to assess China’s gas market 
liberalisation. The liberalisation efforts and associated increasing liquidity make 
it possible to create at least one gas trading hub in China. If the hub prices are 
deemed creditable, this hub may be used as a trade benchmark in China given 
the current efforts in Europe and East Asia to move away from oil-indexed prices 
in traded contracts.1 The consequences of applying the Chinese hub prices as a 
benchmark for Chinese gas trade will be further examined in the second part 
of the chapter. 
1  As discussed in Stern (2012), the rationale for oil-indexed contract pricing is not tenable in a hub-price 
market.
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The second part of the chapter focuses on modelling. The impact of China’s 
gas market liberalisation on the trade flows and prices of pipeline gas and LNG 
was examined with the Asian Gas Trade Model (AGTM), which is based on 
the Nexant World Gas Model (WGM) (Nexant 2013). The WGM covers every 
country in the world that consumes or produces natural gas. The historical 
data are available for 2006–13 and the outlook period is up to 2035. The model 
captures flows at the country-to-country level by pipeline and LNG, with 
contracted and uncontracted flows identified separately. 
Supply and demand for piped gas and LNG are balanced on a quarterly basis 
and include seasonal demand variations, supply swing and storage capacities 
(working volume and deliverability). Demand forecasts for each node are 
exogenously estimated based on considerations of gross domestic product 
(GDP) and population growth, usage share and energy intensity in each sector. 
Supply data are included as a cost curve for each of the natural gas fields for the 
producing country. Production capacity and forecasting data list all active and 
potential natural gas production fields in all natural gas producing countries. 
The model includes all known sales contracts, and active and planned 
infrastructure (pipelines and LNG liquefaction and regasification terminals). 
Contract data include the source and destination of contracts, annual 
contract quantity (ACQ), contract start and end dates, and price formulae. 
The  infrastructure information includes location, start and end dates of 
operation, source and destination, pipeline capacity, start and end dates of 
pipelines, and transportation tariffs.
The oil price assumption used in all our cases was based on World Bank (2015) 
and EIA (2014) forecasts of the Brent Crude average spot price. Previously, it has 
been reported that observed import gas prices follow developments in the oil 
price with a lag of about four to eight months (Siliverstovs et al. 2005). In order 
to capture this, we employed a three-month lag (one-quarter) whenever there 
is indexation to previous prices. For ease of analysis for our study, we have 
classified regions as in the Appendix (Table A7.1). 
Flows within nodes were constrained according to the available infrastructure 
and within the bounds of long-term contracts where appropriate. If the export 
and import nodes were both specified, the model delivered at least the take-or-
pay (TOP) level from the export node to the import node. Volumes above the 
TOP level could be delivered to the import node, diverted to another location 
or even shut in (not produced) based on least-cost grounds. Such contestable 
volumes were priced on a spot basis. The pricing of gas also took into account 
the tightness of the market (for spot contracts) and, in the case of contracts, 
the linkage with oil/oil product prices. For any demand above contracted 
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gas delivery, spot (uncontracted gas) trades occur subject to infrastructure 
availability. Hence changing the terms of contracts can influence the amount of 
spot trade in the future. 
Using the scenario assumptions, the model matched supply to demand taking 
into account production costs, contract costs and transportation costs by pipe 
and LNG with the cost minimisation as the optimisation objective. For more 
details on the specifications of the model, please refer to the AGTM (Andrews-
Speed et al. 2015; ESI n.d.).
China’s market reforms towards a competitive 
gas market
This section introduces market liberalisation from the perspective of policy and 
regulation, gas pricing reform, infrastructure and market structure. Economic 
theory and past experience suggest that market liberalisation requires openness 
of the whole supply chain of the gas sector, from licensing and exploration 
in the upstream sector to trade and transportation and to the final customer 
(IEA  2012). An IEA analysis provides a useful framework to assess the 
development of gas liberalisation. According to this report, the initial steps to 
create gas markets include four goals: open access to infrastructure—that is, 
unbundling of transport and marketing functions and third-party access (TPA); 
introduction of consumer choice; reduction of regulation of wholesale prices; 
and application of competition policy in the sector (IEA 2013). Based on this 
framework, we provide a brief assessment of liberalisation efforts so far. 
Policy and regulation
China’s national gas policy emerged in the past decade with the rapid development 
of the natural gas sector. The policies include upstream development such as of 
shale gas and coalbed methane (CBM), liberalisation of LNG imports, midstream 
regulation featuring TPA, and downstream regulations such as environmental 
projects that require substitution of coal with natural gas. Involvement of the 
private sector and liberalisation of pricing are applied to the whole supply 
chain. These policies aim to encourage exploration, production, infrastructure 
development, efficient utilisation and competition in the gas sector. 
Earlier policies focused on generating adequate supply of natural gas and efficient 
utilisation. For example, on 30 August 2007, China released its National Gas 
Utilisation Policy, which was intended to ease natural gas supply and demand, 
and optimise the structure of natural gas utilisation (NDRC 2007). 
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In line with the overall policy of marketisation and establishing a market economy 
that was promoted in the past five years, the focus of recent natural gas policy has 
shifted from gas supply and consumption to the gas market, with liberalisation 
the highlight. Measures promoted in these policies include pricing reform, 
opening up of the sector to private investors and TPA. For example, the State 
Council’s policy on private investment issued in May 2010 explicitly encourages 
private investment in oil and gas exploration and production, storage and 
pipeline development for oil, gas and refined oil products (State Council 2010). 
According to a reform package issued after the Third Plenary Session of the 
Eighteenth Communist Party of China (CPC) Central Committee in November 
2013, the principles related to the natural gas sector and their implications are that 
the administrative monopoly will be removed and thus access to some upstream 
resources for non-state-owned companies will be improved; the government’s 
role will be regulation and not the operation of monopoly industries, thus 
creating a level playing field between state and private companies; network 
and operations (marketing) will be separated and thus could encourage private 
investment in monopoly sectors such as pipelines; restrictions on market 
access to competition-based operations will also be removed, such as those in 
the downstream gas sector; pricing of gas will be liberalised and there will be 
no intervention in any prices that can be determined by the markets (except 
network prices) (Central Committee of the CPC 2013). In mid-2014, the ‘Energy 
Revolution’ advocated calls for restoration of the commodity characteristics of 
energy products, which indicates that gas may be depoliticised and become a 
product open to more competition; market-based energy pricing mechanisms 
could be established; and there will be changes in governance and improvements 
in the regulatory system.
In the latest policy on energy issued by the State Council (2014)—that is, the 
Energy Development Strategy Action Plan (2014–20)—pricing reform and 
liberalisation for competitive prices are specified: ex-plant prices and retail 
prices will be determined by the markets while network transmission prices will 
be regulated by the government; network infrastructure and its transparent and 
non-discriminatory TPA will be gradually established; and laws and regulations 
on gas pipeline projection will be advanced. 
A legal framework and a regulator are still absent from China’s gas regulatory 
framework. In particular, there is a lack of independent and holistic gas regulators 
The regulation for natural gas is divided between the central government and 
local governments along the supply chain—the central government, with the 
National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) as the administrative 
agency, regulates gas prices from wellhead to city-gate terminals (wellhead 
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prices, processing fees and transportation tariffs);2 while provincial and local 
governments regulate local distribution charges (including connection fees) 
and end-user prices (Chen 2014). After the wholesale transaction, the price is 
adjusted by the provincial government with consideration given to economic 
disparities and local distribution costs (IEA 2013). As residential gas tariffs 
are regulated by local governments, uniform reforms are not possible and the 
central government’s policy goals may not be achieved at the local level. 
Some recent environmental policies will likely have a significant impact on 
the gas sector. The first is climate change policy. China has a target to reduce 
carbon dioxide emission intensity by 40–45 per cent in the period 2005–25, 
and a national carbon market is expected to be launched within two years. 
Both policies will boost future demand for natural gas. Another policy relates 
to air pollution control. In 2013, the Chinese Government set ambitious targets 
to reduce air pollution by 2017; fine particulate matter (PM2.5) is targeted 
to fall by 25 per cent, 20 per cent and 15 per cent, respectively, in the three 
economically developed coastal areas of Beijing–Tianjin–Hebei, Yangtze River 
Delta and Pearl River Delta from their 2012 levels, while all other cities must 
reduce their levels of PM10 by 10 per cent. Given the relative cleanliness of gas 
over coal in terms of carbon emissions and air pollutants, the replacement of 
coal with gas is promoted as a key solution (NDRC and NEA 2014). 
Gas pricing reform
Like the pricing of other energy commodities, gas pricing has experienced 
transformation from the planned to the market economy. The extent of 
regulations on gas pricing varies according to a few factors, such as the source 
of supply, the means and routes of transportation, and the type of end use of 
the specific region. Before 2011, when a trial market mechanism was introduced, 
there were four stages of gas pricing similar to other typical pricing of key 
commodities in China. The fifth stage featured market-based pricing; it started 
in 2011 and has continued (Table 7.2). A detailed account of the gas pricing 
mechanism can be found in the recent literature (Chen 2014; IEA 2014). 
2  Offshore gas prices, which accounted for 10 per cent of domestic gas output, at the wellhead are not 
strictly regulated by the NDRC as offshore acreage has been open to foreign cooperation since the 1980s 
and therefore is subject to a more market-driven pricing system. Similarly, LNG prices are not subject to 
regulation. However, the sale of LNG (after regasification) via long-distance pipeline would be subject to 
the uniform city-gate price regulation (Chen 2014).
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Table 7.2 Evolution of gas pricing reforms in China
Stage Year Event
I 1957–81 Gas production quotas and prices were set by the government. At this 
stage, gas prices were low 
II 1982–92 Also featured ‘dual pricing’. Production beyond quotas was allowed and 
was priced higher than that within the quota (not exceeding 10 per cent). 
This change in pricing aims to encourage investment in gas exploration and 
production
III 1993–2005 Along with the marketisation process, a government-guided price was 
introduced alongside the government-set price. Ex-factor prices were 
introduced to combine the wellhead price and processing fees in 2001
IV 2006–11 The dual pricing system was abolished and a guided-pricing system was 
implemented. A two-tier (classified according to the geological locations 
of the fields) price was introduced during this period. According to the plan, 
an annual adjustment not exceeding 8 per cent of the wellhead price for 
tier-two gas fields was allowed.a In reality, however, there was no annual 
adjustment
a The reference is a five-year moving weighted-average price of crude oil, LPG and coal prices, 
weighted at 40 per cent, 20 per cent and 40 per cent, respectively. 
Sources: Authors’ summary based on various studies (Chen 2014; IEA 2013).
Under the cost-plus pricing mechanisms that prevailed until 2011, the ex-
factory prices,3 including wellhead prices and processing fees, were often set 
according to production costs and could differ among producers (Chen 2014). 
The transmission prices were guided by government regulations. The city-gate 
price was calculated as the ex-plant price plus the pipeline tariff, and thus could 
be different for each sector in each city or region (Chen 2014). Cost-plus pricing 
was also used in the United States in the 1950s to 1970s; however, it changed 
from a wellhead to an area approach to reduce the burden on regulators. It is 
useful in maintaining low gas prices when the level of marketisation is low 
(IEA 2012).
Cost-plus pricing mechanisms have many shortcomings. The pricing mechanism 
can lead to market distortions—either too generous or too parsimonious—because 
it is almost impossible to reveal the true costs of gas production. The prices also 
will not reflect the market fundamentals and fail to send the appropriate market 
signals for upstream development and demand response (IEA 2012). Under 
the cost-plus gas pricing mechanisms, final gas prices are fragmented among 
different kinds of consumers and different regions, and cannot accommodate 
increasing imports of LNG (IEA 2013). Such divergences can be unfair and 
ineffective. Fragmented and uneven pricing regulation created tensions among 
producers and distributors, and discouraged investment in production and 
infrastructure, which are needed to meet demand and enhance market access 
3  Currently, gas prices include ex-factory (plant) prices, transmission prices, city-gate prices and end-user 
prices. In this chapter, unless mentioned otherwise, ‘gas price’ refers to the wholesale price. 
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and regional connectivity. The increasing gap between regulated prices and 
supply costs causes significant financial losses for gas importers (Chen 2014). 
Moreover, government-regulated gas pricing will lead to less transparent price 
signals and an unstable investment climate, as government policy objectives to 
meet desired political, social, economic or environmental outcomes can easily 
change (IEA 2013).
To address these challenges, the Chinese Government introduced a trial netback 
market-value pricing mechanism at the end of 2011 to replace the fragmented, 
cost-plus onshore gas pricing regime. The trial was initially launched in 
Guangdong and Guangxi provinces, where a single regulated price ceiling for 
all piped gas supply to the provinces replaced previous cost-plus wellhead price 
controls (IEA 2014). This reform also indicates that the pricing control point was 
moved from the wellhead to the city gate. The purpose of the reform is to allow 
market forces to play a bigger role in determining the level of domestic upstream 
investment and the volume of imports (Chen 2014). Effectively, it is expected to 
generate more liquidity and help development of a nascent gas market without 
compromising sustainability and affordability (Chen 2014).
In July 2013, in order to facilitate pricing reform, secure gas supplies, promote 
energy efficiency and control emissions, the Chinese Government started to use 
a market-oriented approach by linking the price of incremental gas volume to 
the import prices of alternatives (40 per cent of LPG and 60 per cent of heavy 
fuel oil), which is an expansion of the pilot program (NDRC 2013). The reform 
introduced two categories of gas—existing gas volumes and incremental gas 
volumes—and planned a gradual transition of cost-plus pricing for city-gate 
gas to netback pricing for non-residential sectors (mainly industrial users and 
power generators), which accounted for 80 per cent of the total consumption 
in 2012 (NDRC 2013). In this initial adjustment, only 9 per cent of gas demand 
was affected and the industrial sector bore the majority of impacts (Chen 2014). 
From 1 April 2015, netback pricing replaced the cost-plus pricing as the 
mechanism to price gas for non-residential use. In 2013 and 2014, the 
government steadily raised the prices of existing volumes three times, and 
the price levels in both categories eventually converged to a fully oil-linked 
gas price from 1 April 2015. With the introduction of such a market-oriented 
pricing mechanism, Chinese gas demand will become more closely correlated 
with pricing reform and natural gas will be able to compete against oil products 
across non-residential end-user sectors.
However, some issues with the netback pricing mechanisms remain. First,  it 
is still arguable that this mechanism does not necessarily reflect the true gas 
market fundamentals. For example, this methodology fails to account for coal, 
which is the true competitor of gas for power generation. This will become 
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relevant when gas starts to compete with coal for power generation. The second 
issue is how to manage affordability under market mechanisms. Third, is how to 
differentiate city-gate prices among different regions, which differ in their ability 
to pay, the size of their resource endowment and seasonality. Fourth, what are 
the threshold and frequency of adjustment? 
It is also not clear whether the government will follow the netback when oil 
prices return to high levels, such as above $80 a barrel. Current low oil prices 
provide a chance to implement netback gas prices without a huge surge in gas 
prices; however, continuous application of market-oriented pricing will lead to 
a price surge when oil prices are high. Given the sensitivity of gas demand to 
gas prices, whether the netback pricing will be maintained in that scenario is 
an important question. 
Pricing reform for the residential sector was announced in March 2014, although 
still not market oriented. According to this reform, gas for the residential 
sector will be priced progressively—the price will be higher the greater is 
consumption, and all cities connected to gas pipelines must establish the three-
tiered tariff by the end of 2015 (NDRC 2014). The regulation of prices—and 
thus limited pass-through of gas costs to residential end-users—will remain a 
long-term challenge to market liberalisation. This prevailing cross-subsidisation 
among gas end-users could distort the markets and could be counterproductive 
for gas use in the industry and commercial sectors (IEA 2012). 
Pipeline and third-party access
The midstream, the pipeline, is dominated by national oil companies and 
provincial grid companies. China’s limited long-distance and high-pressure 
transmission network is still being expanded (IEA 2012). China’s pipeline 
transmission is neither sufficient nor open. China had more than 75,000 km of 
long-distance gas transmission pipelines by late 2014 (Su 2014). Although the 
Energy Development Strategy Action Plan (2014–20) projects that the backbone 
of natural gas pipelines will extend to at least 120,000 km by 2020, China seems 
to have a long way to go to develop its network infrastructure to the level of 
Germany or the United States. Furthermore, CNPC is the dominant player here, 
owning 80 per cent of the pipeline network (IEA 2012). As for LNG receiving 
terminals, the first privately owned LNG import terminal, the Zhoushan LNG 
terminal, owned by ENN, was approved in January 2015 and may be completed 
by 2017 (Platts 2015). 
The midstream is still in the early days of privatisation and plans for full 
ownership unbundling. According to the decisions of the Central Committee 
of the CPC (2013), privatisation is the politically preferred direction for state-
owned companies, creating momentum for privatisation of the Big Three. 
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For  example, Sinopec announced in September 2014 that it had sold almost 
30 per cent of its retail unit, comprising a wholesale business, more than 30,000 
petrol stations, more than 23,000 convenience stores, as well as oil-product 
pipelines and storage facilities (Aldred and Zhu 2014). 
CNPC has also made moves to privatise its pipeline assets and its recent 
privatisation plan is quite radical. East–West Pipelines (EWPs) started to 
undergo privatisation by PetroChina, a subsidiary of CNPC, in 2012. It was 
further reported in January 2015 that the PetroChina board had approved 
the plan to fully privatise its Shanghai-based PetroChina Eastern Pipelines 
(CNPC News Centre 2015). Once completed, the pipelines would be completely 
unbundled from PetroChina’s market activities. This separation of pipeline 
activities from CNPC’s production and marketing activities makes it possible 
for the private sector to invest in pipelines and for independent gas producers 
to bypass PetroChina and make deals directly with consumers. However, the 
unbundling does not necessarily improve TPA, thus continuous development of 
TPA policy and enhancement of regulatory capacity are still needed. 
The regulation of TPA was announced in February 2014, mandating gas 
pipeline operators to provide non-discriminatory TPA whenever they have 
spare capacity. The regulation also allows downstream distributors to negotiate 
directly with upstream suppliers over gas supply, while pipeline operators may 
provide only transmission services (NEA 2014). The TPA regulation, however, 
has a major limitation in that it mandates TPA only when the operator has spare 
capacity, which is difficult for third parties to monitor. The current shortage 
of network capacity renders the concept of TPA useless. It is also not clear 
who will judge where there is a surplus capacity. Furthermore, process, terms 
of conditions and tariffs for the TPA are not publicly available (and may have 
not been determined by the NEA). Nevertheless, in the case of LNG import 
terminals, the first successful TPA happened in December 2014, when EEN 
received 6 Mt of LNG through the PetroChina-operated Rudong LNG terminal 
in China’s eastern Jiangsu Province (Platts 2014). 
Market structure and number of players
The Chinese gas industry is dominated by the Big Three national oil companies 
(NOCs): CNPC, CNOOC and Sinopec.4 About 75 per cent of China’s natural gas is 
produced by CNPC, which is also the biggest owner and operator of pipelines, 
in which it has a share of about 90 per cent. CNOOC was the first company to 
import LNG and it is likely to remain the main LNG importer (IEA 2014). CNOOC 
4  While the major oil and gas companies are partially privatised, the state is still the majority shareholder 
of these companies.
China’s Domestic Transformation in a Global Context
152
also has exclusive marketing rights and buys offshore gas from its production-
sharing contract partners at the wellhead (Chen 2014). Shaanxi Yanchang 
Petroleum (Group) is the only local oil and gas enterprise apart from the Big 
Three that is qualified to undertake exploration and development (IEA 2012). 
Other small and medium-sized gas producers have a small share in production 
due to their limited market access—they have to either sell their supplies to 
CNPC or develop the gas for local consumption. Gas imports, such as LNG, are, 
however, not restricted (IEA 2012). 
In the downstream sector, there are no nationally dominant players. A variety of 
domestic suppliers with various ownership structures5 exist, often supported by 
local governments. These distribution companies usually receive gas at the city 
gate and have limited direct access to gas sources (IEA 2012). These distribution 
companies may have monopoly power in their local market, often owning the 
local gas pipeline, as is the case with ENN Energy Holdings. These distributors 
face new competition from the Big Three NOCs, which are currently trying to 
take over some of the domestic markets (IEA 2012). Such integration attempts 
may give the Big Three larger market power and thus impede competition.
Overall, the number of market players is still not sufficient for meaningful 
market competition even at the wholesale level. To achieve a fully competitive 
market, the gas industry will have to transfer its vertically integrated structure 
to smaller, less vertically integrated energy companies. Experience from the 
IEA countries suggests that in closed markets with one or only a few dominant 
market players on the supply side, market openness along the whole gas value 
chain—in particular, in transmission—is necessary because it takes time for 
new entrants to build up confidence, set up business and gain market share 
(IEA 2012). The US experience suggests that liberalisation and open access 
to pipelines starting in 1985 are what led to the creation of the competitive 
wholesale gas market (IEA 2012).
Long-term structural reforms, such as the privatisation of existing gas business, 
opening up TPA and the emergence of new LNG importers, will increase the 
number of market players so that more liquid and thus price-competitive 
gas markets can be generated. The development of shale gas will provide an 
option not available in the past to create new market players. Shale gas may 
increase competition because private firms, as well as non-oil companies, are 
participating in the development of this sector. 
5  Some companies are privately owned—such as ENN Energy Holdings and China Gas—while others 
belong to local governments.
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Simulating the impact of China’s gas market 
liberalisation
The scenario setting
For the current study, a baseline scenario is developed as a reference case to 
study how the international gas market might evolve to 2035. Policy changes 
were simulated in policy scenarios. The differences between the impacts of the 
baseline scenario and the policy scenarios on regional trade patterns, prices, 
production and consumption are then analysed in detail to understand the 
effects of liberalisation, from which we draw our conclusions. 
In the baseline scenario, we have all active LNG contracts in China, of which 
94 per cent are indexed to Japan Customs-cleared Crude (JCC) and only one 
contract is indexed to Henry Hub (HH). For pipeline gas, all contract prices 
are indexed to oil products. Thus, 98.4 per cent by volume of LNG and 100 per 
cent of the pipeline gas are indexed to oil products. All the contracts have ‘take-
or-pay’ (TOP) and destination clauses built in. This is the reference case with 
which we compare the results from our policy scenario simulations. Details can 
be found at Andrews-Speed et al. (2015). 
In the natural gas liberalisation Scenario I – ‘China spot’, China’s Shanghai 
spot prices become the benchmark for both pipeline gas and LNG trading in 
China—a pricing mechanism that is similar to how natural gas is currently 
priced in the United States and the United Kingdom. The Shanghai spot price is 
formed within the range of the marginal cost of supply of gas (shadow price) in 
Shanghai and gas-on-gas competition with LNG prices in the region.6 All new 
contracts starting from 2020, and all existing contacts from 2025, will be indexed 
to the regional benchmark. 
In the ‘China spot, no TOP’ scenario, in addition to the assumptions of Scenario I, 
TOP and destination clauses are removed for all contracts in China (post-2025), 
effectively making China a spot-only market.7 
Baseline scenario 
A detailed explanation of the baseline scenario can be found at Andrews-Speed 
et al. (2015). In this section, we report results relating to China and Australia. 
6  The competing fuel prices used in calculation were average China LNG Contract DES price; Japan spot 
price; and average LNG contract price from Australia.
7  Removing TOP and destination clauses from a contract makes that supply contestable by other demand 
regions. Hence, removing the contract clauses is similar to making all purchases in a spot-only market.
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Prices
A decline in oil prices is the main reason for a decline in spot and shadow 
prices8 for consumers (China, India and Japan) until about 2020 (Figure 7.4). 
This is due to 1) spot gas competing with oil and oil products in the region; and 
2) predominantly oil-indexed long-term contracts in the region. The increasing 
cost of gas extraction in China (unconventional gas) is the reason for an increase 
in shadow prices in China. Increased shadow prices and increased domestic 
demand is expected to make the Chinese market the highest spot-price market 
in the region by 2035. Ample supply of shale gas and moderately rising demand 
result in a less tight market in the United States. This leads to steady HH prices. 
Spot prices in Russia and Australia increase due to increased tightness in the 
domestic market and increased costs of gas extraction.
Figure 7.4 Spot price and shadow price (all prices in 2012 US$ per mmBtu)a
a mmBtu = one million British thermal units.  
Source: Authors’ projections.
8  The shadow price is the marginal cost of gas supply to each node and is thus indicative of the true cost 
of gas. Spot prices are market-driven prices that customers pay for consumption of the gas. The spot 
price is dependent on the cost of procurement (shadow price) and the tightness of the market. Tightness 
of the market is a measure of overall flexibility of supply in relation to demand in a regional market. 
In a market with fewer supply options, market tightness will be high if supply is relatively constrained. 
The exact position within this range is determined according to the state of supply and demand assumed 
for the model run. In an oversupplied market, the spot price should lie close to the marginal cost and in a 
tighter market the spot price will be influenced more strongly by competing fuel prices (Nexant 2013).
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Production & consumption in China
China sees a more than twofold jump in total production from 149 bcm in 2015 to 
341 bcm in 2035, and the increase in consumption is projected to be 256 per cent, 
from 207 bcm in 2015 to 532 bcm in 2035 (Figure 7.5). The weighted average 
cost of production increases from $1.32 per mmBtu in 2015 to $2.54 per mmBtu 
in 2035. 
Figure 7.5 Chinese gas market balance (production and imports) (bcm)
Source: Authors’ projections.
Australia’s LNG production and exports will also dramatically increase. 
Production is expected to increase from 72 bcm in 2015 to 126 bcm in 2019 
and to stay relatively stable in the forecast period. LNG exports is projected 
to increase from 26 Mt in 2015 to 62 Mt in 2019, and decline slightly to 55 
Mt, on average, in the period 2030–35. Meanwhile, domestic consumption is 
expected to be relatively stable with a mild growth trend. About 60 per cent of 
production will be exported, even in 2035 (Figure 7.6). 
Figure 7.6 Australia’s gas market balance (production and exports) (bcm)
Source: Authors’ projections.
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Inter-regional trade flows for China and Australia
There is a significant increase in pipeline imports to China, from 37 bcm in 2015 
to 156 bcm in 2035, and PPG remains the largest source of imports. This increase 
in pipeline imports and increased domestic production (341 bcm in 2035) result 
in decreased dependence on LNG imports, as seen in Figure 7.7. Australia 
remains the dominant supplier to China after 2030, while South-East Asian 
exporters (mainly due to their decreased export capacity) are expected to lose 
market share.
Figure 7.7 China’s pipeline and LNG imports (bcm)
FSU = Former Soviet Union. 
Source: Authors’ projections.
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In this baseline scenario, Australia remains the overall largest exporter of LNG 
to China in the forecast period (2015–35). Australia exports the majority of LNG 
to China and North-East Asia during our forecast period. Exports to China will 
decline after 2030 due to competition from Russia and Central Asia (Figure 7.8).
Figure 7.8 Australia’s LNG exports: baseline scenario (bcm)
Source: Authors’ projections.
Modelling results
Impact of China’s gas market liberalisation on China’s gas sector 
As seen in Figure 7.9, Chinese spot prices start to decline (with reference to the 
baseline scenario) from 2025—the start of hub-based pricing—while hub prices 
in all other major markets remain largely the same. This is due to 1) gas-on-gas 
competition leads to lower competing prices in China; and 2) domestic market 
is less tight due to increased supply options from contract and spot LNG and 
pipeline gas. The same market price for both contracted and spot gas is more 
efficient in bringing in supplies to match demand, resulting in lower spot prices.
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Figure 7.9 Selected spot price comparison: baseline versus China spot price
Source: Authors’ projections.
Production and consumption patterns remain unchanged. LNG and pipeline 
trade patterns are also largely unchanged in such a scenario. This is to be expected 
as demand is unchanged and supply through contracts is also unchanged as 
contract terms remain the same, leading to similar levels of spot purchases (both 
pipeline and LNG) in China, as in the baseline scenario. Total LNG and pipeline 
trade flow patterns to China are therefore relatively unaffected in the ‘China 
spot’ scenario (Figures 7.10 and 7.11).
Figure 7.10 Pipeline imports to China: baseline versus China spot (bcm)
Source: Authors’ projections.
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Figure 7.11 LNG imports to China: baselines versus China spot (bcm)
Source: Authors’ projections.
In the second scenario, in this spot-only market (without TOP and destination 
clauses), China has to compete for spot gas (both pipeline and LNG) to satisfy 
all its demand, and demand may only marginally decline (<1 per cent). Here the 
optimisation of costs sees China developing more of its costlier unconventional 
gas resources compared with the baseline scenario. 
The spot price in China increases in a market where all Chinese imports are 
procured from spot rather than the baseline scenario (Figure 7.12). This is due to 
the fact that in a market where all import purchases are from spot market supply, 
security is reduced. This provides incentives for domestic production from new, 
unconventional sources at higher cost. This leads to the marginal cost of gas 
production (shadow price) increasing in China after 2025, and in Asia after 2030 
(Figure 7.12). Second, competition for spot gas from the market increases the 
tightness of the domestic gas market in China. Therefore, in a spot-only market, 
where China is forced to compete for contestable gas volumes at higher prices 
and also produce gas at higher cost, the spot price in China increases. This 
increase in China spot price leads to increase in spot prices in the region due to 
trade arbitrage.
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Figure 7.12 Spot and shadow prices: ‘China spot, no TOP’ versus baseline (US$)
Source: Authors’ projections.
Figure 7.13 Production comparison: baseline versus ‘China spot, no TOP’ (bcm)
Source: Authors’ projections.
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Domestic production of natural gas increases, on average, by 7.4 per cent, while 
the production cost rises by 13.1 per cent (Figure 7.13).
This increase in production (and therefore less dependence on contestable spot 
gas from global markets) leads to changes in trade patterns, for both LNG and 
pipeline gas. 
Overall, there is only marginally lower import of LNG compared with the 
baseline scenario during this period. Hence LNG import is seen as favorable 
in a fully liberalised market. Although the impact is different among different 
LNG producers. China imports more LNG from South-East Asia, the Middle East 
and Africa and less from Australia and Russia. LNG imports from the first three 
regions are favoured due to the fact that 1) a higher spot price means marginal 
LNG volumes from South-East Asia, Africa and the Middle East are no longer 
priced out; 2) as contracted voumes are displaced by spot gas, cost competitive 
regions (Table 7.3) are expected to dominate the market; and, most importantly, 
3) the decrease in cost of LNG is higher than decrease in cost of pipeline gas, 
as compared to base case scenario. Australian LNG exports to Asia decrease, on 
average, by 20 bcm, while Russia is able to compensate for the loss of Chinese 
exports by exporting more LNG to North-East Asia (Figure 7.14).
Figure 7.14 LNG imports to China: baseline versus ‘China spot, no TOP’ (bcm)
Source: Authors’ projections.
Increased domestic production leads to less demand for piped gas, and most of 
the curtailment applies to Russian gas. Russian gas imports to China decrease, 
on average, by 40 bcm from 2025 to 2035. In contrast, there is an increase, on 
average, of 23 bcm in gas exports from Central Asia, which compensates for 
Russian gas until about 2030. Thereafter, Russian gas is compensated by an 
increase in production than an increase in imports. Other pipeline imports to 
China’s Domestic Transformation in a Global Context
162
China are mostly unchanged (Figure 7.15). There are three reasons for this. First, 
Russian piped gas is costlier (at $12.33 per mmBtu) than Central Asian piped 
gas ($12.07 per mmBtu) during the period 2025–35. Second, China buys gas 
in the market for contestable pipeline spot gas. The Russian spot gas market 
is expected to be more competitive as Russian gas can be sold in Europe, the 
former Soviet Union (FSU) and Asia. The marginal cost of procuring spot gas 
away from the Russian pipeline is therefore higher compared with the Central 
Asian gas market. Third, when the incremental Central Asian contestable gas 
capacity that can be cost effectively diverted to China is exhausted, it is more 
economical to develop domestic resources for production.
Figure 7.15 Pipeline imports to China: baseline versus ‘China spot, no TOP’ (bcm)
Source: Authors’ projections.
Impact of China’s gas market liberalisation on Australia’s LNG 
exports
In a contracted world, due to TOP and destination clauses, Australia sees a 
very small (less than 0.1 per cent) change in overall production and exports to 
Asia even with a spot-indexed market. Therefore, in the ‘China spot’ case, the 
trading pattern remains unchanged. The total change in export volume is not 
more than 1 bcm during the study period (Figure 7.16). Despite the low spot 
prices in China, due to contractual obligations, the demand for contestable gas 
is lower, and Australia with its proximity and cost competitiveness compared 
with North America can supply it at the margin. 
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Figure 7.16 Australian LNG exports: ‘China spot’ scenario
Source: Authors’ projections.
In a market where the demand for spot gas is high and flexibility of supply 
is also high (‘China spot, no TOP’ scenario), higher-cost producers such as 
Australia could, however, lose some of their export volumes to lower-cost 
producers supplying in the region. When all Chinese contracts change to pure 
spot (without TOP and destination clauses), Australia’s LNG is displaced from 
China (all contracted flows) and there is little compensation from increased 
flows to North-East Asia. Total Australian production therefore decreases by 
8.5 per cent and exports decrease by 28 per cent, on average (Figure 7.17).
Figure 7.17 Australian LNG exports: baseline versus ‘China spot, no TOP’ scenario
Source: Authors’ projections.
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The decline can be explained by the marginal cost and average cost of production 
of gas from Australia compared with other major producers. Australian gas is of 
comparable cost with that of the United States and Russia, while disadvantaged 
against that from Qatar, Nigeria and other major producers in South-East Asia 
(Table 7.3). Moreover, factoring in the transportation cost to Asian markets, 
Australia will lose out to Middle Eastern producers (Qatar, United Arab 
Emirates), Africa and South-East Asia, and is at a slight disadvantage compared 
with Russian gas due to the lower transportation costs for Russian LNG from 
Sakhalin through the pipeline to China (Ledesma et al. 2014). It is seen as 
competitive with North American gas in Asia, hence Australia (with contracted 
gas) continues to supply all of its exports to Asia.
Table 7.3 Marginal cost of production of gasa
$ mmBtu 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035
Australia 2.79 4.56 4.34 4.19 3.70
Qatar 1.99 1.99 1.99 1.99 1.99
United States 3.73 4.40 4.44 4.45 4.45
Russia 3.36 3.62 4.31 4.41 4.45
Nigeria 1.69 1.07 1.35 2.20 2.20
South-East Asia 
exporters
3.12 3.62 3.43 4.67 5.69
a Shadow price at the node = marginal cost of production of gas for producers.  
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Financial impact assessment
In the ‘China spot’ scenario, liberalisation of the gas market leads to lower 
procurement costs for China (Table 7.4). It is instructive to compare the total cost 
of gas in China during the forecast period in the baseline scenario with that in 
the ‘China spot’ case—total consumption is the same, but the procurement costs 
are reduced. Due to lower domestic spot prices for the same demand, pipeline 
costs are lower by 5.9 per cent and LNG contract and spot purchase costs are 
lower by 11.7 per cent. Overall procurement costs are lower by 6.3 per cent. 
Uncontracted volumes increase and contracted volumes are kept to the minimum 
TOP amount.
In the ‘China spot, no TOP’ scenario, the total cost of procuring gas for China 
during the forecast period increases by 6.8 per cent compared with the baseline 
scenario. There is a production cost increase of 13 per cent due to increased 
production from higher-cost fields, a 10.5 per cent increase in total pipeline 
procurement costs (even though total pipeline deliveries decline), and an 
11 per cent decrease in LNG import costs due to reduced imports from Australia 
and Russia. 
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Table 7.4 Total production, import and procurement costs for China across 
scenarios, 2015–35
Cost calculation Volume (bcm) Procurement costa (US$ million) 
Baseline Spot Spot, no 
TOP
Baseline Spot Spot, no 
TOP
Production 4,732 4,735 4,997 353,114.40 353,378.20 399,398.00
PPG contracted 4,337 4,435 1,886 780,341.50 689,221.40 279,063.60
PPG uncontracted 4,439 4,447 6,194 1,618,756.00 1,566,592.00 2,373,357.00
LNG contracted 690 688 350 463,525.20 394,801.80 208,463.40
LNG uncontracted 416 417 810 141,484.40 139,285.70 329,525.60
Regasification n.a.b n.a. n.a. 28,805.57 28,924.07 30,125.56
Consumption 7,938 7,938 7,927 3,386,027.00 3,172,203.00 3,619,933.00
a Production cost = production per field; LRMC, contract price = delivered quantity; Contract price, 
spot price = spot quantity; Spot price, calculated for each production field, contracts and spot 
purchases for the duration of forecast in the case of China. 
b n.a. = not applicable. 
Source: Authors’ projections.
Chinese liberalisation is expected to cause a net profit loss to Australia’s LNG 
exports, caused by a decrease in export prices as well reductions in volume 
of exports. In the ‘China spot’ scenario, Australia’s LNG export volumes do 
not change, but average prices will decrease. With the removal of TOP and 
destination clauses, Australian LNG exports further reduces with little in 
compensation from an increase in spot prices.  
As we analyse the export revenue for Australia (Table 7.5) under different 
scenarios of Chinese market liberalisation, in the ‘China spot’ scenario 
total export revenue declines by 4.1 per cent, while in the ‘China spot, no 
TOP’ scenario total export revenue declines by 9.4 per cent. Contracted and 
uncontracted export volumes remain unchanged in the ‘China spot’ scenario, 
while decline in prices result in decline of overall revenue. An increase in spot 
prices is more than compensated by a  decline in the export volumes ‘China spot 
no TOP’ scenario, resulting in decline of overall revenue.
Overall net profits, accounting for costs of production and liquefaction,9 show 
that profits are expected to decline when China liberalises the market (price 
and volume flexibility). Average LNG prices ($ per cm) are $0.5209, $0.4999 
and $0.5149 under the three scenarios of baseline, ‘spot’ and ‘spot, no TOP’, 
respectively.
9  Price DES = cost of production + cost of liquefaction + cost of transportation + profit.
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Table 7.5 Export revenue for Australia in different scenarios, 2015–35 
Exports (bcm) Revenue ($ billion)/average price 
Baseline Spot Spot, no 
TOP




1,251.6 1,250.3 1,072.3 697.0 670.9 601.1
LNG uncontracted 
exports 
321.2 322.6 368.7 122.3 115.4 140.9
Total LNG exports 1,572.8 1,572.9 1,441.0 819.3 786.3 742.0
Production 2,481.6 2,481.6 2,349.7 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Production and 
liquefaction costs
n.a.a n.a. n.a. 485.6 486.9 441.9
Profit n.a. n.a. n.a. 333.7 299.4 300.0
a n.a. = not applicable. 
Source: Authors’ projections.
In contrast with the mixed results for China and Australia, the world is better 
off in China liberalised market scenarios, as seen in the global system cost. 
Global costs for ‘China spot’ and ‘China spot, no TOP’ are lower—1.24 per cent 
and 1.18  per cent respectively—compared with the baseline scenario. 
The procurement costs for major importers in East Asia are, on average, lower 
by 2.12 per cent for ‘China spot’ and 0.84 per cent for the ‘China spot, no 
TOP’ scenario (Table 7.6). This is due mainly to reduced LNG import costs in 
all countries (similar to China), while being independent of pipeline imports 
(in China, pipeline import costs substantially increase in the ‘no TOP’ scenario).
Table 7.6 Optimised system cost, 2015–35 (US$ million)
Baseline Spot Spot, no TOP
Procurement costs: India 568,988.8 562,563.4 570,893.1
Procurement costs: Japan 1,131,709.0 1,107,390.0 1,117,638.7
Procurement costs: Korea 549,608.0 538,492.7 544,446.3
Procurement costs: Taiwan 190,362.1 184,361.8 187,490.6
Global optimised system cost 13,157,315.0 12,994,139.0 13,000,958.0
Source: Individual country costs are calculated similar to China cost calculation, and global cost is an 
output of the optimiser of the World Gas Model.
Summary and implications
In an importing region with a marked dependence on long-term contracts 
(North-East Asia) and with China as the only fully deregulated market, China 
could potentially be worse off. This is due to a potential increase in the spot 
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price due to demand for contestable gas. Concern for supply security10 and 
the level and volatility in price for and supply of spot gas could potentially 
be a good incentive to develop costlier unconventional production, which 
would otherwise be shut down. Even with less import dependence, the overall 
procurement cost could potentially be driven up due to the twin effects of 
higher uncontracted pipeline gas and LNG spot purchases. 
Australian LNG could face competition from a surge in the supply of piped gas 
from Russia and Central Asia. Australian LNG is, however, seen as competitive 
with North American LNG in the baseline scenario simulation. Both in the 
baseline scenario and in the ‘China spot price’ scenario, most of the Australian 
LNG is contracted and Australian LNG is cost competitive with spot gas from 
Russia, North America and South-East Asia by the end of 2030. 
Australian exports could reduce in cases where China’s gas market is fully 
liberalised in the ‘China spot’ scenario (Scenario I). The future of Chinese 
gas supply is well diversified, with an emphasis on domestic production and 
pipeline imports from Russia and Central Asia. This well-supplied market with 
liberalised prices could lead to lower spot prices in North-East Asia. In this 
market, Australian gas with higher marginal costs is expected to be priced out at 
the margin. Moreover, remaining contracted exports to China are transacted at 
this lower spot price, leading to lower export revenue. However, the TOP clause 
in contracts allows Australia to continue to export at least up to the TOP level.
In the scenario in which the Chinese gas market is fully liberalised ‘China spot, 
no TOP’ (Scenario II), the twin effects of increased domestic production and 
competition for spot gas from lower-cost producers in Africa, the Middle East 
and South-East Asia result in a decline in Australian exports to China. Here the 
impact on exports is due to competition with other producing regions (for both 
piped gas and LNG) to supply spot gas (contestable volumes) to China. Reduced 
supply security in an ‘all-spot’ market would provide incentives for domestic 
production in China, thereby reducing import dependence. Also, pipeline gas 
from Central Asia and Russia is cheaper than LNG. However, in this tight ‘spot-
only’ market, higher spot prices would compensate for the drop in volumes.
Nevertheless, the world and the major East Asian buyers are better off, which 
justifies the liberalisation efforts. Comparing the two policy scenarios, however, 
a fully deregulated Chinese market increases the total global system cost and 
procurement costs for the major East Asian gas importers. 
10  Supply security is reflected in the model as the tightness of the domestic market. 
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The simulations suggest that, first, for China, a market with a mix of contracted 
purchases (with TOP and destination clauses) and spot purchases at a single 
price is the most effective form of regulation. We have seen one possibility in 
which, in a balanced market (based on production and consumption forecasts), 
the optimum response for China is to take contracted supplies up to the level 
of TOP and bridge the gap with lowest-cost spot purchases, with a single price 
driven by local supply and demand characteristics.
In contrast, for Australia, from the perspective of maintaining export volumes, 
keeping TOP and destination clauses is in Australia’s economic interest. 
However, when judged against total profit, the benefit becomes small. In any 
case, to compete in a scenario of full liberalisation of key consumer markets 
such as China, with a corresponding impact on domestic prices and emphasis 
on shorter-term contracts, Australia can look at 1) alternative key markets 
where spot prices are higher than Japanese and Chinese prices; and 2) retaining 
contract terms with some conditions on TOP and destination clauses.
Conclusion 
Given the importance of China’s current and future gas demand, its liberalisation 
efforts and the prospect of a hub of Chinese benchmark prices, Chinese 
liberalisation is an important topic for natural gas researchers and policymakers 
at home and abroad. Against the IEA’s assessment criteria, it is clear that 
China’s gas market is still developing and is therefore not ready for wholesale 
competition. Although non-residential gas prices are linked to oil products, 
they are still regulated. And although large customers are allowed to choose 
their suppliers in the full netback pricing from April 2015, TPA is a challenge 
due to the inadequacy of transmission capacity. Short transmission capacity 
will still prevent the access of third parties. Moreover, residential gas pricing 
is still regulated; and the current oil indexation for gas pricing will not lead to 
the more ambitious goal of establishing a spot market and competitive prices. 
The insufficient number of market players in the oligopolistic market structure 
will prevent the formation of a competitive gas market, even at the wholesale 
level. The dominance of NOCs also casts a shadow over market competition, 
if there is any.
The gas market liberalisation process in China, despite recent momentum, may 
require a few decades to be completed. To establish a spot market, the Chinese 
Government will need to take additional measures, including institutional 
changes such as wholesale price deregulation, separation of transmission 
China’s Gas Market Liberalisation
169
and marketing activities, sufficient network capacity with TPA, creation of a 
sufficient number of market players to enable competition, and the involvement 
of financial institutions. 
Despite the challenges, looking forward a decade, a competitive market 
in China is possible. It is possible to develop a deregulated market through 
either pipeline-to-pipeline competition or wholesale market competition in 
a developing stage (IEA 2013). Gas market liberalisation has been reaffirmed 
by the current leadership and could be expedited in coming years. With the 
determination of the Communist Party to liberalise markets, more wholesale 
competition reforms—such as pricing liberalisation, separation of pipelines 
and building gas trading hubs—are on the way. Gas trading hubs, building on 
wholesale competition, could emerge in the coming decade.
Immediate improvements in the gas pricing mechanisms could extend the netback 
to other alternatives, such as coal; allow the publication of price-adjustment 
criteria and procedures; specify regional differentiation formulas; apply 
market prices to the residential sector; and redirect subsidies from distribution 
companies to underprivileged households. For the long term, improvement in 
gas pricing could be achieved by moving the pricing mechanism away from the 
netback and towards competitive hub prices.
The emergence of hub-based prices will have an impact on world trade, and 
prices and demand for natural gas. The emergence of competitive market (gas-
to-gas) prices, if adopted as a trade benchmark, will have a significant impact on 
other gas producing and consuming countries. 
Our estimations show that in an importing region with a marked dependence on 
long-term contracts (North-East Asia), with China as the only fully deregulated 
market, could potentially make China worse off. Even with less import 
dependence, overall procurement costs could potentially be driven up due to 
the twin effects of higher volume and prices for uncontracted pipeline gas and 
LNG spot purchases. A market with a mix of contracted purchases (with TOP 
and destination clauses) and spot purchases at a single price is seen as the most 
effective form of regulation.
Based on the modelling exercise and the nature of Chinese and Australian 
markets, the optimum response for China is to take contracted supplies up to 
the level of TOP and bridge the gap with lowest-cost spot purchases, with a 
single price driven by local supply and demand characteristics. Similarly, 
Australia would also potentially be better off in a predominantly long-term 
contract market. 
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The ongoing liberalisation process is important in achieving China’s gas demand 
targets, which, in turn, is important to achieve its critical goals of improving 
air quality and reducing carbon dioxide emissions. Regulated and often capped 
gas prices make it difficult to pass through high gas prices to consumers and 
reward the comparative advantages of gas over coal in reducing carbon dioxide 
emissions and air pollutants. On the contrary, in a deregulated gas market, the 
prices of gas could be adjusted with oil prices. In this context, pricing carbon 
makes natural gas more competitive over coal in power generation and other 
industrial usage, and carbon taxes will be more effective. The liberalised gas 
market will make it possible to fully utilise the potential of gas in carbon-
abatement technology, and thus could reduce carbon prices. These issues, 
although important, will have to be left for future study. 
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Appendix







North-East Asia Japan, South Korea, Chinese Taipei
Asia-Pacific exporters Brunei Darussalam, Malaysia, Indonesia, Papua New Guinea
Rest of South-East Asia Cambodia, Myanmar, Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam
Other Asia Bangladesh, Hong Kong, Mongolia, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, DPRK, 
Afghanistan, New Zealand
Africa Algeria, Angola, Benin, Botswana, Cameroon, Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, DR 
Congo, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, 
Libya, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, 
Sudan, Togo, Tunisia, Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe 
Europe Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, 
Portugal, Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United 
Kingdom, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, 
Macedonia (FYROM), Romania, Serbia, Slovenia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania
Former Soviet Union Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, 
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan 
Latin America Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Peru, 
Trinidad and Tobago, Venezuela, Uruguay, Jamaica, Puerto Rico, Panama 
Middle East Bahrain, Iraq, Iran, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Saudi 
Arabia, Syria, UAE, Yemen 
North America Canada, Mexico, United States 
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8. China’s Electricity Sector
Powering growth, keeping the lights on and 
prices down 
Stephen Wilson, Yufeng Yang and Jane Kuang1
Introduction and historical context 
Electricity is essential for both human and national development. China’s 
leaders—many of them engineers—have long understood this. Indeed, 
improved and increased electricity supply were integral to at least two of the 
‘four modernisations’ in Deng Xiaoping’s landmark closing speech at the Third 
Plenary Session of the Eleventh Party Congress on 18 August 1977. 
At the founding of the People’s Republic in 1949, China had just 1.85  GW 
of installed electricity generation capacity and a population of more than 
540  million (Jowett 1984). To put this in context, 1.85 GW is less than 
2,000 MW—the capacity of a typical modern large coal-fired or nuclear power 
plant with two units. By 1982, China’s installed power generation capacity had 
reached 50 GW for a population that passed the 1 billion mark in that census 
year (Jowlett 1984), about 800 million of whom lived in rural areas with limited 
or no access to electricity (Peng and Pan 2006, citing the in-depth chapter on 
China in IEA 2002). 
By 1990, according to UN data, installed generation capacity had reached 138 GW, 
and according to the World Bank, more than 94 per cent of the population had 
access to electricity. In 2011, China’s installed generation capacity passed the 
1,000 GW mark, and has since overtaken the United States to become the largest 
power system in the world. By 2010, the World Bank reported near-universal 
electricity access of 99.7 per cent in China—equal to the rate across Organisation 
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries. 
1  This chapter is dedicated to the memory of Wang Leiping (1963–2015), a former energy specialist at the 
World Bank in Washington, DC. Stephen Wilson first met Leiping in 1997 while he was director of the 
Beijing Economic Research Institute for Water Resources and Electric Power (BERI), where he provided 
expert advice on the planning of much of China’s generation and transmission system. This chapter 
reflects a number of things Leiping taught Stephen about China’s power sector when they worked 
together at ERM Energy, and which have stood the test of time. The authors also acknowledge research 
support on the international comparators from Parth Goyal of Rio Tinto India. Any errors are the 
responsibility of the authors. 
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China’s electricity sector faces the competing challenges of powering economic 
growth and development, and keeping the lights on and prices down. To explore 
how China’s policymakers and companies respond to these challenges and to 
understand the likely future development of China’s electricity sector, it is 
helpful to review how China made the journey from extremely limited electricity 
availability to universal access, driving a modern-day industrial revolution in 
the process. 
A hydrothermal power system 
While coal is the foundation fuel of China’s power system today—and coal has 
been a vital energy source in China for hundreds of years—China’s national vision 
for electricity has long included hydropower as a key source of supply, along 
with electricity for all and to power modern industry. Sun Yat-sen originally 
envisioned a large dam across the Yangtze River in 1919, and estimated its 
capacity as 22 GW. The 22.5 GW Three Gorges Dam is the world’s largest power 
station and China’s flagship hydropower project. Construction began in 1994 
and the dam opened in 2008. The importance of hydropower was reflected in 
the name of the former Ministry of Water Resources and Electric Power, which 
was responsible for the electrification of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) as 
a catalyst for industrialisation. 
China has a hydrothermal power system: approximately 75 to 80 per cent coal-
fired (thermal) and 15 to 20 per cent hydropower. While this chapter is about 
electricity, it is important to note that large-scale hydropower in China is not 
primarily about electricity generation. The dams are first and foremost about 
flood control—China has had devastating floods, killing large numbers of people 
and destroying livelihoods. 
During the more than 2,000 years between the Han Dynasty (206 BC – 220 AD) 
and the Qing Dynasty (1644–1911), floods occurred on the Yangtze River nearly 
once every 10 years. During the past 300 years, severe floods breached the 
Jingjiang Dam 60 times, and disastrous floods struck twice in the past 100 years. 
Floods have been a persistent problem for residents and businesses along the 
Yangtze and for the Chinese Government (Chinese Embassy to the United States 
n.d.). 
The dams are secondarily about irrigation and then about improved river 
navigation. Finally, electricity generation provides a revenue stream that enables 
the financing of the major capital works required to build the multipurpose 
dams on China’s many rivers. 
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The purely hydrothermal structure of China’s power sector has begun to change 
with the introduction of other forms of generation, including nuclear and gas-
fired power plants and various forms of intermittent renewable energy, including 
solar and wind power. The first nuclear power plant was built at Daya Bay in 
Guangdong, near Hong Kong, in the 1990s. Yet even with the largest nuclear 
building program the world has yet seen planned or in progress, nuclear today 
comprises only a few per cent of national generation capacity. Similarly, natural 
gas-fired capacity—complementing coal in the thermal side of the system—is 
used mainly for electricity generation at peak times, due to the limited supply 
of gas from domestic sources and the relatively high cost of gas imported as 
liquefied natural gas (LNG) or via long-distance pipelines from Central Asia, 
South-East Asia and, in the future, from Russia. China’s policies to provide 
financial encouragement for wind and solar power have stimulated one of the 
largest renewable energy programs in the world, but these sources also provide 
a small share of overall electricity generation. 
Structure of this chapter 
This chapter is organised as follows: 
• The current situation and some of the challenges facing China’s power sector 
are described, the evolution of China’s electricity sector in the past 30 years 
and reforms undertaken to date are summarised, and the key policy issues 
facing the sector and how they have been managed so far are discussed. 
• Selected international comparisons are drawn between China and other 
significant countries both in terms of the physical power systems and in 
terms of approaches to policy and regulation, with a particular focus on the 
experience of the United Kingdom and reference also to Australia. 
• A framework for analysing ownership structures and regulatory approaches 
is defined. 
• The chapter concludes with the policy choices available for China’s power 
sector. 
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The current situation and some of the 
challenges facing China’s power sector 
The physical system 
China, with 1.4 billion people, already has the largest power system in the 
world, with 1,260 GW of installed generation capacity (as of June 2014), having 
overtaken the United States, which has 1,040 GW for 325 million people. 
And  yet, based on international electricity per capita indices (see Wensley 
et  al.  2013) and conservative projections of gross domestic product (GDP) 
growth and energy efficiency improvements, China’s system is still only half-
developed, if that. 
Zhou, X. (n.d.) noted that ‘[t]he construction of the Three Gorges Hydropower 
Project will further push forward the implementation of the nationwide 
interconnection program’. Not only is the Three Gorges power station large and, 
like all hydropower projects, fully flexible in its ability to ramp its output up 
and down almost instantaneously, it is also located in an advantageous central 
position in the emerging national grid (Figure 8.1). 




Zhou, X. (n.d.) went on to write that ‘[t]he first 10–15 years of the 21st century 
will be a key period to form a nationwide interconnected grid. By the year[s] 
2010–2020, a nationwide interconnected grid will be basically established, 
which will cover major regional and provincial power grids.’ This transpired 
as expected: substantial progress has been made towards the vision of a single 
national grid, with alternating current (AC) interconnectors between a number 
of the regional grids, as well as long-distance ultra-high voltage (UHV) direct 
current (DC) lines, particularly from hydro projects in the south-west to large 
coastal demand centres, including Shanghai and Guangzhou. 
Yet, in common with most other Chinese and foreign experts at the time, Zhou, X. 
(n.d.) also wrote, ‘[i]t is predicted that the nation’s total installed capacity will 
reach 500GW in the year 2010 … [and] a total installed capacity of about 750GW 
by the year 2020’. The 2010 estimate turned out to be about half of the actual 
result, and the 2020 projection also looks like being only half or less of the likely 
outcome. 
The sectoral structure of electricity consumption in China is approximately 
70 per cent industrial, 20 per cent commercial and 10 per cent residential. 
In developed economies, the shares are approximately equal. Commercial and 
residential loads are more temperature sensitive and also vary more by season 
and throughout 24 hours in a day than does industrial load, which is relatively 
constant in aggregate. 
With commercial and residential consumption expected to grow faster than 
industrial consumption in China in coming decades, proportionately greater 
demands will be placed on generation and transmission capacity, which 
consequently will become more valuable. The ability of the system to cope with 
seasonality and peak demands will become increasingly important. 
Compounding these challenges, an increasing proportion of electricity coming 
from intermittent (wind and solar) and non-variable (nuclear) sources generates 
challenges for stability of the grid (Garnaut 2014: 11). Also with China moving 
to the new model of economic growth, it envisages a decline in the contribution 
of growth in the labour force and capital stock, leading to overall growth several 
percentage points lower than in the first decade of the century. The focus on 
increased productivity includes efforts to improve the efficiency with which 
energy is used, to reduce the amount of energy consumed in producing each 
unit of economic output.
Many of the structural changes embodied in the new model of economic growth 
have large and favorable implications for greenhouse gas emissions (Garnaut 
2014: 7). Hence any reforms and regulatory mechanisms implemented will need 
to be appropriate for this reality. 
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Development of the regulatory system and reforms to date
Xu and Chen (2005) identify three phases in the development of the regulatory 
system of the power industry in China: 
• phase I, 1949–85—power industry as state monopoly: the unification 
of government and business functions
• phase II, 1985–97—the unification of government and business functions 
with the gradual opening of the power generation market
• phase III, 1998–2002—separating the functions and responsibilities of the 
government from those of commercial enterprises, and establishing market 
mechanisms for the power industry in some pilot provinces and cities. 
As Deng Xiaoping said, ‘[r]eform is China’s second revolution’. Since the 
mid-1980s, the Chinese Government has carried out a series of power sector 
reforms. Xu and Chen (2005) comment on the success of these reforms: 
In China, the power industry has gone through a series of changes 
since 1985, including: the termination of the monopoly of ‘exclusive 
investment in power generation’, which existed for over 30 years 
during China’s planned economy period; the gradual opening of the 
power generation market; and the introduction of new investment and 
operation entities to relieve the power shortage that had been hindering 
the development of the Chinese economy. Such changes led to the 
remarkably rapid development of China’s power industry. For example, 
the demands for electricity have been largely met. (pp. 2458–2459)
The first major step in the reform process was corporatisation. Following the 
enactment of the Electric Power Law of the PRC in 1996: 
In 1997, the Chinese government took more radical steps to reform 
the power industry, particularly with respect to separating business 
operations and management from government oversight and guidance. 
The governmental functions of the former Ministry of Electric Power 
were divided between the State Power Corporation of China (which 
was newly established) and the State Economic and Trade Commission. 
(Xu and Chen 2005: 2459)  
Towards the end of phase I, in 1980, during the early years of Deng’s ‘second 
revolution’, the first China–Hong Kong power sector joint venture was proposed, 
which led to the 1,980 MW Daya Bay nuclear power plant in Guangdong with 
CLP Group and CGN Power. 
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The early stages of phase II saw five projects for a total of 3,950 MW by about 
1991. All of these were greenfield projects, and most were joint ventures 
(JVs), including Shiajiao B by the Hopewell Corporation from Hong Kong, 
the first build-operate-transfer (BOT) power project in China. The latter part 
of phase II, from the early 1990s to the late 1990s, saw a stampede of foreign 
independent power producers (IPPs) into China, including Intergen (Shell and 
Bechtel), Mirant (Southern Company) from the United States, AES (also from the 
United States) and Meiya Power from Hong Kong. During the ‘big rush’, more 
than 100  memoranda of understanding (MoUs) were signed between foreign 
companies and Chinese partners for the development of power plants, and 
29 large, mostly greenfield projects totalling more than 22 GW were developed. 
Milestones in this period included the first privatisation of an existing plant, 
when 55 per cent of a 2 × 200 MW plant in Liaoning Province was sold to a 
Hong Kong company; the first New York listing, by Huaneng, Naimeng Huadian 
renminbi-listing of Shanghai A-shares; the first competitively bid BOT project, 
Laibin 2 × 360 MW; and Zhejiang Southeast US dollar listing of Shanghai 
B-shares (Wilson and Wang 2002).
At this time, Guangdong was suffering power capacity shortages due to rapid 
growth in industrial demand, and self-generation—much of it by high-emission 
diesel generators and small, poorly controlled coal plants—was proliferating. 
Some of this was on-grid and some off-grid. As Figure 8.2 shows, 14 of 31 GW 
were not centrally dispatched at that time, including 10 GW of thermal plant 
and 4 GW of hydro plant. 
Figure 8.2 The Guangdong electricity sector in late 2002 
Source: Wilson and Wang (2002). 
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Not long after, as China’s electricity demand growth rate started to accelerate, 
Zhejiang Province would suffer severe capacity shortages and rolling blackouts 
during the peak summer season. One of the present authors was asked to assist 
Zhejiang Energy to forecast the 2003 summer peak demand. Distinguishing 
seasonal fluctuations from the suddenly accelerating underlying demand was a 
difficult task. Ironically, a year or two earlier, foreign investors such as National 
Power had looked at a power plant investment in Zhejiang, and decided against 
it, having doubted the demand outlook (Gordon 2005). 
Such lack of foreign confidence in China’s continued economic growth and 
development, and need for electricity—which appears rather quaint from 
the comfortable perspective of 2015—was perhaps a factor in China’s lack of 
confidence in seeking foreign investors as the answer to the country’s power 
needs. By the early 2000s, a number of foreign IPPs were watching and waiting 
and some were already withdrawing from the Chinese market. This followed 
the 1996–97 reforms heralding the beginning of phase III, and disappointments 
on the part of a number of Western IPPs arising from misunderstandings about 
the terms and status of their power purchase agreements (PPAs) with their local 
counterparts and the system operators in the power grids hosting their power 
plants. The backdrop to this was a regional investment climate clouded by the 
aftermath of the Asian Financial Crisis, and such high-profile figures as the last 
governor of Hong Kong, Chris Patten (1998), openly questioning ‘Asian values’ 
in print and through a television documentary series. 
Before his departure from Hong Kong in mid-1997, Patten had asked whether 
there might be scope for competition in Hong Kong’s electricity sector to 
replace the Scheme of Control agreements with the government that were 
used to regulate Hong Kong’s two vertically integrated investor-owned power 
utilities. The resulting study, presented to the Legislative Council under Chief 
Executive Tung Chee-hwa’s post-handover government concluded that genuine 
competition would not be feasible in Hong Kong’s power sector without the 
existence of a competitive market in Guangdong (Wilson et al. 1999). Hong Kong 
was not to be a laboratory for Chinese power sector reform. 
By the end of phase III of its reform process, China had less and less need for 
any of the three things that foreign IPPs could bring: capital, technology and 
management skills. China was well on the way to becoming an exporter not 
an importer of capital. With the exception of certain gas-turbine technology 
(not particularly relevant in a country with limited availability of high-cost gas) 
and some nuclear technology, China already had world-class, highly competitive 
power plant manufacturers. And imported Western managers, in most cases with 
very limited Chinese language and cultural skills, could hardly be considered 
competitive candidates to run power plants in China. 
China’s Electricity Sector
183
Figure 8.3 presents the ownership structure of the generation sector in China 
in late 2002, just before the break-up of the State Power Corporation (SPC) 
monopoly, showing the role of the SPC, other Chinese state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs), privately controlled Chinese companies and foreign private companies. 
Figure 8.3 Structure of generation capacity ownership in China in late 2002 
Source: Wilson and Wang (2002). 
A key question at the time was would the privatisation trend continue, with the 
role for foreign private companies and Chinese non-SOEs extending from the 
margins at the top right of the diagram towards the bottom left? Or would the 
trend be reversed? 
An industry structure for a future competitive market
The beginning of 2003 marks what we might call phase IV of China’s power 
sector reforms: putting in place the architecture for future competition. A major 
restructuring of the SPC, separating generation from transmission, had put in 
place an industry structure to enable wholesale competition: 
China dismantled the State Power Corporation on December 29, 2002 and 
set up 11 new companies in a move to end the corporation’s monopoly 
of the power industry. The former State Power Corporation owned 46% 
of the country’s electricity generation assets and 90% of the electricity 
supply assets.
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The new companies include two power grid operators, namely the State 
Power Grid and China South Power Grid. Each of the five electricity 
generation companies own[s] less than 20% of China’s market. They 
will compete with each other for signing contracts with the power grid 
operators. (Xu and Chen 2005: 2462) 
The ‘big-five gencos’ (generation companies) are as follows: 
• China Huaneng Group is the largest and oldest power generation company 
in China, established in 1985. By the end of 2014, Huaneng had 130 plants, 
more than 110 GW of generation capacity and more than 60 Mt of annual 
coal production. 
China Datang Corporation, Huadian Group, China Guodian Corporation and 
China Power Investment Corporation (CPI Corp) were all incorporated in 2002 
from the former SPC as part of the restructuring. 
• China Datang has China’s largest coal-fired power plant (Inner Mongolia 
Tuoketuo), the world’s largest wind farm (Inner Mongolia Chifeng) and the 
second-largest hydropower project (Longtan Hydro). By the end of 2014, 
Datang had 68 plants and more than 120 GW of power generation capacity. 
• Huadian Group has 70 plants with 123 GW of capacity. 
• China Guodian has 94 plants with a total capacity of 123 GW. 
• CPI has the highest proportion of clean energy of the Chinese generation 
companies, which accounts for 30 per cent of its generation capacity. It has 
participated in nine nuclear power projects in China and has also developed 
downstream industries including alumina refineries. CPI has 65 plants with 
a combined 90 GW of capacity. 
A number of the big-five gencos have integrated up the value chain by acquiring 
coalmines to secure and manage the fuel supply to their power plants. 
• Shenhua Group, meanwhile, has integrated down the value chain by 
developing power plants in addition to its complex of 70 operational 
coalmines, including some of the largest open-cut and underground mines in 
the world, 1,765 km of railway lines, 185 Mt of coal port and wharf capacity, 
30 coal vessels and coal-to-liquids plants. Through its 21 wholly owned and 
holding subsidiaries, the group has 68 GW of power plant, of which 61 GW 
is coal-fired. 
• China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC) and China General Nuclear 
Corporation (CGN; formerly China Guangdong Nuclear Power Corporation 
or CGNPC) are the main companies investing in nuclear power plants in 
China. More recently, the State Nuclear Power Technology Corporation 
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(SNPTC) has had a key role as the partner with Toshiba-Westinghouse in the 
construction and development of third-generation advanced-passive (AP) 
reactor technology in China. In early 2015, it was announced that SNPTC 
and CPI will merge to form the State Power Investment Group, which will 
have assets equivalent in size to the sum of CNNC and CGN assets. 
On 30 December 2002, the government also set up the State Electricity 
Regulatory Commission (SERC), to supervise market competition and issue 
licences to operators in the power industry (Xu and Chen 2005). SERC was 
responsible for administration and regulation of the electricity and power 
industry, including regulating the development of electricity markets and 
advising the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) on setting 
tariffs, while the NDRC actually sets the tariffs, transmission, distribution, safety 
and technical standards, issues business licences, establishes environmental 
laws and supervises development of the industry. In March 2008, the National 
Energy Administration (NEA) was established under the NDRC, and on 
26 March 2013, Xinhua reported that SERC was to be dissolved and its functions 
incorporated within the NEA. Its main responsibilities would include drafting 
and implementing energy development strategies, plans and policies; advising 
on energy system reform; and regulating the sector (Xinhua 2013). 
Bordie et al. (2014) observed that the rail sector, which plays a key role in 
transporting coal—by far the major fuel used in power generation—is the last 
of China’s large network or infrastructure industries previously organised as 
government ministries to be reformed. Network and infrastructure sectors in 
China that were reformed previously include airlines, telecommunications, 
power and water, oil and gas, and highways. 
In the case of the power sector, China’s reforms have not yet proceeded to the 
extent of the reforms in the United Kingdom, Australia and parts of the United 
States. In China, state ownership retains a dominant role, although through a 
number of ‘competing’ corporate entities rather than the semi-monopolistic 
former SPC. The structure of the industry, its ownership and the role of 
competitive forces and regulation remain largely the same as those put in place 
in 2002, as described by Xu and Chen (2005). There are good reasons for this, 
which we return to later in this chapter. 
Meanwhile, China has greatly expanded the capacity, efficiency and reliability 
of its power supply. With the emerging challenges of increasing power costs, 
security, power demand growth and environmental issues related to both the 
consumption of electricity generation and the production of coal in particular, 
the government has actively developed programs to increase energy efficiency 
and minimise emissions. 
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The ‘golden decade’ from 2003–04 to 2012–13 saw unprecedented rates 
of electricity demand growth, generation capacity additions, coalmine 
developments, production and consumption, and associated rail, port and 
transmission infrastructure development. By 2010, China had a 1,000 GW power 
system, when a 500 GW system had been anticipated a decade earlier. Its coal 
industry had grown from 1 billion tonnes to more than 3 billion tonnes, when 
a 2 billion tonne coal and coal-rail system had been considered a challenge a 
decade earlier. This development path has raised questions about environmental 
impacts, amid the constant challenges of economic competitiveness and energy 
security. 
Yet these questions are relevant to all energy sources and power generation 
technologies, although not in similar degree. China has the world’s largest 
hydropower plant and hydropower sector, which are not without environmental 
issues—some with international dimensions in the region. China was on the way 
to having the world’s largest and most rapid nuclear power plant construction 
program when the East Japan earthquake, tsunami and subsequent decisions led 
to the destruction of the Fukushima nuclear power plant in Japan. The program 
has been slowed, but is still likely to become the world’s largest sometime in the 
2020s. China also has the world’s largest installed capacity of wind and solar 
power. 
Parallel reforms and regulation in related industries 
In addition to its role as electricity price regulator through the NEA, the NDRC 
plays a key role in regulating prices in other industries, a number of which 
are closely related to electricity, including the coal market and the rail freight 
sector. Since the major power sector reforms of 2002, China’s coal market has 
undergone substantial reform, prices are now essentially determined by market 
competition between large SOEs, provincial SOEs, private companies and small 
local township and village enterprises, as well as by imported coal. As a result, 
coal prices have become much more volatile, rising to very high levels when the 
market was tight several years ago, and to well below the cost of production for 
many producers in the currently oversupplied market. 
When coal prices were high, power generators’ margins were severely squeezed 
or negative. The NDRC revised wholesale power tariffs accordingly, but 




Rail freight transport, which accounts for a significant part of the value chain 
for coal delivered to power plants, particularly in coastal and southern China, 
is in the early stages of reform (Bordie et al. 2014). The current healthy margins 
for power generators provide an opportunity to ratchet up rail freight tariffs to 
reduce the financial challenges facing the rail sector. 
The gas sector has undergone some reform of pricing, but the high-pressure 
transmission pipeline network is not yet fully open to third-party access. 
The relatively limited availability and high delivered cost of natural gas in China, 
and the policy priorities for its use in sectors other than electricity generation, 
mean that gas sector reform is not likely to be as high a priority for the power 
sector in China as it has been in other countries. 
Looking to the future, the key to economic reform is to properly handle the 
relationship between government and the market. As China is transforming itself 
from a highly power-centralised planned economy to a market-led economy, this 
implies a gradual process of government devolving decision-making back to 
enterprises. This has been the key topic in electricity sector reform in China. 
In 2002, the State Council issued a ‘Proposal for Power Sector Structural Reform’, 
which marked the beginning of the last round of power sector reform. The key 
achievement of this round of reform is that it has led to competition in the power 
generating industry. According to the proposal, there is a separation of power 
generation and power transmission. The State Electricity Company (SEC) has 
been divided into power generation and transmission businesses. The objective 
set out in the proposal is also to ‘gradually realise the separation of transmission 
and distribution service[s] of State Grid and also introduce competition in 
power retailing’. However, State Grid has entrenched its monopoly in dispatch 
management, transmission and market transactions. This has greatly hindered 
the interaction between power users and power producers. Reform of the State 
Grid is therefore the most important step in the next round of electricity market 
reform. 
Separation of transmission ownership from system operation (generation 
dispatch) is likely to be key to the success of these reforms. Woolf (1996) has 
made the case for a genuinely independent system operator (ISO). 
On 18 March 2012, the State Council stressed again that the key to deepening 
power sector reform is to carry out trials for separation of transmission and 
distribution, and to ensure that distributed energy power generation can access 
the grid without ‘bias’, which will ensure continuous reform of the power sector. 
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Selected international comparator countries 
Before discussing alternative industry and regulatory frameworks and the 
choices available to China, it is helpful to review the electricity sector in other 
countries and their experience of reform. 
• The United States has a number of weakly interconnected or unconnected 
regional grids, ageing infrastructure, and is a laboratory of regulatory 
arrangements in a federal system. 
• Japan has one of the world’s largest power systems, but its grid is fragmented 
among the vertically integrated regional Japanese power utilities, each with 
its own franchise monopoly, protected by grid frequency incompatibility—
some operate at 50 Hz, others at 60 Hz. The vertical franchise monopolies 
are now under pressure from the government to reform after the Fukushima 
shock to the system. 
• India has a coal-dominated hydrothermal system. Unlike China, in India, 
the electrification rate is very low. 
• Russia has  abundant gas reserves and generally poor resource utilisation and 
conversion efficiency. China is a neighbour and customer of Russian energy. 
• Germany is generally considered to be a model of industrial efficiency. Its 
power system is one of the largest in Europe and is central to the European 
grid, on which it relies to balance its large proportion of intermittent wind 
and solar renewable energy. 
• Canada has an eclectic system, with ownership and regulatory framework 
varying across Provinces, with parts integrated into adjacent United States 
systems. 
• France has a nuclear-dominated power system complemented by gas, with 
extensive interconnections with neighbouring countries. Government-
controlled Electricité de France dominates the market in an example of the 
state-owned corporate model within a wider competitive market according 
to EU rules. 
• Brazil has a hydro-reliant system vulnerable to drought. 
• The United Kingdom was the pioneer in privatising electricity markets 
and attempting to introduce competition to reduce the need for regulation. 
In more recent years, numerous centrally planned mandates, particularly on 
renewable energy and nuclear power, have in practice squeezed the role of 
competition in the power market. 
• Australia has the longest interconnected electricity market and was an 
early follower of the United Kingdom in electricity reform, with the state of 
Victoria moving first and far on privatisation. 
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China plus these 10 comparator countries account for two-thirds of the global 
installed power generation capacity (including self-generation) and span 
a wide range of industry and regulatory models. Most of the 1.25 billion 
people currently without electricity are outside the 11 comparator countries 
(825 million), except for India (400 million). Table 8.1 shows the data. Table 8.2 
provides a summary of the industry structure, ownership, forms of regulation 
and extent of competition for the 10 comparator countries. 
Table 8.1 Electricity sector of China and 10 comparator countries 





(m sq km) (million) (%) (GW) (US$ b) (type)
China 9.60 1,360 99.7 999 5.9 Mixed 
United States 9.63 312 100 1,041 15.0 Varietya
Japan 0.38 127 100 287 5.5 Private 
Russia 17.1 144 100 223 1.5 State 
India 3.29 1,206 75 207 1.7 Mixed 
Germany 0.36 83 100 163 3.4 Mixed 
Canada 9.98 34 100 132 1.6 Mixed 
France 0.55 63 100 125 2.6 State 
Brazil 8.51 195 98.9 112 2.1 Mixed 
United 
Kingdom 
0.24 62 100 94 2.4 Privateb 
Australia 7.74 22 100 60 1.1 Mixed 
Subtotal 67.38 3,609 91.5 3,443 43.0
RoW 67.04 3,307 74.0 1,672 22.2
World 134.42 6,916 83.1 5,115 65.2
a From private to state to cooperative.  
b Includes foreign state entities.  
Sources: Land area, UN FAO; population, UNDP (data.un.org); capacity, UNDP; electricity access, 
World Bank database.
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Table 8.2 Electricity industry structures and forms of ownership, regulation and 
competition 
Country China Japan Russia
Industry model Corporatised Corporatised Corporatised
Ownership of
generation 
State Mix of private and 
state governments




State As above State 
Ownership of 
distribution 
State As above State 
Key legislation State and federal Federal Federal
Form of 
regulation 
Price regulation Competitive market 
oversight
Price regulation 
Regulator/s NDRC, State Electricity 
Regulatory Commission 




Competition to build new power 
plants, but not for dispatch 
Limited to very large 
customers 
None 
Country Brazil India Germany
Industry model Corporatised Corporatised Regulated market 
Ownership of
generation 
Mixed private and 
government
Mixed private and 
government 




Federal and state Federal govt As above
Ownership of 
distribution 
Mixed Mixed As above





Price regulation Competitive market oversight
Regulator/s MME, ANEEL, CNPE 
and CMSE
MoP, CERC Federal Network Agency, Federal 





auctions held for new 
generation capacity 
No competitive market. 
Capacity shortages and 
substantial self-generation 
Wholesale and retail markets, 
under EU law 
Country France United States Canada
Industry model Regulated market Varies by state Varies by province
Ownership of
generation 
Mix of private and 
state governments
Mix: investor-owned, state govt, 
coops 




Federal As above As above
Ownership of 
distribution 
State and federal As above As above





Price regulation and market 
oversight: varies by state/region 
Varies by province
Regulator/s CRE, FCA FERC, NERC, plus regulators 
in each state, members of 
NARUC 




As required by 
EU law 
Varies from state to state from 
full competition to no choice 
Varies between provinces, includes 




Country United Kingdom Australia
Industry model Market model Market model in NEM states 
Ownership of
generation 
Mix of private and state 
governments
Mix of private and state governments 
Ownership of 
transmission 
Federal As above 
Ownership of 
distribution 
Private As above 
Key legislation Electricity Act (1989) National Electricity Law, plus various state laws 
Form of 
regulation 
Competitive market oversight Competitive market oversight 




Wholesale and retail markets Wholesale and retail markets 
China’s profile in the global power industry
China today has the largest power system in the world. As Figure 8.4 shows, 
while China has close to universal electricity access, China’s power system 
development measured in kilowatts of generation capacity per capita and 
economic development measured in GDP per capita are still far below the levels 
of the seven developed countries in the sample. 
Figure 8.4 Global comparison of power systems (2010 data)
Source: Authors’ analysis using data from UNDP and World Bank. 
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Let us take a closer look at systems which have relevance to China’s efforts 
to build a more competitive electricity market. We have selected the United 
Kingdom and Australia with its National Electricity Market (NEM), with 
a particular emphasis on the state of Victoria, as the examples. The United 
Kingdom was the pioneer in introducing privatisation and competition to large, 
national-scale electricity systems. Victoria was an early follower, while the other 
states in Australia have a variety of ownership structures, which, like China, 
include continued government ownership of generation, transmission and 
distribution assets. 
The United Kingdom’s history of electricity ownership and 
structure 
Historically, the electricity sector in most countries was perceived to be a public 
good or was seen primarily as an essential service. Electricity transmission 
and distribution networks tended to be viewed as having strong natural 
monopoly characteristics. It does not make economic sense to duplicate network 
infrastructure because of their public goods character. This thinking was not 
limited to the networks transmitting and distributing the electricity, but 
extended to the power plants generating the electricity. The economies of scale 
available from large, centralised power plants tended to reinforce the view of the 
entire system as one large, natural monopoly. 
This thinking is evident in the long history of the UK electricity industry. 
By  World War II, the United Kingdom had more than 600 electric power 
companies, both  ‘local authority undertakings’ (electricity distribution 
businesses belonging to local governments) and private companies—
constituting quite a decentralised system. After the war, the political climate 
tended to favour nationalisation and centralisation. This had not always been 
the prevailing thought. 
In 1831, Michael Faraday discovered electric induction, and then magneto-
electric induction. He produced the first electric generator in his laboratory 
in London, and laid the basis for the transformer and the electric motor. 
By 1879, Thomas Edison in the United States had perfected a practical electric 
light bulb. The first legislative milestone in the UK electricity industry was 
The Electric Lighting Act 1882, which allowed the setting up of supply systems 
by individuals, companies or local authorities. Numerous amendments and 
new acts followed, including the 1909 Act regulating planning consent for 
building power stations; the 1919 Act, passed during the reconstruction of the 
nation’s industries after World War I, which rejected the recommendations of 
two committees to effectively nationalise the industry and to unify generation, 
transmission and distribution; the 1922 Act; the 1926 Act creating the Central 
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Electricity Board and the National Grid operating at 132 kV and 50 Hz AC; 
The Electricity Supply (Meters) Act 1936; and The Hydro-Electric Development 
(Scotland) Act 1943. 
The Electricity Act 1947 established the British Electricity Authority (BEA), 
responsible for bulk electricity generation and transmission, and nationalised 
and merged the more than 600 small electricity companies into 12 ‘area electricity 
boards’. The Electricity Reorganisation (Scotland) Act 1954 moved responsibility 
for Scottish electricity supply to the Scottish Office, replacing the BEA with the 
Central Electricity Authority (CEA). The Electricity Act 1957 dissolved the CEA 
and replaced it with the Central Electricity Generating Board (CEGB) and the 
advisory and supervisory Electricity Council. 
Various other amendments and acts on electricity (and gas) were passed in 1961, 
1963, 1968, 1972 and 1979. All of these—a large body of incrementally evolving 
legislation, representing the journey from small, entrepreneurial, private and 
local authority electricity supply businesses—were repealed by The Electricity 
Act 1989, which was a revolutionary piece of legislation that swept away the 
nationalised structure and (re-)privatised the industry.2 
The [government] White Paper ‘Privatising Electricity’ published in 
February 1988 proposed splitting the CEGB into a transmission system 
operator, eventually called The National Grid Company (which was 
transferred to the joint ownership of the 12 Area Boards, who were 
retitled ‘Regional Electricity Companies’) and two generators called 
Big G, which eventually became National Power (40GW) and Little G, 
which eventually became PowerGen (16GW). The rationale for this split 
was the hope that National Power would be big enough to absorb the 
uncertainties of the operating performance of Britain’s idiosyncratic 
nuclear reactors, and also bear the capital cost and operational risks of 
the 1200MW Sizewell B pressurised water reactor being built, together 
with three more units which the government hoped would be built. 
(Henney 1994, summarised in Henney 2011) 
A major lesson in the United Kingdom was that the nuclear sector could not 
thrive under competitive market conditions without some form of government 
support. This was a big factor in the way the generation sector ended up being 
structured at the time of privatisation. Henney continues: 
2  A list of major events in the history of the United Kingdom’s electricity supply is available from: 
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Timeline_of_the_UK_electricity_supply_industry. 
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But while the government could manipulate the valuation and 
finances of the existing nuclear plants, it could not obscure the future 
construction cost risks, nor the high cost of electricity from Sizewell B. 
The financial advisers concluded that the nuclear plants could not be 
sold and eventually the government was forced to put them in Nuclear 
Electric, which would remain in public ownership. By now there was 
no time to split up National Power and PowerGen, and the industry 
started its existence with a most unsatisfactory generation structure of a 
dominant price setting duopoly, which was … to cause many problems 
and costs. (Henney 1994, summarised in Henney 2011)  
National Power and PowerGen were both privatised in a 60 per cent float in 
March 1991, and the balance in 1995. Nuclear Electric, formed in 1990 as a 
government-owned corporation to remove the 11 GW of nuclear assets from 
National Power’s portfolio, was privatised as British Energy in 1995, without 
Magnox Electric, which became part of BNFL in 1998. Electricité de France 
(EdF), a corporation largely owned by the French Government, acquired British 
Energy in 2009. North Scotland Hydro-Electric board became Scottish Hydro-
Electric, and was privatised in 1991. The South of Scotland Electricity Board’s 
non-nuclear plants became Scottish Power and the nuclear plants were put 
into Scottish Nuclear. The 1989 Act created 12 regional electricity companies 
(RECs) from the area electricity boards, which were each then sold in 1990 in a 
public float. 
Lessons from the history of electricity in the United Kingdom 
The above summary of the history of legislation in the electricity industry in 
the United Kingdom paints a picture of constant evolution and organisational 
change. The changes from 1882 to 1989 reflect the evolution of society and 
technology and the tide of prevailing political philosophy during that century. 
State ownership, which has been adopted in the United Kingdom and many 
other countries, is one remedy to the natural monopoly problem, but other 
models are possible, including regulated private ownership. By the late 1980s, 
leading economists and engineers had recognised that electricity generation and 
retail supply need not necessarily be considered natural monopolies. 
Modern information technology and control systems (which were still in their 
infancy in 1989) today enable electricity to be competitively generated, centrally 
scheduled and dispatched according to a set of market rules, subject to technical 
engineering constraints in power stations and throughout the network. 
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Henney’s (2011) view of the initial outcomes of UK electricity privatisation listed 
a number of ‘clear political gains’ as well as economic gains from cost reductions, 
along with identification of serious flaws. In his words, privatisation: 
[A]ppeared to free [electricity] generation from government imposed 
fuel policies; reduced the political power of the electric industry and 
its political dependents, British [power] plant manufacturers and British 
Coal; increased the industry’s accountability because the government 
had not been particularly competent at controlling what it owned; freed 
the industry from public sector constraints; and allowed government to 
focus on tasks which only it could fulfil. There were significant cost gains 
from stopping the construction of three [nuclear] PWRs [pressurised 
water reactors] and four 900MW coal plants that had been planned. 
Manpower reduced by 40% by April 1993 compared with 1990, and 
equipment buying was more careful and more cost conscious. But there 
were serious flaws with privatisation, notably the creation of a duopoly 
of price setting generators, and customers got a poor initial deal—most 
customers’ prices increased to pay for the generous financing of the 
industry, which resulted in major gains for shareholders. (Henney 2011)
Competition policy and electricity reform in Australia 
The first moves to define and establish a national grid in Australia followed the 
Special Premiers Conference in 1991, where: 
Discussions … focussed on measures to increase national efficiency and 
international competitiveness and to move towards a single national 
economy. The focus was on micro-economic reform in the areas of 
regulatory reform; road and rail transport; electricity generation, 
transmission and distribution; and reform of Government Trading 
Enterprises. (COAG 1991) 
This followed the then prime minister Bob Hawke’s 12 March ministerial 
statement, ‘Building a competitive Australia’, which noted that: 
The Trade Practices Act is our principal legislative weapon to ensure 
consumers get the best deal from competition. But there are many 
areas of the Australian economy today that are immune from that Act: 
some Commonwealth enterprises, State public sector businesses, and 
significant areas of the private sector, including the professions. (Hawke 
1991, emphasis added) 
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A subsequent meeting of the premiers and chief ministers in November 
endorsed the need for a national competition policy and an independent review 
of the Trade Practices Act 1974. On 26 February, shortly after taking office as 
prime minister, Paul Keating tabled the major ministerial statement ‘One nation’ 
(Keating 1992), foreshadowing the prominence that the Commonwealth would 
give to competition policy as one of seven elements of its economic and social 
strategy for the 1990s. On 4 October, Keating appointed Professor Fred Hilmer 
to head the National Competition Policy Review, which delivered its report on 
25 August 1993. 
The evolution and operation of Australia’s national competition policy are well 
summarised by Kain et al. (2001) and provide the national context for the reform 
of state public sector businesses in Victoria, including the then State Electricity 
Commission of Victoria (SECV). 
Victoria’s experience of UK-inspired reforms 
As it turned out, the State Government of Victoria led by example the introduction 
of Australia’s competitive NEM, and retail customer choice of supplier by rapidly 
restructuring and privatising the state’s electricity sector. This program was 
driven by the premier Jeff Kennett and treasurer Alan Stockdale, who set out to 
privatise assets as a means of retiring the state government debt of $32 billion. 
During its time in office, Kennett’s government raised more than $30 billion by 
selling businesses in energy, transport and other areas. 
In the words of Kennett’s pre-election energy policy of 1992, they would 
‘implement structural changes in the energy industry necessary to promote 
economic prosperity and job opportunities for more Victorians’. The reforms 
therefore represented a combination of pragmatism (reducing government 
debt) and political philosophy—specifically, the view that private businesses, 
motivated by profit and constrained by competitive forces, with regulatory 
supervision where required, would use capital and operate more efficiently 
than government-owned monopoly corporations. The Kennett government split 
the privatised businesses into competing units whenever possible, to facilitate 
commercial rivalry. 
The UK reforms under The Electricity Act 1989 provided the inspiration 
and general template, and a number of advisors who had worked on the UK 
electricity privatisation also worked on the Victorian electricity privatisation. 
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, reports by the Industry Commission, the 
Tasman Institute, the Business Council and the Review Committee of the 
Victorian Parliament had critically reviewed the performance of the SECV. The 
industry had pursued efficiency improvements through outsourcing, transfer 
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pricing, downsizing and internal power pool arrangements, albeit within the 
constraints of an integrated monopolistic industry structure (Fearon and Moran 
1999). 
In October 1994, Victoria’s electricity industry was again restructured, largely 
into the final form for privatisation. Transmission was disaggregated into the 
Victoria Power Exchange (VPX), a non-commercial body responsible for system 
operation and control, transmission planning and market operations; and Power 
Networks Victoria (PNV), responsible for transmission assets, maintenance and 
operations. Five businesses responsible for distribution networks and retail 
energy supply to customer accounts were created. Generation Victoria was 
separated into four individual baseload power stations (including Loy Yang B, 
then under construction), one portfolio of hydro-plant and one of intermediate 
and peaking gas plant. During 1995–97, all of these businesses, except the gas 
portfolio, were privatised. Proceeds amounted to $24 billion—some $13 billion 
in excess of the SECV’s book value of assets recorded in 1993. 
Australia’s NEM today 
The NEM itself began operations in 1998, with three states—Victoria, 
New  South  Wales and South Australia—followed by Queensland. Tasmania 
joined in 2005, with the commissioning of Basslink. 
Australia’s NEM is the world’s [longest] interconnected system. 
It  stretches for more than 4000 kilometres from Port Douglas in the 
north of Queensland, to Port Lincoln in South Australia and via the 
Basslink undersea cable between Victoria and Tasmania … The NEM was 
designed to include six distinct regions, represented by the five states, 
with the addition of the Snowy Mountains Hydro-Electricity Scheme 
as the sixth region (the Australian Capital Territory is incorporated into 
NSW). Each of these regions operates their own market for the supply 
and demand of electricity. However, every region is connected through 
at least one interconnector that allows for electricity to be imported or 
exported between regions. (NERA Economic Consulting 2007: 3) 
Figure 8.5 shows the generation and transmission topology of the physical 
system in which the NEM operates. NERA Economic Consulting (2007: 
Figure 2.1) shows interconnection capacity between the states. Figure 8.6 shows 
the geographic coverage of the NEM in the context of Australia and the other 
smaller systems that are not part of the NEM. 
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Figure 8.5 Generation and transmission map of the NEM 
Source: AEMO (2015). 
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Figure 8.6 Australia’s NEM and other electricity markets 
Notes: Region 1, NWIS, is the North-West Interconnected System. Region 9 includes off-grid areas 
of New South Wales, Victoria, the Australian Capital Territory and external territories. These areas are 
too small and geographically scattered to present on this map. ‘Rest of WA’ excludes the South-West 
Interconnected System (SWIS) connected areas of Western Australia. ‘Rest of Qld’ excludes NEM-
connected areas of Queensland.  
Source: Hyslop et al. (2014). 
South Australia followed Victoria’s lead in privatising its generation, transmission 
and distribution assets, but the other states have largely retained electricity 
assets in state ownership as government corporations. 
After the Victorian privatisation, it turned out that a number of foreign 
companies had significantly overbid in the tenders for the generation assets, 
based on the expectation that wholesale prices would be approximately double 
the level they turned out to be. This later led to a number of bankruptcies and 
debt writedowns. 
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Policy goals and a framework for analysing 
ownership structures and regulatory approaches 
Drivers of electricity reform vary from one jurisdiction to another. While policy 
goals also vary, they almost universally include the goal to ensure consumers and 
businesses have a safe, reliable and efficiently priced supply of electricity that 
does not adversely affect the natural environment. While specific to electricity, 
this is consistent with the universal framework of the more general ‘energy 
policy trilemma’, as described by Wensley et al. (2013). 
Cost-efficiency is required for efficient pricing. Installed capacity—in 
generation, transmission and distribution—is an important part of the cost of 
electricity supply. Therefore, the market and regulatory arrangements need to 
avoid overinvestment (or premature investment) in capacity, which raises costs 
above their efficient level, and at the same time avoid underinvestment (or late 
investment) in capacity, which compromises the reliability of supply.
Issues with competitive electricity market models 
The introduction of competition to electricity markets requires careful 
consideration and design. Competition between generators over common 
transmission networks and competition between retailers over common 
distribution networks do not arise spontaneously, but need to be created by 
design, through a set of market rules by which all market participants are 
bound, and an appropriate initial industry structure. This requires substantial 
expert input from engineers, economists and legal experts. 
Transmission and distribution networks have significant natural monopoly 
characteristics, and need to be regulated accordingly, with the policy objectives 
in mind. 
It is essential to consider the initial conditions in the market. Whether the 
market has excess capacity, demand balanced with capacity including sufficient 
reserve margin for the desired level of reliability or insufficient capacity will 
have an enormous bearing on market outcomes. 
When competition was introduced to the UK and Victorian power markets in 
the 1990s, there was more than sufficient generation and transmission capacity, 
and despite this, the generation planning and design departments in the former 
state-owned monopoly companies (CEGB in the United Kingdom and SECV 
in Victoria) were planning major plant additions. The introduction of market 
discipline prevented the construction of overcapacity, and competitive forces 
squeezed economic inefficiencies out of the operation of the existing fleet. 
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If, however, competition was introduced to a market with insufficient capacity, 
wholesale prices could rise dramatically, which may or may not be acceptable to 
policymakers. High prices would send a strong signal to build more plants, but 
could lead to bankruptcies if retailers were not able to pass the costs on to end 
consumers, or to political instability if end prices became very high. This would 
be a particular risk, and potentially damaging to the credibility of policymakers, 
particularly if the introduction of competition had been promoted to citizens 
and electricity consumers as a way to drive down prices. 
At the same time as competition can drive down prices, it tends to increase 
price uncertainty. Depending on the characteristics and design of the market, it 
can also increase price volatility. The value of lost load (VoLL) is the economic 
or financial opportunity cost of electricity supply interruption. VoLL varies by 
customer type, but for most customers is tens or hundreds of times the delivered 
economic cost of the electricity itself. Therefore, it can easily be a thousand 
times or thousands of times the value of savings to customers from increased 
economic efficiency. Therefore, a single interruption to electricity supply of 
several hours’ duration can wipe out the gains from lower prices accumulated 
over an entire year. 
Designers of competitive markets need to consider how reliability, including 
sufficient generation reserve margin (as well as sufficient transmission capacity), 
will be assured in the absence of central planning. Capacity reliability margins 
require investments of the appropriate quantity, location (for both generation 
and transmission), timing, type (whether generation and/or transmission as well 
as fuel and plant choices) and environmental impact including emissions. 
Companies investing in competitive markets take into account the return they 
expect to achieve, and make decisions according to their assessment of whether 
this is commensurate with the level of risk. If assets have the potential to become 
stranded in the future, the level of investment risk increases. 
In some circumstances, privatisation can relieve capital constraints, particularly 
where government-owned entities have been subject to public sector borrowing 
requirements. Government borrowing limits have led to underinvestment, for 
example, in rural distribution networks in New South Wales in the 1990s, where 
projects to reduce line losses that would have paid back the investment rapidly 
could not be undertaken. 
Financial risk tends to be higher in competitive markets than in non-competitive 
markets, due to price and volume risk. This is in addition to the fact that the cost 
of capital for private companies is higher than for government corporations. 
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Organisational models and a broad analytical framework 
The general classification typology introduced by Bordie et al. (2014) to describe 
models for the organisation of the rail sector can be adapted and applied to 
the electricity sector. It adopts a two-axis categorisation, providing a matrix 
framework for the various models of ownership, organisational structures and 
regulation of the electricity industry around the world (Figure 8.7). 
On one axis, we consider the ownership of the power sector, distinguishing 
state-owned from privately owned companies, and acknowledging that in some 
countries there is a mix of the two, whether from one region of the country to 
another, for different parts of the system (for example, generation, transmission, 
distribution and retail energy supply) or through partial floats of shares in 
companies. 
On the other axis, we consider the structure of the industry in terms of the 
degree of vertical integration or separation, and the extent of regulation. We note 
that models can exist with either no formal regulation (of private electricity 
companies) or no notion of a separation between the ownership of electricity 
assets and their regulation—for example, where a self-regulating government 
ministry owns the assets. So, the regulation axis also embodies the concept of 
separation between the ownership and regulation of assets. 
Five major organisation models are identified: the ministry model, the 
corporatised model, the regulated model, the market model and the laissez-faire 
model. These ownership and regulatory models occupy the edges and corners 
of the diagram. 
Because of the natural monopoly characteristics of transmission and distribution 
networks, the need for electricity markets to be created by a government imposing 
by law a set of market rules, the desire of most governments to regulate the 
environmental impacts of the industry, and the political importance of reliable, 
accessible and affordable electricity supply, there is a variety of approaches to 
electricity sector governance, and few examples of uncomplicated ‘textbook’ 
models. This is particularly so for the market model. 
The United Kingdom and some sub-national jurisdictions experimented with 
the full market model in the 1990s. Barker et al. (1997) discussed in detail 
power market governance and regulation by comparing the governance and 
regulatory arrangements of power pools operating at the time in England and 
Wales, Victoria (Australia), Alberta (Canada) and Scandinavia. Since the turn 
of the century, new goals—including on renewable energy, facilitating new 
nuclear build and climate mandates—have increasingly been implemented via 
additional regulatory or fiscal constraints.
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Figure 8.7 Power sector models, 10 comparator countries, UK pathway since 
1882 and recent and possible future pathways for China 
Source: Authors’ diagrams, based on industry knowledge and publicly available information. 
Conditions required for a competitive wholesale market 
The industry structure and requirements for true competitive conditions in the 
wholesale market include the following. 
Competitive sourcing of fuel 
If there is no competitive choice of upstream fuels for power generation, 
competition between generators will be less effective. 
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More than adequate generation capacity 
If the system reserve is not greater than the size of the smallest generation 
company in the system, generation companies can bid strategically to drive up 
the price, thereby gaming the market. Explicit collusion, or price-fixing, which 
would be illegal, is not required. Publicly available information on the capacities 
and technical and economic characteristics of other plants, and observation of 
one another’s behaviour in the bidding process, which is repeated every day, is 
enough. Even if this behaviour only applies for a relatively few peak demand 
hours on the system, the extremely high prices resulting at those times have the 
potential to cancel out the gains from competitive forces driving down prices at 
other times of the year. 
Sufficient capacity at the transmission level 
Sufficient capacity at the transmission level is needed so that energy can 
flow unconstrained from generators to the areas of demand. Woolf (2002) 
argues that underinvestment in transmission costs much more than marginal 
overinvestment. If transmission capacity is insufficient, generators can gain 
monopoly pricing power in the constrained parts of the system. Transmission is 
widely considered to remain a natural monopoly, in any given geographic area, 
after the introduction of competition. However, it is possible to have ‘merchant 
transmission’ projects, where an investor builds a new transmission line to earn 
a return based on relieving congestion in the grid. Woolf (2002) set out ‘recipes’ 
for performance-based (incentive) regulation for regulators concerned about 
inadequate transmission investment, with the aim being a transmission system 
that reduces congestion and other costs for the consumer, improves reliability 
and reduces the potential for the abuse of market power. 
Controlled demand growth 
Demand growth must not be so rapid as to erode the reserve margin, otherwise 
competitive conditions will disappear faster than the industry is able to plan, 
build and bring online new capacity. This would likely have been a serious 




Conditions required for a competitive retail market 
Competitive sourcing of wholesale electricity 
Competitive sourcing of wholesale electricity is required if customers are to be 
offered prices that reflect competitive wholesale prices. This was not the case, for 
example, in New Zealand in the early 1990s, when retail electricity competition 
was introduced. 
Regulation of distribution costs
Appropriate regulation of distribution (‘poles and wires’) costs is required, 
as this remains a natural monopoly, for similar reasons that transmission is 
generally considered to have strong natural monopoly characteristics. 
The policy choices for China’s power sector 
In the late 1990s and early 2000s, a number of international advisors and 
agencies, including the World Bank, encouraged China to reform its power 
sector by increasing the role of the private sector and introducing competition. 
China’s 2002 reforms were influenced to a large degree by the UK example, 
as Zhang (2012) has said: 
The grid company’s natural geographical monopoly has not changed as, 
no matter what, you cannot get grid companies [to] build transmission 
lines like a spider web everywhere. Hence how to enhance supervision 
and ensure fair transactions becomes [a] must. After a study trip by the 
then ‘infrastructure department’ to the UK, the Chinese government felt 
that the separation between power generation and the grid, as well as 
setting up an electricity supervision council is suited to China’s situation. 
Hence, China’s power sector reform has largely borrowed [from] the UK 
model and experience. 
However, having put in place the industry structure that would enable full 
wholesale competition along the lines of the then UK power pool, or the Australian 
NEM, China has paused in its reforms. The electricity crisis and market failure 
in California in 2000–01—which involved blackouts, market manipulation, 
declaration by the state governor of a state of emergency, and several major 
corporate bankruptcies—were probably influential in this respect. In any case, 
the Chinese Government’s decision not to press blindly ahead with full-blown 
electricity market competition, or large-scale privatisation of the generation 
sector, now appears wise, given the challenges of the investment that was 
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required to meet double-digit demand growth during the ‘golden decade’ that 
followed, and the success of the industry in meeting that challenge. It would 
have been difficult to meet the policy goals of ensuring a safe, reliable and 
efficiently priced supply of electricity under such conditions. In the meantime, 
in markets from Australia to the United Kingdom and the United States, the role 
of the competitive market has become increasingly constrained by policies to 
promote renewable energy, to reduce carbon dioxide emissions and, in the case 
of the United Kingdom, to underwrite new nuclear power investment. 
In the past few years, the rate of growth of China’s economy, energy system 
and electricity demand has slowed to more moderate levels. Power demand is 
still growing faster than in developed economies. Many developed countries, 
including Australia, have recently been experiencing a decline in power 
consumption and peak demand, due to a combination of policy support for 
distributed renewable energy, improved energy efficiency and the closure of 
energy-intensive industrial facilities no longer able to compete. 
While China’s annual growth rate has slowed, and energy efficiency continues to 
improve, its low electricity intensity per capita compared with other countries 
suggests that considerable generation and transmission capacity investment 
will still be required before the power system is mature (Wensley et al. 2013). 
Estimates vary, but this point is unlikely to be reached before 2025, and possibly 
not until 2035 or later. 
Yang (2015) identifies the current period, from 2008 to 2020, as a transition from 
the first 30 golden years after Deng’s second revolution to the 30 years from 2020 
to 2050 in which China will achieve major milestones in energy, the economy 
and the environment. 
As this chapter goes to press: 
China’s top planning body has published multiple documents stressing 
that market forces should decide how electricity is generated, transmitted 
and distributed. Specifics are still missing, and internal contradictions 
are still rife—the documents, for instance, push renewable energy that 
currently survives by government rules that subvert market forces. 
But if enacted, these ideas would mark the next step in electricity 
reform after Beijing in 2002 cleaved transmission and distribution 
away from generation. In theory, that allowed generation companies 
to compete, though in practice, Beijing dictated electricity prices. 
(Bhattacharya 2015: 28) 
As it moves towards phase V of its power sector reforms, China is now in a good 
position to benefit from the evolving experience of other countries’ experiments 
with power sector markets. Given the scale, geographic extent, regional nature 
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and different stages of development across China’s power system, it could be 
possible to experiment further with market approaches and enhanced regulation 
in some of the more mature parts of China’s power sector and move to national 
implementation later. Such an approach would build on the foundation of the 
earlier reforms, and be consistent with China’s general economic, political and 
social philosophy of making changes carefully and gradually—‘crossing the 
river by feeling the stones’, as Deng famously said. 
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Fundamental to China’s global impact is the ‘unbalanced’ nature of its growth 
surge since the 1990s. The expansion of merchandise production at a faster rate 
than consumption in particular has had direct, and much analysed, effects on 
the terms of trade facing other regions.2 By having created a parallel excess 
supply of savings, however, this also changed the global financial terms of 
trade. That in turn contributed to the observed trend decline in asset yields 
in the same period.3 These improvements in both the product and the financial 
terms of trade of the advanced economies have, however, been partially offset 
by structural unemployment.4
Since the global financial crisis (GFC), there has been a decline in the level 
of imbalance in China’s growth. It is likely that we have seen the beginning 
of the inevitable transition process whereby China’s production structure 
diversifies away from export-oriented light manufacturing into sectors of rising 
demand domestically, and also higher value-added exports. This change is 
much anticipated,5 yet it is also non-neutral from the view of the other large 
1  Funding for the research described in this chapter is from Australian Research Council Discovery Grant 
No. DP0557885. Useful discussions on the topic with Dong He, Song Ligang, Paul Luk and Wenli Chen 
are acknowledged, along with comments received at seminars at The Australian National University, 
the China Center for Economic Research, Peking University and the Hong Kong Institute of Monetary 
Research. Thanks for assistance with data gathering for this research are due to Ying Zhang.
2  The literature on the terms-of-trade consequences for the advanced economies began in the 1990s with 
the debate over the poor performance of unskilled US workers (Bound and Johnson 1992; Wood 1994; 
Berman et al. 1994; and Leamer 1996) and extended into a more complex debate over the apparently 
declining performance of all but the most highly paid US workers (Haskell et al. 2012; Helpman et al. 
2010; Autor et al. 2013). It has also included global modelling studies that kicked off with Krugman 
(1995) and proceeded to the decomposition studies by Tyers and Yang (1997) and Francois and Nelson 
(1998), with more detailed follow-up of labour effects by Tyers and Yang (2000); Winchester and 
Greenaway (2007); Francois and Wignaraja (2008); Harris et al. (2011); Harris and Robertson (2013); 
Levchenko and Zhang (2012); and di Giovanni et al. (2013). Diversity in method notwithstanding, all 
the global modelling studies find net gains to the rest of the world transmitted via terms-of-trade effects.
3  The terms-of-trade gain transmitted financially has been commonly referred to as the Asian ‘savings 
glut’. See Bernanke (2005); Chinn and Ito (2007); Choi et al. (2008); Ito (2009); Chinn et al. (2012); 
and Arora et al. (2015).
4  For a survey and analysis of the neoclassical and Keynesian effects abroad, see Tyers (2015b).
5  See, for example, Lardy (2006).
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economies. Although growth in physical capital and productivity is expected to 
continue, albeit at slower rates than previously, the relative growth in Chinese 
consumption will see a decline in its excess saving.
The international effects of this transition depend on trade and financial 
openness—both in advanced economies and in China. Trade openness has been 
shown to be extensive throughout the regions of focus in this chapter. Financial 
openness has, however, varied through time. Sensitivity to the effects of China’s 
financial openness of the change in China’s growth regime in advanced economies 
has not yet been widely studied. It is the focus of the research presented in this 
chapter.
A parsimonious global macroeconomic model is employed. It incorporates 
bilateral linkages across six regions via both trade and financial flows, 
in  combination with a number of innovative mechanisms for characterising 
financial and macroeconomic interactions. The latter include allowing for asset 
differentiation so as to include optimising financial portfolio management in 
each region. This serves to direct savings from each into investments across 
all regions according to expected rates of return, with the degree of regional 
asset differentiation quantified to reflect financial integration. Second, long-
maturity assets are central to global financial behaviour and, recently, also 
to unconventional monetary policy (UMP), which places direct demands on 
global markets for these assets.6 In reality and in the modelling, this tends to 
enhance the spillover effects of monetary policy.7 This proves important during 
China’s period of high growth because substantial monetary expansions were 
induced in the advanced economies by the deflationary effects of increased 
supply of Chinese products. By contrast, China’s transition to the new model 
of growth increases its consumption and so is inflationary in the advanced 
economies. When  we consider the effects of nominal wage rigidities in the 
advanced economies, the Chinese surge and transition shocks are, respectively, 
contractionary and expansionary.
Overall, the results suggest that China’s earlier growth and ongoing structural 
transition have significant implications for the advanced economies, in terms of 
both financial flows and international terms of trade.8 Given nominal rigidities, 
6  Conventional monetary policy focuses on short maturity assets that serve domestic financial industries 
and are not held in great volume abroad.
7  See, for example, Chen et al. (2014); and Lin and Ye (2015).
8  Advanced economies here refer specifically to the United States, Japan, the European Union and 
Australia.
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these changes are shown to affect their levels of employment.9 With compensation 
for the displaced and unemployed, the results suggest China’s growth surge 
yielded net real income gains in advanced economies driven primarily by the 
terms-of-trade change. On the other hand, the more balanced new growth regime 
also offers net benefits, though driven primarily by increases in employment. 
Both results are sensitive to China’s financial integration because this increases 
flexibility in management of China’s collective asset portfolio.
The next section offers an introduction to China’s international macroeconomic 
impacts and their determinants. Section three describes the model used for 
quantitative analysis. Section four presents numerical analysis of the foreign 
effects of China’s growth surge and transition. Section five considers the 
sensitivity of these effects to financial integration, and section six concludes.
The global impact of China’s growth surge
A significant share of the macroeconomic literature on China’s growth has 
its genesis in concern about the imbalances associated with excess savings 
(the  ‘savings glut’) and the ‘upstream’ financial flows that stem from them.10 
China’s contribution to these upstream financial flows has been variously 
attributed, including to capital market distortions, exchange rate management 
and myriad other Chinese state interventions that confer unfair advantage on 
selected Chinese firms while also raising export and investment levels at the 
expense of household consumption.11 
China’s growth surge
Adopting the standard Lewis model of growth that also reflected growth patterns 
in other East Asian growth transformations, China’s growth model involved 
the shift of hundreds of millions of workers from informal rural  to urban 
9  Empirical analysis also reveals large macroeconomic effects, as found, for example, by Eickmeier 
and Kuehnlenz (2013). The results are contrary to those of N’Daye et al. (2010) and Genberg and 
Zhang (2010), who find that the international effects of increased Chinese consumption are small. 
Their conclusions stem from the use of a model in which spillover effects stem primarily from trade, 
and financial flows are only weakly represented.
10  The literature asserting, and depending on, the ‘savings glut’ hypothesis is now extensive. Contributions 
include Bernanke (2005, 2011); Caballero et al. (2008); Caballero (2009); Chinn and Ito (2007); Choi et al. 
(2008); Chinn et al (2012); Eichengreen (2004); and Lee and McKibbin (2007).
11  The American literature critical of China’s macroeconomic policies is also extensive. Bernanke (2005, 
2011) offers the outline and Krugman (2010) declares that ‘China is making all of us poorer’. The US 
macroeconomic position is put in more detail by, among others, Lardy (2006, 2012) and Bergsten et al. 
(2008). Similar advocacy of policy-induced ‘balance’ in China’s growth can be found, still more formally, 
in Blanchard and Giavazzi (2006), while it is also recognised that some of the US reaction is mercantilist 
(Ito 2009).
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employment, where their labour could be combined with capital and imported 
technology, yielding rapid productivity growth. The modest skill level of these 
workers shifted production towards light (labour-intensive) manufactures. In 
the absence of a parallel increase in consumer and investment demand, this 
required a rapid expansion in trade. The related growth, without parallel reform 
to social and industrial institutions, induced very high rates of household and 
corporate savings, the latter via rising state-owned enterprise (SOE) profits. 
Until China’s World Trade Organization (WTO) accession in 2001, the modest 
size of the Chinese economy limited its effects on the advanced economies.
Given the relocation of much of the world’s light manufacturing to China during 
its growth surge, it is unsurprising that, for advanced economies, the flipside 
was downward pressure on real wages growth. Moreover, the excess saving and 
associated cheap credit presumably contributed to asset price booms that in 
turn ultimately destabilised banking systems. And yet the bulk of the literature 
quantitatively exploring this issue finds a net gain for advanced economies, 
albeit with the caveat of increased structural unemployment.12
The transition to inward-focused growth
Since the global financial crisis (GFC), demand for China’s exports has 
declined. Diversification of patterns of production specialisation, however, is 
neither automatic nor straightforward from a policy standpoint. Moreover, 
the comparative growth required in heavy manufacturing and services is 
constrained by the tendency for these industries to be oligopolistic and thus to 
offer considerable rents associated with entrenched interests.
Despite such challenges, there is considerable potential for growth from these 
previously suppressed sectors (Song et al. 2011; Tyers 2014). Along with reforms to 
social policy that have the ultimate impact of reducing the need for precautionary 
household savings, there are already signs of an emerging, larger role for 
consumption growth in China. Recent studies go so far as to question whether 
China’s official statistics on consumption expenditure are underestimating the 
underlying extent of consumption that is already taking place (Ma and Yi 2010). 
Huang et al. (2013) use a weighted average of consumption-related retail sales 
growth and service sales growth to project the consumption share of gross 
domestic product (GDP). Their results suggest that the consumption share of 
GDP climbed, from 49 to 54 per cent during 2008–10, while China’s National 
12  See the survey by Tyers (2015b).
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Bureau of Statistics (NBS) had it falling, from 48 to 47 per cent.13 This suggests 
a continuing decline in the relative size of China’s current account surplus 
(Arora et al. 2015).
Excess saving and yields
Of the growth in global GDP since 1980 as measured in US dollars at current 
exchange rates, one-third is due to Asian growth, the scale of which has been 
emphasised by the World Bank (2013). The contribution of Asian economies 
to global savings has been even larger. They have supplied about half of the 
corresponding increment to global saving in the same period, with China 
contributing fully one-third of the total increment since 1990. These proportions 
imply that the shift in global growth towards high-saving Asia, which occurred 
in the 1980s, accelerated the rate at which the global savings supply curve 
shifted to the right. If, as the data suggest, the corresponding global investment 
demand curve shifted by less, there would have been a decline in the Wicksellian 
(Wicksell 1936) ‘natural’ rate of interest at the global level.14 Such a shift has 
significant implications for the international financial market.
The global financial market
Consistent with the segmentation theory of the yield curve (Johnson et al. 
2010), long rates are more than the commonly claimed (Borio and Disyatat 
2011) expectational extensions of short policy rates. Specifically, since the 
transaction cost of financing long-term investments via a succession of short 
contracts is prohibitive, short and long-maturity instruments trade at prices 
and yields that differ beyond what would be expected from time preference and 
expectation forces (Shiller et al. 1983; He and McCauley 2013). Short bonds are 
instruments of conventional domestic monetary policy that primarily serve the 
domestic financial sector. Their yield movements are clearly linked to region-
specific business cycles (Arora et al. 2015). In contrast, long bonds arbitrage 
with major instruments of private saving and investment, and are widely traded 
internationally. Their yields therefore tend to follow a smoother path through 
time than yields on short instruments and the trend of this path is indicative 
of movements in the equilibrium between global saving and investment, as is 
suggested in Figure 9.1—the case of the financially dominant United States.
13  Huang et al. (2013) start with the official consumption share in 2000 and derive the GDP shares in 
remaining years using real GDP growth and their estimated consumption growth rates. Using similar 
data, Garner and Qiao (2013) suggest that Chinese consumption expenditure is officially underestimated 
by US$1.6 trillion, also concluding that its GDP share is expanding.
14  Ex ante shifts in saving supply and investment demand cannot be observed. See Tyers (2015b) for 
a discussion of this.
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Figure 9.1 US Treasury bond short and long yields over two decades
Source: US Treasury.
He and McCauley (2013) use their evidence of ‘imperfect substitutability along 
the yield curve’ to explore monetary policy spillover effects. They consider the 
latter to be enlarged by the global integration of long bond markets. That view 
is supported by Ito (2013: 8), who argues that financial globalisation has made 
domestic financial markets more vulnerable to international factors. This in turn 
tends to decouple short-term and long-term rates. Consistent with Bernanke 
(2005), Ito (2013) concludes that the long-term interest rate is tied to global 
saving imbalances, and hence reflects the natural rate of interest.
The reasoning of He and McCauley, and Ito, along with the findings of Rey 
(2013), imply that given free capital mobility, inter-regional arbitrage will take 
place at the long end of the yield curve while the short end of the yield curve 
is, more conventionally, controlled by monetary authorities.15 The time paths 
of the advanced economies’ long yields in Figure 9.2 offer support for this idea 
of international arbitrage. It follows that the contemporary increase in Asian 
savings is a potential explanation for the persistent downward trend in long-
term bond rates since the 1980s that is also apparent from Figure 9.2.16
15  I thank Paul Luk for clarifying this point.
16  The separation of the series for Japan is associated with its long-term current account surplus and the 
major yen appreciation shocks of the late 1980s and early 1990s, which established a negative risk 
premium among Japanese savers. In all regions, inflation rates were low throughout the period shown 
in the figure and so the trend of nominal long rates reflects that of corresponding real rates.
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Figure 9.2 Long-term bond yields in advanced economies
Source: OECD (2015).
Implications
The trends and research presented so far in this chapter suggest changes in 
China’s savings level contribute to trends in the underlying Wicksellian interest 
rate at the global level and therefore to the yields in long bond markets that 
reflect it, now that it has become ‘macroeconomically’ large. It follows that 
the current transition in the pattern of Chinese growth, and its consumption 
behaviour, has important implications for global financial markets and for the 
economic performance of advanced economies, the more so as China’s financial 
sector deepens and becomes more internationally integrated. Second, it follows 
that the emergence of UMP in the large regional economies is also placing 
important demands on long bond markets. These demands, like China’s excess 
saving, tend to reduce yields on long-term debt globally and so the impacts of 
these two forces are difficult to separate. One way to study this is to model the 
global economy numerically, and thereby enable the decomposition of observed 
change among its determinants and the evaluation of the sensitivity of outcomes 
to factors such as financial integration.17
17  For a comparison of the global effects of the change of China’s growth regime with those of the current 
US recovery and the continuing EU and Japanese monetary expansions, see Tyers (2015a).
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Modelling global macro-interdependence 
A multi-region general equilibrium structure that centres on the global financial 
capital market is used for this analysis.18 In it, the financial products of each 
region are differentiated and portfolio managers assign new net savings across 
regions so as to maximise expected portfolio returns. This retains Feldstein and 
Horioka (1980) home investment bias while allowing significant redirections of 
financial flows at the margin in response to changes in expected yields. It also 
allows the level of global financial market integration to be parameterised 
by varying this degree of differentiation. By implication, the scale of short-
run spillover effects associated with growth performance, excess saving and 
monetary policy therefore also depends on it.
There is a tendency for flows between integrated financial markets to move 
the global economy towards interest parity. Asset differentiation, however, 
helps reflect true differences in the properties and riskiness of debt and equity 
contracts across regions, ensuring that interest parity is realistically incomplete. 
At the same time, the expected regional rates of return that drive investment 
flows depart from regional bond yields. The former reflect anticipated rates of 
return on installed capital and the latter reflect short-run equilibrium in regional 
financial markets between savers, indebted governments and investors.
Within each region the demand for money is driven by a ‘cash in advance’ 
constraint applying across the whole of GDP. For any one household, home 
money is held in a portfolio with long-maturity bonds, which comprise claims 
over physical capital and government debt across the regions.19 On the supply 
side of the money market, in regions with UMP, expansions raise demand for long 
maturity bonds, reducing their yield and hence also reducing the opportunity 
cost of holding money.
Six economic regions are identified in the present study—the United States, 
the European Union, Japan, China, Australia and the Rest of the World—
though the focus of this chapter is on the first four.20 Each of these economies 
supplies a single unique product. On the supply side, there are three primary 
factors, with production labour variable and partially employed. The stocks of 
18  The model used is a more advanced variant of that used in Tyers (2015c). That model assumed a perfectly 
integrated global bond market and so tended to generate unrealistically large spillover effects. Here, all 
financial products, including government bonds, are represented as regionally differentiated and so there 
is no perfectly integrated global market for any asset class. Also, this model introduces unconventional 
monetary policy, which sees monetary expansions directly affecting the markets for long-maturity assets.
19  Expectations are exogenous in the model and are formed over future values of home nominal disposable 
income, the rate of inflation, the real rate of return on home assets and bilateral real exchange rate 
alignment.
20  The European Union is modelled as the full 26 countries and it is assumed that this collective has a single 
central bank.
Financial Integration and Global Interdependence
221
physical capital and skill are exogenous in the short run and fully employed. 
The collective household is a net saver, with reduced-form real consumption 
depending on current and expected future real disposable income and the 
home real interest rate. Aggregate consumption is subdivided between the 
products of all regions via a single constant elasticity of substitution (CES) nest. 
Further details of the aspects of the model central to this analysis are provided 
in Tyers (2015a: 4).
Model database, parameters and operation
National accounts, international trade and financial data for the global 
economy in 2011 are used to assemble the database used. The implications of 
changes in China for the three advanced economies are emphasised here and 
the scale of these economies, as represented in the database, is indicated in 
Table 9.1. Of  particular interest are the financial flows between the regions 
in question—a pattern of which is suggested in Table 9.2. In interpreting the 
analysis to follow, it is important to note the substantial share of the United 
States in financial outflows from China.21
Table 9.1 Relative economic sizes of China and the other large regions, ca 2011
% of world China US EU(26) Japan
GDP 11 22 26 9
Consumption, C 8 27 26 9
Investment, I 20 15 22 8
Government spending, G 7 20 30 10
Exports, X 17 17 25 7
Imports, M 15 21 23 8
Total domestic saving, SD 19 13 20 9
Sources: National accounts data supply most of the elements though adjustments have been required 
to ensure that current accounts sum to zero globally, as do capital/financial accounts. The IMF 
database (n.d.) is the major source but there is frequent resort to national statistical databases.
21  Further details as to the sources and construction of the database can be obtained from Tyers (2015c: 
Appendix 2).
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Table 9.2 Shares of total domestic savings directed to investment in each 
region, 2011a
% of row 
total saving
US EU(26) Japan China Australia Rest of 
World
USb 68.0 13.3 6.4 6.4 1.5 4.4
EU(26)c 12.9 80.1 2.3 2.3 0.9 1.5
Japand 14.0 3.3 72.2 6.2 0.7 3.6
Chinac 9.2 0.6 0.9 81.1 0.1 8.0
Australiae 13.0 4.8 2.3 2.1 77.3 0.4
Rest of worldf 3.4 3.9 2.6 2.8 0.1 87.2
a These shares sum to 100 horizontally. They are based on 2011 investment flows. The original flow 
matrix is inconsistent with data on savings and investment from national accounts and so an RAS 
algorithm is used to ensure that row and column sums are consistent with other data. The row sums of 
the original flow matrix are total savings by region and the column sums are total investment by region. 
These sums are sourced from the IMF (n.d.) database and the World Bank (n.d.) database. 
b United States: Values are based on official statistics, BEA. 
c European Union and China: Indirect information from US, Australian and Japanese statistics. 
d Japan: Estimated based on foreign direct investment (FDI) data, assuming investment outflow = 
FDI*1.6. The ratio 1.6 is that of US-reported inward investment from Japan divided by Japanese 
reported outward FDI to the United States. 
e Australia: ABS (2013). 
f Rest of World is a residual. Its saving is inferred from national accounts estimates and its investment 
abroad is determined to balance the matrix of financial flows. 
Sources: As per the notes above.
Primary results: Growth surge and 
transition effects
Two sets of comparative static experiments are undertaken in which shocks 
are applied to the Chinese economy that represent changes over a single year. 
These are stylised representations of actual changes during the growth surge 
period, on the one hand, and the subsequent transition to the new growth 
model on the other. For each, a set of assumptions is required about labour 
markets, fiscal policy and the target of monetary policy in all the regions. 
These are short run and Keynesian in flavour, and are detailed in Table 9.3.22 
The  stylised annual growth surge shocks are listed in Table 9.4 and they 
represent the  comparative performance of the Chinese economy in the surge 
22  Keynesian and neoclassical assumptions about behaviour in response to the Chinese shocks are compared 
using a similar model by Tyers (2015b). While there are key differences in financial market structure 
between the two models, the contrasts that emerge are similar to those that would stem from the model 
used here.
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period: 2002–07.23 The particular shock to consumption behaviour represents 
the observed decline in the share of consumption expenditure and the rise in 
the share of private savings in GDP over those years.
Table 9.3 Key assumptions about labour markets, fiscal and monetary policya
Closure
Labour market Exogenous nominal production (unskilled) wage with endogenous production 
employment
Fiscal policy Exogenous nominal government spending and endogenous government 
revenue at fixed rates of tax on income, consumption and trade
Monetary policy 
targetsb
China and the Rest of the World:
Fixed exchange rates against the US$c
US, EU and Japan:
Fixed monetary basesd
Producer price level targets
Consumer price level targets
a Since the model is a system of nonlinear simultaneous equations and more variables are specified 
than equations in the system, there is flexibility as to the choice of those to make exogenous. This 
choice mirrors assumptions about the behaviour of labour markets, fiscal deficits and monetary policy 
targets. 
b Money supplies can be set to target any of the three price levels (consumer, producer and GDP), 
nominal exchange rates against the US dollar or nominal GDP levels. 
c Australia is a small region also identified in the model. Its monetary policy targets the producer price 
level, which ensures no change in employment. 
d No changes in commercial bank reserve behaviour are assumed so that money multipliers remain 
constant.
In the case of the transition, the first signs of which appeared after 2009, 
slower productivity and factor accumulation rates are combined with a single 
change in Chinese preferences that boosts consumption and reduces saving.24 
The preference shock might be thought of as stemming from the combination 
of life-cycle changes and the social and industrial reforms discussed in earlier 
sections, and it is set at a level sufficient to raise the consumption share of GDP 
by about one-tenth (from 45 to near 50 per cent), which is representative of the 
change suggested by Huang et al. (2013).
23  The capital accumulation and productivity shares of China’s recent growth are controversial (Krugman 
1994). The separate roles these played are examined using a similar model by Tyers (2015a). The shock 
values used here are consistent with the meta-analysis by Wu (2011).
24  The slowdown assumed here is consistent with the analysis by Feng and Yang (2013), though this 
is not to deny that considerable potential remains for further productivity growth, even in China’s 
manufacturing sector (Hsieh and Klenow 2009).
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The growth surge
The numerical simulation results are summarised in Table 9.5. The simulation 
is repeated for three different monetary policy settings for the United States, 
the European Union and Japan, as described in Table 9.3. China’s growth surge, 
combined with its imbalance between production and consumption, created 
excess supply in the advanced economies, so was deflationary in the absence of 
money supply adjustment.25 In the simulation, US dollar appreciation ensures 
that US consumer prices deflate by more than producer prices,26 so monetary 
targeting of the consumer price level requires the largest expansion of the 
US monetary base. Unsurprisingly, the resulting greater liquidity yields the 
best short-run outcome for the advanced economies in general, although the 
monetary expansion, which includes UMP, places further demands on long 
bond markets and exacerbates the decline in their yields.
In the case where the advanced economies target their monetary bases, and hence 
do not respond with monetary expansions, it is noteworthy that the decline in 
bond yields does not occur in all regions. This is because the deflations that 
result are contractionary, reducing both output and saving. This in turn places 
offsetting upward pressure on domestic yields. The net effect depends on the 
intensity of financial interaction with China. 
As we have seen, this interaction is far more intense between China and the 
United States than between China and the other advanced economies. In the 
European Union, therefore, reduced home saving tends to dominate the opposing 
downward force due to the financial influx from China. For this reason, the 
simulated net change in the domestic real interest rate in the European Union 
is positive in the absence of a domestic monetary expansion sufficient to avert 
the contraction.
Real domestic investment rises in the advanced economies with the influx 
from China, but where deflation is not eliminated by monetary expansion, 
insufficiently to sustain domestic labour demand. The net effects on real GDP 
depend on the level of employment, which declines where deflation is allowed 
to persist. Historically, deflation occurred only briefly in the United States and 
Europe during the surge period, but it has been a persistent feature in Japan. 
The results therefore suggest that China’s growth surge ultimately contributed 
to the slow real GDP growth observed in the United States and the European 
Union and the stagnation in Japan during this period.
25  Another way to think of this is that lower interest rates raise the demand for money relative to goods, 
thus reducing the prices of goods in terms of money.
26  This is because the consumption basket includes imported products not included in the calculation 
of the producer or GDP prices.
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In more general terms, however, these economies experienced real appreciations 
relative to China, of a scale roughly equivalent to the terms-of-trade gains 
reflected in this model. The welfare effect of these real income gains can be 
incorporated by deflating nominal GDP by the domestic consumer price level 
to obtain the real purchasing power of home income at home consumer prices. 
This measure shows consistent net gains, suggesting that the overall effect of 
China’s surge in the advanced economies was positive but it was distributed in 
favour of capital owners rather than workers, so it caused distributional stress.
The transition
Both the surge and the transition shocks indicated in Table 9.4 embody 
productivity and factor endowment changes. At their core, however, they 
differ in that the transition offers a reversal of the change in consumption 
behaviour. There is in the transition a rise in Chinese consumption expenditure 
and a decline in savings. This reduces the structural imbalance substantially, 
so the transition’s effects on global financial markets are opposite to those 
of the growth surge. That is, bond yields in the advanced economies rise as 
China’s excess savings are reduced. Because of incomplete financial integration, 
however, yield rises abroad are smaller than within China. This ensures that the 
simulated change in international financial flux is reversed, reducing Chinese 
net outflows and increasing Chinese investment domestically. In the absence of 
monetary contractions in the advanced economies, these shocks are modestly 
inflationary. This stimulates employment and real GDP growth. Real purchasing 
power of income at consumer prices is boosted in the European Union and 
Japan—though not in the United States. This is because the transition shocks 
have caused the advanced economies to suffer terms-of-trade losses. Because 
China is more financially integrated with the United States, these are more than 
fully offset by increased employment only in the European Union and Japan.27
27  These results differ in detail, though not in bottom-line magnitudes of net effects, from the Keynesian 
outcomes of the analysis by Tyers (2015b). This is because the assumption of a fully integrated global 
bond market, made in that paper, yields considerably larger financial spillover effects than obtained 
with the model adopted here.
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Table 9.4 Experimental shocksa
Scenario Shocks, %
Growth surge Productivity, AY 
Consumption constant, AC 
Capital stock, K 





Transition Productivity, AY 
Consumption constant, AC 
Capital stock, K 





Nominal wage, Wb 4
a All shocks are to the Chinese economy only. They are considered representative of annual shocks in 
the growth surge and transition periods. 
b The Chinese nominal wage is shocked with the transition case only to allow for accelerated relative 
production wage growth in the transition, fostering consumption. 
Sources: Calibration to observed changes, combined with the meta analysis of productivity change by 
Wu (2011).
Sensitivity to financial integration
Financial integration can be thought of in several ways, even within the 
confines of the model adopted here. One possibility is to regard greater financial 
integration as being indicative of a more fluid substitution process between 
assets across all regions. This is readily reflected by a rise in all the regions’ 
elasticities of asset substitution, .28 Since Chinese financial development 
is more recent than corresponding developments in China’s product markets 
or in the financial markets of advanced economies, it is here represented as a 
progression in the value of China’s  from small values to full parity with the 
advanced economies.29 
For low values of , China’s financial outflows adhere to the original pattern of 
these flows, as reflected in the 2011 database. When its substitution elasticity 
rises, the distribution of these outflows across regional assets is more responsive 
to relative yield changes. This includes greater flexibility of the share in China’s 
collective portfolio of China’s own domestic assets. To explore the effects 
28  In the model, described in detail by Tyers (2015a), financial integration is indexed by the preparedness 
of asset holders to substitute the assets of one region with those of another, represented by an elasticity 
of substitution. When the value of that elasticity is large, portfolio managers rebalance across regions on 
fine movements in expected rates of return on investment. When it is small, portfolio compositions are 
comparatively stable.
29  The values of the substitution elasticity used in generating the results in the previous section are 15 
for the United States and the European Union, 10 for Japan and five for China. These values reflect 
numerical measures of comparative financial openness (Tyers 2015c: Appendix 2). Here the analysis 
sets them as constant at 20 for all the advanced economies and examines the effects of allowing China’s 
elasticity to rise from two to 20.
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of integration, the growth surge and transition shocks are introduced with 
values of  that range from the very small to those representing integration 
at the level of the advanced economies. The effects of the surge and transition 
on regional bond yields, real GDP and the real purchasing power of regional 
income at consumer prices are assessed for China and the advanced economies. 
For economy of illustration, only the cases in which the advanced economies 
hold constant their money supplies are presented.
Sensitivity during the growth surge
More flexible Chinese portfolio management alters the effects of the growth 
surge, causing departures from the results in Table 9.5 in ways that can be seen 
in Figure 9.3. Not surprisingly, given that the shocks arise from the Chinese 
economy, Chinese performance indicators are the most strongly affected 
by changes in financial integration. Increases in it make China’s outbound 
investment easier and more flexibly distributed across the other economies. 
Since the growth surge caused a substantial rise in excess saving, the more 
readily that saving can be shifted abroad, the smaller is its tendency to suppress 
Chinese home bond yields and the greater is its tendency to suppress yields 
in regions with which China has intensive financial exchange. In the end, the 
modelling suggests that these changes in the degree of Chinese integration 
have, in themselves, only small effects on global bond yields. Of course, these 
experiments have common shocks to Chinese output and excess saving, the 
average international effects of which have already been indicated in Table 9.5. 
The marginal effects of greater flexibility of direction of financial flows are what 
are comparatively small.
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Table 9.5 Effects of the growth surge with moderate financial integrationa
% changes US, EU, Japan monetary target US EU(26) Japan China
Real bond yield, r
Monetary base –0.21 0.07 –0.20 –2.43
Producer price level –1.23 –0.82 –1.22 –3.33
Consumer price level –3.23 –2.84 –3.15 –4.94
Consumer price level, PC
Monetary base –0.20 –0.16 –0.12 –6.19
Producer price level 0.00 0.00 0.00 –5.74
Consumer price level 0.31 0.64 0.19 –5.02
Producer price level, PP
Monetary base –0.67 –0.81 –0.37 –1.58
Producer price level –0.39 –0.74 –0.21 –1.17
Consumer price level 0.00 0.00 0.00 –0.59
Exchange rate versus US$, E
Monetary base 0.00 –0.32 –0.83 0.00
Producer price level 0.00 0.03 –0.63 0.00
Consumer price level 0.00 –0.24 –0.28 0.00
Real investment, I/PP
Monetary base 0.36 0.11 0.2 10.86
Producer price level 0.54 0.83 0.32 11.63
Consumer price level 1.05 2.19 0.65 13.09
Production employment, L
Monetary base –0.24 –0.19 –0.14 3.68
Producer price level 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.35
Consumer price level 0.38 0.78 0.23 5.44
Real output (GDP), Y/PY
Monetary base –0.04 –0.03 –0.03 10.52
Producer price level 0.00 0.00 0.00 10.71
Consumer price level 0.07 0.14 0.04 11.01
Real income, Y/PC
Monetary base 0.55 0.86 0.25 4.15
Producer price level 0.48 0.99 0.24 4.35
Consumer price level 0.44 0.89 0.25 4.77
a These results are from the model described in the text with the closures and shocks listed in Tables 
9.3 and 9.4. The ‘moderate’ financial integration parameters referred to are values of the elasticity of 
substitution between assets for each region, . These are United States: 15; European Union: 15; 
Japan: 10; China: 5; Australia: 15; Rest of World: 5. 
Source: Simulations of the model described in the text.
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Table 9.6 Effects of the transition with moderate financial integrationa
% changes US, EU, Japan monetary target US EU(26) Japan China
Real bond yield, r
Monetary base 0.62 0.54 0.63 3.05
Producer price level 2.61 2.22 2.69 4.94
Consumer price level 2.00 1.63 1.89 4.42
Consumer price level, PC
Monetary base 0.37 0.23 0.31 –1.47
Producer price level 0.00 0.00 0.00 –2.36
Consumer price level 0.07 0.15 0.28 –2.19
Producer price level, PP
Monetary base 0.46 –0.15 –0.03 0.65
Producer price level –0.07 –0.16 –0.47 –0.13
Consumer price level 0.00 0.00 0.00 –0.07
Exchange rate versus US$, E
Monetary base 0.00 0.84 1.31 0.00
Producer price level 0.00 0.00 1.22 0.00
Consumer price level 0.00 –0.06 0.45 0.00
Real investment, I/PP
Monetary base –0.91 –0.62 –0.78 2.64
Producer price level –1.18 –1.99 –0.81 1.25
Consumer price level –1.03 –1.59 –1.11 1.67
Production employment, L
Monetary base 0.45 0.28 0.37 –0.93
Producer price level 0.00 0.00 0.00 –2.15
Consumer price level 0.08 0.19 0.34 –1.91
Real output (GDP), Y/PY
Monetary base 0.08 0.05 0.07 4.57
Producer price level 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.23
Consumer price level 0.01 0.03 0.06 4.29
Real income, Y/PC
Monetary base –0.08 0.47 0.41 4.10
Producer price level 0.05 0.15 0.49 3.70
Consumer price level 0.06 0.16 0.34 3.89
a These results are from the model described in the text with the closures and shocks listed in Tables 
9.3 and 9.4. The ‘moderate’ financial integration parameters referred to are values of the elasticity of 
substitution between assets for each region, . These are United States: 15; European Union: 15; 
Japan: 10; China: 5; Australia: 15; Rest of World: 5. 
Source: Simulations of the model described in the text.
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Real long bond yield Real purchasing power of income Real GDP
Figure 9.3 Effects of the growth surge: sensitivity to China’s financial integration 
(percentage changes)
Source: Simulations of the model described in the text.
The expected movement towards convergence of bond yields occurs between 
China and the United States, but, while Japan also sees its yield declining, the 
effects of integration are opposite in direction in both Japan and the European 
Union relative to the United States. This occurs for the reasons discussed in 
the previous section—namely, there is a mismatch between the intensities of 
trade and financial flows to Japan and the European Union. Strong trading 
relationships cause major terms-of-trade effects and deflation, while weak 
financial relationships (Table 9.2) mean effects on European and Japanese bond 
markets are comparatively small. So, home bond markets in these regions are 
primarily affected by their deflation-induced domestic supply (and hence 
saving) contractions. Even where proportional changes to the initial shares of 
Chinese outflows to the European Union and Japan are substantial, the small 
base tends to push most of the additional outflow to the United States.
The effect of China’s financial integration on its own real GDP and on the 
purchasing power of its income at domestic prices is to impair its short-run 
economic performance. This is because greater integration increases financial 
outflows from China and hence reduces domestic investment. This further 
depreciates China’s real exchange rate, exacerbating the terms-of-trade shift 
against it. Even so, the net effect for China of the surge shock remains very 
positive. Internationally, the tendency for China’s financial outflows to be US-
focused serves to appreciate the US real exchange rate relative to the European 
Union and Japan. On the one hand, this exacerbates the employment contraction 
and hence the effects of the surge on US GDP. On the other hand, it increases the 
terms-of-trade gain and so enhances the real purchasing power of US income.
Sensitivity during the transition
The results from the transition shocks taken over the same range of levels 
of Chinese financial integration (asset substitutability) have a pattern that is 
generally the opposite of the surge shocks. This time the reduction in excess 
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saving ensures that the higher returns are available within China. As can be 
seen from Figure 9.4, at higher levels of integration, China’s portfolio rebalances 
more fully towards domestic assets and away from foreign ones. Home yields 
end up lower, and those in the United States—from whence the rebalance is 
resourced—rise. More minor redistributions also favour the European Union 
and Japan, whose yields fall slightly. Bringing expenditure back home improves 
both real GDP and the purchasing power of national income in China. Removing 
it from the United States reduces the US terms-of-trade gain and hence impairs 
the real purchasing power of US income. On the other hand, the higher US 
bond yield that stems from Chinese integration raises liquidity, while higher 
inflation—though still modest—improves employment, lifting real GDP. 
These effects are reduced in the European Union and Japan because of the effect 
Chinese integration has in reducing their bond yields. On the one hand, this 
causes less inflation and less employment uptake, but on the other, it tends to 
appreciate their real exchange rates, conferring larger terms-of-trade gains.
Real long bond yield Real purchasing power of income Real GDP
Figure 9.4 Effects of the transition: sensitivity to China’s financial integration 
(percentage changes)
Source: Simulations of the model described in the text.
Conclusion
This chapter introduces an elemental global macroeconomic model with national 
asset portfolio rebalancing and explicit representation of unconventional 
monetary policy. It is used to evaluate the international effects of changes 
in China’s growth regime. The post-WTO accession growth surge and the 
subsequent and ongoing structural transition are shown to have important 
implications for the United States, the European Union, Japan and Australia. 
The scale of these effects is further shown to depend on the level of China’s 
financial integration with these advanced economies. 
Even though the growth surge caused considerable structural change in the 
advanced economies—as manufacturing employment relocated to China, 
contributing to increased unemployment—this growth conferred on the 
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advanced economies considerable terms-of-trade gains. The results from 
this analysis suggest that these gains outweighed the losses associated with 
increased unemployment. Had China been more financially integrated at the 
time, it is further shown that the financial influx, particularly into the United 
States, would have been larger. This would have made the US terms-of-trade 
gain larger, but its domestic bond yields would have been lower and the effects 
more deflationary, further reducing US employment and real GDP growth.
China’s ongoing structural transition is relaxing its previous consumption 
repression and this is likely to continue to reduce its excess saving over time. 
The result is a tightening of global financial markets and some still modest 
increases in inflation in the advanced economies, therefore tending to restore 
employment in those economies. 
On the other hand, reduced financial outflows from China depreciate real exchange 
rates in the advanced economies and redistribute investment towards China. 
This brings terms-of-trade losses in the advanced world and the moderating 
investment could slow growth there. As measured by the purchasing power 
of national incomes at home consumer prices, the employment gains appear to 
outweigh the terms-of-trade losses, at least for Europe and Japan. Increasing 
Chinese financial integration is shown to exacerbate these effects, particularly 
for the United States, since Chinese financial outflows have tended to be focused 
on US asset markets.
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10. Capital Account 
Liberalisation in China1
Reform sequence, risks and selective policy issues
Liqing Zhang and Qin Gou
Introduction
Recent decades have witnessed a global wave of financial liberalisation 
unprecedented in both intensity and scope. This follows the breakdown of the 
Bretton Woods fixed exchange rate system in the early 1970s. The wave first 
appeared in high-income economies, following which, during the 1990s, a large 
number of emerging economies undertook profound financial reforms. Most but 
not all high-income economies introduced gradual reforms implementation 
characterised by domestic financial reforms and then capital account opening. 
In contrast, the process of reforms for developing economies lacked a clear 
sequence (see Figure 10.1). 
As the 1990s unfolded, some developing economies undertook rapid, aggressive 
reforms at about the same time, and some relaxed capital controls during the 
very early stages of the reform process. On the one hand, the aggressive approach 
suggests an element of reform efficiency. On the other hand, this approach is 
typically accompanied by short-term pain that results from the relatively high 
risk of financial turbulence. In the second half of the 1990s and early 2000s, 
most of the countries that adopted the aggressive approach to financial reform 
experienced deep and traumatic financial crises, such as Mexico’s ‘Tequila’ crisis 
and the East Asian Financial Crisis (World Bank 2001). In contrast, countries 
that adopted a gradual approach seldom faced such crises, but paid efficiency 
costs for delaying the reform process.
1  Note: The chapter is jointly sponsored by the Chinese Ministry of Education (MOE) project ‘China’s 
capital account liberalization: sequences and risks’ (approval number: 14JZD016).
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Figure 10.1 Trends in global financial reform
Notes: Total reform is defined as reform of the domestic financial system concurrent with opening 
of the capital account, and refers to the financial reform index constructed by Abiad et al. (2008). 
Domestic reform is defined as those reforms applying to the intra-country financial system, including 
interest rate controls, credit controls, prudential regulations, supervision of the banking sector and 
equity market policy. Capital reforms specifically measure the liberalisation of the capital account. 
Along each reform dimension, Abiad et al. (2008) allocate a country a score from zero to three, 
increasing the scale as liberalisation increases. Inverse scoring is used in constructing the index 
of banking system regulation and supervision. 
Sources: Abiad et al. (2008); and authors’ calculations.
In parallel with the varying stylised facts associated with different financial 
reform sequencing strategies among countries runs a longstanding heated 
debate on this topic in the academic literature. Some economists argue 
that correct sequencing, staggered over time, is important to avoid financial 
instability and minimise the risk of crisis that has been attached to free capital 
mobility (Edwards 1984, 1990; Funke 1993; McKinnon 1973, 1991; Stiglitz 
2002). On the other hand, economists have also argued for simultaneous reform 
so as to improve economic and reform efficiency, including via interest rate 
liberalisation and exchange rate flexibility (Choksi and Papageorgiou 1986; 
Quirk and Evans 1995). 
Within this broader debate, China, like many other developing economies, 
confronts a complex set of questions related to the desirability and mode of 
implementing capital account liberalisation as well as to domestic financial 
reform. In the past 15 years, incremental progress has been made in liberalisation 
of the capital account. Recent liberalisation measures include the launch of 
the Shanghai–Hong Kong Stock Connect program, amendment of foreign 
investment law and an increase in the scale of Qualified Foreign Institutional 
Investor (QFII), Renminbi Qualified Foreign Institutional Investor (RQFII) and 
Qualified Domestic Institutional Investor (QDII) schemes. 
Following such progress in China’s financial reform program, the 2014 Annual 
Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER) 
(IMF  2014) considered that of China’s 40 capital account transaction items, 
14 (some 35 per cent) have essentially been liberalised, 23 (57.5 per cent) have 
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been partially liberalised and three (7.5 per cent) remain restricted. The last 
three items relate mainly to controls on capital and money market instruments, 
and controls on derivatives and other instruments. 
Inward foreign direct investment (FDI) was among the earliest items to be 
liberalised in China—a process that began in the mid-1980s and accelerated 
in the early 1990s. The stock of inward FDI stood at US$1.8 trillion in 2014—
equivalent to almost 20 per cent of China’s gross domestic product (GDP). 
Outward FDI and portfolio flows, in comparison, remain restricted. Stocks of 
outward FDI, as well as inward and outward portfolio investments, amounted 
to about 7 per cent of GDP or less in 2014. While there has been some progress 
in capital account liberalisation in recent decades, the degree of capital account 
convertibility in China remains low compared with high-income economies and 
also some developing economies.
At the Third Plenary Session of the Eighteenth Central Committee of the Chinese 
Communist Party in late 2013, a comprehensive market-oriented reform program 
was authorised.2 Financial reform is a significant component of these planned 
reforms. It comprises some 11 items of the newly authorised reform agenda, 
including the opening up of both foreign and private financial institutions; 
establishing a system of market-based interest rates, exchange rates and of the 
official yield curve; developing multilayered capital markets; capital account 
convertibility; and improved financial regulation (Central Committee of the 
Chinese Communist Party 2013). 
While most of these items individually are in urgent need of reform, unavoidably, 
related reforms can only be pushed through simultaneously or in sequence. 
A heated debate has ensued as to the right approach to take in implementing 
China’s financial reforms. Some economists believe a precondition for capital 
account convertibility should be reforms that deliver a strong domestic 
banking system, relatively developed domestic financial markets, interest rate 
liberalisation and exchange rate flexibility (Lardy and Douglass 2011; Prasad et 
al. 2005; Yu 2013). Other economists and policymakers argue for the acceleration 
of capital account convertibility in order to reap its growth benefit, removing 
capital control costs or even pushing back domestic financial reforms.
This chapter reviews the issues involved in moving towards deeper domestic 
financial liberalisation and capital account liberalisation in China. Despite the 
extensive literature on financial reform sequencing, empirical evidence on the 
crisis risks of alternative sequencing strategies is relatively limited. In this 
2  The decision involved several aspects including society, politics, economy, culture and ecological 
civilisation. Decisions of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China at the Third Plenum 
of the Eighteenth Party Congress are available from: www.china.org.cn/. Retrieved 16 January 2014.
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chapter, we use experience of financial reforms to investigate the crisis risks 
of alternative financial reform sequencing, using a cross-country panel-data 
analysis for 50 economies in the years 1973–2005. 
The second section of the chapter reviews the related literature. In the third 
section, we lay out the empirical model used to analyse financial crisis risks 
around alternative sequencing of financial reforms. In the fourth section, 
we apply these empirical results to a scenario-based study of the implications 
for China’s onward financial reform, before offering some concluding remarks.
A brief literature review of capital account 
liberalisation
The theoretical literature suggests that there are several benefits of capital 
account liberalisation. First, liberalisation improves capital allocation efficiency 
and risk diversification, and fosters financial development, which in turn 
stimulate economic growth (Kose et al. 2009). Second, it avoids the transaction 
cost of capital controls, which in any case are not perfectly effective. 
There are also several arguments in favour of capital controls. First, extreme flows 
of capital are likely to induce excessive fluctuations in liquidity and to render 
monetary policies ineffective. Second, large capital flows help to synchronise 
the domestic and international business cycles, implying the domestic economy 
risks unpredictable capital flow reversals and severe financial instability, even 
financial distress and crises (Bhagwati 1998; Levy Yeyati et al. 2009; Rodrik 1998; 
Stiglitz 2002).
Empirical studies, however, find little conclusive evidence for growth-enhancing 
effects (Edison et al. 2002; Quinn and Toyoda 2008; Rodrik 1998). Nor  has 
consensus been reached on the net effects of the volatility and crisis risks 
induced by free capital flows across countries (Edwards 2007, 2008; Glick and 
Hutchison 2001; Glick et al. 2006; Hutchison and Noy 2005).
A more nuanced literature exploring the effects of financial reform according to 
their sequence offers some insight into how countries can reap the benefits and 
minimise the costs of capital account liberalisation (IMF 2012). Sequencing here 
is defined as the setting of a clear order among financial sector liberalisation 
measures (IMF 2012). There are three different views on the importance 
of sequencing. 
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The first view favours gradual reform that incrementally implements reforms 
in an appropriate sequence. This is usually called the ‘gradualist approach’. 
Three main reasons why the appropriate sequencing and coordination of reforms 
are important are summarised by the IMF (2012: 317):
Inappropriate sequencing of reforms could cause excessive risk taking 
and financial instability; limited institutional capacity necessarily 
requires some prioritization of reform elements; given the numerous 
policy and operational reforms in each area of financial policy, setting 
priorities could facilitate and encourage the adoption of reforms; hence, 
this aspect of financial sector assessments is important. 
Before this note from the IMF, sequencing of financial reforms had been of less 
concern since the early stages of the post-fixed exchange rate financial and capital 
account liberalisation process (Edwards 1984, 1990; Funke 1993; McKinnon 
1973, 1991; Prasad et al. 2005; Stiglitz 2002). In general, these authors argue 
that eliminating capital restrictions too early can be costly because of the effects 
on the (real) exchange rate and on international competitiveness, and also the 
potential short-term effect of instigating an asset-price boom. More dangerously 
again, the country may be subject to ‘sudden stops’ of capital inflow, and also to 
large-scale capital flight when capital inflows are unexpectedly withdrawn by 
foreign investors (speculators). In such circumstances, the country is forced to 
devalue its currency and can suffer a costly monetary crisis. Such a crisis can also 
spread to other countries and result in a severe international or regional crisis. 
The East Asian currency crisis provides an example that is suggestive of a 
pattern of inappropriate sequencing of capital account liberalisation that 
contributed to both the speed and the severity of the crisis in many countries 
(Edwards 2009; World Bank 2001). Development of adequate institutional 
capacity appears to be an important and necessary precondition for coping 
with capital account liberalisation volatility, and thus for reaping net gains 
from that process (IMF 2012; Obstfeld and Taylor 2004). This thus raises the 
issue of the institutional design and scope of reform strategies for safeguarding 
macroeconomic and financial stability (IMF 2003, 2012). 
This further raises the question of what is the appropriate sequence. McKinnon 
(1993) offers a widely influential argument that reform of the domestic financial 
sector and trade liberalisation should precede liberalisation of the capital 
account. The reason is that in a distorted domestic financial system with interest 
rate regulations and credit controls that lack sufficient supervision, opening 
of the capital account will either lead to capital flight that in turn erodes the 
domestic deposit base or lead to over-borrowing foreign currency, which is 
also risky. 
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In contrast, the ‘interest group theory’, proposed by Rajan and Zingales (2003), 
suggests that trade and capital account openness should instead precede 
domestic financial liberalisation (Hauner and Prati 2008). Their logic relates to 
the fact that in a closed economy, interest groups oppose financial development 
because they benefit from preventing the entrance of new competitors. In this 
way, early trade and capital liberalisation introduce new external competition 
that challenges the rents enjoyed by local interest groups in the closed economy, 
and thus facilitates financial development.
Another body of thought argues for simultaneous reforms—that is, for no 
sequencing at all. There are three points of logic behind these arguments. 
The first is that full liberalisation of the capital account can promote flexibility 
in both the exchange rate and the interest rate, which could in turn support 
capital account reforms (Quirk and Evans 1995). Second, simultaneous reform 
has no reform cost but brings great economic benefit in the absence of market 
distortions and externalities (Choksi and Papageorgiou 1986). Finally, a ‘big-
bang’ reform can avoid the delays brought by interest groups and thus reduce 
the costs of reform.
Capital account liberalisation, sequence and 
crisis: An empirical investigation 
We investigate the effects of financial reform sequencing on the likelihood of 
experiencing financial crisis. Following Edwards (2009), Ghosh et al. (2014) and 
others, we specify the following benchmark variance component panel probit 
model (Equations 10.1 and 10.2).
Equation 10.1
Equation 10.2
In Equations 10.1 and 10.2, Crisisit is a dummy variable that takes the value of 
one if country i in period t experiences a financial crisis (banking, currency 
or debt crisis), and zero otherwise. Whether a country experiences a crisis is 
the result of an unobserved latent variable, Crisisit*, which is a function of the 
degree of capital opening (Kaopenit) and domestic financial system liberalisation, 
and a group of other controlled variables within the vector Xit, including GDP 
per capita (in log term), the annual growth rate of GDP per capita, the inflation 
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rate based on the consumer price index (CPI), the growth rate of the ratio of 
broad money to foreign reserves, the real interest rate, the real exchange rate 
overvaluation, the current account surplus over GDP, financial development 
measured as the ratio of private credit to GDP, and government deficit over GDP. 
Crisis data are sourced from Laeven and Valencia (2013), whose dataset comprises 
all systemic banking, currency and sovereign debt crises during the period 
1970–2011. They define a systemic banking crisis as either significant signs of 
financial distress in the banking system or severe banking policy intervention, 
while currency crisis is defined as a nominal depreciation of the currency via 
the US dollar of at least 30 per cent that is also at least 10 percentage points 
higher than the rate of depreciation in the year before; a sovereign debt crisis 
is defined as sovereign debt default and restructuring. Crisisit takes a value of 
one if at least one of these events happens, and zero otherwise. All controlled 
variables are lagged one year in order to control for potential endogeneity issues 
arising from a reverse causal effect from crisis to the control variables, and thus 
omitting the variable effects. 
The capital account liberalisation indicator used, Kaopenit, is constructed by 
Quinn and Toyoda (2008), and is a standard indicator used in the literature. 
This measures de jure restrictions on cross-border financial transactions based 
on detailed information on restrictions on capital transactions collected by 
AREAER (IMF 2014). The data are constructed around an index range of 0–100, 
where a higher value implies a higher degree of capital account liberalisation. 
We construct our own index of capital account liberalisation by dividing the 
Quinn and Toyoda (2008) indicator by 100 to obtain an index scaled from zero 
to one.
The domestic financial reform indicator, Fin_domesticit, is constructed by 
aggregating domestic financial system reform indicators from the financial 
reform dataset of Abiad et al. (2008). That dataset captures the degree of 
liberalisation in five dimensions: 1) credit controls and reserve requirements; 
2) interest rate controls; 3) entry barriers to the banking industry; 4) state 
ownership of banks; and 5) regulations and supervision of the banking sector. 
Along each dimension, a country was given a score between zero and three, 
with zero corresponding to repression and three indicating full liberalisation. 
For banking system regulation and supervision, the opposite scoring is true. 
These scores were normalised to a range from zero to one. This index is available 
for a sample of 91 countries in the period 1973–2005. 
Since domestic financial reform is a multifaceted phenomenon, we further divide 
domestic financial reforms by three sub-dimensions: banking system reform, 
which includes entry barriers to the banking industry; state ownership of banks 
and regulation and supervision of the banking sector (Fin_bankit); interest rate 
China’s Domestic Transformation in a Global Context
246
control (Fin_interestit) and credit controls (Fin_creditit). Definitions of all the 
variables and their sources are summarised in Table A10.1 in the Appendix, 
while descriptive statistics are reported in Table A10.2.
Baseline empirical results
To examine the impact of domestic financial reform and capital account 
liberalisation on the probability of financial crisis, we start with a baseline 
model covering the entire sample. We run panel data regressions using a random 
effects probit model, the results of which are reported in Table 10.1. 
The significantly positive coefficient of Kaopen and the significantly negative 
coefficient of its cross-term with domestic financial reform in column (1) 
indicate that capital opening (Kaopen) increases the likelihood of experiencing 
a crisis, while domestic financial system reform facilitates in reducing the crisis-
inducing effect of capital account opening.
For the three types of financial crisis, the results are mostly consistent: the 
coefficient of Kaopen is positive and significant, except in the case of currency 
crisis; and the coefficient on the cross-term with domestic financial reform is 
significant and negative. Moreover, the coefficients are very stable, varying 
from 1.32 to 1.61 for Kaopen and –1.68 to –1.89 for the cross-term. This means 
a 1 per cent increase in capital opening is associated with an increase in the 
propensity of experiencing a crisis by 1.4 per cent, while a 1 per cent increase 
in domestic financial reform is associated with a 1.7 per cent increase in crisis 
propensity. Therefore, a more open domestic financial system helps buffer an 
economy from financial risks caused by capital account opening. The influence 
of other variables is as predicted.
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Table 10.1 Marginal effects and predicted probabilities of financial crisis: The role 
of capital account opening and domestic financial reform
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables Crisis Banking crisis Currency crisis Sovereign debt crisis
Kaopen 1.6143** 1.4802** 1.3246 1.4275**
(0.6269) (0.7137) (0.8767) (0.7085)
Kaopen*Fin_domestic –1.8841*** –1.8197*** –1.6881** –1.7650***
(0.5745) (0.6457) (0.8288) (0.6420)
Fixed EXR –0.6132 –0.0733 –1.1383* –0.0786
(0.4152) (0.4549) (0.6711) (0.4508)
Intermediate EXR –0.0042 0.0276 0.0323 0.0111
(0.2974) (0.3497) (0.4559) (0.3475)
GGDP –2.6722 1.6215 –6.2185** 1.5592
(2.1325) (2.6016) (2.7526) (2.6023)
Log(GDP) –0.2202 –0.1259 –0.2200* –0.1214
(0.0823) (0.0984) (0.1131) (0.0981)
Inflation 0.1674 0.2051 0.1561 0.1926
(0.1738) (0.2198) (0.2176) (0.2206)
M2_reserve 0.3974** 0.1170 0.7054*** 0.1040
(0.1734) (0.2336) (0.2206) (0.2196)
Real interest 0.4298 1.9737** –0.6393 1.8595*
(0.8549) (0.9891) (1.2086) (0.9821)
Real exchange rate 
overvaluation
0.0114** 0.0072 0.0151*** 0.0067
(0.0046) (0.0064) (0.0054) (0.0065)
Current account surplus
(% of GDP)
–2.4192 –2.4621 –2.4595 –2.2879
(1.8413) (2.0962) (2.7738) (2.0847)
Financial development 0.0047* 0.0048 0.0029 0.0044
(0.0028) (0.0033) (0.0043) (0.0032)
Predicted probabilities 5.20% 3.41% 2.56% 3.25%
Observations 890 890 890 890
No. of countries 50 50 50 50




Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. 
Source: Authors’ estimations.
To analyse the influence of the specific domestic financial reforms on the 
consequences of capital account opening, we separately examine the three areas 
of domestic financial reform—namely, domestic banking sector reform, interest 
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rate liberalisation and credit reform (Tables 10.2–10.4). We find similar results 
in Table 10.2, as domestic banking sector reforms are associated with reduced 
capital account opening crisis risks, for each type of financial crisis. Specifically, 
a 1 per cent increase in capital opening is associated with an increase in the 
propensity of experiencing a crisis by about 1 per cent, while a 1 per cent 
increase in domestic financial reform is associated with a decrease in crisis risk 
of some 1.4 per cent. The effects of other controlling variables still hold. 
The results suggest that banking system reform—which mainly refers to 
reducing entry barriers to the banking sector, allowing greater development of 
private banks—and strengthening regulation and supervision of the banking 
sector play an important role in mitigating the financial risks of capital account 
opening. This is possibly because greater supervision and competition increase 
the risk-management capacities of the domestic banking sector and thus increase 
domestic market resilience in the face of external economic and financial shocks 
that could trigger capital outflows on the level of a financial crisis.
Table 10.2 Marginal effects and predicted probabilities of financial crisis: The role 
of capital account opening and banking sector reform
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables Crisis Banking crisis Currency crisis Sovereign debt crisis
Kaopen 1.1356** 1.0073* 0.8902 0.9702*
(0.5119) (0.5815) (0.7166) (0.5779)
Kaopen_bank –1.5203*** –1.4754*** –1.3338** –1.4341***
(0.4640) (0.5242) (0.6711) (0.5215)
Fixed EXR –0.5585 –0.0232 –1.0806 –0.0278
(0.4096) (0.4514) (0.6577) (0.4474)
Intermediate EXR –0.0241 0.0089 0.0121 –0.0058
(0.2950) (0.3478) (0.4481) (0.3459)
GGDP –2.8479 1.4437 –6.4181** 1.4010
(2.1270) (2.6105) (2.7475) (2.6082)
Log(GDP) –0.2193*** –0.1250 –0.2157* –0.1209
(0.0828) (0.0992) (0.1135) (0.0990)
Inflation 0.1390 0.1742 0.1322 0.1629
(0.1779) (0.2286) (0.2204) (0.2290)
M2_reserve 0.3933** 0.1090 0.7011*** 0.0954
(0.1731) (0.2341) (0.2197) (0.2200)
Real interest 0.2173 1.7482* –0.8488 1.6421*
(0.8578) (0.9877) (1.2170) (0.9806)
Real exchange rate 
overvaluation
0.0113** 0.0074 0.0150*** 0.0069
(0.0046) (0.0063) (0.0055) (0.0063)
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables Crisis Banking crisis Currency crisis Sovereign debt crisis
Current account surplus
(% of GDP)
–2.4341 –2.4079 –2.6362 –2.2437
(1.8323) (2.0850) (2.7740) (2.0744)
Financial development 0.0043 0.0044 0.0025 0.0040
(0.0028) (0.0032) (0.0042) (0.0032)
Predicted probabilities 5.19% 3.40% 2.57% 3.25%
Observations 817 795 803 813
No. of countries 50 50 50 50




Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. 
Source: Authors’ estimations.
For the other two dimensions of domestic financial reform, we find that while 
credit reform is associated with decreasing the crisis risks of capital account 
opening (Table 10.3), interest rate liberalisation unexpectedly has a positive but 
insignificant effect (Table 10.4). Eliminating credit controls meanwhile facilitates 
capital allocation efficiency and removes distortions in the domestic financial 
system—a result supported by (McKinnon 1991). 
Table 10.3 Marginal effects and predicted probabilities of financial crisis: The role 
of capital account opening and credit distribution
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables Crisis Banking crisis Currency crisis Sovereign debt crisis
Kaopen 0.5847 0.4140 0.5201 0.3961
(0.4722) (0.5526) (0.6279) (0.5529)
Kaopen_credit –0.7845** –0.6642 –0.8760* –0.6363
(0.3696) (0.4285) (0.5138) (0.4274)
Fixed EXR –0.4757 –0.0067 –0.9618 –0.0107
(0.3934) (0.4309) (0.6401) (0.4273)
Intermediate EXR –0.0335 –0.0119 –0.0022 –0.0245
(0.2919) (0.3407) (0.4498) (0.3392)
GGDP –2.8711 1.3334 –6.3950** 1.2590
(2.1179) (2.5673) (2.7565) (2.5684)
Log(GDP) –0.1827** –0.0946 –0.1820* –0.0927
(0.0799) (0.0956) (0.1091) (0.0954)
Inflation 0.2078 0.2504 0.1803 0.2358
(0.1649) (0.1994) (0.2116) (0.1998)
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables Crisis Banking crisis Currency crisis Sovereign debt crisis
M2_reserve 0.4102** 0.1480 0.7017*** 0.1266
(0.1714) (0.2281) (0.2165) (0.2138)
Real interest 0.7513 2.2359** –0.3327 2.1078**
(0.8536) (0.9949) (1.2073) (0.9873)
Real exchange rate 
overvaluation
0.0111** 0.0067 0.0147*** 0.0063
(0.0046) (0.0065) (0.0054) (0.0065)
Current account surplus
(% of GDP)
–2.5391 –2.6568 –2.4772 –2.4821
(1.7814) (2.0272) (2.7011) (2.0148)
Financial development 0.0034 0.0034 0.0021 0.0030
(0.0027) (0.0032) (0.0042) (0.0031)
Predicted probabilities 5.21% 3.41% 2.57% 3.26%
Observations 817 795 803 813
No. of countries 50 50 50 50




Note: Standard errors are in parentheses.  
Source: Authors’ estimations.
Table 10.4 Marginal effects and predicted probabilities of financial crisis: The role 
of capital account opening and interest rate liberalisation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables Crisis Banking crisis Currency crisis Sovereign debt crisis
Kaopen 0.0617 0.2639 –0.3028 0.2702
(0.7140) (0.7766) (1.0331) (0.7752)
Kaopen_int –0.1202 –0.3835 0.1529 –0.3847
(0.5540) (0.5875) (0.8283) (0.5864)
Fixed EXR –0.4989 –0.0953 –0.8611 –0.0942
(0.3947) (0.4321) (0.6324) (0.4298)
Intermediate EXR –0.0087 0.0090 0.0420 0.0003
(0.2856) (0.3334) (0.4349) (0.3325)
GGDP –2.9846 1.2262 –6.5579** 1.1574
(2.0975) (2.5474) (2.7354) (2.5490)
Log(GDP) –0.1959** –0.1116 –0.1886* –0.1095
(0.0802) (0.0959) (0.1098) (0.0957)
Inflation 0.1972 0.2401 0.1615 0.2271
(0.1614) (0.1928) (0.2043) (0.1930)
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables Crisis Banking crisis Currency crisis Sovereign debt crisis
M2_reserve 0.4096** 0.1553 0.6873*** 0.1331
(0.1697) (0.2247) (0.2123) (0.2111)
Real interest 0.5988 2.0538** –0.5212 1.9387**
(0.8407) (0.9776) (1.1824) (0.9698)
Real exchange rate 
overvaluation
0.0105** 0.0060 0.0141*** 0.0056
(0.0046) (0.0063) (0.0054) (0.0063)
Current account surplus
(% of GDP)
–2.6725 –2.6763 –2.8106 –2.5335
(1.7495) (2.0008) (2.6414) (1.9927)
Financial development 0.0025 0.0028 0.0004 0.0025
(0.0027) (0.0031) (0.0041) (0.0031)
Predicted probabilities 5.19% 3.39% 2.56% 3.25%
Observations 817 795 803 813
No. of countries 50 50 50 50




Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. 
Source: Authors’ estimations.
Evaluation of the early warning system
We test the predictive power of our empirical model following the methods 
of the early warning system literature (Qin and Luo 2014). To identify 
risks of a financial crisis, we first need to set a parameter threshold so that 
the model can signal when the estimated probability of a crisis exceeds that 
threshold. Typically, the in-sample crisis probability is chosen as the threshold. 
The  in-sample probabilities of financial crisis, banking crisis, currency crisis 
and sovereign debt crisis are 5.14 per cent, 3.27 per cent, 2.49 per cent and 
3.63 per cent, respectively, as shown in Table 10.5. 
The model has correctly signalled a crisis for 82 per cent of financial crises, 
81 per cent of banking crises, 95 per cent of currency crises and 78 per cent 
of sovereign debt crises, and in the same order has successfully predicted non-
crisis for 76 per cent, 77 per cent, 58 per cent and 77 per cent, respectively. The 
Type  I error—that is, the probability of incorrect rejection of financial crisis 
when crisis actually occurs—is between 5 per cent and 22 per cent, while that 
of a Type II error (failure to reject a financial crisis when crisis does occur) 
is between 23 per cent and 42 per cent. Generally speaking, the predictive power 
of our model is good, especially for the currency crisis model that predicted 
correctly 95 per cent of the time. 
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Table 10.5 Performance of the early warning system
Crisis Banking crisis Currency crisis Sovereign debt crisis
Threshold 5.14% 3.27% 2.49% 3.63%
(a) No crisis occurs
(i) No signal 633 621 458 617
(ii) Signal 142 148 325 170
(b) Crisis occurs
(i) No signal 10 6 1 6
(ii) Signal 32 20 19 20
Statistics
(1) The percentage of correct 
classification
76 77 59 77
(2) The proportion of signals 
conditional on crises occurring
82 81 95 78
(3) Type I error 18 19 5 22
(4) Type II error 24 23 42 23
Source: Authors’ summary.
Robustness check
Our baseline results could be subject to statistical error, which affects the 
reliability of the findings. 
To understand these risks, we conduct some robustness checks. First, we 
substitute the indicator for capital account liberalisation with the one 
constructed by Abiad et al. (2008) (Kaopen2) for the index constructed by 
Quinn and Toyoda (2008) to reduce the risk of measurement error. The results 
are reported in Table 10.6. The results are similar to the benchmark model, in 
which the coefficient on capital account opening is positive and significant, and 
its cross-term with domestic financial liberalisation is negative and significant. 
This reconfirms the earlier result that indicates greater reform of the domestic 
financial system serves to decrease the crisis risks attached to capital account 
opening. We also check the influence of different types of domestic financial 
reforms, and find that banking system reform appears to be important in its 
association with reducing the harmful risks of capital account opening—
confirming the results of the basic model. 
The second robustness check is to add more control variables to the baseline 
model. In this case, we focus on the government deficit.3 Results of this new 
model, presented in Table 10.7, show that financial reform is associated with 
3  This is not included in the basic model because this variable greatly reduces our final sample.
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different outcomes of capital account liberalisation, except that in the case of 
the currency crisis that association is not significant. Therefore, we believe our 
basic model is robust.
Table 10.6 Robustness check: Alternative indicators
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables Crisis Banking crisis Currency crisis Sovereign debt crisis
Kaopen2 0.3613** 0.3543* 0.3134 0.3302
(0.1791) (0.2065) (0.2446) (0.2056)
Kaopen2_domestic –1.6786*** –1.7735** –1.4610* –1.7154**
(0.6025) (0.6894) (0.8596) (0.6887)
Fixed EXR –0.4949 0.0212 –1.0102 0.0038
(0.4062) (0.4600) (0.6400) (0.4562)
Intermediate EXR 0.0116 0.0621 0.0343 0.0371
(0.2987) (0.3615) (0.4493) (0.3581)
GGDP –2.8160 1.2572 –6.2683** 1.1852
(2.1244) (2.5853) (2.7557) (2.5815)
Log(GDP) –0.1668** –0.0731 –0.1869* –0.0670
(0.0755) (0.0893) (0.1058) (0.0888)
Inflation 0.1808 0.2117 0.1573 0.1988
(0.1648) (0.2085) (0.2066) (0.2095)
M2_reserve 0.3913** 0.1093 0.6866*** 0.0936
(0.1736) (0.2363) (0.2187) (0.2216)
Real interest 0.5818 2.0562** –0.5710 1.9475**
(0.7869) (0.9120) (1.0913) (0.9040)
Real exchange rate 
overvaluation
0.0110** 0.0065 0.0145*** 0.0060
(0.0046) (0.0065) (0.0053) (0.0065)
Current account surplus
(% of GDP)
–2.5654 –2.6430 –2.6088 –2.4709
(1.8175) (2.0860) (2.7121) (2.0766)
Financial development 0.0033 0.0037 0.0018 0.0034
(0.0027) (0.0032) (0.0041) (0.0031)
Predicted probabilities 5.19% 3.40% 2.55% 3.25%
Observations 817 795 803 813
No. of countries 50 50 50 50




Note: Standard errors are in parentheses.  
Source: Authors’ estimations.
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Table 10.7 Robustness check: Alternative control variables and samples
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables Crisis Banking crisis Currency crisis Sovereign debt crisis
Kaopen 5.5497* 7.2340* 78.9570 7.1280*
(2.9560) (4.2125) (0.0000) (4.2784)
Kaopen_domestic –7.0235** –8.7139** –77.5441 –8.4916**
(2.7593) (3.9870) (0.0000) (4.0445)
Fixed EXR 2.5600 2.6641 –77.8428 2.7100
(461.3604) (624.5154) (0.0000) (732.6701)
Intermediate EXR 3.5700 3.6512 –17.3689 3.6532
(461.3589) (624.5133) (0.0000) (732.6683)
GGDP –4.3000 –6.4972 –183.6347 –6.8148
(8.0252) (9.4391) (0.0000) (9.3527)
Log(GDP) 0.1214 0.1800 –6.6217 0.2203
(0.3811) (0.4933) (0.0000) (0.4926)
Inflation –0.0475 –0.1484 –45.8003 –0.1721
(0.4666) (0.4530) (0.0000) (0.4645)
M2_reserve 0.1466 –2.4797* 21.6464 –2.6337*
(0.3573) (1.3089) (0.0000) (1.3714)
Real interest –1.1628 –0.5035 29.2760 –0.5415
(2.5250) (2.8508) (0.0000) (2.8854)
Real exchange rate 
overvaluation
0.0379 0.0263 3.8286 0.0258
(0.0346) (0.0425) (0.0000) (0.0430)
Current account surplus
(% of GDP)
–12.3877 –16.5165 88.5961 –16.7613
(7.5535) (11.7872) (0.0000) (12.1869)
Financial development 0.0073 0.0111 0.1996 0.0077
(0.0081) (0.0113) (0.0000) (0.0102)
Gov_deficit –0.0644 –0.0758 0.6441 –0.0828
(0.0677) (0.0798) (0.0000) (0.0811)
Predicted probabilities 1.50% 2.54% 1.64% 1.58%
Observations 315 311 312 314
No. of countries 45 45 45 45




Note: Standard errors are in parentheses.  
Source: Authors’ estimations.
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Four scenarios for China by 2020: Probability of 
financial crisis under different reform sequences
Figure 10.2 China’s financial reform: Cross-country comparison
Sources: Abiad et al. (2008); and authors’ calculations.
China’s financial system is relatively repressed in several dimensions, even when 
compared with low-income economies, as shown in Figure 10.2. The degree of 
capital account opening and domestic financial system liberalisation, including 
the banking system, interest rate formation and credit allocation, is low. 
China is on track to speed up implementation of market-oriented reforms in 
the financial system, both internally and externally. It is therefore important 
to understand whether the sequence of domestic financial reforms and capital 
account opening is important. To more specifically draw policy implications for 
China, we analyse a multi-country dataset to investigate how the sequence of 
financial reform affects financial risk.
Based on our empirical model and results, we also predict the probabilities of 
financial crisis under different scenarios of reform sequencing. 
In the first instance, we explore the different sequences of domestic financial 
reforms as a whole and with capital account opening. We assume four related 
scenarios as follows:
• Scenario one assumes that capital account opening precedes liberalisation 
of the domestic financial system, and also that the capital account is opened 
in a single period following a big-bang pattern. Specifically, we assume 
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China fully liberalises the capital account to the average level of high-income 
economies in 2015 while domestic financial reform retains its present status.
• Scenario two assumes that capital account opening precedes liberalisation 
of the domestic financial system but capital account opening takes place 
gradually. Specifically, we assume that China gradually liberalises the capital 
account to the average current opening level of high-income economies by 
2020 while putting domestic financial reforms on hold. 
• Scenario three assumes that China gradually and concurrently liberalises 
the capital account and the domestic financial system to the current average 
opening level of high-income economies by 2020.
• Scenario four assumes that China liberalises its domestic financial system 
before achieving full capital account opening. Specifically, we assume that 
China gradually liberalises the domestic financial sector to the current 
average opening level of high-income economies by 2017, while gradually 
liberalising its capital account to the current average opening level of high-
income economies by 2020.
The assumptions of all the other variables used in the perdition model are 
described in Appendix Table A10.3. Table 10.8 reports the predicted probabilities 
of experiencing a financial crisis in the years 2015–20 under the four scenarios. 
In our empirical model, the probability of crisis is regressed on lagged capital 
account opening and domestic financial reform variables—that is, reform in 
2015 affects the crisis propensity in 2016, and so on. 
Table 10.8 Scenario analysis: Sequence and speed of domestic financial reform 
and capital account opening—Percentage chance of experiencing crisis
Type of crisis 2015 2016 2018 2020 2016–20 average
Scenario 1: Big-bang reform of capital accounts in 2015 without domestic financial system reform
Crisis 9 14 14 14 14
Banking crisis 8 11 11 11 11
Currency crisis 27 3 3 3 3
Sovereign debt crisis 7 10 10 10 10
Scenario 2: Gradual reform of capital accounts until 2020 without domestic financial system reform
Crisis 9 10 12 14 12
Banking crisis 8 8 9 10 9
Currency crisis 2 2 3 3 3
Sovereign debt crisis 7 7 8 9 8
Scenario 3: Gradual reforms of both capital account and domestic financial system until 2020
Crisis 9 9 8 6 7
Banking crisis 8 7 6 4 6
Currency crisis 2 2 2 1 1
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Type of crisis 2015 2016 2018 2020 2016–20 average
Sovereign debt crisis 7 7 5 4 5
Scenario 4: Gradual reform of capital account until 2020 and gradual reform of domestic financial system 
until 2017 (achieving full liberalisation of domestic financial system earlier than of capital account)
Crisis 9 7 5 5 6
Banking crisis 8 6 4 3 4
Currency crisis 2 2 1 1 1
Sovereign debt crisis 7 6 3 3 4
Source: Authors’ summary.
Under scenario one, when a big-bang opening of the capital account takes 
place without additional reforms to the domestic financial system, the model 
predicts a big jump in the likelihood of China experiencing a financial crisis 
in 2015–16. The likelihood rises further—to 14 per cent—by 2020. Applying 
the same reform assumptions to each type of crisis delivers similar predictions. 
China is somewhat likely to experience a banking crisis and a sovereign debt 
crisis during 2016–20, with an average probability of 11 per cent and 10 per cent, 
respectively. Following the sequencing assumptions of scenario one would be 
relatively risky for China.
The model predicts smaller probabilities of experiencing each type of financial 
crisis under scenario two than under scenario one. The difference lies in the much 
more gradual capital account liberalisation for China, though the difference does 
not eliminate the probability of China experiencing a crisis. In scenario two, the 
likelihood of China experiencing a financial crisis is 12 per cent, on average, 
in 2016–20. Moreover, there is lower likelihood under these assumptions that 
China will experience a banking and sovereign debt crisis.
The picture changes dramatically under scenario three and scenario four. 
When China reforms its domestic financial system at least as soon as it reforms 
the capital account, the probability of crisis falls significantly. Compared with 
scenario two, China is assumed to gradually liberalise its domestic financial 
system concurrently with a gradual liberalisation of the capital account from 
2015 to 2020. Reform of the domestic financial system appears to serve as a 
buffer against the risk of shocks, which then leads the likelihood of crisis to fall 
annually, and reach less than 6 per cent by 2020. China similarly faces a smaller 
likelihood of experiencing each type of crisis under scenario three. 
Under scenario four, China realises full liberalisation of the domestic financial 
system in 2017, ahead of realising full liberalisation of the capital account, 
which happens in 2020. The model predicts that crisis probability falls to an 
average of 6 per cent. The likelihood of experiencing each type of crisis also 
decreases. In other words, a more liberalised domestic financial system, with 
China’s Domestic Transformation in a Global Context
258
a more competitive banking system, more liberalised interest rates and a more 
market-oriented credit allocation mechanism, serves to increase the overall 
stability of China’s financial system.
Trends among the predicted probabilities of experiencing different types of 
financial crises are depicted in Figure 10.3. This shows clearly that from scenario 
one to scenario four, the probabilities decrease by year for each type of crisis 
from 2016. This offers striking evidence that gradual liberalisation in China’s 
case would be safer than a big-bang reform of the capital account (see the 
difference between scenario two and one), and also that advanced or concurrent 
domestic financial system liberalisation would serve to buffer against capital 
account opening shocks and similarly to reduce related crisis probabilities 
(the difference between scenarios two and three). This is more clearly so where 
full domestic liberalisation is achieved in advance of capital account opening 
(the difference between scenarios three and four).
Figure 10.3 Scenario analysis: Domestic financial reform and capital account 
opening 
Notes: Scenario one assumes big-bang reform of the capital account in 2015 without domestic 
financial system reform; scenario two assumes gradual reform of the capital account until 2020 without 
domestic financial system reform; scenario three assumes gradual reform of both the capital account 
and the domestic financial system until 2020; scenario four assumes gradual reform of the capital 
account until 2020 and gradual reform of the domestic financial system until 2017, which means China 
achieves full liberalisation of the domestic financial system earlier than of the capital account. 
Source: Authors’ summary.
Capital Account Liberalisation in China
259
We further examine the effects of different sequences and speeds for banking 
system reform and capital account opening. As before, we assume four 
scenarios and predict crisis probabilities. The only difference is that here we 
substitute reform of the whole domestic financial system for domestic banking 
sector reform. The predicted probabilities under four scenarios are depicted in 
Figure 10.4. 
Figure 10.4 shows a similar pattern: from scenario one to scenario four, crisis 
probabilities become lower and lower. This again supports two propositions. 
First, gradual liberalisation is much safer than big-bang reform in capital account 
opening. Second, domestic banking system reform is important in reducing the 
financial risks of further capital account liberalisation.
Figure 10.4 Scenario analysis: Banking system reform and capital account 
opening
Notes: Scenario one assumes big-bang reform of the capital account in 2015 without domestic 
banking system reform; scenario two assumes gradual reform of the capital account until 2020 without 
domestic banking system reform; scenario three assumes gradual reform of both the capital account 
and the domestic banking system until 2020; scenario four assumes gradual reform of the capital 
account until 2020 and gradual reform of the domestic banking system until 2017, which means China 
achieves full liberalisation of the domestic banking system earlier than of the capital account. 
Source: Authors’ summary.
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Finally, we predict probabilities of crisis under similar scenarios for different 
sequences of credit allocation reform and capital account opening. The results 
are shown in Figure 10.5. Although the difference of the predicted crisis 
probabilities is smaller between different scenarios, scenarios three and four 
are still much safer policy paths than scenarios one and two. Therefore, gradual 
reform of the capital account and earlier domestic financial reform are important. 
Figure 10.5 Scenario analysis: Credit allocation reform and capital account 
opening
Notes: Scenario one assumes big-bang reform of the capital account in 2015 without domestic credit 
allocation system reform; scenario two assumes gradual reform of the capital account until 2020 
without domestic credit allocation system reform; scenario three assumes gradual reforms of both the 
capital account and the domestic credit allocation system until 2020; scenario four assumes gradual 
reform of the capital account until 2020 and gradual reform of the domestic credit allocation system 
until 2017, which means China achieves full liberalisation of the domestic credit allocation system 
earlier than of the capital account. 
Source: Authors’ summary.
In summary, the results suggest that the financial risks that China could suffer 
during the process of financial reform would be lower if China were to implement 
domestic financial system reform before capital account liberalisation, and also 
to achieve capital account liberalisation gradually. Among domestic financial 
system reforms, banking system reform appears to be especially important. 
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This refers to lowering banking market entry barriers, improving the equality 
of access to private capital, and strengthening the regulation and supervision 
of banks.
Conclusion
Within the financial liberalisation sequencing literature there are different schools 
of thought. In one, economists believe that the opening of the capital account 
should be the last step of economic liberalisation in transitional economies so 
as to avoid risks of financial instability—that is, policy sequencing should be 
used in the process of financial reform, meaning that domestic financial reform 
can be pursued in advance of full removal of capital controls. This relates to 
the fact that premature liberalisation of the capital account can invite excessive 
capital inflows that ultimately produce a boom–bust cycle in economies where 
the domestic financial sector is sufficiently distorted and constrained, or simply 
underdeveloped.
Another school of thought argues that trade reforms and capital account 
liberalisation should precede the entire process of economic reform because 
foreign competition and related spillovers reduce the resistance of interest 
groups that stand against domestic financial and other internal economic 
reforms. Finally, one group of economists believes that no sequence at all 
should be followed—that is, emerging market economies can undertake all 
reforms, domestic and external, simultaneously. This is because this dramatic 
reform strategy removes all market distortions in a single shot and therefore 
significantly reduces the costs associated with reforms and allows the benefits 
of reform to come earlier.  
Using a cross-country panel dataset of 50 economies during the period 1973–
2005, our empirical study identified substantial effects of the sequencing of 
financial reforms on the likelihood of an economy experiencing a financial crisis. 
Specifically, the liberalisation of the capital account can increase the likelihood 
of experiencing a crisis, while domestic financial system reforms reduce the 
risks of a crisis resulting from the potential volatility of an open capital account. 
Specifically, reform of the domestic banking sector and removal of credit controls 
tend to have a substantial impact on the mitigation of financial risks induced by 
capital account opening, while the impact of interest rate liberalisation remains 
unclear. 
After three decades of economic transition that have left the financial sector 
comparatively untouched, China has pledged to deepen its financial sector 
reforms. At the Third Plenary meeting of the Eighteenth National Congress 
of the Chinese Communist Party in November 2013, a comprehensive plan for 
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these reforms was announced, to take place from now until 2020. Among these 
reforms, financial sector liberalisation is obviously one of the more significant. 
Related policy areas include lowering market entrance to the banking sector, 
interest rate liberalisation, capital market development, establishment of a 
deposit insurance system, improvement of financial regulation, increased 
exchange rate flexibility and capital account convertibility. It is widely believed 
that success in financial sector reform is of great importance to China’s structural 
adjustment and long-term economic development.
To reduce the associated risks and increase the chance of success of China’s 
financial reforms, the right policy sequence is crucial. Our scenario analysis 
suggests that if China fully liberalises its capital account using a big-bang 
model in 2015 in the absence of sufficient domestic financial sector reform, 
especially reform of the banking sector, there is about a 14 per cent probability 
of experiencing a financial crisis during 2016–20. The likelihood falls to 
12 per cent if China gradually liberalises its capital account, without domestic 
financial reforms. And, finally, gradual reform of the capital account combined 
with advanced completion of domestic financial reforms reduces the predicted 
probability of crisis—to 6 per cent during 2016–20 in our model. 
Although there has been a strong push to fully liberalise the capital account, this 
study suggests that acceleration of domestic financial reforms is a more urgent 
task. Among others, state-owned banking reforms, interest rate liberalisation, 
together with building up a deposit insurance system and enhancing the role 
of capital markets, should be policy priorities. To maintain the independence of 
monetary policy and to mitigate currency speculation under a more open capital 
account, a significant increase in the flexibility of the renminbi exchange rate 
is also imperative.
A contrasting argument—one in favour of accelerating capital account 
liberalisation—is that it will benefit the process of renminbi internationalisation, 
and that this is good for building a new international monetary system as well 
as for China (Zhang and Tao 2015). It is true that a more open capital account is 
necessary for the internationalisation of the renminbi, particularly where the 
renminbi will serve as an international reserve currency. It is not necessarily the 
case, however, that there will be no progress on renminbi internationalisation 
until China has fully liberalised its capital account. The rapid development 
of the Hong Kong offshore renminbi market in recent years has shown that 
renminbi internationalisation can progress even where China retains selective 
capital controls. In fact, the euro dollar market in the 1950s and 1960s provides 
an interesting historical precedent for such a process. In that case, the US dollar 
became much more influential as an invoice and settlement currency through 
the offshore market, while the US domestic financial market retained many 
restrictions, including controls on cross-border capital movement.
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Prudent strategy in capital account liberalisation is advised not only on the basis 
of this chapter’s risk assessments, but also in the context of China’s less stable 
macroeconomic situation. Risks include rapid increases in local government 
debt, a fragile shadow banking system and continuous cooling of the real estate 
market. Moreover, fake invoicing of cross-border trade transactions and fictional 
outward service payments have combined to allow capital flight in the past year 
or so. In the context of these potentially unstable macroeconomic and financial 
circumstances, the findings of this study suggest that rapid and full removal of 
capital controls could induce serious challenges to China’s financial stability in 
the short run. Research towards better understanding the effects of financial 
policy sequencing on the soundness of financial opening, especially in the case 
of a large economy like China’s, is required urgently.
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Appendix
Table A10.1 Variables definition and data sources
Variable Definition Source
Crisis Dummy variable taking a value of one if at least one of 
systemic banking, currency or sovereign debt crisis arises, 
and zero otherwise
Laeven and Valencia 
(2013)
Banking crisis A systemic banking crisis is defined as either a significant 
sign of financial distress in the banking system or a 
severe banking policy intervention. A dummy variable is 
equal to one where any of these arise, and zero otherwise
Laeven and Valencia 
(2013)
Currency crisis A currency crisis is defined as a nominal depreciation of 
the currency against the US dollar of at least 30 per cent 
that is also at least 10 percentage points higher than 
the rate of depreciation in the preceding year. A dummy 
variable is equal to one in these cases, and zero otherwise




A sovereign debt crisis is defined as a sovereign debt 
default and where there is a need for sovereign debt 
restructuring. A dummy variable is equal to one in these 
cases, and zero otherwise
Laeven and Valencia 
(2013)
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Variable Definition Source
Kaopen Measures the degree of liberalisation of the capital 
account
Quinn and Toyoda 
(2008)
Kaopen2 A measure of the degree of liberalisation of the capital 
account
Abiad et al. (2008)
Fin_domestic Captures domestic financial reform along five different 
dimensions: credit controls and reserve requirements, 
interest rate controls, entry barriers, state ownership, and 
banking regulations 
Abiad et al. (2008)
Fin_bank A measure of banking system reform, including entry 
barriers to the banking sector, state ownership of banks 
and regulations, and supervision of the banking sector
Abiad et al. (2008)
Fin_interest A measure of the liberalisation of the interest rate Abiad et al. (2008)
Fin_credit A measure of the liberalisation of credit allocation Abiad et al. (2008)
Fixed EXR A dummy variable equal to one in cases of a fixed 
exchange rate regime, defined to include classification 
of 1) no separate legal tender; and 2) a pre-announced 
peg or currency board arrangement, and equal to zero 
otherwise
Ilzetzki et al. (2011)
Intermediate 
EXR
A dummy variable indicating an intermediate exchange 
rate regime, defined to include classification of 3, pre-
announced horizontal band ≤ +/–2%; 4, de facto peg; 5, 
pre-announced crawling peg; 6, pre-announced crawling 
band ≤ +/–2%; 7, de facto crawling peg; 8, de facto 
crawling band ≤ +/–2%; 9, pre-announced crawling band 
≥ +/–2%; 10, de facto crawling band ≤ +/–5%; 11, 
moving band ≤ +/–2%; and 12, managed floating
Ilzetzki et al. (2011)
Float EXR Dummy variable indicating a floating exchange rate 
regime. It includes classification of 13, freely floating
Ilzetzki et al. (2011)
GGDP Growth rate of real GDP per capita (purchasing power 
parity)
World Bank (2014) 
LogGDPP Log term of real GDP per capita (purchasing power parity) World Bank (2014)
Inflation Inflation rate as measured by the consumer price index World Bank (2014)
M2_reserve M2/reserve World Bank (2014)
Real interest Real interest rate World Bank (2014)
Real exchange 
rate overvaluation
Deviation of real effective exchange rate from trend 




The surplus of current account/GDP World Bank (2014)
Financial 
development
Private credit/GDP World Bank (2014)
Gov_deficit Government fiscal deficit/GDP World Bank (2014)
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Table A10.2 Statistical description of variables
Variable Obs Mean Median Std dev. Min. Max.
Crisis 820 0.05 0 0.21 0 1
Banking crisis 796 0.03 0 0.17 0 1
Currency crisis 800 0.02 0 0.14 0 1
Sovereign debt crisis 816 0.03 0 0.17 0 1
Kaopen 820 0.74 0 0.27 0.125 1
Kaopen2 820 0.74 1 0.35 0 3
Fin_domestic 820 0.66 0.73 0.26 0 1
Fin_bank 820 0.59 0.67 0.29 0 1
Fin_interest 820 0.82 1 0.34 0 3
Fin_credit 820 0.69 0.67 0.32 0 3
Fixed EXR 820 0.14 0 0.34 0 1
Intermediate EXR 820 0.74 1 0.44 0 1
GGDP 820 0.02 0.02 0.04 –0.15 0.30 
LogGDPP 820 8.69 9.31 1.48 5.13 10.61 
Inflation 820 0.09 0.05 0.39 –0.03 10.58 
M2_reserve 820 0.06 0.01 0.38 –0.94 3.58 
Real interest 820 0.07 0.06 0.10 –0.71 0.94
Real exchange rate 
overvaluation
820 –8.94 –0.06 102.71 –1,678.56 153.44 
Current account 
surplus
820 –0.01 –0.01 0.06 –0.18 0.33 
Financial development 816 58.05 49.48 40.61 2.21 196.48 
Gov_deficit 286 0.42 0.41 4.60 –15.79 11.26 
Note: The definition and data source of each variable correspond with those described in Table A10.1.
Table A10.3 Assumptions for projecting financial crisis
Variable Assumption
Kaopen The index from Quinn and Toyoda (2008) is updated only until 2011. According 
to the IMF’s AREAER (IMF 2014), China has only had one major policy change 
in the capital account transactions from 2012 to 2014, which was the relaxing 
of controls on derivatives and other instruments. Using this as a reference, we 
augment the Quinn and Toyoda (2008) database for 2011–14, via a marginal 
increase in China’s capital account opening score, from 0.5 in 2011 to 0.55 in 
2014. From 2015 to 2020, this is assumed to follow each of four scenarios, 
which are described in detail in section four
Fin_bank The index from Abiad et al. (2008) is updated only up to 2005. We update 
the series, including an adjustment to the banking sector-controlling index 
proportionally to reflect the large state-owned banks’ market share of 
loans from 2005 to 2014, as sourced from the China Banking Regulatory 
Commission. From 2015 to 2020, this is assumed to follow each of four 
scenarios, which are described in detail in section four
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Variable Assumption
Fin_interest The index from Abiad et al. (2008) is updated only to 2005. We adjust 
the interest rate liberalisation index to 2.25 in 2014 from 2.0 in 2005—an 
augmentation that reflects the expansive floating range of the interest rate in 
2012 and the removal of the floor on the baseline loan rate in 2013
Fin_credit The index from Abiad et al. (2008) is updated only to 2005. We adjust the 
credit liberalisation index to 2.5 in 2014 from 2.25 in 2005. From 2015 to 
2020, this is assumed to follow each of four scenarios, which are described in 
detail in section four
Fin_domestic We update the index based on the updated index of banking, interest rate and 
credit controls to 2014. From 2015 to 2020, this is assumed to follow each of 
four scenarios, which are described in detail in section four
Intermediate EXR We assume China maintains its current exchange rate regime until 2020
GGDP The World Bank (2014) reports data until 2013. Growth rate of GDP per capita 
data for 2014 are obtained from the National Bureau of Statistics. We assume 
the GDP per capita growth rate will be 7 per cent in 2015 and 6.1 per cent 
from 2016 to 2020, based on Cai and Lu (2012)
LogGDPP We predict GDP per capita during 2015–20 according to the predicted growth 
rate of GDP per capita based on Cai and Lu (2012)
Inflation The World Bank (2014) reports data until 2013. We assume an inflation rate 
of 2.6 per cent from 2015 to 2020, which is average inflation between 2008 
and 2013, and obtain the inflation rate for 2014 from the National Bureau of 
Statistics 
M2_reserve The World Bank (2014) reports data until 2013. From 2014 to 2020, we 
assume the ratio of M2 over reserves will grow at 2.5 per cent year-on-year, 
which is the average growth of the ratio between 2008 and 2013
Real interest The World Bank (2014) reports data until 2013. We assume the rate to be 
4.2 per cent from 2014 to 2020 onwards, which is the rate in 2013 
Real exchange rate 
overvaluation
The World Bank (2014) reports data until 2013. We assume this rate to be 
0.74 annually from 2014 to 2020, the period average value from 2008 to 2013 
Current account 
surplus
The World Bank (2014) reports data until 2013. For 2014, we use data directly 
from the National Bureau of Statistics. Global economic prospects from the 
World Bank indicators predict the ratio of China’s current account surplus over 




The World Bank (2014) reports data until 2013. From 2014 to 2020, we 
assume the ratio of credit over GDP will grow at 1.27 per cent year-on-year, 
which is the average growth of the ratio between 2004 and 2013
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11. The Offshore Renminbi 
Market and Renminbi 
Internationalisation
William Nixon, Eden Hatzvi and Michelle Wright1
Introduction
The status of the Chinese renminbi (RMB) as an ‘international’ currency has 
developed considerably over recent years. This is evidenced by the increasing 
use of the RMB as a settlement currency for transactions between Chinese 
residents and non-residents. To date, the internationalisation process has been 
largely policy-driven. Chinese authorities are, for example, actively encouraging 
residents to increase their use of RMB in international trade transactions and, 
more recently, providing non-residents with greater access to RMB investment 
in the Chinese mainland (and vice versa). 
It is apparent, however, that there is still a considerable way to go before the 
RMB becomes a truly international currency. The RMB, for example, is not yet 
widely used in transactions between non-residents—a key reason for which 
is that China’s capital account remains partially closed. It follows, then, that 
the success of the RMB internationalisation agenda will be determined in large 
part by China’s broader path towards capital account liberalisation. That said, 
the development of an offshore RMB market is also an important part of this 
process, in that it provides ready access to RMB for use in transactions between 
non-residents—should there be demand to do so.
There are a number of motivations for RMB internationalisation. One of these 
is largely symbolic—namely, to ensure that the international usage of the RMB 
better reflects China’s global economic weight. But there are also some other, 
more direct benefits that could be associated with RMB internationalisation. 
In particular, greater international usage of the RMB may reduce the currency 
risk and cost of international trade for Chinese exporters and importers (Frankel 
2012). More specifically, if Chinese residents are able to invoice their cross-border 
transactions in local currency, they will be less exposed to increasing exchange 
1  The authors are from the International Department of the Reserve Bank of Australia. The views expressed 
in this chapter are the authors’ own and do not necessarily reflect those of the Reserve Bank of Australia. 
The authors are solely responsible for any errors. 
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rate volatility if China continues to transition from a managed to a freely floating 
exchange rate regime. This could help to alleviate some of the ‘fear of floating’ 
concerns that can arise for many emerging economies during the capital account 
and exchange rate liberalisation process (Calvo and Reinhart 2002). Further, 
if Chinese residents are able to settle cross-border transactions in RMB, they 
will be able to avoid the transaction costs associated with converting RMB into 
foreign currency (and vice versa).
RMB internationalisation thus also has the potential to reduce the aggregate 
currency mismatch on China’s international balance sheet. As outlined in 
Cheung et al. (2011), the combination of China’s large and persistent current 
account surpluses, its managed exchange rate regime and its openness to (mostly 
RMB-denominated) foreign direct investment (FDI) has led to a large—and 
rapidly increasing—long foreign currency position. By internationalising the 
RMB, Chinese residents can potentially increase their RMB-denominated claims 
on the rest of the world, which would diversify the currency risk embedded in 
China’s overall international asset position.
A final possible motivation for RMB internationalisation is related to there 
being a close link between RMB internationalisation and capital account 
liberalisation. Policy initiatives that seek to internationalise the RMB may also 
have the effect of increasing the flow of RMB between the onshore and offshore 
markets. Given that there continues to be some debate in China about the merits 
of capital account liberalisation per se, some commentators consider the goal of 
RMB internationalisation to be a politically more palatable way for proponents 
of capital account liberalisation to achieve this objective (Yu 2014). 
In light of the important role played by the offshore RMB market in facilitating 
China’s progress towards currency internationalisation, this chapter begins with 
a brief overview of the features of the offshore market in section two. Drawing on 
Hatzvi et al. (2014), the chapter then outlines a range of recent policy initiatives 
that seek to further develop the offshore market, in section three, before 
discussing their implications for various metrics of RMB internationalisation in 
section four. 
Although there has been significant progress in internationalising the RMB, this 
does not yet appear to have translated into a reduction in currency mismatch. 
This conclusion, consistent with Cheung et al. (2011), is explored further 
in section five. We specifically propose that the internationalisation of the 
RMB to date could have actually increased the currency mismatch on China’s 
international balance sheet, as the widely held perception (until recently) that 
the RMB would continue to appreciate steadily against the US dollar is likely 
to have discouraged non-residents from denominating their liabilities in RMB. 
However, we also suggest that, in the future, there may be some scaling back 
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in these expectations; indeed, there has already been some evidence of this 
throughout much of 2014 and 2015. If increased two-way flexibility in the 
RMB is sustained, this could mean that the RMB internationalisation process 
may become increasingly associated with a reduction in China’s long US dollar 
position over time. 
Overview of the offshore RMB market
Since the announcement of a pilot scheme for RMB trade settlement in mid-2009, 
the Chinese authorities have been gradually easing restrictions on the use of 
RMB outside mainland China. Since mid-2010, the original RMB trade settlement 
scheme has specifically been expanded to encompass all trade between China 
and the rest of world, and the RMB has also become fully convertible outside 
China. This has enabled the creation of a pool of RMB outside the mainland and 
the development of an offshore RMB market.
Hong Kong initially provided the sole connection between the onshore RMB 
market and the rest of the world, making it the primary hub of offshore RMB 
activity. In recent years, several additional official offshore ‘RMB centres’ have 
emerged. Although the flow of RMB between the Chinese mainland and the 
offshore market remains subject to a number of restrictions, RMB is permitted 
to flow freely between the various official offshore centres, which means that the 
offshore RMB market is best described as comprising the sum of all activity in 
these centres (even though most offshore RMB activity continues to occur in 
Hong Kong). Given that the offshore pool of RMB is freely accessible to market 
participants outside mainland China, the offshore RMB market can be thought 
of as providing an environment in which a range of RMB banking products 
can be developed and in which firms outside mainland China can begin to use 
the currency, even if they do not have direct access to the onshore market. 
The ultimate source of both onshore and offshore RMB, however, remains the 
People’s Bank of China (PBC).
There are three main channels through which the size of the offshore pool of 
RMB can change: trade, income and capital flows (described in further detail 
in Table 11.1).2 To date, RMB payments by Chinese importers have been the 
primary source of RMB liquidity for the offshore market. This is not surprising, 
as foreign exporters have an incentive to receive RMB from their Chinese 
counterparts so long as there is an expectation that the RMB will continue to 
appreciate (discussed further in section five).
2  This abstracts from the money multiplier effect where RMB loans offshore would increase the amount of 
offshore RMB deposits. There are also ‘informal’ channels that are created by attempts to evade existing 
capital controls. 
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Table 11.1 RMB flows between mainland China and the offshore market
Current account Capital account
Trade in goods and 
services








































outside China for 

























a Issuance of RMB-denominated bonds in the offshore market, where the funds raised are repatriated 
back to the mainland. ‘Panda’ bonds are where foreign firms issue bonds in mainland China, but these 
cannot generally be repatriated offshore. 
Source: Authors’ own summary.
Although the capital account liberalisation process to date has led to an increase 
in RMB-denominated capital flows, the onshore and offshore pools of RMB 
continue to be partly separated by the capital controls that remain in place. 
This  also means that there are two distinct exchange rates for the RMB: the 
onshore spot rate (where RMB is denoted as yuan, CNY), which is managed by 
the PBC and is accessible only to participants in the mainland market; and the 
spot rate in offshore markets—the most important of which is Hong Kong (where 
RMB is denoted CNH)—which is freely floating and accessible to all offshore 
participants.3 The offshore rate tends to track the onshore rate relatively closely, 
although the two rates can diverge at times (Figure 11.1). 
3  Other offshore centres sometimes refer to their own exchange rate—for example, CNT is used to define 
RMB exchange rates in Taiwan. However, as there are few restrictions on the flow of RMB offshore, the 
value of offshore RMB should be equivalent at any point regardless of the location within the offshore 
market.
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Figure 11.1 Chinese renminbi (RMB per US dollar, inverted scale)
* Negative spread indicates that US$1 buys more RMB offshore than onshore. 
Sources: Bloomberg; RBA.
Recent policy initiatives in the offshore 
RMB market
In recent years, a range of policy initiatives has been introduced to further develop 
the offshore RMB market. These include initiatives that are designed to increase 
the efficiency of payment system linkages between the onshore and offshore 
markets—most notably through the establishment of official RMB clearing 
banks. Other such initiatives seek to increase non-resident participation in RMB 
markets, such as the Renminbi Qualified Foreign Institutional Investor (RQFII) 
program, central bank investment in RMB assets, cross-border RMB lending 
schemes and, most recently, the Shanghai–Hong Kong Stock Connect program.
Official RMB clearing banks
As with any currency, with the RMB, international use requires the cooperation 
of domestic banks in China. In particular, offshore banks need access to clearing 
balances with onshore banks in order to facilitate RMB transactions in the 
offshore market. 
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With that in mind, the internationalisation of the RMB began in late 2003 when 
the Chinese authorities appointed the Bank of China, Hong Kong (BOCHK), 
the first official ‘RMB clearing bank’ outside mainland China. This meant 
BOCHK could accept RMB deposits from offshore banks and place them with 
the PBC’s Shenzhen sub-branch. In turn, BOCHK could clear and settle RMB 
transactions in the offshore market. As part of its clearing bank status, BOCHK 
was also granted a quota to transact directly within China’s onshore interbank 
foreign exchange (FX) market, enabling it to square foreign currency positions 
arising from ‘participating’ bank transactions.4 Alongside BOCHK’s new rights, 
foreign branches and subsidiaries of mainland Chinese banks began to offer 
‘correspondent’ banking services to offshore banks. Those services provide 
offshore banks with an additional channel via which to clear and settle RMB 
transactions with their mainland Chinese counterparts, essentially by allowing 
offshore banks to open RMB accounts at banks in mainland China. 
In recent years, the Chinese authorities have designated official RMB clearing 
banks in a wide range of jurisdictions outside Hong Kong. As of April 2015, there 
were 15 official clearing banks worldwide, all of which are offshore branches of 
Chinese banks, including one in Australia (Table 11.2). The primary purpose 
of these clearing banks is to facilitate cross-border RMB payments between 
the onshore and offshore RMB markets, and within the offshore market itself. 
Similar to BOCHK, these clearing banks are permitted to maintain onshore RMB 
balances to facilitate RMB transactions on behalf of their local participating 
banks. They also have more direct access to RMB liquidity from the PBC and 
are permitted to transact directly within China’s onshore interbank foreign 
exchange market, subject to a quota.
Table 11.2 RMB clearing banks, as of 4 May 2015
Centre Date announced Bank
Hong Kong Dec 2003 Bank of China
Macau Jun 2004 Bank of China
Taipei Dec 2012 Bank of China
Singapore Feb 2013 ICBC
London Mar 2014 China Construction Bank
Frankfurt Mar 2014 Bank of China
Luxembourg Jun 2014 ICBC
Paris Jun 2014 Bank of China
Seoul Jul 2014 Bank of Communications
Doha Nov 2014 ICBC
4  Participating banks hold accounts with a clearing bank for the purpose of clearing RMB transactions. 
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Centre Date announced Bank
Toronto Nov 2014 Bank of China
Kuala Lumpur Nov 2014 Bank of China
Sydney Nov 2014 Bank of China
Bangkok Dec 2014 ICBC
Zurich Jan 2015 –
Sources: RBA; SAFE.
Prior to the establishment of RMB clearing banks in these other offshore centres, 
local banks were able to effect RMB transactions through two channels: by 
participating in another offshore clearing bank’s payments system (most likely 
BOCHK); or by making use of ‘correspondent banking’ relationships with banks 
in mainland China (discussed above). The primary benefit of using a local official 
clearing bank rather than a non-local offshore clearing bank or a correspondent 
banking relationship is that it can provide a more direct method of effecting 
payments (for example, a reduction in settlement delays). Over time, this could 
improve the efficiency and/or lower the transaction costs of such payments. 
The official status of these clearing banks also means that they play an important 
symbolic role in establishing recognised offshore RMB centres, especially by 
raising awareness and confidence among firms in these jurisdictions about their 
local financial sectors’ capacity to facilitate RMB transactions.
That said, it is possible that the role of clearing banks (along with the other 
alternative mechanisms for effecting cross-border RMB payments) could 
diminish over time. Chinese authorities are in the process of developing the 
China International Payments System (CIPS), which is expected to give all 
offshore banks the opportunity to acquire access to China’s domestic payments 
system and foreign exchange market. The development of CIPS, therefore, has 
the potential to foster significant further development of the offshore market. 
The process, however, may take some time to complete. Hence, offshore RMB 
clearing banks are likely to play a central role in connecting offshore financial 
institutions and their non-financial customers to their counterparts in China for 
some time yet. 
Central bank initiatives
Central banks have also undertaken a number of initiatives that seek to support 
the development of the offshore RMB market, including bilateral currency swap 
agreements, RMB liquidity facilities and RMB investments. 
The PBC has, as of February 2015, signed bilateral currency swap agreements 
with 28 central banks (Figure 11.2). Under these agreements, foreign central 
banks can exchange their local currency for RMB with the PBC (that is, RMB 
China’s Domestic Transformation in a Global Context
278
obtained from the onshore market) for mutually agreed purposes. This enables 
foreign central banks to provide RMB liquidity to the offshore market during 
times of market stress or, in some cases, simply to promote the development of 
the offshore RMB market. By providing an assurance that market participants 
can approach their local central bank to access RMB liquidity if required, 
central bank swap lines support the development of the local RMB market. 
Swap lines range in size from RMB700 million (Uzbekistan) to RMB400 billion 
(Hong  Kong). There is relatively little publicly available information on the 
extent to which these swap lines have been activated. It is, however, known 
that Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea and Argentina have all activated their 
swap lines (for non-test purposes).
Figure 11.2 PBC local currency swap agreements
Note: A light-blue bar indicates that some portion of the swap line has been activated as of February 
2015 (based on publicly available information). 
Sources: PBC; RBA.
Some central banks have also established RMB liquidity facilities to provide 
short-term RMB funds to offshore market participants, in some cases using 
their swap agreements with the PBC. These additional measures are designed 
to further ensure market participants have confidence in the availability of 
liquidity in the offshore RMB market. Specifically, the Hong Kong Monetary 
Authority (HKMA) and the Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) both offer 
eligible financial institutions access to overnight RMB loans. The MAS also 
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allows participants in Singapore’s payments system to access three-month RMB 
loans for trade-related purposes. Further, in anticipation of additional demand 
for offshore RMB following the launch of the Shanghai–Hong Kong Stock 
Connect program (discussed below), the HKMA has introduced an intraday 
RMB repurchase agreement (repo) facility to provide up to RMB10 billion to 
banks in Hong Kong.5 
In recent years, at least 40 central banks have also begun to invest a portion 
of their foreign exchange reserves in RMB-denominated assets (BOCHK 2014). 
For example, the Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) now holds 5 per cent of its 
total foreign exchange reserves in RMB-denominated assets (RBA 2014).6 While 
this does not directly influence the offshore RMB market per se, as these reserves 
are typically held in the form of RMB-denominated assets in mainland China, 
it is an important component of the broader RMB internationalisation process. 
Reserve asset holdings are a key characteristic of an international currency. 
The RMB Qualified Foreign Institutional Investor 
(RQFII) program 
The expansion in the number of official RMB clearing banks and currency swap 
agreements should increase demand for offshore RMB by increasing market 
participants’ confidence that cross-border RMB transactions can be effected 
efficiently and predictably. Chinese authorities have recently taken a number of 
further steps to increase the investment options available to offshore holders of 
RMB, and thereby support the development of the market by increasing market 
participants’ willingness to take on RMB exposures. For example, offshore RMB 
can now be used to make investments in mainland China, primarily via the RQFII 
program. This allows approved foreign investors to buy and sell designated 
assets in China’s onshore equity and bond markets. The RQFII program can thus 
be thought of both as being part of China’s broader capital account liberalisation 
process and as an initiative that is designed to encourage broader participation 
in the offshore RMB market. 
Importantly, the RQFII program is only available to investors with operations in 
a jurisdiction that has been granted an RQFII quota by the Chinese authorities. 
The RQFII program was initially made available only to Hong Kong-domiciled 
5  Additionally, the HKMA designated a number of banks as primary liquidity providers (PLPs). 
The HKMA will offer PLPs an RMB repo line (to obtain both intraday and overnight funds) to ensure 
that they have sufficient liquidity available to perform market-making functions in Hong Kong’s 
offshore market.
6  The Reserve Bank’s investment makes use of a scheme commonly known as the China Interbank Bond 
Market scheme, which is separate to the QFII and RQFII programs (discussed below) and is typically 
used by central banks and sovereign wealth funds.
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investors, with a quota of RMB20 billion granted in 2011. Hong Kong’s quota 
has since been incrementally raised to RMB270 billion. From the middle of 
2013 to April 2015, RQFII quotas totalling RMB600 billion (A$123 billion) 
have also been granted to a range of other offshore centres, including Australia 
(Table 11.3).
Table 11.3 RQFII quotas, as at 4 May 2015
Centre Quota
(RMB b)
Date announced Allocation to datea
(RMB b)
Hong Kong 270 Dec 2011 270.0
Singapore 50 Oct 2013 26.0
United Kingdom 80 Oct 2013 15.2
France 80 Mar 2014 6.0
Germany 80 Jul 2014 6.0
South Korea 80 Jul 2014 30.5
Qatar 30 Nov 2014 n.a.b
Canada 50 Nov 2014 n.a.
Australia 50 Nov 2014 10.0
Switzerland 50 Jan 2015 n.a.
Luxembourg 50 Apr 2015 n.a.
a The activation of Taiwan’s RQFII quota is conditional on the finalisation of the Cross-Strait Trade in 
Service Agreement. 
b n.a. = not applicable. 
Sources: PBC; SAFE.
As of April 2015, about 80 Hong Kong-domiciled entities had been granted 
RQFII licences. Outside Hong Kong, about 40 firms have acquired quotas, 
although more are in the process of applying (the process typically takes 
about six months). Once a firm has acquired a quota, it is able to offer RMB 
investment products to a broad range of investors, including those located 
outside its original jurisdiction. For example, some Hong Kong-domiciled firms 
have partnered with US and Europe-domiciled financial institutions to launch 
exchange-traded funds on foreign stock exchanges, including the New York 
Stock Exchange and the London Stock Exchange. This allows investors without 
an RQFII quota to gain exposure to China’s equity and bond markets. 
The RQFII program is in addition to the Qualified Foreign Institutional Investor 
(QFII) program, which has been in place since 2003. The QFII program permits 
approved foreign investors to use foreign currency to invest in designated 
Chinese financial assets. Unlike the RQFII program, the QFII program has no 
jurisdiction-specific quotas. From an investor’s perspective, however, the RQFII 
program has several potential advantages over the QFII program—among them, 
greater discretion in portfolio allocation and less restrictive rules regarding the 
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repatriation of funds. The RQFII program also permits authorised investors 
to invest part of their RQFII quota in China’s fixed-income interbank bond 
market, whereas QFII-approved investors must apply for an additional quota 
to access this market. As of the end of April 2015, the total value of allocated 
quotas under the RQFII program was about RMB364 billion, with an additional 
RMB506 billion worth of aggregate global RQFII quotas yet to be allocated. 
This compares with about RMB457 billion of allocation for the QFII program 
(Figure 11.3). As investors utilise their jurisdictions’ quotas, the RQFII program 
is likely to account for more foreign investment in Chinese financial assets than 
the QFII program.
Figure 11.3 Foreign investment in Chinese financial assets (accumulated 
approved quotas)
* Excludes Taiwain’s RQFII quota. 
Sources: CEIC Data; RBA, SAFE.
Shanghai–Hong Kong Stock Connect program
In addition to the RQFII program, the other key policy initiative aimed at 
increasing the attractiveness of offshore RMB (from the perspective of foreign 
investors) is the Shanghai–Hong Kong Stock Connect program. The program, 
which began operating in November 2014, allows offshore investors to purchase 
approved (RMB-denominated) stocks listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange 
(SSE)—known as ‘northbound’ trading. Similarly, eligible mainland investors 
are able to purchase (Hong Kong dollar-denominated) stocks listed on the 
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Hong Kong Stock Exchange (HKEx)—known as ‘southbound’ trading. In other 
words, the Stock Connect program provides an additional avenue through which 
offshore (onshore) investors can buy and sell Chinese (Hong Kong) equities in 
addition to the RQFII and QFII programs, and therefore is an additional link 
between the offshore and onshore RMB markets.
Purchases in both exchanges are subject to total and daily quotas (Table 11.4). 
Offshore investors are permitted to purchase a total of RMB300 billion worth 
of SSE stocks (daily quota of RMB13 billion). Mainland Chinese investors are 
permitted to purchase a total of RMB250 billion worth of HKEx stocks (daily 
quota of RMB10.5 billion) (Table 11.4). Like the RQFII program, the currency 
exchange takes place in the offshore market, so investors must purchase (sell) 
RMB in the offshore market in order to buy mainland (Hong Kong) stocks.
Table 11.4 Features of the Stock Connect program
Northbound trading
Hong Kong to Shanghai
Southbound trading
Shanghai to Hong Kong
Daily quotaa RMB13 billion RMB10.5 billion
Aggregate quota RMB300 billion RMB250 billion
Eligible investors All foreign investors Institutional Chinese investors, mutual 




SSE 180 Index and SSE 380 Index Hang Seng Composite LargeCap Index 
and Hang Seng Composite MidCap Index
a Daily limits operate on a ‘first come, first served’ basis. Daily quota balances are calculated on a ‘net 
buy’ basis and are adjusted when a buy order is cancelled, rejected by the other exchange or executed 
at a better price. 
b Individuals with more than RMB500,000 in their brokerage accounts. 
Source: Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing Limited (HKEx).
Early trading via the Stock Connect program was heavily skewed towards 
Shanghai-listed stocks. The daily northbound quota was exhausted on the first 
day of trading, while less than 20 per cent of the daily southbound quota was 
used. However, southbound trading increased markedly in April 2015 alongside 
a broadening of eligible mainland investors to include mutual funds. As of 
April 2015, investors have used some 43 per cent of the aggregate northbound 
quota and 34 per cent of the aggregate southbound quota (Figure 11.4). 
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Figure 11.4 Shanghai–Hong Kong Stock Connect program 
(aggregate quota used)
Source: Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing Limited (HKEx).
The primary advantage of the Stock Connect program over the RQFII program 
is that it is open to all foreign investors, whereas the RQFII program is restricted 
to financial institutions domiciled in countries that have been granted RQFII 
quotas (although once an institution obtains an RQFII quota, it can use this to 
set up RMB products elsewhere). Moreover, gaining an RQFII licence and quota 
for individual institutions is a comparatively lengthy process. 
Nevertheless, the RQFII program is likely to continue to be used as it has some 
advantages over the Stock Connect program. Importantly, institutions with an 
RQFII quota can invest in mainland fixed-income assets and a broader range of 
mainland stocks. In addition, while Stock Connect investors are subject to an 
aggregate daily quota (for the market as a whole) and execution queues, RQFII 
investors can transact subject only to their own individual quotas. The two 
programs are nonetheless partial substitutes. Since Hong Kong has exhausted 
its aggregate RQFII quota, some Hong Kong-based entities have reportedly 
requested to be allowed to transfer stocks bought under the RQFII program 
to the Stock Connect program in an attempt to free up space in their existing 
RQFII quotas.
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RMB cross-border lending schemes
In addition to the RQFII and Stock Connect programs—which seek to increase 
the cross-border flow of RMB-denominated portfolio investment—there are a 
number of pilot schemes that permit RMB-denominated lending flows. Such 
schemes typically only permit flows between designated mainland Chinese 
cities or regions and specific offshore centres, and are therefore not available 
to all offshore market participants. The first of these schemes, established in 
January 2013, allows companies incorporated in Qianhai—a special economic 
zone (SEZ) within the Chinese city of Shenzhen—to borrow RMB from banks 
in Hong Kong to fund investment projects within Qianhai. As interbank RMB 
interest rates have typically been noticeably lower in Hong Kong than in the 
mainland (notwithstanding some narrowing in the onshore–offshore spread in 
the latter half of 2014), it is possible the scheme has provided Qianhai firms with 
access to cheaper funding.7 
In 2014, similar schemes were established between Singapore-based banks 
and firms in China’s Suzhou Industrial Park, in Jiangsu Province, and Tianjin 
Eco-City, as part of a broader range of initiatives between the Chinese and 
Singaporean governments to develop these two innovation-oriented initiatives. 
Entities within the zone of both initiatives have also been permitted to issue 
RMB-denominated bonds in Singapore and to undertake direct investment in 
Singapore-based corporations. 
Another scheme, with Taiwan, was established in late 2013 and follows a 
slightly different model. Under this scheme, subsidiaries of Taiwanese firms 
in the Jiangsu city of Kunshan, near Shanghai, are permitted both to borrow 
RMB from their offshore parent companies and to extend RMB loans to them. 
In addition, and most recently, non-bank financial institutions and enterprises 
domiciled in the Shanghai Free Trade Zone have been permitted to borrow RMB 
from any offshore centre, subject to certain conditions.8 
Recent progress towards RMB 
internationalisation
Partly through the policy initiatives outlined above, China has made significant 
progress in internationalising its currency in the past few years. This is evident 
in part by the fact that China’s RMB-denominated current account transactions 
7  Interest rates are privately negotiated between borrowers and lenders and are therefore not publicly 
available.
8  The funds must be put towards manufacturing operations and project construction within the zone 
and their value cannot exceed specified limits. 
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have grown rapidly, and now account for about one-fifth of China’s total current 
account transactions (Figure 11.5). RMB-denominated investment (particularly 
inward investment) has also increased noticeably in recent years, but remains 
small relative to the value of RMB-denominated trade settlement.
Figure 11.5 Cross-border RMB settlement
Sources: CEIC Data; RBA.
By economic jurisdiction, Hong Kong continues to account for the majority of 
China’s RMB-denominated cross-border transactions, followed by Singapore and 
Taiwan. This is unsurprising given that Hong Kong remains the centre of the 
offshore RMB market. Nevertheless, the launch of official RMB clearing banks 
in Singapore and Taiwan in early 2013 coincided with a substantial increase in 
the RMB-denominated share of each economy’s bilateral merchandise trade with 
China in 2013 (Figure 11.6). The share of China’s merchandise trade settled in 
RMB with economies excluding Hong Kong, Taiwan and Singapore increased 
slightly in 2013, but, in comparison, remained relatively low at about 3 per cent. 
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Figure 11.6 Bilateral RMB trade settlement, as a share of total bilateral 
merchandise trade with China
Sources: CEIC Data; PBC; RBA.
Importantly, while the share of trade settled in RMB has increased markedly, 
it is not clear whether the share of trade invoiced in RMB has increased to the 
same extent. Relatively few data are available on invoicing. The distinction is 
important because the extent of trade settlement in RMB could partly reflect 
differences in the value of onshore and offshore RMB. This could mean the 
settlement data are overstating underlying demand for RMB. 
Notwithstanding China’s overall current account surplus, the value of China’s 
cross-border RMB payments (for example, for imports) typically exceeds the value 
of China’s cross-border RMB receipts (for example, from exports) (Figure 11.7). 
In other words, China runs a current account surplus but an RMB-denominated 
deficit for trade denominated in RMB. One potential reason for this is that 
Chinese firms may have been attempting to benefit from the typically higher 
value of offshore RMB relative to onshore RMB (also known as the offshore 
premium, and shown in Figure 11.1). For example, when the RMB buys more 
US dollars in the offshore market than in the onshore market, Chinese importers 
have an incentive to exchange RMB for US dollars in the offshore market to meet 
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US dollar payments. From China’s perspective, such a transaction will be counted 
as RMB trade settlement even though, from the perspective of the foreign firm, 
the underlying trade flow is both settled and invoiced in US dollars.9 
Figure 11.7 Cross-border RMB receipts and payments
Sources: CEIC Data; RBA; SAFE.
In any case, the net outflow of RMB from China in recent years has led to a rapid 
increase in the stock of RMB deposits in offshore centres, although growth 
slowed somewhat in 2014 (Figure 11.8). While Hong Kong continues to account 
for the majority of offshore RMB deposits, the stock of deposits in Taiwan and 
Singapore has increased rapidly since early 2013, respectively rising to about 
RMB300 billion and RMB280 billion at the end of December 2014. 
9  Likewise, when the RMB buys fewer US dollars in the offshore market, Chinese exporters have an 
incentive to exchange their US dollar receipts for RMB in the offshore market (rather than the onshore 
market) before sending the receipts back to the mainland. Again, this will count towards RMB trade 
settlement even though the underlying trade flow is settled and invoiced in RMB from the foreigner’s 
perspective.
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Figure 11.8 Value of RMB deposits
Sources: CEIC Data; MAS.
As the pool of offshore RMB deposits has grown, so too has the offshore RMB-
denominated bond market. Hong Kong remains the prime location for offshore 
RMB bond—or ‘dim sum’ bond—issuance, but the market is also growing 
rapidly in Singapore, Taipei and Luxembourg. The majority of issuers continue 
to be mainland Chinese companies or offshore subsidiaries of mainland Chinese 
companies (Figure 11.9). Funds raised are typically repatriated back to mainland 
China. Most of the dim sum bond issuance by other firms has also been used to 
fund their operations in mainland China. 
One reason for the prevalence of mainland Chinese issuers in the dim sum bond 
market is that the cost of funding has typically been lower in the offshore market 
than on the mainland. This is evidenced, for example, by the consistently lower 
yield paid on Chinese government bonds issued in the offshore market relative 
to those issued in the onshore market (Figure 11.10). This is partly because 
capital account restrictions limit the flow of offshore RMB back to the mainland, 
such that there is a large pool of RMB in offshore markets with relatively limited 
investment opportunities (and therefore strong demand for dim sum bonds from 
offshore investors). However, recent policy initiatives aimed at increasing the 
flow of RMB between the offshore and onshore markets (for example, the Stock 
Connect program and cross-border lending schemes) have begun to reduce 
this gap.
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Figure 11.9 Dim sum bond issuance, by nationality of parent issuer
Source: Dealogic.
Figure 11.10 Chinese five-year government bond yields
Sources: Bloomberg; RBA.
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There have also been a small number of offshore RMB bond issues by foreign 
governments, with the UK Government raising RMB3 billion in October 2014 
and the NSW Treasury Corporation raising RMB1 billion in November 2014. 
This followed the Canadian Province of British Columbia’s issuance of an 
RMB2.5 billion dim sum bond in late 2013. Some foreign banks have also 
tapped the market. ANZ, for example, became the first foreign issuer to sell 
a Basel III-compliant RMB-denominated capital instrument when it issued an 
RMB2.5 billion dim sum bond in January 2015. Moreover, bond issuers have 
used the offshore RMB swap market to hedge their foreign currency risk. 
For  example, the NSW Treasury Corporation swapped the proceeds from its 
RMB bond issue into Australian dollars.
RMB internationalisation and currency mismatch
As outlined in Cheung et al. (2011), the combination of China’s large and 
persistent current account surpluses, its managed exchange rate regime and 
its openness to (mostly RMB-denominated) FDI has led to a large currency 
mismatch in the past decade. The value of China’s foreign currency assets has 
correspondingly far exceeded the value of its foreign currency liabilities. In 
other words, years of foreign currency reserve accumulation by the PBC have 
produced a substantial long US dollar position (Figure 11.11). As a result, an 
appreciation of the RMB against the US dollar leads to a decline in the value of 
China’s net international asset position (in RMB terms). 
Against this background, one potential motive for RMB internationalisation is 
to increase China’s RMB-denominated foreign assets and thus reduce China’s 
exposure to an appreciation of the RMB. For example, if a Chinese resident 
purchased a dim sum bond issued by a non-resident, and the non-resident used the 
proceeds to purchase goods from a Chinese exporter, China’s RMB-denominated 
claims on the rest of the world would increase (all else remaining constant).
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Figure 11.11 China’s balance of payments (quarterly flows, percentage of GDP)
* Excluding foreign exchange reserves. 
Sources: CEIC Data; IMF; RBA.
The RMB internationalisation process to date has, however, likely worsened 
the currency mismatch between China’s international assets and liabilities. 
One reason for this is that, by design, the policy initiatives so far announced 
(such as RQFII and Stock Connect) have had the effect of increasing China’s RMB-
denominated foreign liabilities, rather than increasing its RMB-denominated 
foreign assets.10 Another reason is that the net outflow of RMB from China’s 
cross-border trade in recent years has led to an increase in the stock of RMB 
deposits in offshore centres, which has also increased China’s RMB-denominated 
foreign liabilities. This outcome likely reflects the fact that, until recently, market 
participants have typically expected the RMB to continue to appreciate against 
the US dollar. In effect, foreigners have been discouraged from denominating 
their liabilities in RMB because they expect the RMB to experience a significant 
real appreciation against the US dollar. (For a full discussion of the relationship 
between RMB trade settlement, RMB appreciation and currency mismatch, 
see the Appendix for this chapter.) 
10  The Stock Connect program also increases China’s FX-denominated foreign assets.
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Against this background, the extent to which market participants perceive the 
RMB to be undervalued or overvalued is an important consideration when trying 
to assess the outlook for RMB internationalisation—and is especially so of the 
extent to which this process is likely to translate into a reduction in aggregate 
currency mismatch on China’s international balance sheet. Specifically, if firms 
continue to view RMB appreciation against the US dollar as a ‘one-way’ bet, 
there would likely be a continuation of the trend of recent years of net RMB 
outflows from trade settlement, net RMB capital inflows and a further increase 
in the degree of currency mismatch. This trend could reverse if participants 
come increasingly to expect greater two-way movements in the RMB exchange 
rate. 
A number of reports suggest that market participants have either scaled back their 
expectations for future RMB appreciation against the US dollar or now expect 
the RMB to depreciate against the US dollar (Figure 11.12) (see, for example, 
Wildau 2015). These expectations may have arisen for a number of reasons, 
but have likely been reinforced by the fact that the RMB has increasingly been 
trading near the lower bound of its daily trading band against the US dollar in 
the onshore market. Relatedly, there has been a marked slowdown in the pace 
of PBC reserve accumulation. Moreover, Chinese officials have indicated their 
desire to see greater two-way volatility in the RMB’s exchange rate (PBC 2014). 
Figure 11.12 Chinese RMB (spot rate against US dollar, inverted scale)
* Mean estimate of forecasters polled by Consensus. 
Sources: Bloomberg, Consensus Economics; RBA.
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Conclusion
The international use of the RMB has continued to increase in the past few 
years, facilitated by policy initiatives applying within mainland China and to 
several offshore centres. For example, the designation of official RMB clearing 
banks has provided more direct mechanisms for settling offshore entities’ RMB 
transactions with their Chinese counterparts. By facilitating RMB transactions, 
these clearing banks establish the necessary infrastructure for future progress in 
RMB internationalisation. The expansion of the RQFII program and the launch 
of the Stock Connect program have also increased the extent to which cross-
border flows of RMB are liberalised, particularly flows into China. 
There are a number of possible reasons why China is pursuing RMB 
internationalisation. These include ensuring that the status of the RMB reflects 
China’s global economic weight, and also to reduce the currency risk faced 
by individual Chinese entities as the exchange rate regime is progressively 
liberalised. In addition, China may be pursuing RMB internationalisation to 
reduce the extent of currency mismatch on its aggregate balance sheet. To date, 
however, RMB internationalisation has instead tended to increase the degree of 
currency mismatch, partly because of pervasive expectations of future one-way 
RMB appreciation. Nevertheless, recent experience of greater two-way volatility 
in the RMB—and a growing market consensus that the RMB is unlikely to 
continue to appreciate monotonically against the US dollar—could change this 
over time. In any case, given that RMB internationalisation is closely related 
to the broader capital account liberalisation process, it is likely to continue 
to be pursued as a policy objective for some time. Until this broader capital 
account liberalisation process is completed—and potentially beyond then—
the offshore RMB market is likely to have an important role to play in RMB 
internationalisation. 
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Appendix
To illustrate the relationship between RMB trade settlement and currency 
mismatch, we can consider three different states of the world: 
1. China settles all of its trade in US dollars 
2. China settles all of its trade in RMB 
3. China settles more imports than exports in RMB  
(that is, the current situation). 
For simplicity, in each scenario it is assumed the Chinese authorities maintain an 
independent monetary policy and a hypothetical fixed exchange rate of US$1 = 
RMB5 (note that this highly stylised example implies that China must be closed 
to private capital flows, as per the standard ‘trilemma’ of international finance). 
China is also assumed to run a current account (trade) surplus of US$5 billion 
(US$10 billion of exports and US$5 billion of imports). 
In the first scenario—in which all current account transactions are settled in 
US dollars—the PBC must increase its foreign exchange reserves by US$5 billion 
to maintain the RMB’s fixed exchange rate against the US dollar (Table A11.1). 
This is equivalent to the PBC lending US dollars to the rest of the world to 
finance the rest of the world’s current account deficit (relative to China). 
This increases China’s international asset position by US$5 billion. Regardless 
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of whether the PBC chooses to sterilise its purchases of US dollars, its liabilities 
will increase by RMB25 billion (in the form of newly printed RMB or RMB loans 
from domestic entities).
Table A11.1 China’s international assets and liabilitiesa
Exports Imports Change in China’s 
net international 
asset position
Change in China’s 
foreign currency 
reserves
Scenario 1 US$10 billion US$5 billion + US$5 billion + US$5 billion
Scenario 2 RMB50 billion RMB25 billion + RMB25 billion 0
Scenario 3 US$10 billion US$4 billion + 
RMB5 billion
+ US$6 billion – 
RMB5 billion 
+ US$6 billion
a Assuming the PBC maintains its fixed exchange rate of US$1 = RMB5. 
In the second scenario—in which all current account transactions are settled 
in RMB—the PBC must (on net) loan RMB25 billion to finance the rest of the 
world’s RMB25 billion current account deficit. In turn, China’s net international 
asset position increases by RMB25 billion. Unlike the first scenario, here, 
the PBC’s assets and liabilities are both denominated in RMB, so there is no 
currency mismatch. 
In the third scenario, we assume that all exports are denominated in US dollars 
(US$10 billion), but the US$5 billion worth of imports are partly denominated 
in US dollars (US$4 billion) and partly in RMB (RMB5 billion). This means 
that there is a net US dollar inflow of US$6 billion and a net RMB outflow of 
RMB5  billion (through trade). This RMB outflow is a liability on the PBC’s 
balance sheet (for example, held as RMB deposits offshore), but the PBC must 
purchase the US$6 billion inflow to maintain the fixed exchange rate, implying 
additional liabilities of RMB30 billion. 
The currency composition of China’s international assets and liabilities is different 
in scenario three (assets of US$6 billion and a liability of RMB5 billion) to that 
in scenario one (assets of US$5 billion). China’s long foreign currency position, 
in fact, increases by more in scenario three, as the partial RMB denomination 
of imports means that there is a greater net inflow of foreign currency from 
trade. As a result there is a greater need for the PBC to acquire foreign currency 
reserves to offset this inflow. This demonstrates—in a highly stylised way—how 
the internationalisation of the RMB can result in a greater degree of currency 
mismatch on China’s aggregate balance sheet than otherwise—if it results in a 
higher value of RMB outflows than inflows.  
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12. China’s Manufacturing 
Performance and Industrial 
Competitiveness Upgrading
International comparison and policy reflection
Kevin H. Zhang1
Introduction
China’s sustained economic growth in the 37 years from 1978 is a story 
of manufacturing industry success. China has enjoyed rapid structural 
transformation and a process of deep development (Gereffi 2009; Lin and Wang 
2012; Zhang 2006). As a factory to the world, China is also the world’s number 
one producer of manufactured goods and manufactured exports. Recently, China 
has also been seeking to upgrade its production frontier towards more capital 
and technology-intensive industries.
China is evidently a manufacturing giant, but is it really an industrial power? 
And if it is an industrial power, what drives its industrial competitiveness? 
While there have been some studies on Chinese industry and manufacturing 
exports in general, the literature focusing on these questions has so far been 
limited.2 One evident gap in the literature is inadequate measurement of 
manufacturing performance (MP) and the identification of MP determinants. 
Working in this direction, this chapter aims to advance the existing literature 
as follows. First, it studies eight indicators of three MP dimensions (capacity, 
intensity and quality) in both domestic and world markets, as suggested by 
UNIDO (2013), we provide more comprehensive measures of MP in China. 
Second, in addition to manufacturing drivers at the micro level of firms and 
industries, it examines macro-drivers of China’s industrial development against 
international benchmarks, including development strategies and industrial 
policy. Third, we assess the role played by foreign trade and foreign direct 
investment (FDI) in China’s MP and IC by focusing on their impact on industrial 
1  This chapter is a revised version of a paper presented at the CESA-RDI Conference on Deepening Reform 
for China’s Long-Term Growth and Development, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Beijing, 11–12 
December 2014. I thank the participants of the conference for their helpful comments. Of course, any 
errors remain my own.
2  The studies on Chinese industry and manufacturing development include Brandt and Thun (2010); 
Gereffi (2009); Lin and Wang (2012); Nahm and Seinfeld (2014); Zhang (2006); Zhao and Zhang (2007, 
2010).
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capacity, intensity and quality, especially technology upgrading. Fourth, we 
use more recent data (up to 2013) to complement the cross-country ranking in 
1992–2010 by UNIDO (2013).
Section two provides the analytical framework on which China’s industrial 
competitiveness is assessed and against which its performance is compared 
internationally. Section three examines the drivers of China’s industrial success 
by first distinguishing initial conditions and causes and then by identifying their 
main drivers. Two drivers, industrial policy and export FDI, are then discussed 
in sections four and five, and conclusions are drawn in the final section.
An analytical framework for study of China’s 
industrial competitiveness
Industrialisation—structural transformation from traditional agriculture to 
modern manufactures and services—has been considered a key to economic 
growth and development since the Industrial Revolution in the eighteenth 
century. Industrial development is desirable not only as a source of higher 
productivity growth and per capita income, but also to achieve greater diversity 
in economic structure. The latter helps to reduce a country’s vulnerability to 
poverty and external shocks. 
To better illustrate China’s industrial performance, Figure 12.1 and Table 12.1 
lay out some basic related indicators. As the data in the table illustrate, in 
the 35 years from 1978 to 2013 China’s gross domestic product (GDP) grew 26 
times over. The industrial sector, however, grew the fastest and also made the 
largest contribution to growth (growing 42 times over), as shown in Figure 12.1. 
By 2014, China had become the second-largest economy in the world at current 
exchange rates, but number one in purchasing power parity (PPP) terms. As the 
most populous country, however, China’s GDP per capita lags far behind the 
United States and other high-income economies, including South Korea, Taiwan, 
Singapore and Hong Kong. 
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Figure 12.1 Growth of China’s GDP and its component sectors, 1978–2013 
(1978=100)
Sources: National Bureau of Statistics various years[a].
Table 12.1 China’s position in the top-10 economies, 2014






United States 17,416(1) 17,416(2) 316(3) 53,670(1) 53,960(1)
China 10,361(2) 17,617(1) 1,357(1) 7,635(9) 12,982(9)
Japan 4,770(3) 4,750(4) 127(6) 46,140(2) 37,630(3)
Germany 3,820(4) 3,722(5) 80(7) 46,100(3) 44,540(2)
France 2,902(5) 2,580(8) 66(8) 42,250(4) 37,580(4)
United 
Kingdom
2,848(6) 2,549(9) 64(9) 39,110(5) 35,760(5)
Brazil 2,244(7) 3,264(7) 200(4) 11,690(8) 14,750(8)
Russia 2,057(8) 3,565(6) 144(5) 13,860(7) 23,200(7)
Italy 2,129(9) 2,128(10) 60(10) 34,400(6) 34,100(6)
India 2,048(10) 7,376(3) 1,252(2) 15,70(10) 5,350(10)
Notes: Ranking for each indicator in the table is given in parentheses after the figure. According to 
the World Bank’s International Comparison Program, China passed the United States to become the 
world’s number one economy in purchasing power parity (PPP) GDP in 2014. 
Sources: World Bank (2015); and CIA (2015).
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Based on a method developed by UNIDO (2013), a country’s industrial 
competitiveness (IC) can be assessed via eight indicators that are grouped 
along three dimensions, as shown in Table 12.2. The first dimension relates 
to a country’s capacity to produce and export manufactures. Unlike measures 
used before, we include total output as well as output per capita to capture the 
manufacturing scale in the context of China’s population. Output per capita can 
understate the capacity of populous countries like China, India and the United 
States relative to small ones. Including total output might not only correct such 
understating, but also reflect economies of scale derived from the large amount 
of output. The second dimension covers a country’s industrial intensity in terms 
of manufacturing value added share in GDP and manufactured export share in 
total exports. The third IC dimension captures a country’s industrial quality 
in terms of technological deepening and upgrading in domestic manufacturing 
output and exports. In contrast with other available indices, the IC index 
provides a unique cross-country industrial performance benchmark and rank 
based on quantitative indicators of industrial performance. These rankings are 
provided for 135 countries for the years 1992–2010 (UNIDO 2013).3
Table 12.2 Industrial competitiveness: Three dimensions and eight indicators
Industrial capacity Manufacturing value added per capita (MPC)
Manufactured exports per capita (MXPC)
Manufacturing value added share in world (MWS) 
Manufactured exports share in world (MXWS)
Industrial intensity Manufacturing value added share in GDP (M/GDP)
Manufactured exports share in total exports (MX/X)
Industrial quality
Medium and high-tech manufacturing value added share in total (MQ)
Medium and high-tech manufactured export share in total (MXQ)
Source: Author’s reorganisation based on UNIDO (2013).
Table 12.3 reports the top 15 of the world IC ranking in 1992–2010, which 
reveals a pronounced yet familiar pattern. The most industrially competitive 
nations in the world are those with high-income industrialised economies. 
The top-three positions are occupied by Japan, Germany and the United States, 
which have headed the rankings since 1992. China has ascended rapidly to its 
rank of seventh.
3  In contrast with other indices currently available, the IC index provides a unique cross-country 
industrial performance benchmark and ranking based on quantitative indicators of manufacturing 
development. Rankings are provided at global levels for 135 countries in 1992–2010 (UNIDO 2013). 
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Selected details capturing China’s industrial growth are presented in Table 12.4, 
including eight IC component indicators for the period 1990–2010. Within each 
of UNIDO’s nominated eight indicators, China has evidently made significant 
progress. Looking to the indicators that have been augmented here to adjust 
for China’s population size, manufacturing value added per capita (MPC) has 
increased eight times and manufactured exports per capita (MXPC) are up an 
extraordinary 19 times. In parallel, China’s share of manufacturing value added 
in the world (MWS) rose by 13 percentage points, from 2.6 per cent in 1990 to 
15.3 per cent in 2010, and its share in world manufactured exports (MXWS) rose 
by 12 percentage points, from 2.2 per cent to 14.1 per cent. In parallel, in 2010 
China surpassed Germany to become the world’s largest manufactured goods 
exporter, and in 2011 it replaced the United States as the largest producer of 
manufactured goods in the world. 
Table 12.4 China’s industrial competitiveness and eight indicators, 1990–2010
Indicators 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 Change in 1990–2010
Industrial capacity
MPC (US$) 100.3 199.4 303.1 480.4 820.0 +$719.7
MXPC (US$) 58.2 108.9 179.9 550.4 1,123.6 +$1,065.4
MWS (%) 2.6 5.0 6.7 9.4 15.3 +12.7
MXWS (%) 2.2 3.4 4.7 9.3 14.1 +11.9
Industrial intensity
M/GDP (%) 25.9 30.5 32.1 33.0 34.2 +8.3
MX/X (%) 72.5 88.8
91
91.7 94.8 96.2 +23.7
Industrial quality
MQ (%) 37.8 38.0 42.9 41.6 40.7 +2.9
MXQ (%) 26.7 35.4 45.5 57.7 59.8 +33.1
IC index value 0.08 0.13 0.16 0.24 0.33 +0.25
Source: Computed from UNIDO (2015).
Table 12.5 presents cross-country comparisons of the eight IC indicators for the 
top 15 economies for industrial competitiveness in 2010. Given its population 
size and stage of development, China, of the 15 countries listed, is the country 
with the lowest per capita values for MPC and MXPC, but the country with 
the highest values for the aggregate items, including MWS and MXWS. 
China outperforms most of the other 14 economies in industrial intensity, as 
measured by M/GDP and MX/X, but rates poorly by the share of medium and 
high-tech manufacturing value and exports in total, respectively. 
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A summary of China’s position in global industry can be derived for industrial 
capacity, industrial intensity and industrial quality. First, China has raised 
its industrial capacity by an unprecedented amount in a short time, in both 
manufacturing output and manufacturing exports. Due to its scale, no country 
is likely to challenge China seriously on these dimensions in the near future. 
Second, China’s industrial intensity has grown to a level that is comparable with 
or even higher than many industrialised economies. Third, China has made 
significant progress in industrial quality, although it still has a long way to 
go to catch up with the leading economies. China is continuing a process of 
upgrading its manufacturing exports from simple, labour-intensive products 
to capital and technology-intensive goods. It should be noted, however, that 
the high ratios of MQ and MXQ—40.7 per cent and 59.8 per cent respectively 
(Table 12.5)—overstate China’s performance in technological upgrading due to 
the extensive role played by China in vertical integrated global value chain and 
processing exports, which is discussed later.
In sum, China’s manufacturing success is mainly due to extraordinary 
performance in aggregate capacity and intensity, but not yet in quality. 
Why was China’s performance extraordinary?
A range of factors influences industrial development. These include the macro 
and microeconomic environments and the policy environment. To understand 
which combinations lead to successful industrial performance, it is essential 
to distinguish between endowments or conditions and the causes of industrial 
performance. A country’s advantageous (disadvantageous) endowments  or 
conditions relative to other countries can be viewed as its comparative 
advantages (disadvantages) in industrial development. These, however, are not 
the causes of good (bad) industrial performance. Causes of a particular outcome 
are instead generative forces or events that are the origin of the outcome or the 
factor that make it happen.
The initial advantages China had for industrial development included 
abundant cheap labour; huge potential markets; a high saving rate; a culture 
of patience, persistence and learning; good relations with the Western, 
economically developed world in 1978; and an efficient, centralised governance 
system (although this is open to debate). China’s disadvantages included low 
labour quality; low industrial technology; poor infrastructure; an inefficient 
planned economic system; a weak market system; and shallow human capital. 
These  endowments or conditions had existed for some time, but cannot be 
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attributed to China’s industrial success. There are instead two driving causes: 
a well-designed development strategy and industrial policy, and an effective 
export and FDI attraction strategy.
China’s development strategy was one of a mixed-economic transition that 
gradually introduced market elements into the pre-existing planned economy, 
including and especially by opening up to foreign trade and FDI. This export-
led and FDI-led industrial development approach served as a catalyst for the 
effective utilisation of China’s then advantages so as to offset or transform its 
disadvantages. For example, cheap labour was utilised in processing exports and 
foreign-invested labour-intensive manufacturing enterprises; the large domestic 
market was used to attract foreign investors; industrial upgrading took place 
over time via rising foreign trade and FDI; and so on.
China is unique in its endowments, especially in having been the world’s most 
populous country and also one of its poorest, in addition to being an economy 
that was autarkic before 1978. In being a low-income country, however, 
China did share many features in common with other developing economies. 
What China did differently from others are its market-oriented reforms, which 
led to an effective development strategy and industrial policy and its opening 
to trade and FDI, which helped build up industrial competitiveness, especially 
industrial upgrading.
China’s export structure changed dramatically, as suggested by data in Tables 12.6 
and 12.7. In 1985, exports of primary products and resource-based manufactures 
specifically represented 49 per cent of all exports. By 2013, less than 30 years 
later, that share had fallen to 7.5 per cent. In contrast, the share of non-resource-
based manufactures rose from 50 per cent to 92 per cent (Table 12.6). Within that 
category, the share of high-technology exports jumped from 3 per cent in 1985 
to 34 per cent in 2013, and for medium-technology exports the share increased 
from 8 per cent to 29 per cent. Table 12.7 reports export structure by Standard 
International Trade Classification (SITC) in 1984–2013. The biggest change took 
place in SITC 7 (machinery and transport equipment), which now makes up 
almost half of China’s exports (about $1 trillion in 2013), compared with less 
than 6 per cent ($1.5 billion) in 1984.
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China’s process of industrial upgrading displayed several turning points since the 
inception of reforms in 1978. The first of these appeared in 1986, when exports 
of textiles and clothing exceeded those of crude oil, indicating the transition 
from exporting resource-intensive products to labour-intensive manufactured 
goods. The second turning point was in 1995, when exports of machinery and 
electronics overtook those of textiles and clothing. This signified the transition 
from exporting labour-intensive goods to capital-intensive products. China’s 
entry to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001 indicated the third wave 
of upgrading, after which not only did product sophistication increase, but 
also high and new technology exports grew rapidly. Many Chinese exporters 
have through these transitions become an integral part of the global supply 
chains of large multinationals that lead the automobile, computer and aviation 
industries (Lin and Wang 2012). In 2014, China initiated several programs that 
worked on not only increasing value-added exports and moving up global value 
chains, but also encouraging firms to go global. Such programs include the ‘one 
belt and one road’ strategy, and supporting financial organisations proposed 
mainly by China: the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank, Silk Fund and the 
New Development Bank.
Development strategy and industrial policy
The role of development strategy and industrial policy in China’s structural 
upgrading is impossible to ignore (Ahrens 2013; Harrison and Rodriguze-
Clare 2010). Strategy and policy here refer to the ways in which and policy tools 
with which China’s government aims to build up the country’s manufacturing 
competitiveness. 
The key to China’s development strategy is following, not defying, comparative 
advantage (Lin and Wang 2012). This type of policy enabled China to selectively 
promote certain industries or activities with the aim of encouraging them 
to develop their latent/potential comparative advantage. The comparative 
advantage-following strategy should be taken not in a static but in a dynamic 
way, and a nation should not only follow the initial comparative advantages, 
but also create new comparative advantages over time. The Chinese Government 
has been playing a pivotal role in industrial development in developing such 
dynamic comparative advantages, although the importance of the market 
economy has grown. The government has, in particular, directed both domestic 
and foreign investment towards specifically targeted sectors as soon as the 
latent/potential comparative advantages began to appear. Investment promotion 
has mainly assumed the form of (public) investment in physical infrastructure, 
the provision of credit at preferential interest rates and fiscal incentives. 
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Compared with many developing economies, China’s strategy and industrial 
policy seem to be successful in enhancing industrial development and 
manufacturing upgrading. Before 1978, China’s comparative advantage was 
suppressed by its heavy industry-oriented development strategy. As heavy 
industries are capital intensive and incapable of absorbing more workers, 
employment opportunities in the industrial sector were limited in spite of 
large investments. The economic reforms introduced since 1978 put China’s 
development strategy more in line with its comparative advantages, in which 
priority was given to labour-intensive manufactures in order to take advantage 
of its abundant cheap labour (Lin and Wang 2012).
In addition to the comparative advantage-following strategy, China’s industrial 
policy in the past three decades emphasised principles of developing through 
industrialisation and long-term policy goals rather than random and short-
term behaviours. The policy contains the following elements: market-oriented 
industrial development, export-led manufacturing, FDI-led manufacturing, 
investing in infrastructure, and innovation through industrial agglomeration and 
large market-led business models. The current policy targets include developing 
the higher end of the global industry chain; promoting technological innovation 
and investing in research and development (R&D); increasing China’s discourse 
power in the global supply chain; raising the value of made-in-China brands 
through improving technology, management and marketing; changing from 
original equipment manufacturer (OEM) to original design manufacturer (ODM) 
and original brand manufacturer (OBM); changing from parts manufacturing 
to machine manufacturing; and changing from single-business globalisation to 
multiple-business globalisation.
China’s development strategy is premised on leveraging its advantages, including 
the size of its potential market and the low cost of its factor inputs—chiefly 
labour, but also the cost of land, electricity and raw materials. Over time, China 
has sought to add to these advantages by seeking to minimise its weaknesses 
(bureaucratic red tape, low-quality labour), upgrade its logistics capabilities and 
move up the technology value chain. China also seeks to leverage economies 
of scale, and it has made major investments in infrastructure and logistics to 
lower transportation costs and to speed the time to market for export products. 
The growth of China’s supply-chain cities—led by FDI-driven clusters in 
Guangdong and single-product clusters in Zhejiang—is a perfect illustration of 
how China’s government and enterprises are turning scale-driven specialisation 
into a persistent competitive advantage for the country. China has a coherent 
and multidimensional upgrading strategy to diversify its industrial mix and to 
add high-value activities. China is developing high-tech exports in a regionally 
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integrated fashion, based on complex networks of export production that 
link leading electronics multinational enterprises (MNEs) and their first-tier 
suppliers and global contract manufacturers.
Exports and foreign direct investment 
China and many other developing countries have pursued export-oriented 
and FDI-oriented strategies, but with different implications for industrial 
upgrading. While many developing countries followed a model associated with 
extensive privatisation and open markets, China has attained record levels of 
export growth and FDI inflows through a more statist approach to its industrial 
development. Liberalising imports alone was not considered to be sufficient to 
jump-start exports. The Chinese way has two equally important parts: economic 
system reform and the gradual opening of its markets to the outside world. 
Both are indispensable for achieving industrial growth.
The opening up of China’s trade and FDI occurred in five stages. The first 
(1979–87) was characterised by reforms to break the state monopoly in trade, 
to experiment with special economic zones (SEZs) and to provide incentives for 
exporters. Foreign borrowing and FDI were encouraged. In the second stage 
(1988–93), the responsibility system and the shared foreign exchange revenue 
system were introduced to promote exports, and the dual exchange rate system 
was implemented and import tariffs began to be reduced. The third stage (1994–
2001) witnessed further liberalisation in trade and FDI to prepare for WTO 
entry, including unifying the foreign exchange rate and reducing the tariff rate 
unilaterally from 40 per cent to 16 per cent. China’s entry to the WTO was the start 
of the fourth stage (2001–14). As China’s laws and institutions were conforming 
to international standards, trade and FDI inflows expanded dramatically (at an 
average annual rate of 35 per cent until 2007), and trade value exploded from 
$510 billion in 2001 to $2.174 trillion in 2007, and more than $4 trillion in 2014. 
The export structure was upgraded rapidly as well, making it comparable with 
that of a high-income rather than a developing economy (Rodrik 2006). The last 
stage began in 2014, with China ‘going global’: China overtook the United States 
as the largest trading nation; its outward FDI exceeded inward FDI; it proposed 
and established the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank; and initiated the ‘one 
belt and one road’ program to encourage closer links with the rest of the world.
Foreign investors played a vital role in providing the market connections for the 
types of products needed by the international market, and for accessing orders 
for exports and the technology suitable for the development stage of the country. 
Thus, labour-intensive industries were able to expand rapidly. China’s success 
has been a unique form of industrial organisation called supply-chain cities 
China’s Domestic Transformation in a Global Context
310
(Gereffi 2009), which has permitted it to achieve economies of both scale and 
scope in global value chains. China’s unique path is fascinating in its own right, 
but China’s escalating importance as a supplier, a market and recently as a source 
of outward FDI makes many countries in the world highly dependent on China’s 
future economic performance.
China also uses FDI to accelerate learning in new industries and knowledge 
spillovers in its domestic market. Despite restrictions imposed by the WTO 
against domestic performance requirements for MNEs, China’s local market is 
sufficiently attractive for multinational manufacturers that they are willing to 
comply with the wishes of local, regional and national government authorities, 
despite stringent technology transfer requirements.
Caveats for export structure and industrial 
upgrading
The title of ‘world’s factory’ was first applied to the United Kingdom during 
the Industrial Revolution, when that country was dominant in global industry. 
As the United States took off in the 1870s and surpassed the United Kingdom in 
terms of GDP, the United States became the world’s factory, especially after World 
War II, when the United States made up almost half of global GDP. The strong 
manufacturing performance of Germany and Japan (especially the latter’s 
industrial miracle in the 1970s) won the description of ‘world manufacturing 
centres’ for those countries.
How can China’s world-factory position and advanced export structure be 
assessed relative to traditional industrial powers. According to the data, 
China’s export composition resembles that of a country with an income per 
capita level three times higher than China’s (Rodrik 2006). The overlap between 
China’s exports to the United States and those of Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries to the United States increased 
from 15 per  cent in 1994 to 21 per cent in 2005 (Schott 2008). Two caveats 
should be noted. One is that foreign-invested enterprises (FIEs) have played 
a very important role in China’s expansion and industrial upgrading. The FIE 
share of China’s exports rose from less than 10 per cent to 60 per cent in 1985–
2007, and fell but remained at 50 per cent in 2013. FIE export share in high-
technology goods is even higher. More than 90 per cent of China’s high-tech 
exports to the United States were produced by FIEs, and about 65 per cent of 
China’s high-tech exports to the United States were from various policy zones 
in China (Schott, 2008).
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Another caveat relates to processing trade. A large share of China’s exports 
involves assembling duty-free imported inputs for export in processing trade 
zones. The share of processing trade in China’s exports rose from 47 per cent in 
1992 to 55 per cent in 2007, before falling to 42 per cent in 2013. In the high 
export growth machinery sector, most of this growth is indeed due to growth 
in processing trade. More than 95 per cent of China’s high-tech exports were 
processing exports during 1995–2006, and 90 per cent of China’s expanding 
high-tech exports to the United States are in processing trade (Rodrik 2006 and 
Schott 2008).
Nevertheless, even after taking account of these caveats—that is, small value 
added in vertical integration and processing trade—China is still likely to 
outperform all other countries in export structure and industrial upgrading.
In sum, China has come a long way in upgrading, but it has been only partially 
successful. China has become competitive with industrial countries in high-tech 
sectors, but it still has a long way to go to climb the technological ladder.
Conclusion
This chapter studies China’s manufacturing performance and industrial 
development in 1978–2014, focusing on two issues: the global position of 
Chinese industry and the main drivers of China’s rapid industrial growth. 
Taking advantage of recent UNIDO (2015) data on cross-country industrial 
competitiveness, we assess China’s industrial development based on eight 
indicators grouped into three dimensions (industrial capacity, industrial 
intensity and industrial quality). The main conclusions from this work are 
1) China’s large manufacturing success is manifested mainly in volume, although 
further development will depend on industrial quality; and 2) China’s industrial 
development has been driven by development strategy and industrial policy, 
and success in exports and FDI. 
International comparisons suggest advantages and disadvantages for China in 
industrial development. The advantages include strong and effective central 
government, abundant and cheap but productive labour, a huge and growing 
domestic market, high quality of infrastructure, and a culture of patience, 
persistence, innovation and frugality. The disadvantages include lack of 
innovation and therefore dependence on Western technology, low value added 
due to processing/assembly manufacturing at the bottom of the ‘smiling 
curve’, and weaknesses in logistics, marketing and sales channels. The future 
of China’s manufacturing represents the future of emerging economies and the 
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future of the world. There is still a long way to go for China to transform from 
a manufacturing giant to a centre of manufacturing quality. Innovation and 
operational excellence are the keys to the transformation.
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13. China Becomes a Capital 
Exporter
Trends and issues
Mei (Lisa) Wang, Zhen Qi and Jijing Zhang
Introduction
The rapid rise of China’s outbound direct investment (ODI) in the past decade is a 
significant economic phenomenon. According to China’s Ministry of Commerce, 
in 2014 Chinese companies invested US$116 billion in 156 countries—about 
45 times more than in 2002. If new investments by Chinese companies with 
an existing foreign presence abroad were included, China’s ODI in 2014 would 
have exceeded inbound FDI by about US$20 billion—that is, China became 
a net capital exporting country in 2014 (Ministry of Commerce 2015). 
The surge in China’s ODI has in fact encountered a lot of resistance in some 
destination countries. Questions arise about Chinese companies’ investment 
motivations, and there are concerns expressed about Chinese ODI approaches. 
Moreover, some consider Chinese investment a threat. Former  minister of 
commerce  Deming Chen suggests that only one-third of China’s intended 
investments in the United States receive approval from authorities 
(Hornby 2013). In other words, there is a large share of potential Chinese ODI 
that has failed to go abroad. Similarly, there is the potential of significant benefit, 
for China and destination countries, in better understanding China’s ODI.
This chapter addresses selective concerns about Chinese companies and the 
resistance they have encountered in their ODI experiences. It particularly 
focuses on the fact that a significant share of China’s outbound investment is 
by state-owned firms. The background to China’s state-owned enterprise (SOE) 
reform process explains why and how SOEs have behaved in making ODI. 
The chapter also discusses the new round of SOE reforms and the implications 
for the future development of China’s ODI. The aim of this is both to facilitate 
China’s globalisation process and to enable destination countries to benefit from 
Chinese ODI potential by having a clear understanding of the institutional 
background against which Chinese SOEs have participated in ODI.
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The chapter has three further sections. Section two analyses trends and discusses 
issues in Chinese ODI focusing on SOEs’ motivations and political connections 
in determining ODI. Section three discusses the new round of SOE reform and 
the implications for Chinese ODI. We then discuss and conclude in section four.
Trends and issues in China’s ODI
Trends in China’s ODI
Recent trends
Since the period of opening-up and reform, China’s outbound FDI has moved in 
four phases. The first, early in the reform period, from 1980 to 1990, was when 
ODI was negligible (Figure 13.1). China’s goal at that time was solely to attract 
inbound investment. From 1991 to 2000, ODI was similarly limited, reaching 
just US$2.3 billion in the period (Figure 13.1).
Figure 13.1 Four stages of China’s ODI
Source: Foreign direct investment data set compiled by United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD).
In 2001, China’s economy shifted from being just ‘open’ towards also being 
outbound. First, China became a member of the World Trade Organization 
(WTO). Second, the Chinese Government launched its ‘going out’ policy, which 
encouraged ODI via selective incentives. This marks the third phase of China’s 
ODI development (Figure 13.1). Specifically, from 2001 to 2007, China’s ODI rose 
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to US$10.6 billion. This is 4.6 times the level of ODI in 1991–2000. In the years 
since the global financial crisis (GFC), however, China’s ODI has grown at an 
extraordinary rate (Figure 13.1).
Figure 13.2 illustrates the dramatic rise in China’s ODI flows. From 2002 to 2013, 
it grew at a compound rate of some 40 per cent (Figure 13.2).1 Average annual 
ODI since the GFC has reached US$74 billion—seven times the level of ODI in 
2001–07 (Figure 13.2). Since some research has highlighted that a good share of 
China’s ODI passes through Hong Kong or is otherwise excluded from national 
statistics, these levels could be far higher. 
Figure 13.2 China’s ODI flows, 1980–2013
Source: UNCTAD.
By the end of 2013, China’s ODI flow and stock were US$101 billion and 
US$614 billion, respectively, ranking China at number three and number 12 in 
the world, respectively. China ranks first among developing countries in both 
categories.
Future prospects2
China’s ODI has developed rapidly in the past decade. There is vast potential for 
additional ODI growth. 
The ‘investment development path’ theory is based on an empirical analysis of 
67 countries in the period 1967–78 (Dunning 1981), which found a tendency for 
net ODI to be cyclical around the level of economic development. Between a gross 
1  Because the flow was unusually low in 2000 and unusually high in 2001, the flow in 2002 was used. 
2  The work is based on Professor Fan Gang’s advice. 
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national product (GNP) per capita range of US$5,000 and US$10,000, ODI tends 
to reach a transition point where it surpasses the level of inbound investment—
that is, the net outward investment (NOI) becomes positive, and the country 
becomes a net direct investment exporter. 
In China’s case, GNP per capita reached US$5,680 in 2012, at which point China’s 
outbound investment was still less than its inbound FDI by US$27.5 billion. 
It was not until 2014, when China’s gross domestic product (GDP) per capita 
reached $7,485, that China’s NOI become positive. In line with the per capita 
range identified by Dunning (1981), China’s ODI surge is in the mid range of the 
theory’s predictions. 
Looking forward, it is estimated that China’s ODI will increase at the annual 
compound growth rate of 19–22 per cent in the decade from 2013 (Wang 2014).3 
This would make the total increased volume of China’s ODI during 2013–20 
between US$2.5 trillion and US$3.6 trillion (Figure 13.3). The estimates of Wang 
(2014) are higher than Rhodium Group’s estimate of US$1–2 trillion, but lower 
than that of the Hong Kong Institute for Monetary Research (HKIMR), which 
puts the figure at US$4.6 trillion (Figure 13.4).4
Whatever the precise level, China’s ODI is set to keep growing rapidly in the 
next decade. 
3  See detailed analysis in Wang (2014).
4  HKIMR’s estimation is based on very optimistic assumptions. For example, they assume that China’s 
average GDP growth rate is 8.4 per cent during 2012–15 and 7 per cent during 2016–20. The authors’ 
assumption is 7 per cent during 2013–17 and 6.5 per cent during 2018–22. 
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Figure 13.3 Estimated annual flow of Chinese ODI, 2013–22 (US$ billion)
Source: Wang (2014).
Figure 13.4 Comparison of China’s future ODI estimations, 2013–22 
(US$ trillion)
NERI = National Economic Research Institute. 
Note: Estimation by Rhodium and HKIMR is for the period 2011–20.  
Sources: Rhodium from Rosen and Hanemann (2011); Hong Kong Institute for Monetary Research 
(HKIMR) from He et al. (2012). 
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China is not the only developing country with surging ODI levels. As the share 
of global GDP of developing economies has grown and per capita incomes 
have risen into the US$5,000–10,000 range identified by Dunning (1981), so 
too has their collective ODI. Figure 13.5 charts developing-country ODI across 
40 years—from almost nothing to more than one-third of total global ODI. 
Figure 13.5 ODI of developing countries
Source: UNCTAD.
Figure 13.6 illustrates ODI trends among several of the largest emerging market 
economies, the BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India and China), in particular 
after the GFC. About the time of the GFC, China’s ODI surpassed Russia’s to 
become number one amongst these four countries.
Figure 13.6 BRIC ODI
BRIC = Brazil, Russia, India and China. 
Source: UNCTAD.
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Traditional ODI theories were developed primarily around developed-country 
ODI as, until the turn of the century, these ODI flows dominated global ODI. 
There is an insufficient comparative body of research on ODI between developing 
countries to understand whether these earlier theories still provide an ideal 
framework for analysis in this new, more varied global ODI landscape. Indeed, 
in this new landscape, there are cases where developing countries have become 
the largest investors in developed economies—for example, the case of Chinese 
ODI into Australia. 
Issues in China’s ODI
Dominance of SOEs
As noted earlier, the rapid growth of China’s ODI has led to concern in some 
host destinations. These concerns come from not only the media and the general 
public, but also governments, scholars and other analysts. A leading concern is 
the high share of China’s ODI by Chinese SOEs. 
The ODI of China is in fact dominated by SOEs, even though it is not easy 
to confirm this using official data. Specifically, China’s official ODI data list 
numerous state-owned or state-controlled corporations under the broader 
classification of ‘corporation’, from which it is not possible to distinguish 
whether these corporations are state or privately owned. 
Our attempt to explore SOE ODI relies on data compiled by the US-based 
Heritage Foundation’s China global investment tracker (HF 2015), which has 
recorded Chinese ODI and contracts of more than US$100 million since 2005. 
That this series from the HF tracks only transactions of more than US$100 million 
suggests that non-SOEs’ investment—mostly smaller transactions—is under-
represented. On the other hand, as an unofficial tracker, it could also miss some 
SOE investments. We assume the HF data are representative. 
By the end of 2013, according to the foreign direct investment dataset compiled 
by United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), China’s 
ODI stock was US$614 billion, while HF records China’s ODI (excluding the 
contracts) as US$476 billion between 2005 and 2013. This suggests the HF data 
capture some 78 per cent of China’s ODI, even though its record starts only from 
2005. It is not known whether the difference relates to large investments that 
were not included in the HF dataset or whether the difference is made up of ODI 
transactions below the US$100 million limit of the tracker.
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Based on the HF dataset, we identify companies one by one and categorise 
them as SOEs and non-SOEs. The dominance of SOEs within Chinese ODI is 
obvious, especially before 2009 (Figure 13.7). According to our calculations, 
between 2005 and 2013, 89.4 per cent of the US$807.5 billion of Chinese ODI 
and contracts were linked to SOEs. 
With an estimated 90 per cent of China’s ODI from SOEs, demystifying SOEs is 
the key to understanding Chinese ODI. Among the concerns of ODI recipient 
countries is that SOE ODI is driven by the Chinese Government, and in turn 
motivated by political and state-based strategic considerations, not commercial 
ones. That generates fear that SOE investment is potentially harmful to the 
national interest of destination countries. 
Figure 13.7 ODI by China and Chinese SOEs above US$100 million 
Note: The value here includes both investments and contracts, so the value here is larger than the 
UNCTAD data. On average, 59 per cent is investments and the rest are contracts. 
Source: Heritage Foundation (2015); and authors’ calculations.
These concerns are understandable. China’s rising ODI is new. Traditionally, ODI 
has moved between Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) countries, and from OECD countries to developing countries. In the case 
of China’s ODI, China is not only a developing country but also a transitional 
economy. It is not a member of the OECD. This means that China’s ODI comes from 
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an economy with a unique system that is not easy to understand. Understanding 
it demands energy, time and interest in learning about it. Of  course, some 
concerns could be protectionism in disguise.
Regulatory environment confronting China’s ODI 
In response to such concerns, the overseas regulatory environment confronting 
China’s ODI is getting tougher, especially towards SOEs. For example, following 
the passage of the US Foreign Investment and National Security Act of 2007, 
Australia also issued new foreign investment guidelines, in 2008, while Canada 
introduced an amendment to the Investment Canada Act in 2009. All have made 
SOEs’ investments in their domestic markets more difficult. 
In the United States, 2012 marked a shift in the apparent scrutiny of Chinese 
investment in that country. That year, the number of Chinese transactions 
reviewed by the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) 
jumped 109 per cent—from 11 transactions in 2011 to 23 in 2012 (CFIUS 2012). 
China accounted for 20 per cent of the total transactions covered by CFIUS 
(Figure 13.8) (CFIUS 2012). In comparison, China’s investment in the United 
States comprised only 2.5 per cent of total FDI in the United States that year 
(UNCTAD). 
Figure 13.8 Chinese transactions covered by the Committee on Foreign 
Investment in the United States
Sources: US Treasury Department; Rhodium Group; authors’ calculations.
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Figure 13.9 illustrates the characteristics of Chinese ODI in the United States 
in the third quarter of 2014, which is after the investment review process 
was tightened. In this quarter, SOEs’ investment in the United States almost 
disappeared (Hanemann and Gao 2014).
Figure 13.9 Typology of Chinese entities investing in the United States, Q3 2014
Source: Hanemann and Gao (2014). 
In addition to investments reviewed by CFIUS, many proposed transactions 
were withdrawn by Chinese companies before the review stage, after informal 
exchanges with regulatory agencies or their legal advisors. These abandoned 
bids are unknown to the public. Deming Chen, former Chinese minister of 
commerce, said in March 2013, ‘[r]oughly one dollar of every three dollars we 
want to invest in the U.S. gets approved’ (Hornby 2013).
Let us take an example of how process affects Chinese investment attempts in 
the United States. In July 2012, CITIC Securities, the biggest securities house 
in China, announced that it had approved its subsidiary, CITIC Securities 
International, to purchase 100 per cent of equity in Credit Lyonnais Securities 
Asia (CLSA),5 for US$1.25 billion. The transaction was closed a year later, in 
late July 2013. One of the main causes of the delay was that the US Government 
was against the transaction—because CITIC Securities’ biggest shareholder was 
CITIC Group (which owns 20 per cent of CITIC Securities) and CITIC Group is 
owned by China’s Ministry of Finance. The US Government does not want a US 
company—CLSA Americas LLC—to be controlled by the Chinese Government. 
5  CLSA is a brokerage firm that used to be owned by Credit Lyonnais, a French company. 
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The deal was only approved when China’s Vice-Premier Wang Yang personally 
raised the issue during the fifth round of the US–China Strategic and Economic 
Dialogue, held in early July 2013. 
In 2012, a US$15 billion acquisition of Canadian company Nexen by China’s 
third-largest oil company, China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC), 
was considered by many as a breakthrough for China’s overseas investment. 
Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper, when announcing approval of the 
deal in December 2012, said that the government had been making efforts to 
reduce state ownership in economic sectors, but the energy sector had been made 
an exception in being bought and controlled by foreign governments instead. 
Although China’s CNOOC, as an SOE, has received approval for the Nexen deal, 
it was followed by the Canadian Government indicating that it intends to impose 
stricter rules in future for foreign state-owned companies acquiring Canadian 
companies. CFIUS has also barred CNOOC from operating Nexen’s Gulf of Mexico 
oilfields. In 2013, Lenovo, a leading private computer company in China, which 
some consider a state-supported enterprise (The  Economist 2012),  attempted 
to acquire Blackberry, but the deal was rejected by the Canadian Government. 
There is new uncertainty about trade and investment policies. The United 
States is leading the formation of Asia’s biggest trade and investment agreement, 
the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), but without the inclusion of China—the 
region’s largest economy. An article in The Economist considers this initiative 
nonsensical (The Economist 2014). A former US undersecretary of state Robert 
Hormats has linked the TPP to restrictions on investments by SOEs and SSEs 
[state-supported enterprises] that, he says, may have an unfair competitive 
advantage in the US or in third countries, through anti-competitive practices 
which require ‘a robust and effective policy response’. The TPP, in his view, is a 
significant opportunity to move the SOE issue forward (Hormats 2011).
In order to clarify SOEs’ motivations in ODI, it is necessary to investigate SOE 
reform and the principal–agent problem.
The evolving role of SOEs 
At the end of 2013, there were 156,000 SOEs (incorporated enterprises, not 
corporation groups) in China. Among them, 52,000 were central SOEs (some of 
them are subsidiaries of 112 central SOE groups, which are under the supervision 
of the State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission; some 
were SOEs affiliated with central ministries, such as the Ministry of Finance), 
and 104,000 were provincial or other local SOEs. The total number of SOE 
employees was about 37 million, 18 million of whom were employed by central 
SOEs, and 19 million by local SOEs (Ministry of Finance 2014). 
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At the end of 2013, the combined assets of SOEs stood at RMB104 trillion 
(US$17 trillion)—up 16.3 per cent year-on-year (yoy); and the total outstanding 
debt was RMB67.1 trillion (US$10.9 trillion)—up 16.7 per cent yoy. In 2013, SOEs’ 
operating revenue rose 10.8 per cent to RMB47.1 trillion (US$7.7 trillion), and 
profits increased 5.3 per cent to RMB2.6 trillion (US$400 billion). The companies 
paid a total of RMB3.8 trillion (US$620 billion) in taxes in 2013—up 5.4 per cent 
yoy (Ministry of Finance 2014). 
In the past 30 years, Chinese SOEs have undergone a series of reforms, including 
on bankruptcy, mergers and acquisitions. From the first SOE bankruptcy, of 
Shenyang Explosion in 1986, to the first SOE listing, of China Communications 
Construction Company, on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange in 2006, and the first 
SOE (CITIC) moving its headquarters to Hong Kong in 2014, the Chinese SOEs 
have undergone profound changes. 
At the core of this is change to the management system and operating modality. 
At the beginning of the 1980s, Chinese SOEs were directly attached to the 
government bodies that, in turn, were deeply involved in SOE operations. 
During the 1980s and 1990s, initial reforms were carried out to separate 
the government’s ownership from management’s operating role. Early last 
decade, nine government bodies engaged in managing SOEs were abolished. 
The resistance to these reforms was immense. Then Premier Zhu Rongji declared 
‘I am willing to risk my life to carry this reform through’. 
From 1998 to 2006, the number of SOEs decreased by 59 per cent, from more 
than 60,000 to less than 30,000. The number of people employed by SOEs fell 
from about 37 million to about 18 million (Shao 2007). Many small and medium 
SOEs have been privatised.
In 2003, the Chinese Government established the State-Owned Assets 
Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC). SASAC is the SOE 
empowered to execute regulatory authority over and determine the rights of 
SOEs. Unlike former regulators, SASAC enjoys consolidated powers over SOE 
regulation—there has been a massive shift from fragmented to concentrated 
regulatory power. This new regulatory regime exerts a subtle influence on SOEs’ 
behaviour, the detailed mechanism for which will be discussed in the section 
exploring SOEs’ motivations. 
In 2006, SASAC issued the ‘Guiding Opinions on Pushing Forward the 
Adjustment of State-Owned Capital and Merger and Acquisition of State-
Owned Enterprises’. The document made it clear that if central SOEs did not 
rank among the top three of their industry, they would be merged and acquired. 
The goal then was to reduce the number of central SOEs from 155 to between 
80 and 100. 
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Eight years later, in 2014, there were 112 central SOE groups. In the intervening 
years, the SOE performance evaluation criteria set up by SASAC was revised 
several times, with profit-making at its core. By 2013, there were about 260 
SOEs listed overseas, and 953 SOEs listed on the domestic stock market (People’s 
Daily 2013). 
Therefore, after a series of reforms, SOEs’ motivations and political connections 
have been reshaped. 
Is SOE ODI commercially motivated?
Many scholars have undertaken comprehensive analyses of whether SOEs are 
commercially motivated (for example, Cornish 2012; Downs 2007; Drysdale 2011; 
Drysdale and Findlay 2009; Hanemann and Rosen 2012; Rosen and Hanemann 
2011). These scholars have concluded that that SOEs are generally commercially 
motivated, but concerns remain. There is a spectrum of SOE behaviours, and 
this leads to a spectrum of different views. 
Central SOEs: China CNR versus China CSR
China CNR and China CSR are both leading companies in the rail rolling stock 
industry in China. Both are centrally owned SOEs and both are listed on the 
Hong Kong and Shanghai stock exchanges. 
In the second half of 2012, Argentina announced a decision to purchase a fleet 
of city rail cars. China CNR, Alstom and several other companies participated in 
the bid. China CNR’s bid price was US$2.3 million per car, and other companies’ 
bid prices were about US$2 million per car. This prompted China CSR to 
approach Argentina with a lower bid, of US$1.27 million per car. Ignoring the 
Chinese Government’s request that it should first register at the China Chamber 
of Commerce for the Import and Export of Machinery and Electronic Products 
(CCCME), China CSR ultimately won the contract to supply 409 cars to Argentina 
for a total of US$514 million. 
The reason for China CSR’s bid being much lower was that its car design was 
for an older model and its car parts would be made in China, while China CNR’s 
bid was for a newer car model and the car parts would be imported. As a result, 
China CSR was able to make a profit at its low bid price. Furthermore, China CSR 
was at the time short of orders and facing operating difficulties.6 
6  The two companies were merged by the end of 2014. One of the purposes was to avoid the harmful cut-
throat competition between them. 
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SOE versus a privately owned enterprise: Zoomlion and Sany
Zoomlion and Sany are both leading public companies in the construction 
machinery industry in China. Zoomlion is listed on both the Hong Kong and the 
Shanghai stock exchanges. Sany is listed only on the Shanghai Stock Exchange.
Zoomlion is a provincial government company, operating under the auspices of 
the Hunan Assets Supervision and Administration Commission. Zoomlion was 
established in 1992. It had been growing at a compound annual rate of 65 per 
cent for 20 years. 
Sany is a privately owned enterprise (POE)—that is, founded and owned by 
private individuals, with chairman Liang Wengen as its controlling shareholder. 
Sany was established in 1994 and has been growing at about 50 per cent annually. 
It was selected by the Financial Times as one of the FT Global 500 in July 2011, 
becoming the only Chinese machinery company on the list.
In November 2007, the Italian company CIFA, the world’s third-largest concrete 
machinery company, launched a public auction for its shares. Zoomlion and 
Sany both submitted bids in January 2008. Zoomlion partnered with Goldman 
Sachs and won the bid. Afterwards, the chairman of Zoomlion said that even 
though the timing of the bid was not good (on the eve of the GFC), it could not 
let CIFA fall into the hands competitors. 
Another example from Europe is from late 2011. When German company 
Putzmeister, the world’s number one brand in concrete machinery, was looking 
for a buyer in December 2011, Zoomlion and Sany both received invitations 
to bid. Even though Zoomlion was the only company with approval from the 
National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) to participate in the bid, 
Sany partnered with CITIC PE and succeeded in acquiring Putzmeister in a 
record 33 days.
These two cases are examples of Chinese SOEs competing fiercely with each 
other and with POEs. They also illustrate how SOEs and POEs do not necessarily 
follow the coordinating efforts of the Chinese Government to enhance their own 
business as independent commercial entities. 
How do political elements influence SOEs’ ODI? 
Being state-owned, SOEs are clearly connected closely with the government and 
politics. However, this does not necessarily mean that SOEs’ behaviour reflects 
their owners’ policy purposes. Twisted by the complicated principal–agent 
problem, SOEs tend to pursue their own rather than their owners’ objectives. 
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It is essential to understand SOEs’ principal–agent problem. There are three 
tiers to the SOE principal–agent system: the nation or all people as principal are 
located on the top; as agents, the SOEs’ managers are at the bottom of the three 
tiers; the regulators, who exercise SOE owners’ authority and rights on behalf 
of the principal, are in the middle. 
Within this system, regulators play multiple and significant roles. On behalf of 
the whole nation, they scrutinise SOE investment proposals, select and assign 
SOE managers, inspect SOE productivity, examine SOE restructuring plans, 
and evaluate senior managers’ performances, as well as other performance 
or proposals. In other words, the regulators are involved in and exert subtle 
influence on SOEs’ operation. 
As the bridge connecting the SOE owners with SOE managers, regulators have 
dual characters: economic and political. By changing the regulatory structure 
and political environment, the nation or government can exert influence on 
regulators’ incentives and also constrain their behaviour. The changed behaviour 
of regulators in turn affects the SOEs’ behaviour and performance.
Regulatory regime change 
We divide the regulatory regime into ‘separated regime’ and ‘integrated regime’ 
according to the degree of concentration of regulatory power. The regulatory 
regime is integrated where fewer regulators enjoy a higher concentration of 
power. The regime is regulated where there are more regulators and a lower 
concentration of power. 
Since the market-oriented reforms introduced in 1978, Chinese SOEs’ regulatory 
regime has been changing dramatically. The main trend since the reforms began 
in 1978 is towards consolidating what were decentralised regulatory powers. 
There has been incremental transition from a separated regime to an integrated 
regime. 
The regulatory regime transition since 1982 can be divided into two periods 
that pivot around 2003, the year in which the creation of SASAC led to greater 
concentration of regulatory power. From 1982 to 2003, there were for the 
most part four SOE regulators: the State Economic and Trade Commission 
for examining SOEs’ reform and reconstruction; the Ministry of Finance for 
asset management and financial supervision; the Ministry of Organisation for 
selecting and assigning SOE managers; and the Central Work Committee for Large 
Enterprises, ensuring the implementation of the party’s policies. There were 
also 10 specialised industrial ministries depending on the year, including the 
Ministry of Textiles, Ministry of Coal and Ministry of Mechanical Engineering 
Industry. These took responsibility for their corresponding industry’s planning, 
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coordination and supervision. Generally, before 2003, the regulatory power 
was distributed among various regulators, which can be called ‘a separated 
regulatory regime’ as compared with ‘an integrated regime’, to be discussed 
next.
In 2003, SASAC was established, consolidating all the powers of the State 
Economic and Trade Commission, Ministry of Finance, Central Work Committee 
for Large Enterprises, Ministry of Organization, and so on. This in turn means 
that SASAC monopolises all regulatory powers over SOEs. Consequently, the 
period after 2003 can be viewed as an integrated regulatory regime, taking the 
concentration of regulatory power into consideration. 
According to Qi et al. (2015), there is a trade-off in these regime choices. A more 
decentralised, separated regime has comparative advantage in reducing the risks 
of collusion between regulators and SOEs. An integrated and more centralised 
regime has comparative advantage in effective use of regulatory powers. 
There is a free-riding problem in the separated regulatory regime. When 
regulatory powers are shared by several regulators, responsibility for success 
and failure is diffused amongst all players. In the separated or decentralised 
regulatory regime, Chinese SOEs repeatedly complained that all the regulators 
would claim success when their SOEs outperformed expectations, but avoid 
responsibility when SOEs underperformed. Regulators in the separated regime 
do not have sufficient incentive to promote good performance in the SOE, 
including when that would involve expanding domestically or internationally. 
The establishment of SASAC resolved the problem of free-riding, because 
reward or punishment for good or bad performance goes to the sole regulator. 
Regulators’ reputations for competence are enhanced by successful expansion 
into more mature and competitive foreign markets. Promoting ODI is also a way 
for regulators to respond to the national strategy of ‘going out’, and by so doing, 
to accumulate credits for future promotion. 
The Chinese national strategy of ‘going out’ was initiated in the late 1990s, 
but was not implemented effectively until a decade later. According to the 
mechanism described above, only if the related government departments’ 
incentive problems were solved properly could the ‘going out’ strategy be 
implemented effectively. The establishment of SASAC solved the incentive 
problems, assisting the acceleration of SOEs’ ODI after the mid-2000s.
Another concern of SOE regulation is the need for mechanisms to prevent 
collusion between regulators and SOEs. The state delegates to regulators so that 
they can supervise SOE behaviour. This in turn mitigates the SOE principal–
agent problem, although it does not completely remove it. In the process of 
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regulation, the regulators can potentially collude with the SOEs they regulate 
for their own benefit and at the expense of the state. For regulators, collusion 
has at least two faces: bribery and the ‘revolving door’.
Corruption related to a regulator’s abuse of power is not uncommon in the Chinese 
state sector. This can be indirectly demonstrated by the dozens of SOE officials 
who have been investigated and charged during the national anti-corruption 
campaign that was instigated in 2013. The revolving-door phenomenon is also a 
salient problem in the Chinese state sector. According to the Unirule Institute of 
Economics (2011), among 19 ministries and commissions, 30.6 per cent of the 183 
leaders with at least the rank of Vice Minister have at some point been employed 
by an SOE. Zhou (2010) shows that among the SOEs listed on the Chinese A 
Share Market, 1,142 senior corporate executives—some 50 per cent—used to 
serve as government officials. 
The revolving door gives regulatory officials an incentive to collude with SOEs. 
They can, for example, avoid strictly imposing regulation to keep a friendly 
relationship with their potential SOE’s colleagues. 
While the integrated regulator has a stronger incentive to perform well and 
is less constrained than separated regulators in using regulatory powers, the 
separated regime regulators can check and balance one another. The checks and 
balances reduce the risk of collusion (Qi 2015).
Collusion, causes losses to the SOE owners—for example, through approval of 
inefficient investments. However, extra costs are incurred when owners try to 
police this kind of collusion.
As the Chinese regulatory regime changed from a separated to an integrated 
regime, SOE regulators had stronger incentives to promote SOEs’ ODI. SOEs’ 
investments have increased dramatically since the establishment of SASAC in 
2003. However, possible collusion between the regulator and SOE under the 
SASAC regime can lead to lower quality ODI. Low-quality ODI could contribute 
to SOE ODI growth, but lower the efficiency of Chinese ODI as a whole.
Political environment 
The second factor that influences regulator incentives and constraints is the 
political environment. Currently, the biggest factors that influence government 
officials’ inventiveness and constraint are the breadth and depth of the ongoing 
national anti-corruption effort. 
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China’s corruption problem is severe. In 2014, China ranked 100th among 
175 countries on the Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions 
Index—on par with Algeria and Suriname. Corruption can lead to low-quality 
investment—domestically and internationally—and so impose a cost on the 
SOE owner and the Chinese economy.
Since 2013, Chinese President Xi Jinping has overseen a high-profile anti-
corruption campaign. This has targeted hundreds of thousands of officials at all 
levels of government and in the state-owned sector. As of 2015, it had executed 
cases involving 100 high-level officials, including several very senior executives 
of SOEs, and punished more than 70,000 officials for violations of the eight-
point anti-graft rules. More than 200,000 petty officials have also been targeted. 
Considering the number of officials punished and the scale of scrutiny, this anti-
corruption campaign is considered the toughest in China for 30 years.
The scale of this anti-corruption action has had several consequences for China’s 
SOE ODI. It slows SOE ODI growth, but ultimately enhances its efficiency. 
According to the analysis framework we have applied here, the regulator’s 
incentive for promoting ODI partially comes from benefits from collusion. 
In an environment with intense anti-corruption efforts, regulators’ and SOEs’ 
collusive behaviour is easier to investigate—that is, regulator incentives to 
collude with SOEs have been compressed by anti-corruption actions. Reduction 
of the expected benefits from collusion discourages regulator and SOE collusion, 
and reduces inefficient investments. 
Our analysis shows that SOE behaviour is affected by political elements such as 
the regulatory regime and the political environment. The perceptions of some 
destination countries differ from the actual behaviour of SOEs not only because 
the State sees value in good commercial performance of the companies which 
it owns, but also because principal–agent problems means the managers do not 
always follow the objectives of the State.
Chinese SOEs cannot be compared with those three decades ago during the 
central planning era. Moreover, SOEs keep changing as the reforms grow 
broader and deeper over time. 
SOE reform: Implications for China’s ODI
At the Third Plenary Session of the Eighteenth Communist Party of China Central 
Committee, held in November 2013, ‘The Decision on Major Issues Concerning 
Comprehensively Deepening Reforms’ was adopted. SOE reforms make up a key 
element of reforms within the decision. 
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The main components of this next round of SOE reforms include developing 
a mixed-ownership economy, improving the state-owned asset management 
system, improving SOE governance and management systems, and strengthening 
the budget system for state-owned capital operation.
Developing a mixed-ownership economy, in particular, is central to the new round 
of SOE reforms. Mixed ownership refers to allowing more SOEs and enterprises of 
other ownership types to develop into mixed-ownership enterprises. This means 
allowing private capital to invest in state-owned capital investment projects, and 
allowing mixed-ownership enterprises to adopt employee stock ownership so as 
to align the interests of capital owners and workers. 
Currently, the overall design of the SOE reform is being studied and 
developed under the leadership of a unit within the Central Leading Group for 
Comprehensively Deepening Reform,7 chaired by President Xi. Key questions of 
the reform being discussed and explored include how and what share private 
capital can take in SOEs, how senior management might be allowed to hold 
stocks, and how state-owned capital investment and operating companies can 
be established. On the final point, the question is whether to transform existing 
central SOEs into separate holding and operating companies, or to divide central 
SOEs into different groups, with the larger and stronger ones sponsoring and 
establishing holding and operating companies. 
A number of central SOEs have already started reforms within the new policies. 
For example, the board of China Petroleum & Chemical Corporation (Sinopec)—
China’s largest manufacturer and supplier of petroleum products and major 
petrochemical products—approved a plan to restructure its fuel retail business 
and invite private capital to form a mixed-ownership company. The shareholding 
percentage allocated to private capital is up to 30 per cent (Shanghai Securities 
Daily 2014). 
Separately, in October 2013, Sinopec announced it would look for investors for 
its Monteny and Duvernay shale gas projects in Canada, which Sinopec acquired 
in 2011. The hope is that this will lower Sinopec’s own capital requirement and 
also speed up development of the projects. The Canadian Minister of National 
Resources commented that this SOE was operating just like a commercial entity, 
in buying, selling and bringing in investors (Reuters 2013). 
A second example is from China’s largest oil and gas producer and distributor, 
PetroChina. In March 2014, PetroChina announced it would establish six 
separate platforms for its undeveloped reserves, unconventional oil, gas, 
transmission, refinery (onshore and offshore) and financial businesses. It plans 
7  The unit’s name is Economic System and Ecological Civilization System Reform Group.
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to use the production share model to bring in private capital and push for a 
mixed-ownership system. This reform reflects PetroChina’s desire to open the 
entire business chain, and also to outcompete Sinopec. 
In the power sector, China Power Investment Corporation (CPI Corp), one 
of the five largest state-owned electricity producers in China, announced in 
March 2013 that it would allow private capital to invest in some of its subsidiaries 
and projects. This would extend to up to one-third of the total share capital. 
CITIC Pacific’s acquisition of CITIC Limited in March 2013 caught the market’s 
attention. The acquisition process involved CITIC Group injecting most of its 
operating businesses, currently held by CITIC Limited, into its Hong Kong-listed 
subsidiary company, CITIC Pacific (Figure 13.10). The deal would be the largest 
asset injection into a Hong Kong-listed company from the Chinese mainland.
Figure 13.10 CITIC before and after the acquisition
Source: CITIC.
The ‘new’ CITIC headquarters will be in Hong Kong. As a Hong Kong-listed 
company, the new CITIC will be subject to the more mature legal system of 
Hong  Kong and similarly to the higher supervision standards of Hong Kong 
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regulators and media. This will help make its operations and finances more 
transparent, and will also improve its management system and corporate 
governance. Changes will include adopting an employee stock option plan, 
recruiting senior management from the market, lowering the government’s 
ownership share and attracting more private and overseas capital. 
On 15 July 2014, SASAC announced pilot reforms applying to six central SOEs, 
including State Development and Investment Corp, China National Cereals, Oils 
and Foodstuffs Corporation (COFCO), Sinopharm, China Construction, China 
Energy Conservation and Environmental Protection Group, and Xinxing Cathay 
International Group. The pilot projects include 1) transforming central SOEs 
into state-owned capital investment companies; 2) developing central SOEs 
into mixed-ownership companies; and 3) giving central SOE boards the right 
to recruit senior management personnel from the market, and to assess their 
performance and determine compensation independently. 
At the provincial level, almost all of the 32 provinces and municipalities have 
publicly announced SOE reform plans. For example, Gree Electric Appliances 
Inc., a provincially owned entity in Guangdong and a leading electric appliances 
company in China, will transfer up to 49 per cent of its shares to investors 
through an open bidding process. These plans received positive reactions from 
capital markets. 
What’s new in this round of SOE reform? 
Mixed ownership is not a new concept in China. It was in use more than two 
decades ago, in 1993. Central SOEs’ mixed-ownership practices have been 
continuing over the years, through public listing and introducing strategic 
investors, and so on. More than 60 per cent of the subsidiaries of central SOEs 
are now structured in ways that include some level of mixed ownership. 
Several differences can be identified between this new round of SOE reform 
and previous ones. First, the status of mixed ownership has been elevated and 
is now considered the basic form of the socialist economic system—and, as a 
result, the majority of SOEs can now become mixed-ownership entities. Second, 
private capital is encouraged to take controlling shares. Third, employees of 
mixed-ownership enterprises will be permitted to hold stocks (China Securities 
Daily 2014). 
The SOE reforms, as difficult and complicated as they are, will bring profound 
changes to the Chinese economy, as well as to Chinese enterprises and their 
overseas investments. As the SOE reforms evolve, so should the world’s views 
on them. 
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Concluding Remarks
China’s ODI, like ODI from any other country, aims to make profits, and to do 
so seeks sound investment environments with fair and transparent regulatory 
rules. As China’s economy continues to grow at a slower, ‘new normal’ rate 
in the next decade, the rate of China’s outbound FDI, by SOEs and privately 
owned firms, is likely to continue to be buoyant. In parallel, their economic 
efficiency will be enhanced by broader economic reforms, and also SOE reforms.
Through this growth process, misunderstandings, fear and protectionism will 
hinder the execution and success of China’s ODI, while also preventing host 
countries from benefiting from the contributions that Chinese ODI could make to 
economic growth and employment. To that end, ‘[s]uccumbing to the nationalist 
response to foreign investment would, based on all the evidence, be extremely 
damaging economically as well as have political ramifications’ (Drysdale 2011: 70). 
Similarly, The Economist has noted that ‘to reject China’s advances would thus be 
a disservice to future generations, as well as a deeply pessimistic statement about 
capitalism’s confidence in itself’ (The Economist 2010). 
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14. The Impact of Coastal 




One of the most successful aspects of China’s economic reform and open-door 
policy implemented since late 1978 has been attracting inflows of foreign 
direct investment (FDI). By the end of 2014, China had attracted US$1.5 trillion 
in FDI inflows, making it the largest FDI recipient in the developing world. 
Coastal and inland regions vary in their attractiveness as locations for FDI, and 
Chinese policies have favoured coastal regions through the establishment of 
special economic zones (SEZs) and various preferential treatments (Chen 2011). 
FDI  inflows have therefore been concentrated in the coastal regions, which 
account for about 80 per cent of total FDI inflows into China. 
That spatial concentration of FDI within China could have consequences for 
inland regions. On the one hand, it could be drawing factors of production 
away from inland regions and providing competition in product markets, both 
domestic and international. This would produce unbalanced regional growth 
and widen income inequality between coastal and inland regions. On the other 
hand, inland regions less well-served by FDI could benefit from coastal FDI if 
there are inter-regional knowledge spillovers from coastal to inland regions. 
This chapter aims to investigate whether the dense concentration of FDI in 
China’s coastal regions has boosted or undermined the economic growth of 
inland regions. Specifically, the study uses Chinese province-level data to test 
whether there are inter-regional knowledge spillovers from FDI concentrated 
in coastal regions and also how these spillovers are affected by FDI directed to 
different trade activities—processing trade1 versus ordinary trade. This study 
1  There are two kinds of processing trade: processing or assembling with imported materials; and 
processing or assembling with supplied materials. For the first, the processing firms import—free of 
customs duty—materials and components that are used to produce finished goods and export them 
to international markets. In the case of the second, the processing firms process or assemble duty-free 
materials and components supplied by foreign firms and export finished products. They are paid a fee 
for the processing or assembling activities. The foreign firms control both the supply of the materials 
and the entire international marketing of the processed or assembled products.
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makes two contributions to the literature. First, it tests directly inter-regional 
knowledge spillovers from FDI—specifically, spillovers from coastal FDI to inland 
provinces. This serves to add new empirical evidence to the sparse literature on 
inter-regional knowledge spillovers of FDI. Second, the study tests how FDI in 
different types of trade activities—processing versus ordinary trade—in coastal 
regions affect the economic growth of inland provinces. This could shed light 
on the effectiveness of processing trade policies implemented in coastal regions 
since the mid-1980s. 
The study finds that, on average, coastal FDI has had a negative impact on 
economic growth in inland provinces. By further dividing coastal FDI into 
northern and eastern FDI and southern FDI, based on the depth of engagement 
in processing trade, the study finds that FDI in the northern and eastern coastal 
provinces (which are moderately engaged in processing trade) has positive 
spillovers on the economic growth of inland provinces, while FDI in southern 
coastal provinces (those heavily engaged in processing trade) has had a negative 
effect on the economic growth of inland provinces. It is also interesting to note 
that FDI in other inland provinces that are less engaged in processing trade is 
found to have positive spillovers on the economic growth of inland provinces. 
One explanation for this could be that ordinary trade generates larger industrial 
linkages with inland regions than does processing trade, as the latter is based 
largely on processing imported inputs.
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows: the second section discusses 
the theoretical explanations of how knowledge spillovers from FDI contribute 
to developing host countries’ economic growth and presents a brief literature 
review. Section three sets out the theoretical framework of this analysis and 
specifies the empirical model; section four describes the data and specifies 
the variables; section five presents the results of the regression analysis and 
explains the estimation results. Section six provides the conclusion and policy 
implications. 
Literature review
FDI is one of the most important means through which international knowledge 
spillovers take place. Because of ownership advantages and the possession of 
firm-specific intangible assets, FDI can generate knowledge spillovers to domestic 
firms (Caves 1996; Dunning 1993). FDI knowledge spillovers are regarded as an 
important source of knowledge in developing countries. Demonstration effects, 
human resource movement, vertical industrial linkages, technical assistance 
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and information flows are examples of knowledge spillovers via which FDI can 
improve the productivity and competitiveness of local firms, and thus promote 
economic growth in the host country. 
FDI knowledge spillovers can be horizontal or vertical. Horizontal spillovers 
take place within the same industry through demonstration effects and labour 
turnover. FDI can, however, also impose competition on domestic firms, 
crowding them out of product markets and competing with them in labour and 
resource markets (for example, Aitken and Harrison 1999; Chen 2011; Chen et 
al. 2013; Fu 2011; Hu and Jefferson 2002; Hu et al. 2005). 
Vertical FDI knowledge spillovers arise through forward and backward 
industrial linkages between FDI firms and domestic firms within the supply 
chain (for example, Chen et al. 2013; Girma et al. 2004; Javorcik 2004; Kneller 
and Pisu 2007). When FDI firms provide higher-value intermediate materials for 
their customers or when they transfer product knowledge to their suppliers, they 
contribute to domestic firms’ productivity and competitiveness in upstream and 
downstream industries, in turn increasing local economic growth.
Do FDI knowledge spillovers also take place between regions within a country? 
Theoretically, inter-regional knowledge spillovers of FDI could take place via at 
least four channels. The first is inter-regional movement of labour: FDI stimulates 
inter-regional labour migration, and when employees trained by FDI firms move 
back to their own regions, they can bring knowledge to local firms and thus 
knowledge diffusion takes place (Fosfuri et al. 2001; Holger and Strobl 2005).2 
Second are inter-regional backward and forward industrial linkages: FDI firms 
may develop inter-industry linkages with local firms in other regions, providing 
those firms with greater opportunities in economies of scale and productivity 
improvement (Chen et al. 2013; Javorcik 2004; Kugler 2006; Liu 2008). Third, the 
innovations and research and development (R&D) activities of FDI firms might 
generate inter-regional knowledge spillovers through imitation and reverse 
engineering by firms in other regions (Bronzini and Piselli 2009; Funke and 
Niebuhr 2005; Keller 2002; Kuo and Yang 2008). The fourth channel is formed 
by the macroeconomic consequences of increased demand for products from 
other regions as a result of the increased income generated by FDI (Brun et 
al. 2002; Zhang and Felmingham 2002). FDI could, however, also impose 
competition on other regions—for example, crowding them out of product 
2  Cai and Wang (2003) show that in 2000 there were 124.6 million internal migrants in China, of whom 
73.4 per cent were inter-provincial migrants. The eastern provinces are the main destination for inter-
regional migrants. More than 60 per cent of immigrants in eastern provinces were from inland regions. 
Bao et al. (2007) find that when real FDI rose by 1 per cent, internal migration rose by more than 1.25 
per cent during the 1990s. The workers returning from the coastal foreign firms accelerated the inland 
regions’ processes of imitation of advanced technologies brought by coastal foreign firms (Du et al. 2005; 
Rozelle et al. 1999). 
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markets and competing with them in labour and resource markets (Aitken and 
Harrison 1999; Branstetter and Feenstra 2002; Fu 2011; Hu and Jefferson 2002; 
Hu et al. 2005). 
The literature on knowledge spillovers from FDI is extensive and growing. 
Studies on the inter-regional knowledge spillovers of FDI, however, remain few. 
Girma and Wakelin (2007) find that while domestic firms in the United Kingdom 
benefit positively from foreign firms in the same region and that FDI spillovers 
do occur within regions, they find no relationship (even a negative relationship) 
between productivity in one region and FDI in other regions. Halpern and 
Murakozy (2007) examine firm-level data for Hungary and find that the effect of 
regional and county boundaries is insignificant. 
In the case of China, a few studies have used firm-level data to test regional 
spillovers from FDI, but reached inconsistent conclusions. Girma and Gong 
(2008) use data for state-owned enterprises (SOEs) from 1999 to 2002 and 
find that the activities of foreign firms do not benefit SOEs in other regions. 
Liu et al. (2009) find backward and forward FDI spillovers among firms at the 
regional level only. Xu and Sheng (2012) use firm-level census data from the 
manufacturing industry for 2000–03 and find that domestic firms benefit more 
from the presence of foreign firms in the same sector within the same region 
than either between sectors or between regions. 
However, a few studies find positive inter-regional spillovers from FDI. 
Madariaga and Poncet (2007) use city-level data for 1990–2002 and find that FDI 
inflows affect economic growth in surrounding cities. Ouyang and Fu (2012) use 
city-level data for 1996–2004 and find that FDI in coastal regions has positive 
inter-regional spillovers on the economic growth of inland regions. In contrast, 
using provincial industry-level data for the period 1990–2005, Wang et al. 
(2013) find that inter-regional FDI spillovers are consistently negative—that is, 
foreign investment in one region attracts resources away from regions with less 
FDI, and thus has a negative influence on the growth of industrial output in 
neighbouring regions. Additional study of the impact of FDI on inter-regional 
knowledge spillovers is evidently required in order to better understand its role 
in the economic growth of host countries. 
This study adds to the existing literature by examining inter-regional knowledge 
spillovers from FDI in China—the largest developing country and also the 
largest FDI recipient among the developing economies. This study specifically 
investigates and answers two questions: 1) are there inter-regional knowledge 
spillovers from coastal FDI on the economic growth of inland regions; and 
2) do  different types of FDI in coastal regions have different impacts on the 
economic growth of inland provinces? 
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The model
We use the following aggregate production function to estimate the impact of 
coastal FDI on the economic growth of inland provinces (Equation 14.1).
Equation 14.1
In Equation 14.1, Yit is the real gross domestic product (GDP) of inland province 
i in year t; Ait is the total factor productivity (TFP) level of inland province i 
in year t; Lit is total labour input of inland province i in year t; DKit is domestic 
capital stock of inland province i in year t; and FKit is the foreign capital stock 
of inland province i in year t. 
Under these assumptions, within the aggregate production function, FDI is 
treated as a separate factor of capital input (FK) alongside domestic capital input 
(DK) and labour input (L). 
Theoretically, because FDI brings into the host country a package of capital, 
technology, production knowhow, management skills, marketing skills and 
information, competition, and so on (Caves 1996; Dunning 1993), it is expected 
that FDI can increase the host country’s economic growth by a number of means. 
First, FDI inflows will increase demand for labour and create employment in a 
host country, especially a developing country. The increase in employment will 
contribute to an increase in total output, thus leading to a higher output level 
along the existing production function. It is expected that the higher the level 
of employment created by FDI, the higher will be the output growth of the host 
economy. 
Second, FDI inflows increase the host country’s fixed capital formation. 
FDI  is believed to be a leading source of technology transfer and human 
capital augmentation in developing countries. Technological progress takes 
place through a process of capital deepening through the introduction of 
new varieties of knowledge-based capital goods. It also proceeds via specific 
productivity-increasing labour training and skill acquisition promoted by 
multinational enterprises (MNEs). Therefore, through capital augmentation in 
the recipient economy, FDI is expected to be growth enhancing by encouraging 
the incorporation of new inputs and technologies into the production function, 
thus shifting the production function of the host country. This positive shifting 
effect is the contribution to output growth of FDI as a capital input. It is expected 
that the higher the foreign capital input, the higher will be the output growth 
of the host economy.
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Third, through knowledge spillovers such as learning by doing or learning by 
watching (demonstration effects), R&D, human resource movement, training 
courses, vertical industrial linkages, technical assistance and exposure to fierce 
competition, FDI is expected to increase the productivity and efficiency of local 
firms in the host country. As a result, FDI can shift the production function of 
the host economy to a higher level. It is expected that the greater the presence 
of FDI, the higher will be the spillover effects of FDI on local economic growth.
Fourth, FDI can generate inter-regional knowledge spillovers to increase 
the productivity and efficiency of firms in other regions through the inter-
regional movement of labour, inter-regional backward and forward industrial 
linkages, inter-regional imitation and reverse engineering, and inter-regional 
macroeconomic consequences, such as increased market demand for products 
from other regions as a result of increasing incomes generated by FDI. As a 
result of inter-regional knowledge spillovers, FDI in one region can shift the 
production function of another region to a higher level. It is expected that the 
higher the regional FDI stock to which a region is exposed, the higher the inter-
regional knowledge spillovers of FDI on that region’s economic growth will 
be. However, FDI in one region may also impose competition on other regions, 
crowding them out of the product market and competing with them in the 
labour and resource markets. So, the net effect of inter-regional spillovers from 
FDI in one region on the economic growth of other regions is inconclusive, 
subject to empirical investigation. In this study, to investigate the inter-regional 
knowledge spillovers of FDI on inland provinces, we define two kinds of inter-
regional FDI knowledge spillovers. One is the inter-regional knowledge spillover 
of FDI from coastal regions on an inland province, and the other is the inter-
regional knowledge spillover of FDI on an inland province from other inland 
provinces.
Given our assumptions of the model of the spillover channels of FDI, TFP, Ait, 
can be defined as in Equation 14.2.
Equation 14.2
In Equation 14.2, Ait is the TFP level of inland province i in year t; Bit is the 
residual TFP level of inland province i in year t; SFKit–1 is the presence of FDI 
in inland province i in year t–1, which captures the spillovers from FDI within 
inland province i; CRFKit–1 is coastal region FDI stock exposed by inland province 
i in year t–1, which captures the inter-regional spillovers of coastal province FDI 
on inland province i; OIRFKit–1 is other inland region FDI stock exposed by 
inland province i in year t–1, which captures the inter-regional spillovers of 
FDI from other inland provinces on inland province i; t is a time trend, which 
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captures the Hicks-neutral technological progress in inland province i; and HK 
is human capital in inland province i in year t, which is expected to have a 
positive impact on economic growth.
Incorporating Equation 14.2 into the aggregate production function Equation 
14.1, and rearranging the items on the right-hand side, with the addition of 
a constant term (β0) and an error term (eit), we obtain the following empirical 
regression (Equation 14.3).
Equation 14.3
LnYit = β0 + β1LnLit + β2LnDKit + β3LnFKit + β4SFKit–1 + β5LnCRFKit–1 + 
β6LnOIRFKit–1 + β7HKit + β8t + eit 
In Equation 14.3, i (i = 1, 2, …, 20) and t (t = 1987, …, 2010) denote inland 
province i and year t; Y is real provincial GDP; L and DK are labour and 
domestic capital stock;3 FK is foreign capital stock, which serves to capture the 
contribution of FDI to economic growth through capital augmentation; SFK 
is the presence of FDI in an inland province (share of foreign capital stock in 
total capital stock), which captures the spillover effects of FDI within an inland 
province; CRFK is the coastal region foreign capital stock to which an inland 
province is exposed, which captures the inter-regional spillovers of coastal 
FDI; OIRFK is other inland foreign capital stock to which an inland province 
is exposed, which captures the inter-regional spillovers of other inland FDI; 
HK is human capital; and t is a time trend, which captures the Hicks-neutral 
technological progress. 
This specification allows not only testing of the direct contribution of FDI 
to provincial economic growth (if coefficient β3 is positive and statistically 
significant then it can be ascertained that FDI has directly contributed to 
inland province economic growth through capital input), but also further tests 
undertaken on the spillover effects of FDI on inland province economic growth 
in three aspects. First, we can test the spillover effects of FDI on economic 
growth within an inland province. If the coefficient β4 is positive and statistically 
significant, there is evidence that FDI has generated positive spillover effects 
within an inland province. Second, we can test the inter-regional spillover 
effects of FDI from coastal provinces on inland province economic growth. 
If  the coefficient β5 is positive and statistically significant, there is evidence 
that FDI in coastal provinces has generated positive inter-regional spillovers on 
the economic growth of inland provinces. Third, we can test the inter-regional 
spillover effects of FDI from other inland provinces on the economic growth of 
3  Official data of labour employed by FDI at the provincial level are not available, so the total numbers for 
labour in each province are used in the regression.
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an inland province. If the coefficient β6 is positive and statistically significant, 
there is evidence that FDI in other inland provinces has generated positive inter-
regional spillover effects on an inland province’s economic growth.
Equation 14.3 is an augmented production function that we use to estimate 
the intra-provincial and inter-regional spillover effects of FDI on China’s inland 
provinces’ economic growth. The first part of the analysis is to investigate 
whether there are inter-regional spillover effects on inland provinces from FDI in 
coastal provinces. The second part of the analysis is to investigate whether FDI 
in different trade activities generates different inter-regional spillover effects on 
inland provinces’ economic growth by dividing coastal FDI into northern and 
eastern coastal FDI and southern coastal FDI based on the level of engagement 
in processing trade. The following section outlines the data and specifies the 
variables. 
Data and variable specification
This study uses province-level data covering China’s 31 provinces and the 
period 1987–2010. The 31 provinces are divided into 11 coastal provinces4 
and 20 inland provinces.5 The data for provincial GDP (Y) and provincial total 
capital stock (billion RMB at 1978 prices) are from Wu (2009).6 Wu uses the 
conventional perpetual inventory method by employing the recently released 
national accounts figures to derive a capital stock series for China’s 31 provinces 
and three economic sectors (that is, agriculture, manufacturing and services) for 
the period 1977–2010. This produces one of the most comprehensive datasets of 
capital stock series for China’s 31 provinces and three economic sectors. 
Calculating foreign capital stock
The data for FDI stock (FK) are calculated in several steps. First, the US dollar 
value of annual FDI inflows is converted into a renminbi (RMB) value by using 
the annual average official exchange rate. Second, the RMB value of annual FDI 
inflows is deflated into the real value at 1978 prices by using China’s national 
consumer price index (CPI). Third, a 5 per cent depreciation rate is assumed 
for foreign capital (FDI). Finally, FDI stock is accumulated for each year end 
measured in billion RMB at 1978 prices. 
4  The 11 coastal provinces are Beijing, Fujian, Guangdong, Hainan, Hebei, Jiangsu, Liaoning, Shandong, 
Shanghai, Tianjin and Zhejiang.
5  The 20 inland provinces are: Anhui, Chongqing, Gansu, Guizhou, Guangxi, Heilongjiang, Henan, Hubei, 
Hunan, Inner Mongolia, Jiangxi, Jilin, Ningxia, Qinghai, Shaanxi, Shanxi, Sichuan, Tibet, Xinjiang 
and Yunnan.
6  Data for 2007–10 are provided by Wu (2009).
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Calculating the share of foreign capital 
The presence of FDI in an inland province is measured as the share of FDI stock in 
the total capital stock of an inland province (SFK) to capture the intra-province 
spillover effects of FDI on provincial economic growth. The share of FDI stock 
is calculated as FDI stock over total capital stock of an inland province. It is 
reasonable to assume that FDI inflows and spillover effects have a time lag, so the 
value of one year lag of SFK is used in the model. The use of the lagged value 
of SFK also can reduce the potential problem of endogeneity in the regression. 
The hypothesis is that provinces with a higher share of FDI stock in total 
capital stock will have higher spillover effects from FDI to the local economy, 
thus increasing the productivity and efficiency of local firms and promoting 
provincial economic growth. 
Measuring coastal region FDI
We use the formula ΣjtFDIjt × e
–Dij to measure the coastal region FDI stock (CRFK) 
to which an inland province is exposed,7 where FDIjt is the amount of FDI stock 
in coastal province j in year t; Dij is the distance in 1,000 km between inland 
province i and coastal province j; and e
–Dij works as a discount factor, since greater 
distance implies higher transaction and transportation costs, which make inter-
regional migration and access to coastal markets more difficult. Therefore, FDIjt 
× e–Dij measures the amount of FDI stock in coastal province j that might affect 
inland province i, and ΣjtFDIjt × e
–Dij is the total amount of FDI stock from all 
coastal provinces that might affect inland province i in year t. 
Different coastal regions attract different types of FDI. FDI in southern coastal 
provinces is mainly directed towards processing trade, while FDI in northern 
and eastern coastal provinces is moderately engaged in processing trade 
(Chen  2011). In addition to estimating the average inter-regional spillovers, 
we also estimate inter-regional spillovers of FDI from different coastal regions. 
We use the same formula as above to calculate the amount of FDI stock in the 
northern and eastern coastal provinces (N&ECRFK)8 and the amount of FDI 
stock in the southern coastal provinces (SCRFK)9 to which an inland province is 
exposed. Using the same reasoning as for the share of foreign capital, the value 
of one year lag is used for all coastal region FDI stock variables in the model.
7  Keller (2002) uses a similar method to measure the effective foreign-country R&D to which a country 
is exposed.
8  The northern and eastern coastal provinces are Beijing, Hebei, Jiangsu, Liaoning, Shandong, Shanghai, 
Tianjin and Zhejiang.
9  The southern coastal provinces are Fujian, Guangdong and Hainan.
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Controlling for FDI in other inland provinces 
FDI in other inland provinces may also generate inter-regional spillovers and 
influence the economic growth of the inland province. To control for the 
potential inter-regional spillovers from other inland provinces on an inland 
province’s economic growth, we use the same formula to calculate the FDI stock 
of other inland provinces (OIRFK) to which an inland province is exposed. 
As above, the value of one year lag is used for the other inland region FDI stock 
variable (OIRFK) in the model.
Measuring other inland province variables
The domestic capital stock (DK) of each inland province is obtained by deducting 
the FDI stock (FK) from the total capital stock. Labour (L) is the total number of 
people employed in each province measured as million persons. Human capital 
(HK) is measured as the ratio of the number of university students to the total 
population of each inland province. 
The dependent and independent variables and the data sources are summarised 
in Table 14.1.
Table 14.1 Variables of the impact of FDI on the economic growth of China’s 
inland provinces
Variable name Specification of variables Sources
Dependent variable
Yit GDP of inland province i in year t. RMB billion at 
1978 prices 
Wu (2009) and NBS (various 
issues) 
Independent variables
Lit Total number of employed people of inland 
province i in year t. Million persons
NBS (various issues) 
DKit Domestic capital stock of inland province i in year 
t. RMB billion at 1978 prices 
Calculated from Wu (2009) and 
NBS (various issues)
FKit FDI stock of inland province i in year t. RMB 
billion at 1978 prices 
Calculated from, for before and 
including 2005, NBS (various 
issues); after 2005, PBS (various 
issues of each province)
SFKit–1 Share of FDI stock in total capital stock of inland 
province i in year t–1. Percentage
Same as above
CRFKit–1 Coastal region FDI stock exposed by inland 
province i in year t–1. RMB billion at 1978 prices
Same as above
OIRFKit–1 Other inland region FDI stock exposed by inland 
province i in year t–1. RMB billion at 1978 prices 
Same as above
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Variable name Specification of variables Sources
N&ECRFKit–1 Northern and eastern coastal region FDI stock 
exposed by inland province i in year t–1. RMB 
billion at 1978 prices
Same as above
SCRFKit–1 Southern coastal region FDI stock exposed by 
inland province i in year t–1. RMB billion at 1978 
prices
Same as above
HKit Human capital of inland province i in year t 
measured as the ratio of the number of university 
students to total population. Percentage
NBS (various issues) 
Estimation Results
Estimates of average inter-regional spillover effects
The data used in the regression are a panel dataset at the province level, 
containing China’s 19 inland provinces for the period 1987–2010.10 We first 
conduct a Hausman test to choose between the random-effects model and the 
fixed-effects model for the regression. The Hausman test prefers the fixed-effects 
model. Therefore, we estimate Equation 14.3 under the fixed-effects model in 
order to eliminate the province-specific and time-invariant factors that could 
affect economic growth. The regression results are reported in Table 14.2. 
The regression results show that domestic capital input (DK) is positive and 
statistically significant at the 1 per cent level, while labour input (L) is negative 
but insignificant. This implies that the marginal product of domestic capital is 
much higher than that of labour due to the relatively abundant labour supply 
and scarcity of capital in inland provinces. The variable of human capital (HK) 
is positive and statistically significant at the 1 per cent level, which provides 
empirical evidence that human capital contributes to economic growth. 
The  Hicks-neutral technological progress represented by the coefficient on 
a time trend (t) is positive and statistically significant at the 1 per cent level, 
indicating that inland provinces experience technological progress and move 
onto a higher steady-state technology over time. 
10  Tibet is excluded from the regression because of a lack of data.
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Table 14.2 Estimating inter-regional spillovers of FDI on inland province economic 
growth, 1987–2010 (dependent variable: LnY)



























* Statistically significant at 0.10 level. 
** Statistically significant at 0.05 level. 
*** Statistically significant at 0.01 level. 
Note: t-statistics are in parentheses. 
Source: Author’s own estimations.
Turning to the variables of our main interest: first, the variable of foreign capital 
stock (FK) is positive and statistically significant at the 1 per cent level, which 
provides strong support for the idea that FDI as a factor of capital input directly 
contributes to inland province economic growth. The estimation results imply 
that inland provinces with higher FDI inflows will have higher economic growth 
as a direct result of the increase in foreign capital input. 
Second, the variable of the share of FDI stock in total capital stock (SFK)—
the spillovers of an inland province’s own FDI—is negative and insignificant. 
This finding is consistent with Chen (2013, 2014), who finds that FDI in China’s 
inland provinces has not generated significant spillovers on the local economy 
due to the low level of FDI. Nunnenkamp and Stracke (2007) also find that FDI 
in poor regions in India is too small to generate spillover effects to boost local 
economic growth. 
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Third, the variable of OIRFK—the FDI stock of other inland provinces—is 
positive and significant at the 1 per cent level, which implies that FDI in other 
inland provinces has generated positive spillovers on inland provinces. This may 
be because of technology spillovers through backward and forward industrial 
linkages, information flows and the movement of labour between FDI firms in 
inland provinces and local economies, thus increasing the economic growth of 
inland provinces.
Fourth, on the other hand, the variable of CRFK—the FDI stock in coastal 
provinces—is negative and significant at the 1 per cent level, which implies 
that FDI in coastal provinces has had a negative impact on the economic growth 
of inland provinces. This might be explained by the following two points. 
The first is competition between coastal FDI firms and inland provinces. Coastal 
FDI firms compete with inland provinces in both factor markets and product 
markets. Although competition can force inland provinces to improve their 
efficiency and increase productivity, inland provinces are at a competitive 
disadvantage when facing superior technology, modern management methods, 
advanced marketing skills and extensive international market networks, high 
product quality, and high wages and other compensation provided to employees 
of FDI firms in the coastal regions. 
In the factor markets, attracted by greater employment opportunities and the 
higher wages offered by coastal FDI firms, tens of millions of young and more 
productive non-skilled workers flow from inland to coastal regions. This  is 
evidenced by the massive flows of migrant workers from inland to coastal 
regions. Second, attracted by a set of preferential policies, including tax policies, 
offered to FDI firms, especially in the coastal regions, capital flows from inland 
provinces to the coastal regions for FDI joint ventures. Third, because of high 
incomes, high living standards and more carrier development opportunities, 
skilled labour also flows from inland provinces to coastal regions to work in FDI 
firms. 
In the product markets, because of high quality, famous brand names, advanced 
domestic and international marketing skills and extensive market networks, as 
well as good post-sales customer service, coastal FDI firms outperform inland 
provinces not only in the domestic market by stealing domestic market share 
from the inland provinces, but also in international export markets by squeezing 
out inland provinces. 
The second point is the lack of industrial linkages between coastal FDI and 
inland provinces. This may be because coastal FDI firms, on average, are heavily 
engaged in processing trade, which is based largely on processing imported 
inputs and exporting final products to world markets. Therefore, backward and 
China’s Domestic Transformation in a Global Context
352
forward industrial linkages may be absent or very weak between coastal FDI 
and inland provinces. For example, Fu (2004) uses Chinese province-level data 
for 1990–99 and finds no evidence of spillovers from coastal export activity into 
inland regions. She argues that this is because nearly half of export activity 
in coastal provinces is processing trade that does not provide inter-industry 
linkages to inland regions. Chen et al. (2013) use Chinese firm-level data from 
2000 to 2003 and find that high-exporting FDI firms do not generate technology 
spillovers to domestic firms because the former are heavily engaged in processing 
exports and have no backward and forward industrial linkages with domestic 
firms. 
The above analysis has revealed that, on average, coastal FDI has negative impacts 
on the economic growth of inland provinces because of intense competition 
in factor and product markets and because of the lack of industrial linkages 
between coastal FDI firms and inland provinces. However, different coastal 
provinces attract different types of FDI, especially in the level of engagement in 
processing trade, which may have different impacts on the economic growth of 
inland provinces. Therefore, in addition to estimating the average inter-regional 
spillovers of coastal FDI, it is necessary to estimate the impact of inter-regional 
spillovers of FDI from different coastal regions on the economic growth of inland 
provinces.
Estimating the impact on inland provinces of FDI 
in different coastal regions 
The northern and eastern coastal region and the southern coastal region are 
the two main destinations for FDI inflows into China. In terms of the level of 
engagement in processing trade, however, FDI in these two regions is different. 
Table 14.3 presents the shares of processing trade in the total trade of selected 
provinces for the period 2003–10. As the table shows, the southern coastal 
provinces have the highest shares of processing trade, the northern and 
eastern coastal regions have moderate shares of processing trade and the inland 
provinces have the lowest shares. On average, FDI firms’ trade accounts for more 
than 50 per cent of China’s total trade and is directed heavily towards processing 
trade, particularly in the southern coastal provinces. Therefore, in terms of trade 
patterns, FDI in the southern coastal region is mainly engaged in processing 
trade, FDI in the northern and eastern coastal region is moderately engaged in 
processing trade and FDI in inland provinces is less engaged in processing trade.
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Table 14.3 Shares of processing trade in selected provinces, 2003–10
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Coastal provinces
North and east
Beijing 23.38 23.11 24.20 22.57 24.26 34.62 39.60 34.31
Shanghai 40.76 43.02 45.47 44.88 43.42 41.81 40.92 37.92
Jiangsu 54.83 58.82 62.58 61.23 58.80 52.50 52.83 50.66
South
Fujian 42.40 44.09 43.35 41.52 38.97 38.47 33.69 34.37
Guangdong 68.96 67.65 67.26 46.27 62.73 58.96 70.58 42.68
Inland provinces
Shanxi 2.95 5.12 9.49 12.65 23.55 15.35 11.45 13.95
Inner Mongolia 7.22 7.59 14.52 6.25 3.38 5.97 2.77 7.70
Heilongjiang 4.76 5.01 4.31 3.52 3.91 4.06 6.29 3.95
Anhui 12.62 16.41 17.92 21.99 20.14 17.76 17.18 17.65
Jiangxi 9.23 12.93 15.41 23.26 22.69 25.59 23.61 23.35
Henan 22.87 29.83 31.49 25.82 17.67 13.01 15.02 15.71
Hubei 15.99 14.74 13.84 17.57 17.88 15.72 6.13 4.77
Hunan 7.55 10.06 8.19 10.64 11.88 5.99 10.69 17.33
Chongqing 3.56 2.76 1.21 8.21 7.12 6.41 8.23 13.41
Sichuan 28.15 20.91 14.33 22.40 27.83 33.54 37.23 41.83
Shaanxi 11.06 12.84 12.37 16.74 18.54 15.48 19.00 36.02
Gansu 27.16 22.55 19.87 17.14 5.28 4.83 7.36 7.12
Xinjiang 3.63 3.29 2.40 1.80 1.11 0.66 2.15 1.53
Sources: Calculated from Qiu (2013); and NBS (various issues).
Knowledge spillovers through backward and forward industrial linkages are 
among the most important channels through which technology, management 
skills and marketing information are transferred from FDI firms to the local 
economy. Therefore, we can hypothesise that FDI in coastal regions engaged in 
different trade activities—processing and ordinary trade—could have different 
impacts on inland provinces. FDI firms engaged mainly in processing trade 
would have no impact on inland provinces because of the lack of industrial 
linkages or a negative impact by reducing demand for intermediate inputs 
from and competing in world export markets with inland provinces. FDI firms 
engaged mainly in ordinary trade would generate positive knowledge spillovers 
to inland provinces through industrial linkages by sourcing raw materials and 
intermediate inputs from inland provinces. 
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We also use Equation 14.3 to conduct the regression; however, the variable of 
coastal region FDI stock (CRFK) is replaced with two variables: the northern 
and eastern coastal region FDI stock (N&ECRFK) and the southern coastal 
region FDI stock (SCRFK). The estimation results (see Table 14.4) show that 
FDI in the northern and eastern coastal region (N&ECRFK) generates positive 
and statistically significant (at the 5 per cent level) spillovers on the economic 
growth of inland provinces, while FDI in the southern coastal region (SCRFK) 
has a negative and statistically significant (at the 1 per cent level) impact on the 
economic growth of inland provinces. 
Table 14.4 Estimating inter-regional spillovers from coastal FDI in different 
trade activities on inland province economic growth, 1987–2010 (dependent 
variable: LnY)





























* Statistically significant at 0.10 level. 
** Statistically significant at 0.05 level. 
*** Statistically significant at 0.01 level. 
Note: t-statistics are in parentheses. 
Source: Author’s own estimations.
The Impact of Coastal FDI on Inland Economic Growth in China
355
Why does FDI in the southern coastal region have a negative spillover on 
inland provinces while FDI in the northern and eastern region generates 
positive spillovers on inland provinces? Because FDI in the southern coastal 
region is heavily engaged in processing trade, it not only reduces demand for 
intermediate inputs from firms in inland provinces, due to a lack of backward 
and forward industrial linkages, it also competes in world export markets with 
inland firms, generating a negative impact on their economic growth. FDI in 
the northern and eastern coastal region is moderately engaged in processing 
trade, and although it also competes with firms in inland provinces, it does 
have a certain level of backward and forward industrial linkages with inland 
provinces through sourcing raw materials and intermediate inputs from inland 
firms and selling intermediate inputs to those firms, thus generating some 
positive spillovers on inland provinces. Therefore, the empirical estimation 
results support our hypothesis that FDI in coastal regions engaged in different 
trade patterns—processing versus ordinary trade—has different impacts on the 
economic growth of inland provinces. 
It is also interesting to note that the variable of OIRFK—FDI stock in other 
inland provinces—is consistently positive and significant in all regressions, 
implying that FDI in other inland provinces generates positive spillovers on 
the economic growth of inland provinces. As discussed above, FDI in inland 
provinces is less engaged in processing trade and more engaged in ordinary 
trade. Therefore, FDI in inland provinces has extensive backward and forward 
industrial linkages with firms in other inland provinces, which enhance the 
transfer of knowledge spillovers from FDI to local economies, thus contributing 
to the economic growth of inland provinces. This finding provides further 
evidence of the importance of industrial linkages in enhancing knowledge 
spillovers from FDI to the local economy. 
Conclusion
The main purpose of this study is to investigate empirically the impact of inter-
regional spillovers from coastal FDI on the economic growth of China’s inland 
provinces, with a particular emphasis on how this impact is affected by the level 
of engagement of FDI in processing trade in different coastal regions. The study 
finds that, on average, coastal FDI has a negative impact on the economic 
growth of inland provinces. However, by dividing coastal FDI into a northern 
and eastern region and a southern region, the study finds that FDI in southern 
coastal provinces still has a negative impact on the economic growth of inland 
provinces because of intense competition in both factor markets and product 
markets, and because of a lack of backward and forward industrial linkages 
with inland provinces because of heavy engagement in processing trade. FDI 
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in the northern and eastern coastal provinces, however, has positive spillovers 
through backward and forward industrial linkages with inland provinces 
because of moderate engagement in processing trade and a certain level of local 
sourcing. FDI in other inland provinces has positive spillovers on the economic 
growth of inland provinces through backward and forward industrial linkages 
due to the low level of engagement in processing trade and a high level of local 
sourcing. Therefore, this study provides further evidence of the importance 
of industrial linkages in enhancing knowledge spillovers from FDI to the local 
economy. The  study also finds that spillovers from inland province FDI are 
absent because of the low level of FDI inflows into those provinces. 
The findings of this study imply that China’s inland provinces still have a lot 
of benefits to gain from the inflow of FDI. First, China should design policies 
to help inland provinces improve local economic and technological conditions 
and their overall investment environment in order to attract more FDI inflows. 
The implementation of the ‘Western Development Strategy’ and the ‘One Belt 
and One Road Development Strategy’ will greatly improve the investment 
environment of inland provinces. Second, China should redesign processing trade 
policies to focus on increasing local sourcing and enhancing industrial linkages 
through economic structural reform and industrial upgrading. Third, China 
should encourage contact, information exchange, production and technological 
cooperation, and joint R&D activities between FDI firms and domestic firms in 
general and between coastal FDI firms and inland firms in particular, in order to 
enhance and accelerate the diffusion of positive knowledge spillovers from FDI 
to China’s economy.
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15. China’s Trade 
Negotiation Strategies
Matters of growth and regional economic integration
Fan He and Xiaoming Pan1
Introduction
China’s opening and reform process that began in the late 1970s has induced a 
great era during which the Chinese economy has been incrementally integrating 
with the world economy. Outbound trade and inbound foreign direct 
investment (FDI) served as the twin engines of growth. China’s contemporary 
economic story is ‘a classical demonstration of the potential of export-oriented 
industrialization’ (Krugman and Obstfeld 1991: 247). An acceleration of that 
process arrived with China’s accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
in 2001. China enjoyed tremendous gains by facing lower tariffs and fewer trade 
restrictions in accessing the extensive markets of WTO member countries and 
by reducing its own restrictions on trade. China became the ‘factory of the 
world’. 
China’s reliance on export-oriented growth now faces challenges. The global 
financial crisis (GFC) of 2008 hit developed countries—the most important 
markets for Chinese export goods. The consequent sluggish demand for Chinese 
products forced many small and medium enterprises to close, especially in 
south-eastern China where most light manufactured goods for export are made. 
Guangdong was hit especially hard, as was China’s aggregate export level. 
While  the US economy has somewhat recovered from the turmoil that began 
in 2008, structural challenges in the European Union paint a gloomy economic 
picture. External demand for Chinese products has not rebounded to pre-GFC 
levels. On the supply side, too, wage gains in China are making labour-intensive 
production more expensive. Manufacturing industries seeking lower labour 
costs have already begun to move to other Asian countries, such as Vietnam 
and Indonesia. The ‘world’s factory’, therefore, faces overcapacity within many 
export-oriented industries.
1  The views expressed in this chapter do not necessarily represent the views of the institutions for which 
the authors work. The authors are responsible for any errors.
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In terms of its continuing economic development, China also faces the ‘middle-
income trap’—few countries have smoothly transitioned from middle to high-
income status. Acknowledging the need for a change of growth model, the 
Third Plenary Session of the Eighteenth Communist Party Central Committee 
in November 2013 clearly highlighted that China will need to shift from a fast-
growing economy that is essentially dependent on ‘investment in heavy industry 
and low-cost, manufactured exports to a more mature economy driven by 
domestic consumption and the production of higher-value goods and services’ 
(Wharton Business School 2015).
In addition to the endogenous challenge of a growth model transition, China is 
also facing an exogenous international dynamic where the current international 
trade rules are under negotiation. New rules are being called for so as to adjust 
for the expansion of global value chains. Thanks to the more than a decade-
long stalemate of the WTO’s multilateral Doha Round negotiations, countries are 
now seeking to reform current trade rules through mega-regional negotiations. 
This is the first time regionalism has prospered over multilateralism since the 
establishment of the WTO in 1995. The negotiations for mega-regional trade 
agreements—especially the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), the Transatlantic 
Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) and the Regional Comprehensive 
Economic Partnership (RCEP)—have attracted a lot of attention. These delineate 
the general outlook of international trade rules in the twenty-first century. 
While these persist with seeking to liberalise trade in goods, they involve 
trade discrimination and therefore rules of origin. There is greater focus on 
liberalisation of services and investment protection. They also expand the 
current trade agenda by incorporating new issues—such as the environment 
and labour—into negotiations.
Given these potential shifts in trade governance, as part of the transition 
to a new growth model, China must also reconsider its approach to trade 
agreements. Under the old growth model, trade agreements played a critical role 
in facilitating the export of goods made in China and also in allowing Chinese 
manufacturers to successfully plug into East Asian production networks. 
China could reconsider its entire negotiation approach in the face of a weakening 
WTO-based multilateral trading system and the emergence of exclusive mega-
regional negotiations. Fully utilising multilateral and regional trade negotiation 
platforms and participating in the process of international trade rule-making are 
significant to how China defines its role in international economic governance. 
A comprehensive and sophisticated negotiation strategy will help China to 
confront domestic economic challenges and to accelerate its steps to further 
integrate with the world economy. 
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This chapter explores Chinese trade negotiation strategy in response to its 
domestic reform as well as its changing role in the world economy. Section two 
briefly introduces China’s export-oriented economic model and points to the 
need for new methods of navigation in the world economy. Section three 
discusses the changing dynamics of the international trading system and the 
implications for China in a geopolitical context and with regard to its trade 
negotiation agenda. Based on the analyses of China in the world economy and 
international trade rule-making process, section four focuses on the discussion 
of Chinese trade negotiation strategies. Given the three perspectives discussed—
the failure of the Doha Round, the proliferation of regional trade agreements and 
calls for new trade rules in the Pacific Rim—this chapter offers a comprehensive 
overview of Chinese trade negotiation strategies. The chapter finally suggests 
that China will work with other countries towards convergence of the different 
trade agendas of mega-regional agreements and in so doing play a bigger role in 
shaping the international trading system.
Changing relations between China and the 
world economy
Challenge for the traditional export-oriented growth model
The opening-up policy from the late 1970s transformed China from a planned 
economy towards a market-oriented economy. In the early stages of that process, 
a fundamental policy element was the pioneering opening up of selective coastal 
areas of China, which in turn helped to fire up the economic growth of other 
regions in the country. 
First, China’s government boosted its investment in these coastal regions. 
The  share of the central government’s investment in these regions increased 
from 39.5 per cent during 1953–78 to 53.5 per cent during 1979–91 (Yao 
2008). That surge in investment was used mainly to construct infrastructure. 
Favourable policies also sought to attract FDI. The rapid development of 
infrastructure and favourable treatment for foreign investors, together with 
cheap local labour, helped China to become the largest developing country 
FDI destination. During these years, China received about 20 per cent of total 
inbound FDI into developing countries. Through 2006–10, FDI accounted for 
nearly 2.5 per cent of China’s average gross domestic product (GDP) (World 
Bank 2010). The majority of foreign companies that flooded into China set up 
factories that produce goods for export. In turn, foreign-invested enterprises 
came to produce nearly half of all China’s exports. China in turn rose to become 
a significant global trade participant.
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Figure 15.1 displays the evolution of the trade volume of China, from 1978 
to 2013. It illustrates that the levels of imports and exports have risen since 
1990. The year 2001, when China joined the WTO, marks an acceleration point, 
especially in China’s exports. The financial crises of 1997 and 2008 each reduced 
demand for China’s exports. China was, however, hit more severely by the 
latter than the former. Having experienced a temporary fall in demand in 2009, 
Chinese exports have, however, continued to increase, helped by the post-GFC 
economic stimulus package. The graphs of both imports and exports are less 
steep in the period after 2011.
Figure 15.1 Chinese trade volume, 1978–2013 ($ million)
Source: NBS (2015). 
Figure 15.2 illustrates the share of GDP in exports since 1978. The mainly rising 
trend demonstrates how trade became an important endogenous component 
of China’s economic growth, especially from the mid-1990s. The importance 
of exports to China’s economy, in particular, was accentuated after China’s 
accession to the WTO. During 2002–07, the average share of exports in GDP 
peaked at 30 per cent, in 2007. Exports became the ‘engine’ of Chinese economic 
growth. Since the GFC in 2008 exports have not returned to pre-crisis levels, 
and instead have contributed less and less annually to GDP. In 2013, the ratio 
of exports to GDP reached 23.3 per cent—close to the ratio of 2003. While still 
making a great contribution to GDP, exports evidently no longer serve as China’s 
economic engine. 
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Figure 15.2 Export trade share of GDP, 1978–2013
Source: NBS (2015).
Sluggish world demand is one of the main explanations for China’s export 
slowdown. While the uncertain recovery of the US economy is somewhat positive 
news for Chinese exporters, the US Government’s measures to minimise its trade 
deficit with China serve to curb the scale of rebound in demand for Chinese 
exports. The pace of export increase is slow. In contrast, China’s demand for 
US exports is rising relatively rapidly. China became the United States’ largest 
export destination in 2013. That year, China imported goods to the value of 
$122.1 billion—up 10.4 per cent year-on-year (US Trade Representative 2015). 
China’s exports to the United States in 2013 increased $14.9 billion, with a more 
moderate rate of 3.4 per cent from 2012.
China’s exports to the European Union face challenging conditions. A stalled 
recovery, ageing population, monetary challenges and high unemployment 
prevent the European Union from rebounding as a major importer. According 
to EU statistics, from 2009 to 2013, the average growth rate of imports from 
China was 6.8 per cent, against an average growth rate of its exports to China 
of 15.6 per cent. In fact, the growth rate of imports from China was negative in 
2009, 2012 and 2013, at –13.6 per cent, –1 per cent and –4.1 per cent respectively 
(EC 2015). The drawn-out economic recovery of the European Union hardly 
offers a promising future for bilateral trade. 
Emerging economies’ growth has decelerated to their slowest pace since 2008, 
or pre-GFC. Weak domestic demand and currency depreciation since May 2013 
leave even emerging economies unable to import at previous levels. In sum, 
China’s export-oriented growth model faces an unprecedented challenge in the 
face of shrinking global demand.
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Domestically, China also faces the challenge of adjusting to a new balance 
between investment and consumption. In the past three decades, investment has 
served as the other engine of Chinese economic growth. Investment currently 
accounts for nearly half of GDP—well above the peak of about 40 per cent at a 
similar stage in South Korea and Taiwan. While investment remains high, ‘the 
marginal contribution of an extra unit of investment to growth has been falling, 
necessitating ever larger increases in investment to generate an equal amount 
of growth’ (Lee et al. 2012: 16). Over-reliance on investment offers diminishing 
returns, and is unsustainable especially following the excessive investment 
induced by the RMB400 trillion stimulus program implemented in the aftermath 
of the GFC in 2008. 
While greater domestic consumption is being encouraged, this will hardly 
ignite economic growth. Household final consumption in China in 2012 was 
38.2 per cent of GDP—up only marginally from 36.7 per cent in 2006, despite 
rapid economic growth (OECD 2014: 39). This level is much lower than the 
average for OECD countries. Striking a sustainable balance between investment 
and consumption is a focus of China’s ongoing domestic economic reforms. 
In light of this challenging set of conditions, official figures suggest China’s 
economic growth rate in 2014 was 7.4 per cent—the lowest since the 1990s. 
The  current economic slowdown, however, could benefit China in the long 
run if it is used as a springboard for reforms that successfully and sustainably 
shift the country’s growth model. In this way, the ‘new normal’ era requires 
adjustments in domestic economic policies and also in externally oriented trade 
policies and strategies. Moreover, trade strategies that are compatible with 
these domestic conditions will help China to achieve a stable and successful 
growth model shift. Areas of relevance to these adjustments are explored in the 
next section.
Changing facets of the Chinese economy
The GFC in 2008 has deeply changed the shape of the global economy. For China, 
it forced a reconsideration of its growth model and pushed forward related 
domestic reforms. Indeed, it is also offers a turning point through which China 
is renavigating its role in the world economy.
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Moving up global value chains
The proliferation of multinational companies investing in China not only drove 
China’s economic growth, but also created opportunities for Chinese businesses 
to plug into global value chains (GVCs). Components were exported to China 
and final products were cased in China, and vice versa. As a result, China has 
become an integral part of Asia’s regional production networks. 
Early in China’s broader economic transition, Chinese exports were famously 
characterised as cheap clothes, shoes and low-value-added products. Chinese 
industries were therefore positioned at the low end of the GVCs, with the 
interest margin for Chinese companies being accordingly minimal; however, 
‘benefiting from GVCs depends on how much value a country creates in the 
GVCs’ (OECD  2013). In the face of sluggish demand for those products, the 
Chinese economy and Chinese companies now need to figure out how to add 
more value to the GVCs. 
Innovation is part of the story of moving upwards in GVCs. This also helps 
Chinese companies maintain competitive advantage in the face of increasing 
pressure from labour costs. Chinese companies are already successfully taking 
action in pushing for higher status within GVCs. The 2014 world intellectual 
property report, the flagship publication of the Geneva-based World 
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), notes that China filed 32.1 per cent 
of the 2.6  million global patent applications in 2013, making it the greatest 
total patent filer in the world, followed by the United States (22.3 per cent) and 
Japan (12.6 per cent) (WIPO 2014: 12). In addition, Chinese foreign-oriented 
patents have surged since 2000, by an average annual growth rate of 40 per cent 
between 2000 and 2005, and 23 per cent since 2005 (WIPO 2014: 2). 
The significance of innovation has, in fact, been written into China’s national 
economic strategy. Innovation is intended to be a new driving force for growth 
and for increasing Chinese competitiveness in the world economy. Accordingly, 
subsidies and policy support from both the central and local governments 
are intended to encourage companies to increasingly engage in research and 
development (R&D) activities. 
Becoming an outbound investor as well as a recipient 
investor 
Inbound FDI has served as an important driver of China’s economic growth in 
the past three decades. China became one of the hottest investment destinations 
in the world. In 2014, China attracted US$128 billion in foreign investment, 
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reflecting a moderate increase of 3 per cent on the previous year. That year, China 
also surpassed the United States to become the largest recipient of investment in 
the world (UNCTAD 2015: 1).
In parallel, the recent rapid increase in Chinese outward foreign direct investment 
(OFDI) is also striking. In 2014, Chinese OFDI reached US$102.9 billion—up 
14.1 per cent on the previous year. At this rate, Chinese OFDI will soon exceed 
its FDI. Having been a large capital-recipient country, China has become an 
important investor in the world economy. 
Within that broader trend are tendencies that reflect Chinese companies 
seeking to develop advanced technologies through a merger and acquisition 
(M&A) process. For example, it is reported that PetroChina and China National 
Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) have signed a few agreements with Western 
transnational corporations (TNCs), including Shell. Some of these agreements 
include articles on technological assistance and support (UNCTAD 2014b: 12). 
Concurrent with expanding market size and maximising business opportunities, 
Chinese companies are investing globally in a manner that emphasises 
narrowing the technology and management gaps with companies in developed 
countries. This is a critical step for Chinese companies undergoing a process 
of globalisation. 
At the national level, Chinese OFDI is also expected to grow with the 
implementation of the ‘one road and one belt’ initiative. A $40 billion 
‘Silk Road Fund’ has been founded to support investment in the infrastructure 
of developing countries. In general, Chinese companies are being encouraged 
to invest abroad and compete in the global market. It is hoped that massive 
investment by Chinese companies abroad will unlock opportunities for China 
to evolve from a country that is ‘merchandise exporting’ to one that is ‘capital 
exporting’. 
Free trade zones and other opening-up measures
Transition from export orientation poses many challenges for China’s economy. 
There is no single prescription that can offer a detailed picture of what China’s 
economy will become in the future, so China’s government continues its usual 
practice of learning by doing. 
One such area of experimentation is the practice of free trade zones (FTZs), which 
set aside an area for trial of innovative trade, investment and financial policies. 
The idea is to provide ‘replicable experience’ for other regions and the national 
economy as a whole for further liberalisation. The Shanghai Pilot Free Trade 
Zone, which was approved by the State Council in August 2013, is the pioneer 
for exploring approaches to achieving deepening reform and further opening in 
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the current economic context. Its practices include granting investors ‘national 
treatment’ except for investment items listed in the ‘negative list’, and also 
simplifying customs procedures. These are novel policy instruments for both 
national and local governments. 
Particularly noteworthy is the approach to the ‘negative list’, which has 
been explicitly written into the draft Foreign Investment Law. This approach 
fundamentally changes the traditional Chinese system of governing foreign 
investment. Under the new rules, foreign investors can enjoy pre-national 
treatment unless they fall into a category on the negative list. That is, a clear 
and transparent framework is now provided for foreign investment. In parallel, 
foreign investors can also benefit from a simplified registration system that 
removes the traditional lengthy approval process. Despite some criticism, the 
draft Foreign Investment Law indicates the arrival of a more transparent, stable 
and sophisticated system of governance of foreign investment (Pan 2015).
In the footsteps of Shanghai, Fujian, Guangdong and Tianjin are the recently 
announced second group of experimental FTZs. In addition to replicating the 
successful experience of Shanghai, these zones are expected to contribute 
to a more open Chinese economy, and to explore a new model of regional 
cooperation and a rule-based business environment. It is also hoped these 
three new FTZs will serve as hubs of regional economic growth and offer useful 
experience to facilitate regional development. In so doing, they should also be 
able to provide experience in responding effectively to the changing dynamics 
of international trade. 
Changing dynamics of international trade rules
Failure of Doha Round negotiations in the WTO 
At the end of the twentieth century, the establishment of the WTO was one of 
the greatest achievements of the international economic system. The agreements 
made under this multilateral trading system have had extensive influence on 
its 160 member countries. Under three pillars—trade in goods, services and 
intellectual property rights—the WTO has brought high-level liberalisation to 
international trade rules. In addition, the WTO’s rule-based dispute-settlement 
system has earned a reputation for efficiency and effectiveness in settling trade-
related disputes between member countries. 
On the other hand, and as highlighted by Petersmann (2005: 649), multilateral 
trading is like a bicycle that has one wheel subject to regular negotiation. 
Through WTO negotiations, trade rules are updated and member countries can 
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be motivated to seek changes in the multilateral trading system. The stalemate of 
Doha Round negotiations, however, has stalled that system. Confident of success 
more than a decade ago, negotiators proposed an agenda based on development 
issues for the Doha Round negotiations. Yet, the round has run into problems 
due to the divergent interests between developed and developing countries 
(Cho 2010: 574). Moreover, the ‘single undertaking’ principle—which requires 
universal agreement of member countries on an issue—makes the negotiations 
extremely difficult. At the ministerial conference in Bali in 2013, however, 
some modest progress was achieved on trade facilitation, reduction of import 
barriers from least-developed countries (LDCs) and on food security programs 
in developing countries. The reality is, however, that member countries are 
struggling to wrap up the Doha Round, and hope among members for agreement 
on substantial rules is slim. The multilateral trading system is struggling to 
provide new trade rules.
The proliferation of regional trade negotiations
In the last decades of the twentieth century, another remarkable, new 
phenomenon in the global economy was the emergence of GVCs. As they change 
the shape of global trade and investment, GVCs are now among the leading 
causes of the proliferation of regional trade negotiations. 
With advances in technology reducing transportation and communication 
costs, multinational companies have in recent decades been able to operate 
with branches across countries, including developing countries. Specifically, 
production lines are split across countries with the location of each process 
based on comparative advantage, such as in cheap labour. In turn, a single 
product is no longer made within one country. Rather, production is an 
incremental process across many countries that provide different components 
of the production process. 
Removing barriers to customs and investment, and facilitating the activities of 
value chains, is thus now essential to creating trade and bolstering the prosperity 
of the economy in the twenty-first century. It is estimated that reducing barriers 
in GVCs could increase global GDP by nearly 5 per cent and global trade by 15 per 
cent (World Economic Forum et al. 2013: 13). Existing trade rules, however, are 
built on the perception of trade ‘at the border’. Concepts such as tariffs, rules 
of origin and so on reflect a way of thinking in which products are labelled as 
being from a single country, rather than the combined effort of many countries. 
In the twenty-first century, trade rules that advocate tariff reductions and quota 
elimination are important, but insufficient to bolster trade. The expansion of 
GVCs has thus led to calls for changes to create new rules that better suit the 
structure and needs of global trade (Baldwin 2011: 8–9). 
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Amid this dynamic, the deadlock of the Doha Round of negotiations has helped 
create a trend among member countries to turn to regional trade negotiations. 
The world’s greatest traders—China, Japan, the European Union and the United 
States—have all sought solutions in regional talks. As noted earlier, there are 
three leading regional negotiation initiatives under way: the RCEP, TPP and TTIP. 
Two of them—RCEP and TPP—are concentrated on the Asia-Pacific, reflecting 
the well-developed and lucrative supply chains in the region, and creating 
common interest for countries to push for the negotiation of more sophisticated 
trade rules that are compatible with local production networks. 
In contrast, the TTIP focuses on divergence within and duplication of regulatory 
policies. It seeks to create a more specific and subtle set of trade rules based on 
business sectors that reduce divergence and duplication across domestic laws. 
The European Union and the United States are already working on divergence 
within related issues, such as food safety and automobile parts. They hope to 
use the TTIP as the ‘standard makers, rather than standard takers’ (Bollyky and 
Bradford 2013). Through a more united regulatory approach, the European 
Union and the United States hope to ensure other countries gravitate towards 
their joint standards, despite the shift of economic power to emerging economies.
As of April 2015, none of these three negotiation platforms has borne substantial 
fruit. Although the TPP is moving towards a conclusion, its content is still unclear 
due to issues with the Trade Promotion Authority and disagreement within the 
US Democratic Party. The RCEP agenda also seeks to conclude negotiations by 
the end of 2015; however, there are many issues needing resolution before a 
final deal can be reached. The TTIP appears to be a secondary priority on the 
United States’ trade agenda this year—after the TPP deal. 
A call for new trade rules in the Pacific Rim
In the Pacific Rim, while RCEP and TPP complement each other in terms of their 
membership scope and issue coverage, they are in competition to be the first to 
offer an update to the international trade rules of the WTO. In turn, the outlook 
for international trade rules varies greatly, depending on whether the RCEP or 
the TPP is signed first. 
RCEP negotiations include 10 Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) 
members and Australia, China, India, Japan, New Zealand and South Korea. 
These are big trading partners within the region. The negotiation agenda covers 
an extensive range of issues, such as tariff reduction, services, investment and 
intellectual property rights protection. RCEP’s aim is to further reduce tariffs 
among member countries, to grant more market access within service sectors and 
to create a liberal, facilitative and competitive regional investment environment. 
Negotiations are taking place based on the current structure of the ASEAN+1, but 
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with improvements in many aspects. The RCEP negotiations engage 16 countries 
so as to make RCEP rules comprehensive and of high quality, reflecting the 
collective determination to more deeply integrate the various national economies. 
The negotiation agenda incorporates sensitive issues, including competition. 
The competition issue was once raised in multilateral trade discussions in the 
Singapore Round of negotiations of the WTO. It was removed from the agenda, 
however, due to opposition from developing countries. It represents remarkable 
progress that it can now appear on the agenda of RCEP, even though most of 
the participants are developing countries. Despite the pursuit of comprehensive 
liberalisation, the guidelines of the RCEP also address the issue of flexibility by 
‘taking into consideration … the different levels of development of participating 
countries’.2 The negotiations will consider country differences and allow special 
and differentiated treatment for LDCs. 
Unlike the RCEP, the TPP purports to create ‘twenty-first-century high-level 
international trade rules’. Led by the United States, the TPP is being negotiated 
by 11 other Asia-Pacific countries: Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, 
Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore and Vietnam. The TPP seeks 
comprehensive coverage of issues, including services, investment, intellectual 
property rights, state-owned enterprises (SOEs), the environment and labour. 
While improving the level of rights based on WTO rules, such as protection for 
investors and intellectual property rights, it also intends to reduce tariffs to zero 
and expand market access in service sectors. 
More ambitiously, the TPP aims to write new disciplines into international 
trade rules. It addresses competitive neutrality and regulates SOEs. It also 
imports environmental and labour-related elements into trade law frameworks. 
Specifically, it attempts to add the environment and labour costs into the cost of 
products so as to factor these impacts into the competitiveness level of products. 
Developing countries have expressed concern that TPP negotiation areas will 
make them less competitive. Concerns have also arisen about selective rule 
proposals, such as the extension of intellectual property right protection to 
pharmaceutical products, which could favour developed countries. The TPP is 
being pushed by the United States, and this makes it a struggle for developing 
countries to protect their interests. Negotiators are still working towards a 
final deal. 
If agreed by negotiating countries, the TPP could become the template for 
future international trade rules. By utilising the TPP, the United States could 
maintain its lead in international trade rule-making. In this way, the TPP serves 
as a critical instrument for the United States to achieve its goal ‘to be involved in 
2  Guiding Principles and Objectives for Negotiating Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, 
November 2013.
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the discussions that could shape the future of this region and to participate fully 
in appropriate organizations as they are established and evolve’.3 These rules are 
used to secure the competitiveness of American companies globally and to regain 
leverage for the US economy. In a geopolitical sense, the TPP also serves to unite 
the United States and its allies through economic ties and adds momentum to 
political bilateral and regional relationships. It is understood to be the economic 
pillar of the United States’ ‘rebalancing’ policy in the Pacific Rim.
Despite its increasing trade power and enthusiasm to join international trade 
rule-making, China is currently excluded from TPP negotiations. Chinese high-
level officials have expressed interest in joining the negotiations to deepen 
China’s integration with other economies (Tiezzi 2014). Despite this, it is appears 
China will not be allowed to join in drafting the new international trade rules 
under the framework of the TPP. 
The RCEP serves as an alternative for China, though China and other negotiating 
countries have a long way to go to reach an agreement. The rules of RCEP will be 
not as ambitious as the TPP’s, but this could serve as a middle ground towards 
consensus on a more ambitious trade package like the TPP. In his address to 
the 2015 Boao Forum for Asia, Chinese President Xi Jinping re-emphasised the 
significance of concluding the RCEP deal by the end of 2015. Hopefully, Chinese 
facilitation can help to induce accelerated negotiation of the RCEP towards 
agreement. We will see which is the first agreement to update the trade rules in 
the Pacific Rim.
Chinese trade negotiation options 
Cards in China’s hands
Multilateral approaches
Joining the WTO in 2001 has significantly benefited Chinese economic growth 
in the past decade. It also saw China deepen its integration with the global 
economy. As the world’s largest exporter, China should now be part of trade 
negotiations and write its will into the system of international trade rules. 
It wishes to seize the opportunity during this round of mega-regional trade rule 
negotiations by joining the various negotiating arenas.
3  Remarks of President Barack Obama at Suntory Hall, Tokyo, 14 November 2009.
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The WTO is the fundamental platform for negotiating new trade rules. 
As a proponent of multilateralism, China supports the significance of the WTO’s 
legislative function in evolving new rules. China has actively participated in the 
Doha Round negotiations. It has also worked closely with the United States and 
India on the divergence between developed country and developing country 
issues. It signed the agreement on trade facilitation at the Bali ministerial 
conference and pushed for its conclusion when the agreement was struck in 2014. 
China is also an active participant of plurilateral agreement negotiations inside 
the WTO. Given the stalemate of the Doha Round, the plurilateral approach 
has emerged in the form of groups of like-minded WTO member countries 
negotiating on selected issues. Thus far China has entered into negotiations 
for the Information Technology Agreement and Government Procurement 
Agreement. China has also expressed its interest in the Trade in Services 
Agreement (TISA) and hopes to become a negotiating member. It has, however, 
so far been excluded due to the concerns of some developed countries, including 
the United States. Indeed, some of the issues covered in these negotiations are 
also sensitive for the Chinese economy and could pose challenges to the current 
structure of Chinese governance. The Chinese Government has realised that being 
among the rule-makers is essential to protecting its own interests in the global 
context. Being a signatory to negotiations within the WTO would allow China 
to be present when the important issues are being considered. The plurilateral 
agreements negotiated by a group of members will apply to all WTO members, 
if accepted by all the other WTO members. Multilateral negotiations, despite 
their slowness, can be effective instruments for advancing trade-related issues.
Regional approach 
Given its core interest in the Asia-Pacific, China also actively participates in 
regional negotiations of new trade rules. It engages in discussions towards 
building free trade areas with neighbouring countries with a view to having a 
positive impact on both regional economics and geopolitics. 
In East Asia, free trade agreement (FTA) negotiations between China, Japan and 
South Korea began in 2012. The seventh round of negotiations was completed 
in April 2015. China and South Korea were able to reap an early harvest by 
signing a bilateral FTA—China’s most substantive FTA, covering the largest 
trade volume and the most comprehensive range of issues. 
In addition, China is negotiating an FTA with the Gulf Cooperation Council, 
which consists of Bahrain, Oman, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United 
Arab Emirates (UAE). The negotiations were stopped after being launched in 
2009, but resumed in 2013. Bilateral negotiations between China and each Gulf 
Cooperation Council country continue. FTAs serve as important instruments for 
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strengthening economic ties between China and signatory countries. Under the 
‘one belt and one road’ initiative, it could be expected that there will be a 
proliferation of FTAs and bilateral investment treaties (BITs) between China and 
its neighbours in the near future. Of course, preferential trade is not multilateral 
free trade and cannot substitute for its benefits.
The RCEP is another trade-related negotiating platform in the Asia-Pacific, 
incorporating 16 countries. Production networks within this region are tightly 
interconnected. China has put great emphasis on RCEP negotiations to facilitate 
further expansion of regional production networks and strengthen China’s ties 
with South-East Asian countries in particular. It might not be easy to wrap up 
these negotiations quickly, however, due to the different development levels 
and interests of the countries involved. An alternative accelerated track lies 
in China having started negotiations with ASEAN countries on an upgraded 
version of the ASEAN–China FTA, which is at the top of the Chinese trade 
negotiation agenda. 
At the 2014 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) leaders’ gathering in 
Beijing, China addressed the importance of building a free trade area among 
APEC member countries. The feasibility study on an FTA for the Asia-Pacific 
(FTAAP) will be launched in response. In addition to the RCEP, therefore, 
through the FTAAP and the ASEAN–China FTA, China could play a bigger role 
in shaping trade rules and the regional economic architecture in the ongoing 
process of Asia-Pacific economic integration. 
China’s FTAAP initiative also highlights that China is willing to work with 
the United States on drafting new trade rules towards broader Asia-Pacific 
economic integration. Although the original FTAAP idea was first proposed by 
the United States, the United States is now preoccupied with concluding the 
TPP. Even where the negotiations for an FTAAP are launched, the United States 
would have these built on the TPP negotiations—that is, with its clear emphasis 
on the TPP, the United States seeks to influence the general structure of the 
FTAAP and apply the TPP’s rules to a larger group of APEC countries. Since the 
FTAAP’s negotiation agenda has not yet been clarified, it will require a lot of 
collaboration between China and other countries to make the FTAAP a reality.
Bilateral approaches
Among 15 FTAs signed by China as of April 2015, almost all are bilateral 
agreements, except the FTAs agreed with Hong Kong, Taipei (China) and Macau 
(Table 15.1). China has signed FTAs with a broad range of Asian countries, 
including ASEAN, Australia, Korea, Pakistan and Singapore. China also has 
FTAs with Chile, Costa Rica, New Zealand and Switzerland. FTAs now in the 
pipeline will boost Chinese economic integration with Japan and Norway.
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Table 15.1 FTAs signed by China as of April 2015
Asia-Pacific (1976) Developing–developed
China–Thailand (2003)a Developing–developing














a It was later included in the ASEAN+China.  
Source: Authors’ compilation based on information from China’s Ministry of Commerce.
Chinese experience as a WTO member, which helped to massively increase 
China’s exports in the past decade, made it an enthusiast for free trade. 
While preferential trade agreements have few of the advantages of genuine free 
trade, and have disadvantages as well, China has tended to seek to replicate 
that success by gaining more market access and by further reducing tariff 
levels through bilateral FTAs with countries in the region. In the early days of 
these FTA negotiations, China applied an individual approach to negotiations 
on goods, services and investments to accelerate implementation, including in 
the ASEAN–China FTA’s Early Harvest Program. During this period, Chinese 
FTA emphasis was on trade in goods, particularly tariff reductions. The more 
complicated Singapore Round issues—referring to an earlier WTO multilateral 
negotiation round, including government procurement, competition and trade 
facilitation—received little attention. 
A more proactive stance by China emerged in FTAs signed with New Zealand 
and Singapore in 2008. These negotiations had multiple focuses in addition to 
the liberalisation of trade in goods. In particular, China put more emphasis on 
the negotiation of services and Singapore Round issues. The coverage of services 
and liberalisation steps was more vigorous and comprehensive compared with 
earlier negotiations. Several Singapore Round issues, such as trade facilitation, 
were on the negotiation agenda, although competition and government 
procurement proved too sensitive to address. China has, however, recently 
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taken a more comprehensive and vigorous approach to FTAs signed with 
developed countries. For example, China’s FTAs with Iceland and Switzerland, 
each signed in 2013, and with South Korea in 2015, have more comprehensive 
coverage in goods, services and investments, especially with respect to Singapore 
Round issues. 
Chinese issue-related FTA strategies 
Bilateral investment treaties
Following China’s shift towards becoming an important outbound investor, 
it urgently needs to update its BITs with its trade and investment partners. 
As of April 2015, China has signed 145 BITs with a wide array of countries 
(UNCTAD 2014a). Many of these BITs—particularly those signed in the early 
days of China’s opening-up—were drafted from the stance of protecting China’s 
inbound investment recipient interests. For instance, the BITs intentionally 
narrowed the scope of arbitration and restricted the availability of use of ad hoc 
arbitration in the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes 
(ICSID), unless disputes were related to compensation over expropriation and 
nationalisation (Heymann 2008: 515). 
China’s BITs have evolved significantly in the past decade, offering more 
balance between investor and recipient protections, including a more fully 
fledged dispute-settlement provision. ‘While it has not yet converged on U.S. 
“high-standard” BIT practice, it has come closer’ (Gantz 2014: 28). Recent BITs 
signed with developed countries, such as Canada in 2012, represent remarkable 
progress in the way China addresses national treatment, most-favoured nation 
(MFN) treatment and dispute settlement, though there have been some 
reservations. The enlarged scope of these BITs indicates a clear shift for China in 
its negotiating stance, based on its role changing from being merely a recipient 
to being also a major outbound investor. The ongoing BIT negotiations with 
the United States will, when completed, reflect China’s most advanced such 
regulations. 
The negotiations for BITs or for investment chapters within FTAs will be among 
the priorities of Chinese trade negotiations in the future, especially under the 
umbrella of the ‘one road and one belt’ strategy. Cautious agreement on reciprocal 
national treatment, MFN and dispute-settlement mechanisms in host countries 
will benefit Chinese investors in the long run by offering accessible, stable and 
predictable investment environments. This will also help to ensure a successful 
transition from the tradition of government-led overseas investment to private 
outward investment while adhering to the relevant international rules. 
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Last, China’s change in its stance in BIT negotiations leaves room for it to join high-
level FTAs. Building a predictable and stable, investment-friendly environment 
will be in China’s and China’s investors’ favour. Despite many contentious issues 
in the high-level trade rules, the shared concern over protections for investors 
could create common ground for China and other developed countries to work 
together. The consensus on investment issues will pave the way for China to join 
the negotiations for high-level international trade rules.
Services
According to WTO statistics, China’s services exports reached $205 billion in 
2013. With a steady annual rate of increase of nearly 8 per cent, Chinese exports 
in services cover 4.4 per cent of total world services exports. China’s imports 
of services in the same year were $329 billion, reflecting a higher share—some 
7.52 per cent—of total world imports. China’s services imports also increased 
more sharply, at an annual rate of 18 per cent (WTO 2014). 
Transportation and travel explain most of the increase in services trade. More 
importantly, value-added services are contributing increasingly to GDP—up to 
46 per cent in 2013 from 32 per cent in 1992 (World Bank 2015). The expansion 
of GVCs integrates not only Chinese component manufacturers into the 
global economy, but also the service providers of these production lines. As a 
huge market that holds much promise for China’s middle class, there is great 
potential for a boom in trade in services, both domestically and globally. This is 
particularly true in the global context given that China’s advantage in providing 
cheap labour is diminishing. Indeed, China faces a great opportunity to expand 
its services into the region and the world.
In that context, China will also embark on negotiating service agreements with 
its trading partners. Its activeness in participating in the TISA, as mentioned 
above, is part of this story. The emphasis in negotiations for services is first 
on opening market access in the transportation and travel sectors; the Chinese 
Government faces few difficulties to open domestically. Liberalisation of the 
financial and telecommunications sectors is expected to gradually increase in 
the pace and prioritisation of domestic reforms. This liberalisation of services 
trade also could provide China with a new engine for its economic growth. 
New sensitive issues
Some new sensitive issues—such as SOEs, the environment and labour—pose 
challenges for China in twenty-first-century trade negotiations. As outlined 
above, these issues are important impediments to China joining high-level 
trade negotiations such as those of the TPP. Handled badly, they can also be 
impediments to genuinely free trade. Environment was once an area in which 
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Chinese standards once diverged from most developed countries, but today 
Chinese standards in many areas exceed those of some countries, including 
Australia, which are expected to be members of the TPP. If the TPP is concluded, 
the pressure for China to tackle labour standards in particular will increase. 
China’s commitment to addressing these issues, however, is also subject to 
progress in Chinese domestic reforms in each relevant sector. If the TPP cannot 
be concluded in the near future, this will buy China time to proceed at its own 
pace on domestic reforms in related issues. 
It is noted, however, that Chinese negotiators will pay more attention to the 
regulation of these new issues in such high-level trade negotiations. Due to the 
sensitivity of these issues, the TPP, even were it to be concluded, might not 
be able to set binding rules for members. China could address these rules as 
non-binding, or seek a transitional period in which to adapt to relevant rules, 
in order to minimise its exposure to any negative consequences. Despite the 
sensitivity and complexity of these issues, China might consider adjusting by 
putting emphasis on domestic reform and negotiation strategies.
Conclusion: To work towards converging on a 
trade deal
The international trading system is at a crossroad, thanks to deadlock in the 
multilateral Doha Round of WTO negotiations and the parallel emergence of 
a few mega-regional trade negotiation platforms. The mega-regionals, which 
have attracted a lot of attention, could turn out to be a stumbling block for 
genuinely global free trade, or could pave the way to reaching a multilateral 
deal within the WTO’s frameworks. It is important that they pave the way, and 
that major participants in regional preferential trading areas keep this at the 
front of their minds. Divisions among trading blocks, as reflected in the shape of 
these mega-regional negotiations, pose uncertainty for the international trading 
system and suggest there could be delays in adapting to these trading dynamics. 
Though geopolitical concerns could justify such divisions, large traders need to 
work together to converge on a trade deal towards the goal of evolving the new 
trade rules that are needed for twenty-first-century prosperity and economic 
security. Through this process, China will play an active role and seek to expand 
its influence to match its economic power. Any attempt to exclude China is 
unwise and would be unsuccessful, as the story of the Asian Infrastructure 
Investment Bank proves.
China seeks to work with its large trading partners, such as the United States and 
the European Union, towards taking responsibility for collectively upgrading 
international trade rules. The internal reform of the Chinese economy and its 
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changing role in the global economy provide common ground for China, a large 
developing country, and developed countries to work on their divergence and 
to agree to a new set of rules. As an important and indispensible player in the 
Pacific Rim as well as the world, China is expected to take on a more active role 
in the evolution of a twenty-first-century trading system.
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16. Boom to Cusp
Prospecting the ‘new normal’ in China and Africa
Lauren Johnston
Introduction
Multiple domestic structural factors underlie China’s lower ‘new normal’ growth 
target of 7 per cent: reduced export demand growth, an ageing and higher-cost 
workforce, environmental priorities and constraints, and diminishing returns 
to physical capital relative to human capital. With the middle-income trap still 
to be avoided and China home to some 100 million citizens living below the 
RMB2,300 per annum national poverty line at the end of 2012 (World Bank 
2015), finding ways to ensure growth is sustainable and delivers the livelihoods 
of a high-income country is now an objective of government. 
Economic ties with Africa are one source of growth for China. China–Africa 
trade reached almost US$200 billion in 2013—up from about US$10 billion in 
2000 (IMF 2015a). Realised annual foreign direct investment (FDI) in Africa 
in 2013 surpassed US$3 billion—up from US$317 million a decade earlier 
(NBS 2014). Total Chinese investment stock in Africa exceeded US$26 billion in 
2013 (NBS 2014).
Despite the slowing of China’s own growth, China–Africa growth prospects 
remain buoyant. By 2020, intra-developing country trade is forecast to have 
increased tenfold over a decade, with China–Africa trade leading the way 
(Fletcher and Ahmed 2012). China’s investment in Africa is also set to expand 
dramatically. Chinese state media announced in late 2013 a national decision 
to provide US$1 trillion in financing to Africa by 2025 (Xinhuanet 2013). 
These growth trajectories will not only shape China’s international integration 
and Africa’s economic development prospects, but also come to shape features 
of the world economy.
Internal debate in Africa about China’s rising economic ties with the continent 
is intense. At the political level, in 2006 Zambian presidential candidate the late 
president Michael Sata famously accused the Chinese of being ‘infestors’ rather 
than investors. South African President Jacob Zuma has been more circumspect, 
suggesting in 2012 that ‘Africa’s commitment to China’s development has been 
demonstrated by supply of raw materials, other products and technology 
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transfer’, adding that ‘[t]his pattern of trade is unsustainable in the long term. 
Africa’s past economic experience with Europe dictates a need to be cautious 
when entering into partnerships with other economies’ (Hook 2012). 
There are governance issues also. In a 2014 transparency index, China was ranked 
last of 62 donor agencies (Publish What You Fund 2014). The home regions of 
African presidents are found to receive three to four times more Chinese aid 
than other regions, leading to accusations that China plays patronage politics 
(Dreher 2014). Trade with China is also found to be proportionately greater to 
African countries with a poor governance record (de Grauwe et al. 2012). 
In the Financial Times in March 2013, the Central Bank Governor of Africa’s 
largest economy, Nigeria’s Sanusi Lamido, wrote that Africa should: 
[R]ecognize that China—like the US, Russia, Britain, Brazil and the 
rest—is in Africa not for African interests but its own. Romance must 
be replaced by hard-nosed economic thinking. Engagement must be 
on terms that allow the Chinese to make money while developing the 
continent, such as incentives to set up manufacturing on African soil 
and policies to ensure employment of Africans. (Financial Times 2013)
The stakes are high, for both China and Africa. In 2010, current Chinese President 
and then vice-president, Xi Jinping, promised Africa that China would ‘enlarge 
the scale of China–Africa trade, and optimize the trade structure’ (Pang 2010). 
This is important—during 2005–12, China accounted for some 30 per cent of 
sub-Saharan Africa’s export growth (Drummond and Liu 2013: 10).
China’s ‘new normal’ growth era is, however, now ending the decade-long 
China-led commodities price boom (Garnaut 2012), which in turn will affect 
China–Africa economic ties. The majority of Africa’s exports to China are raw 
commodities, especially oil. Visiting Africa in early 2015, International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) Managing Director Christine Lagarde warned, ‘[m]omentum is 
slowing in many advanced and emerging economies, including in China—one 
of Africa’s main trading partners’ (Ochelle 2015).
The effects for Africa’s commodity and non-commodity exporters alike could 
be extensive. Dramatic falls in the iron ore price, for example, are a significant 
factor in the IMF in April 2015 lowering its annual growth forecasts for Guinea, 
Liberia and Sierra Leone—from 6 to 1 per cent, from 11 to 6 per cent and from 
5.4 per cent to 1 per cent respectively (IMF 2015b). The falling iron ore price 
has delivered an especially harsh blow to the fiscal positions of the three least-




This chapter focuses on the evolution of China–Africa economic ties. It sheds 
light on the importance of China to Africa, and also of Africa to China. 
The chapter also draws attention to a series of factors that highlight ways in 
which China’s slowdown may not be all bad news for African economies. The 
end of the commodities boom could instead give rise to gradual investment and 
trade expansion outside the resources sector—a case of ‘boom to cusp’—that 
could place the continent in a better position for more broadly based growth.
The second section of this chapter presents a short chronological introduction 
to China–Africa relations, with a focus on economics. The third section presents 
the stylised facts of contemporary economic ties. The fourth section outlines 
issues in China–Africa ties, with a focus on trade, especially in oil. The final 
section draws together the preceding discussion to highlight uncertainty amid 
potential for the emergence of new sources of growth in China and Africa.
China–Africa: Return of a fleeting ‘old normal’
China’s ties with Africa date back to the three fifteenth-century visits of Admiral 
Zheng He’s fleets to the East African coastline (Dreyer 2007). On these visits, 
Chinese porcelains, silks and crafts were exchanged for African products, fauna 
and flora (Levathes 2014). 
When the People’s Republic of China (PRC) was formed in 1949, most of Africa 
remained under European colonial rule. The first independent African country 
to establish official diplomatic ties with Beijing was Egypt, in 1956. This marks 
also the beginning of China’s direct aid to Africa (Mao 2011). Other  post-
independence early movers to recognise Beijing include Guinea and Sudan 
(in 1959), Ghana (1960), Democratic Republic of the Congo (DR Congo, 1961), 
Kenya (1963), and Benin and Republic of the Congo (Congo Republic, 1964) 
(Brautigam 2009: 68).
Premier Zhou Enlai’s 1963 visit to 10 mostly newly independent countries 
was another turning point in Sino–African political economic ties.1 The visit 
delivered the formal launch of China’s aid policy for Africa, including a promise 
of help to construct a railway from Zambia to Tanzania, enabling landlocked 
Zambia’s copper to be exported around Zimbabwe and South Africa. In the years 
thereafter, African votes were instrumental in Beijing’s 1971 win over Taiwan in 
acquiring China’s seat on the UN Security Council (Brautigam 2009). 
1  Including United Arab Republic (now Egypt), Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Ghana, Mali, Sudan, Ethiopia 
and Somalia (MFA 2000).
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As Beijing launched its opening and reform policies in the late 1970s, African 
growth performance was mostly poor to disastrous. Examples include the 1980s 
economic crises in Guinea and Tanzania. From the mid-1970s to mid-1990s, 
almost all economies in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) had zero or negative economic 
growth per capita (Radelet 2010: 1). Just one African economy made The Growth 
Report’s list of 13 sustained high-growth economies of the later twentieth 
century: Botswana (World Bank Staff 2008). China’s ongoing transformation, 
in contrast, took place within a neighbourhood of high-performing economies; 
more than half the economies listed were East Asian.2 
Macroeconomic conditions in Africa, however, have changed. The majority of 
economies in SSA have performed better since 1996 (Arbache and Page 2007). 
The 1994 end of Apartheid in South Africa allowed SSA’s then largest economy 
to reintegrate with the region, while also helping to stabilise regional politics 
(Carmody 2009). Chinese President Jiang Zemin’s visit to Africa in 1996 marks a 
shift in the driver of Sino–African ties from politics towards economics (Alden 
2007: 15).
For China, those changes in Africa and Jiang’s official visit came at a ripe time. 
China’s exports of machinery and electronics exceeded those of textiles and 
clothing in 1995 (Lin and Wang 2014: 4). That rapid industrial growth saw 
China become a net oil importer in 1991, prompting an international quest for 
energy and other raw material supplies. Africa was seen as a potential source of 
undeveloped resources. 
In extended outreach to Africa, China also sought support for Chinese policies 
in international affairs, acceptance of the RMB as an international currency, 
and the creation of new markets for Chinese goods and services. China offered 
willingness to invest in Africa’s infrastructure and capacity to follow through 
(Brautigam 2009; Broadman 2007: 11; Pannell 2013). Jiang’s visit coincided 
with a decision of China’s State Council to ‘combine aid to Africa, mutual co-
operation, and trade together’ (Brautigam 2009: 80). 
For these reasons, Africa is also a focus of China’s national-level outbound 
investment policy. Officially launched in 2000, the ‘Going Out’ policy aims to 
gain access to natural resources that are in short supply domestically, to forge 
international brand names of Chinese origin, and to diversify investments 
utilising China’s trillion-dollar foreign exchange reserves.
Since 2000, growing China–Africa ties are coordinated through the Forum on 
China and Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), which China instigated in the footsteps 
of the Europe–Africa Summit and the Tokyo International Conference on 
2  The 13 are Botswana, Brazil, China, Hong Kong (China), Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Malta, Oman, 
Singapore, Taiwan (China) and Thailand.
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African Development (TICAD). Via FOCAC, a triennial head-of-state forum 
rotate between China and an African host. The sixth such summit will be hosted 
by South Africa in November 2015. FOCAC is also the umbrella under which 
more regular ministerial and working groups between Chinese and African 
governments take place. 
Not all African countries are part of FOCAC. Burkina Faso and Swaziland are 
excluded from FOCAC because China insists that all participants adhere to the 
One China Policy. Gambia is also excluded as, although in late 2014 it ceased 
recognising Taipei, it has not agreed to diplomatic ties with Beijing. 
FOCAC politically formalised ties between China and Africa in 2000, and since 
2009 China has grown to become Africa’s largest bilateral trade partner. Since 
2009 Africa’s trade with China exceeds in value the sum of all intra-African trade 
(IMF 2015a). The rapid expansion of economic ties helped to transform Africa 
from the ‘hopeless continent’ (The Economist 2011) into a new pole of global 
growth, and home to some of the world’s fastest growth rates (The Economist 
2011; Wang 2007).
China–Africa economics overview
Sino–African economic ties run in three interconnected channels: aid, investment 
and trade. This section provides an overview of those flows, and also outlines 
their interlaced structure. 
China’s aid data are presented using a different methodology to that of the 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). This makes 
it difficult to draw international comparisons (Brautigam 2011a: 203–22; Brandt 
2013). 
According to the 2014 China White Paper on Foreign Aid, from 2010 to 2012, 
China provided RMB89.3 billion (US$13.4 billion) in foreign aid, through 
grants, interest-free loans (8.1 per cent of total foreign aid) and concessional 
loans (55.7 per cent of total foreign aid). This three-year sum is equivalent to 
about one-third of China’s entire pre-2009 foreign aid to all countries, according 
to figures in the first aid white paper of 2011 (Zhou 2014). The amount suggests 
annual foreign aid of about $5 billion, making China the world’s tenth-largest 
provider of foreign aid (Zhou 2014). 
The white paper also reveals that about half of China’s foreign aid goes to 
countries in Africa (MOFCOM 2011, 2013). That aid prioritises agricultural 
development, followed by infrastructure, health, capacity building (education) 
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and climate change (MOFCOM 2011, 2013). There were 86 aid-related 
infrastructure projects under way that seek to better integrate domestic and 
regional economies (MOFCOM 2011, 2013). 
Towards mitigating and adjusting to climate change, China has built several 
meteorological monitoring stations in African countries, and is active in 
supporting the development and utilisation of new energy on the continent. 
Recent projects receiving Chinese state financial support include a 400-megawatt 
solar power plant in Ghana at a cost of US$1 billion. Negotiations are in progress 
around a US$140 million solar power station in Garissa, Kenya (Tsagas 2013), 
and a US$132 million wind farm in Tanzania. Such investments help to address 
Africa’s power gap in a more sustainable way than via old energy models. 
They also create an international market for Chinese new energy companies. 
This type of exchange reflects the principle of mutual development that is an 
explicit founding principle of China’s foreign aid program.
And so the line between Chinese aid and investment is a murky one (see Brautigam 
2011). The evolution of China’s development financing between aid and 
commercial investment is introduced by Lin and Wang’s (2014: 8) summary of 
China’s financing mechanisms available to Africa: 
Other Official Flows [OOF] (large but less concessional loans and export 
credit provided by China EXIM [Export–Import Bank of China]); 
resource for infrastructure packages; equity investment by China–
Africa Development (CAD) fund; infrastructure investment by the China 
Development Bank (CDB) and other commercial banks (which are OOF-
like loans and investments with the intention for development, but non-
concessional, and suitable for long-term infrastructure investment). 
As a result of economics and of Chinese policy, China’s FDI stock in Africa 
has risen rapidly in the past decade—from US$900 million in 2004 to US$3.37 
billion by 2013 (Figure 16.1). Until 2013, the largest single investment made by 
China in Africa took place in 2008, a year in which China’s FDI flow, stock and 
single largest investment item were comparable in level. FDI stock has since 
accumulated to vastly exceed any single project or annual flow. The majority 
of all such Chinese FDI into Africa is loan financed (MOFCOM 2013). It is 
noted that since government statistics have been found to underestimate the 
size of outward FDI (Shen 2015), the actual flow and stock levels are probably 
significantly higher than these official statistics.
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Figure 16.1 Mainland Chinese FDI stock in Africa (US$ billion)
Sources: NBS (2013, 2014). 






Burkina Faso 4.3 4.3
Burundi 1.1 9.8
Cameroon 57.2 148.4
Cape Verde 0.1 15.2
Central African Republic 1.3 60.4
Chad 121.0 321.3
Comoros - 4.5
Congo Republic 110.0 695.4
Congo, DR 121.3 1,091.8
Côte d’Ivoire –4.8 35.0
Djibouti 2.0 30.6
Egypt 23.2 511.1
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São Tomé and Príncipe - 0.4
Senegal 10.4 83.3
Seychelles 17.7 103.5
Sierra Leone 40.0 108.4
South Africa –89.2 4,400.4








Africa total 3,370.6 26,185.8




Lumpy across time and countries, official Chinese FDI data (Table 16.1) for 2013 
reveal the consistent recent tendency for fuel and metal suppliers to receive the 
lion’s share of China’s Africa-bound FDI. Across the past decade, the largest 
annual recipients of Chinese FDI in Africa were Nigeria in 2003; Sudan in 2004, 
2005 and 2011; Algeria in 2006, 2009 and 2012; South Africa in 2007, 2008 
and 2010; and Zimbabwe in 2013. Countries in recent years that have received 
more than 5 per cent of total Chinese FDI into Africa include Kenya, Angola and 
Sudan—the last two being China’s most important African oil suppliers.
Despite this prominence of commodities in China–Africa ties, neither of the 
largest two single investments by China in Africa arose within the commodities 
sector; they were in finance and in infrastructure. In 2008 the Industrial 
and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) acquired 20 per cent of South Africa’s 
Standard Bank for US$5.6 billion (Standard Bank 2011), while in November 
2014, Africa became home to China’s largest-ever outbound FDI transaction. 
That deal is between Nigeria, Africa’s largest economy, and state-owned China 
Railway Construction Corporation Limited. When complete, the 22-stop, 
1,400-kilometre railway line will connect Nigeria’s most populous city, Lagos, 
in the west, along the coast to Calabar in the east, creating 200,000 construction 
jobs in Nigeria and generating US$4 billion in Chinese equipment exports.3 
Non-commodity investments in general—including in wholesale trade, retail 
catering and textiles—often fall outside China’s official investment statistics, the 
reliability of which generally remain of concern (Rosen and Hanemann 2009: 3). 
The scale of mainland Chinese FDI into Africa that passes via Hong Kong and 
other offshore centres is similarly not known, but is significant.
Structural factors also help to explain these patterns. China became dependent 
on foreign sources of energy from the early 1990s and its ‘going out’ policy 
explicitly prioritised investment in natural resources in which Chinese import 
demand was strong. More recently, labour in China has also become relatively 
scarce and more expensive. Selective African countries, in contrast, offer 
young, rapidly increasing and, on average, lesser-educated populations, in an 
environment that is more politically and macroeconomically stable than in earlier 
decades. Rising Chinese investment interest in Africa is what one would expect 
from analysis based on relative factor endowments and costs (see Krueger 1977).
The commodity-focused pattern of investment supports resources serving as 
collateral for high-risk investment financing—a model of Chinese investment 
known as ‘Angola terms’. However, the presence of resources seems to affect 
only the level of investment, not the decision to invest (Cheung et al. 2012). 
A link between commodity wealth and corruption in Africa (see Leite and 
3  See: www.out-law.com/en/articles/2014/november/china-signs-contract-for-coastal-rail-project-in-nigeria/.
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Weidmann 1999) could also help explain why, from 2003 to 2006, China’s foreign 
investment in 26 African countries was biased towards natural resources and 
poor governance (Kolstad and Wiig 2011). 
The associated increase in Chinese investor interest in such diverse countries 
as Vietnam, Bangladesh, Ethiopia and Tanzania reflects a new phase in an old 
process in which China itself served as a low-cost investment destination. 
This  process of transfer of industrial processes from higher to lower-wage 
countries is described by the multi-tiered, hierarchical ‘flying geese’ model 
(Akamatsu 1961, 1962). The model traces the spread of industrialisation from 
more to lesser developed economies—the initial ‘goose’ (the more advanced 
economy) leads the second-tier ‘geese’ (lesser advanced economies), which are 
followed by third-tier geese (least-developed economies) through a process of 
gradual production transfer. 
While the model describes the iterative industrialisation process that was 
followed by Japan, South Korea and Taiwan in their investments in China and 
elsewhere in Asia, Lin and Wang (2014) compare the different scale of China’s 
flying geese potential with that of Japan and Korea at a similar stage. According 
to their numbers, Japan in 1960 had 9.7 million workers in manufacturing 
and in 1980 Korea had 2.3 million. China, by comparison, is presently home to 
something closer to 100 million factory jobs. A comparable transfer of factory 
jobs abroad could thus logically be an immense driver of employment and 
industrialisation in today’s poor countries. 
There are an increasing number of examples from China in Africa of this 
potentially greatest-ever gander of flying geese. Textile giant China JD Group’s 
textile factory now produces textiles once produced in China for export to 
the United States—from Tanzania. In Ethiopia, China’s Huajian Group plans 
to invest some US$2 billion in the coming decade, expanding a nascent shoe-
manufacturing cluster that exports within Africa, and also to Europe and North 
America. The plan makes use not only of Ethiopia’s comparatively low wages, 
but also of intra-African trade preferences and its LDC trade preferences.
Investments in the automotive sector similarly seek to utilise low wages and 
intra-African trade preferences. A US$50 million Foton Motors vehicle assembly 
plant in Nairobi, Kenya, opened in 2012. The plant has capacity to manufacture 
up to 10,000 pick-up trucks and light commercial vehicles annually, and targets 
its output to the emerging East African market. Similarly, state-led Beijing 
Automotive Industry Holding Company, one of China’s largest automotive 
manufacturers, and South Africa’s Industrial Development Corporation, since 
2013, together run Beijing Automotive Works (BAW) South Africa. The joint 
US$17.8 million minibus assembly line brings South Africa closer to its goal of 
full domestic manufacture of minibus taxis (Global Post 2015). 
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Table 16.2 Geographic distribution of China’s outbound FDI flows, 2013
Continent Amount Share (%) Annual growth
Asia* 75.60 70.1 16.7
Europe 5.95 5.5 –15.4
Latin America 14.36 13.3 132.7
North America 4.90 4.5 0.4
Africa 3.37 3.2 33.9
Oceania 3.66 3.4 51.6
Total 107.84 100.0 22.8
* Includes investment channelled through Hong Kong to third destinations. 
Source: NBS (2014: 85).
Despite an ever-increasing number of such investment projects, China’s 
outbound FDI to African destinations is small relative to China’s total outbound 
FDI and to total inbound FDI into Africa. In 2013 Africa attracted just 3.2 per 
cent of total Chinese outbound FDI (Table 16.2). And yet, few topics in applied 
development economics attract more media scrutiny, and less attention from 
empirical economists. 
Future directions in China’s investments in Africa can be deduced from political 
speeches and the combination of excess supply capacity in China and large 
development needs, suggesting that a good proportion of China’s US$1 trillion 
investment target for Africa will focus on infrastructure. 
Visiting Africa in May 2014, Premier Li spoke directly of connecting African 
capitals using China’s high-speed rail technology. In Africa in January 2015, 
Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi reiterated China’s commitment to helping 
Africa build the ‘three major networks’: railway, road and regional aviation. In 
Ethiopia at the 2015 heads-of-state meeting of the 54-member African Union 
(AU), China signed the ‘African Union–China deal’. This is billed as the most 
substantive project the AU has ever signed with a partner, and promises to 
connect the continent by road, rail and air transportation. 
In aviation, privately owned Hainan Airlines agreed to inject US$50 million into 
Kenya’s Astral Aviation in 2014. The memorandum agrees to develop Kenya’s 
Nairobi Jomo Kenyatta airport into a regional East African aviation hub using 
funds from China’s China–Africa Development Fund. Senegal, Sudan, Togo and 
Djibouti are among countries that have ongoing airport construction projects 
that include a Chinese partner (Radliki 2015). 
Under China’s flagship ‘One Belt and One Road’ initiative, several deep-water 
coastal ports in Africa are also in progress: Bizerte in Tunisia; Dakar, Senegal; Dar 
es Salaam, Tanzania; Djibouti, Djibouti; Libreville, Gabon; Maputo, Mozambique; 
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and Tema, Ghana. These are intended to facilitate Africa’s own economic 
development, as well as to serve as locations for transcontinental trade between 
Chinese and African economies, along the ‘maritime Silk Road’.
The focus on infrastructure reflects the importance of easing ‘bottle-necks in 
domestic and intra-regional economic development’ (Lin and Wang 2014: 13). 
China’s high level of foreign exchange reserves, coupled with excess capacity 
and competitive strength in infrastructure and related industries, can convert 
Africa’s development requirements into new sources of foreign income and 
international brand recognition. It can also help to realise China’s geo-economic 
and geopolitical ambitions via railway and maritime trade routes. 
Chinese investors are similarly investing in downstream infrastructure-related 
industries. In late 2014, Hebei Iron & Steel, China’s largest steelmaker, announced 
plans to relocate 5 million tonnes of production (roughly 11 per cent of its annual 
output) to South Africa. In March 2015, state-owned giant steelmaker Sinosteel 
signed a memorandum of understanding with the Government of Kenya to 
build a ‘steel city’ outside Nairobi towards meeting Kenya’s rising domestic and 
regional steel demand (Muhoro 2015). 
At the raw commodities level, in 2014 China was also party to a US$20 billion 
agreement with Rio Tinto, Chinese state-owned aluminium giant Chinalco, the 
Government of Guinea and the International Finance Corporation. The deal 
will develop Guinea’s Simandou iron ore deposits—home to almost 2 billion 
tonnes of mostly high-grade iron ore. It is the largest combined iron ore and 
infrastructure project ever attempted in Africa. 
Similarly, in April 2015, Shandong Iron and Steel Group reported acquiring the 
remaining 75 per cent share of Sierra Leone’s Tonkolili iron ore mine, and the 
associated infrastructure company, African Port and Railway Services. Shandong 
plans to lift production at the mine to 25 million tonnes per year (Cornish 2015; 
Macrobusiness 2015). The academic literature has considered the potential for 
Africa’s iron ore reserves to supply Chinese demand (Hurst 2013). The potential 
to supply rising steel demand in Africa is of increasing importance to Africa, 
China and the global mining industry.
Across Africa, urbanisation and infrastructure development are increasing 
demand for steel.4 In Kenya, government projections suggest that domestic 
demand for steel will rise, from 1.8 million metric tonnes in 2013 to 2.5 million 
tonnes by 2020, and then to double by 2030 (Ministry of Industrialisation 
and Enterprise Development of Kenya 2015). These developments are being 
assisted by Chinese infrastructure investments, including the Chinese-led East 
4  From Nairobi, the railway line will extend to Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi and South Sudan.
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African standard-gauge railway that is under construction, to be completed by 
early 2018. This project will link five East African countries: Kenya, Uganda, 
Rwanda, Burundi and South Sudan. The nascent Chinese-founded multilateral 
Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank has received support from the President 
of the African Development Bank for institutional cooperation to provide the 
capital and support for such growth forecasts.
Figure 16.2 China–Africa trade (US$ billion)
Source: IMF (2015a). Trade balances reflect the author’s own calculations.
While Chinese FDI in Africa is expected to rise rapidly, presently China–Africa 
trade levels dwarf those of aid and FDI combined. According to Chinese data, 
total Sino–African trade value reached US$192 billion in 2013 (Figure 16.2). 
This comprised Chinese imports of US$111 billion from Africa and exports of 
US$81 billion—a figure more than 10 times higher than the US$10 billion value 
of trade in 2000 (IMF 2015a). Aggregated African data, however, report a lower 
total trade level for 2013, of US$146.1 billion. 
Sino–African trade is proportionately more important to Africa than to China. 
Trade with China made up 14 per cent of total African reported trade in 2013. 
China’s trade with Africa, however, made up just 4.6 per cent of total reported 
Chinese trade that year (IMF 2015a). African data point to a trade deficit with 
China of US$15.2 billion in 2013. That year, China reported a deficit in trade 
with Africa, of US$29.4 billion (ibid).
China’s Domestic Transformation in a Global Context
396
Oil makes Chinese imports larger than exports in trade with Africa (Ademola et 
al. 2009; Thomson and Horii 2009). Oil imports have risen significantly in recent 
years. In 1990, China imported no oil from Africa. By 2010, roughly one-quarter 
of its foreign oil supply was being sourced from the continent (Thompson and 
Horii 2009: 648).
Table 16.3 Selective ‘top-10’ Africa–China export indicators, 2013
Country Export volume (US$b) Country Export intensity (%)
Angola 29.0 Sierra Leone 78.1
South Africa 11.8 Gambia  57.0*
Congo Republic 5.2 Mauritania 55.5
Congo, DR 2.5 Congo Republic 53.5
Zambia 2.4 Angola 45.9
Mauritania 1.6 Congo, DR 42.2
Nigeria 1.4 Mali 30.1
Sierra Leone 1.3 Zambia 25.5
Gabon 0.8 Burkina Faso 24.8
Ghana 0.7 Rwanda 24.3
Zimbabwe 0.6 Zimbabwe 23.6
Egypt 0.6 Benin 21.2
Africa 65.4 Africa 14.3
* A significant share of which are re-exports from other West African countries.  
Note: Author’s own calculations, and where export intensity is weighted by country, not by travel level.  
Source: IMF (2015a), where export intensity is defined as the ratio of exports to China over a 
country’s total exports. 
Data in Table 16.3 make the point that of China’s top-10 African exporters, half 
have oil as the main export—Angola, Republic of the Congo, Ghana, Nigeria 
and Gabon. The remainder of the top 10 are minerals exporters. Countries in 
Africa with fewer minerals and fuel exports have much less favourable trade 
complementarities and thus lower export intensities with China. Countries 
exporting less than 1 per cent of their total exports to China in 2013 include 
Kenya, Senegal, Tunisia, Morocco, Djibouti and the island nations of Mauritius, 
São Tomé and Príncipe, Comoros and Cape Verde (IMF 2015a). 
These trade tendencies are congruent with old trade theory. A condition of trade 
under the Heckscher-Ohlin (1991) model is that trade should arise between two 
countries that differ with respect to their relative factor endowments—primarily 
labour, capital and natural resources. The model demonstrates that the gains to 
trade around specialisation are greatest when the country with abundant capital 
and scarce labour specialises in the production of goods that utilise capital most 
intensively, and vice versa. 
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Accordingly, China is not alone in having imports from Africa dominated by 
fuels and minerals. Even where oil and gas-rich North African countries are 
excluded, imports to the European Union and the United States from sub-
Saharan Africa are still dominated by minerals and fuels (see Gualberti et al. 
2014). According to the study by Gualberti et al. (2014), in 2012 fuel represented 
some 76 per cent of the United States’ imports from SSA—more than China’s 
72 per cent. Africa’s imports from China, in contrast, are driven mainly by 
machinery, chemicals and manufactured goods, though patterns vary somewhat 
among importers (Drummond and Liu 2013).
Strong export specialisation in commodities can have negative externalities, 
including through ‘Dutch disease’. Dutch disease arises when a surge in the 
value of commodity exports pushes up the real exchange rate, reducing the 
competitiveness of other, including industrial, sectors (Corden and Neary 1982). 
China–Africa economics research
Alongside hope for greater African international economic integration, there 
is cynicism about China’s growing investment and trade ties with Africa. 
The worry is that what is perceived as the colonial outcome will be repeated—
large-scale extraction of resources for little indigenous return. 
While it is early days yet for assessing the long-run nature of the return of 
the ‘fleeting old normal’, it is not too early to assess some impacts. The China–
Africa literature identifies both positive and negative effects of expanding 
Sino–African economic ties. These depend to a large extent on mineral resource 
endowments (Jenkins and Edwards 2005; Kaplinsky 2005; Zafar 2007). 
China led strong growth in demand for energy and metals over the first decade 
of this century, causing a rapid rise in related prices from 2003 to 2011, with 
a brief interlude for the global financial crisis (GFC) (Garnaut, forthcoming). 
Declining prices since 2011, however, reflect China’s progress towards its goal of 
using less energy, especially coal, per unit of GDP.
China’s demand growth for energy and metals decelerated just as global supply 
growth was building strong momentum. Oil and copper are among China’s 
important imports from Africa, the latter especially in trade with Zambia. 
The prices of both oil and copper peaked in 2011, before declining through to 
early 2015 (Chapter 2 in this volume).
Prior to the passing of the peak of the China-led commodities boom, research had 
identified some of the impacts of China’s trade and investment ties on African 
economies. Indirect trade impacts, including the diversion of investment and 
labour to the extractive sector at the expense of manufacturing (Dutch disease), 
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is found to have adversely affected the horticulture and textiles sectors of 
Zambia (Bova 2008), and Africa’s resource exporters more generally (Kaplinsky 
and Morris 2008). Commodity trade with China has also displaced light 
manufacturing in selected African countries (Giovannetti and San Filippo 2009; 
Kaplinsky and Morris 2008; Khan and Baye 2008). At least during the years 
of the commodities boom, African countries that were strongly specialised in 
exports of commodities tended to experience stronger and more broadly based 
growth than countries with more diverse exports (Baliamoune-Lutz 2011). 
Change under way in China’s own economy, however, means that the China-led 
resources boom is now fading, and may narrow that gap. 
Imports from China have contributed to African development (Baliamoune-
Lutz 2011; Maswana 2010). Low-cost Chinese manufactures suit average income 
levels and thus consumption budgets in many African economies. Intensity of 
import trade with China varies less across countries than intensity of exports to 
China (Johnston et al. 2014: 6).
The 50 per cent fall in the oil price, from June 2014 to March 2015, is explored 
by Hou et al. (2015). For the continent as a whole, the report cites research 
suggesting that a 30 per cent drop in oil prices (smaller than the recent decline) 
is projected to directly reduce the value of oil exports in SSA by US$63 billion 
and reduce imports by an estimated US$15 billion. 
Table 16.4 Oil importer and exporter groupings, top 10, Africa, 2013a 
Oil exporters
Net oil exporters Nigeria, Angola, Algeria, Libya, Equatorial Guinea, Congo 
Republic, Gabon, Sudan, Chad, Ghana
Oil export dependency Chad, Angola, Libya, Gabon, Nigeria, Congo Republic, Sudan, 
Equatorial Guinea, Algeria, Cameroon
Oil exports as share of GDP Equatorial Guinea, Angola, Congo Republic, Gabon, Libya, 
Chad, Nigeria, Algeria, Côte d’Ivoire, Sudan
Oil importers
African net oil importers South Africa, Morocco, Tanzania, Kenya, Egypt, Ethiopia, 
Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Uganda, Senegal
Oil import dependency Tanzania, Guinea, Mali, Côte d’Ivoire, Senegal, Gambia, 
Burkina Faso, Kenya, Mauritania, São Tomé and Príncipe
Oil imports as a share of GDP Liberia, Mauritania, Tanzania, Seychelles, São Tomé and 
Príncipe, Zimbabwe, Senegal, Guinea, Mali and Mozambique
a Listed in order of magnitude. 
Source: Hou et al. (2015).
The effects at the country level depend primarily on whether a country is an oil 
exporter or importer. Table 16.4 lists countries in order of the scale of oil exports 
and imports, and shows the relative importance of oil in trade value, fiscal 
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revenues and production (GDP). Countries listed in the top half of the table—oil 
exporters—are suffering a loss of direct revenues from oil sales. The result is a 
painful revision of budget plans, with Ghana, Gabon, Angola and the Republic 
of the Congo all reported to be cutting back on national expenditure plans this 
year (Games 2015). For those in the bottom half of Table 16.5, however, the drop 
in oil price provides an improvement in the terms of trade.
Hou et al.’s (2015) overview of the impacts of the oil price crash on Africa also 
shows how declining resources exports lead to real exchange rate depreciation 
in many countries. This expands opportunities for trade and investment in other 
sectors, with favourable development effects. There is a chance of a long-run 
positive story for Africa, and China–Africa—the chance of a ‘boom to cusp’. 
The opportunity is for movement from a commodities boom to the cusp of a 
sustainable industrial transition and integration with the world economy. 
Table 16.5 Selective net oil importer economic ties with China 
Country Export dependence FDI stock BIT in force Infrastructurea
Tanzania 13.2 717 2014 Port
Kenya  0.9 636 2001 Rail
Ethiopia 12.8 772 1998 Railb
a Not a complete list of China-invested infrastructure projects.  
b Associated with a port extension in Djibouti, at a port that is relied on by landlocked Ethiopia. 
Sources: IMF (2015a); MOFCOM (2014); Johnston and Yuan (2014); UNCTAD (2015); various news 
sources. 
Table 16.5 highlights selected stylised facts about China’s economic ties with 
three net oil importers in Africa. These countries are especially important to 
the idea of ‘boom to cusp’ because they are three economies that China has 
nominated to become hubs for its outbound investment in Africa. All are in 
East Africa and currently have low export intensities with China as against more 
resource-rich countries. All have signed a bilateral investment treaty with China 
and are direct or indirect beneficiaries of China’s infrastructure investments in 
Africa. 
Advantageously in a context of long-run economic development, two of the 
three economies are also classed as coastal and resource-poor (CRP) economies 
(Collier and O’Connell 2007). The significance of CRP status relates to recent 
findings on the relationship between sustainable economic transformation 
between countries and over time. Specifically, in the second half of the twentieth 
century, it was when CRP countries began to sustainably industrialise that 
growth elsewhere in a region/continent—in resource-rich economies and in 
landlocked resource-poor economies—was likely to produce a broader, more 
sustainable transformation (World Bank Staff 2008) than is more typical of 
growth around resources trade.
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Over the years 1995–2009, Johnston et al. (2014) identified China to have 
relatively weak trade and economic policy ties with economies in sub-Saharan 
Africa with supply and exploitation of weak national resource endowments, 
against an empirical benchmark derived from gravity modelling. Given the 
scale of China’s African ties, especially with resource exporters, the authors 
concluded that China’s weaker ties with non-resource exporting coastal 
economies could undermine hope for sustainable long-run regional economic 
growth and development. 
The terms of trade have since shifted in favour of coastal and resource-poor 
economies. The commodities crash presents a painful shift for established 
commodities exporters, but is good news for net resource importers in Africa. 
This is potentially good news for finding new sources for sustainable long-term 
economic growth in Africa. The United Nations projects that on current fertility 
rates by 2050 Africa’s population will be double what it is at present. Under the 
UN assumptions, Nigeria’s population will reach some 400 million and Kenya 
will have a population of almost 100 million. This makes now a good time to 
construct the tangible and intangible economic infrastructure that will support 
that future population.
The largest-ever gander or brace of Peking’s 
ducks in Africa?
The depth and breadth of China–Africa ties suggest that slower growth in China 
will slow growth in Africa. This chapter has, however, traced an underlying good 
news story in the new normal of China and Africa. That story relates to longer-
term potential of the shift towards more diverse African export specialisation 
combined with excess capacity in China’s steel and infrastructure industries. 
Lessons from other regions’ experiences with industrial transformation mean 
that the pattern of China–Africa ties as a result of the ‘new normal’ could 
contribute positively to African development.
China is a continental-sized economy facing tight resource constraints. Home of 
the world’s largest and an ageing population, its slowing economy offers cheap 
capital and internationally competitive industrial, including infrastructure, 
capacity. Africa, in contrast, offers a fast-growing and young population, and 
relatively high natural resource and arable land levels per capita. On the whole, 
it is in need of massive infrastructure investment, affordable financial capital 
and investors with an appetite for risk.
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Economic historian Angus Maddison identified that it took 1,400 years to 
double per capita income before the eighteenth century. As the Industrial 
Revolution spread, however, it took only 70 years to double per capita income 
from the late eighteenth century to the mid-nineteenth century. In the second 
half of the twentieth century, it took only 35 years for developed countries 
to double per capita income (Maddison 2001; World Bank 2008, cited in Lin 
and Wang 2014). This process of economic transformation has since been even 
faster in 13  rapidly growing emerging economies. Many of these—including 
Korea, Taiwan and other East Asian newly industrialised economies, and later 
China—have followed a pattern of development that can be described by the 
flying-geese model elaborated on earlier in this chapter.
Economic logic indicates that as African countries continue to accumulate 
human, physical and financial capital, their export structures will transform 
and upgrade. 
Africa’s process will be its own, but this does not preclude lessons from East 
Asia’s experience being valuable reference points for the China–Africa story. 
The success of the China–Africa partnership, that is, might help to transform 
not only China’s international economic prospects, but also those of Africa. 
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17. The Trend of China’s 
Foreign Investment Legal System
From the perspective of the China (Shanghai) Pilot 
Free Trade Zone 
Gao Xiang and Huiqin Jiang
Introduction
The China (Shanghai) Pilot Free Trade Zone (SPFTZ) was approved by the State 
Council in August 2013 and established on 29 September of that year (Central 
Government of the PRC 2013; Xinhuanet 2013). It is located in the district of 
Pudong in Shanghai, and is the integration of four existing special customs 
supervision areas (SCSAs): Shanghai Waigaoqiao Free Trade Zone, Waigaoqiao 
Free Trade Logistics Park, Yangshan Free Trade Port Area and Pudong Airport 
Comprehensive Free Trade Zone.1
The establishment of the SPFTZ was designed to meet the needs of China’s 
economic and legal development, and is consistent with China’s long-time policy 
of economic reform.2 China’s economic growth has slowed since 2012 (Wang 
and Liu 2013), which has made it necessary for economic transformation and 
upgrading to ensure sustained, stable and rapid economic growth. The rapid 
reconstruction of world trade and investment rules requires China to have 
new ideas for its opening-up policy (Xu et al. 2013). Moreover, after years in 
operation, shortcomings in China’s foreign investment law have emerged (Gao 
and Jiang 2014: 549–50), which have made reforms necessary in this area.
The SPFTZ is different from previous SCSAs. It focuses on system innovation, 
rather than favourable treatment (Xu et al. 2013). The areas involved include not 
just taxation, but have expanded into investment, trade, finance, law, and so 
on.3 The legal and economic reforms tested in the SPFTZ will serve as practical 
experience, will be mirrored and repeated in other parts of the country, will 
1  The four SCSAs were established in June 1990, December 2003, June 2005 and July 2009, respectively. 
See SPFTZ (2013a).
2  ‘China’ refers to mainland China only.
3  Framework Plan for the China (Shanghai) Pilot Free Trade Zone (SPFTZ Framework Plan).
China’s Domestic Transformation in a Global Context
410
eventually help China to boost the recovery, transformation and upgrading of 
its economy, as well as furthering its integration into the international foreign 
investment legal system.4
Pilot system reforms in the SPFTZ have been successful and some are now being 
used beyond the zone. This chapter looks at the direction of China’s foreign 
investment law by examining the legal systems applied in the SPFTZ, comparing 
them with China’s general foreign investment legal system and analysing their 
application in regions outside the SPFTZ. 
The framework of foreign investment laws and 
policies in China5
The basic framework of China’s foreign investment law and policy has been 
developed gradually since it adopted its open-door policy. China’s current 
foreign investment law and policy include laws and regulations, the Guiding 
Catalogue for Foreign Investment Industries (the Guiding Catalogue), the 
Catalogue of Priority Industries for Foreign Investment in the Central-Western 
Region (the Central-Western Catalogue) and a series of policies. 
Laws and regulations
China’s current foreign investment law comprises three enterprise laws, their 
implementation rules, the Company Law of the People’s Republic of China (the 
Company Law),6 and hundreds of administrative regulations and rules. China’s 
first foreign investment law is the Law of the People’s Republic of China on 
Chinese-Foreign Equity Joint Ventures (the Equity Joint Venture Law), made in 
1979.7 Subsequently, the National People’s Congress (NPC) promulgated the Law 
of the People’s Republic of China on Foreign-Invested Enterprises (the Foreign-
Invested Enterprises Law)8 and the Law of the People’s Republic of China on 
Chinese–Foreign-Invested Joint Ventures (the Contractual Joint Ventures Law).9 
These laws—generally known as China’s ‘three investment laws’—are basic 
laws governing foreign investments in China.
4  Notice of the State Council on Issuing the Framework Plan for China (Shanghai) Pilot Free Trade Zone, 
issued 18 September 2013.
5  See Gao and Jiang (2014: 532–6).
6  Promulgated on 29 December 1993; amended on 25 December 1999 and 28 August 2004; revised on 
27 October 2005; and amended again on 28 December 2013.
7  Promulgated on 8 July 1979; amended on 4 April 1990 and 15 March 2001.
8  Promulgated on 12 April 1986; amended on 31 October 2000.
9  Promulgated on 13 April 1988; amended on 31 October 2000.
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To ensure the implementation of the three investment laws, the State Council 
promulgated three regulations or rules: Regulations for the Implementation 
of the Law of the People’s Republic of China on Chinese–Foreign Equity Joint 
Ventures (Equity Joint Venture Regulations);10 Rules for the Implementation 
of the Law of the People’s Republic of China on Foreign-Capital Enterprises 
(Foreign-Capital Enterprise Rules);11 and Rules for the Implementation of the 
Law of the People’s Republic of China on Chinese–Foreign Contractual Joint 
Ventures (Contractual Joint Venture Rules),12 which are collectively referred to 
as the regulations of the three investment laws. The three investment laws and 
the regulations of the three investment laws constitute the basic framework of 
China’s foreign investment law. 
Since the promulgation of the Company Law in 1993, a basic legal framework 
has been established by which special laws are to be applied to foreign 
investment companies, in addition to laws applicable to companies in general.13 
This  framework stands after several amendments to the Company Law.14 
In addition, a large number of rules relating to foreign investment have been 
issued,15 which, together with the three investment laws, the regulations of 
the three investment laws and the Company Law, have formed a relatively 
comprehensive foreign investment legal system in China.
Guiding catalogues
The three investment laws and the regulations of the three investment laws 
provide guidance on the areas and industries in which foreigners may invest.16 
In 1995, in order to provide further guidance for foreign investment and to 
ensure foreign investments are consistent with China’s national economic 
and social development plans, the relevant departments of the State Council 
promulgated the Guiding Catalogue for the review and approval of foreign 
10  Promulgated on 20 September 1983; revised on 15 January 1986, 21 December 1987, 22 July 2001 and 
19 February 2014.
11  Promulgated on 21 December 1990; revised on 12 April 2001 and 19 February 2014.
12  Promulgated on 4 September 1995; revised on 19 February 2014.
13  Article 18 of the Company Law, promulgated in 1993.
14  The amendments of the Company Law in 1999, 2004 and 2013 did not touch the principle. The revision 
in 2005 broadens the extent of the principle, by including foreign invested corporations owned by 
shareholders.
15  For example, Measures for Strategic Investment by Foreign Investors upon Listed Companies 
(promulgated on 31 December 2005); Provisions on Mergers and Acquisitions of Domestic Enterprises 
by Foreign Investors (promulgated on 8 August 2006); Provisions on the Establishment of Investment 
Companies with Foreign Investment (promulgated on 10 June 2003; amended on 13 February 2004 and 
17 November 2004); and so on.
16  See Article 3 of Equity Joint Ventures Regulations; Article 3 of Foreign-Invested Enterprises Law; 
Articles 4 and 5 of Foreign-Capital Enterprises Rules; and Article 4 of Contractual Joint Ventures Law. 
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investment applications.17 On 11 February 2002, the State Council promulgated 
the Provisions on Guiding Foreign Investment Direction,18 providing that both 
the Guiding Catalogue and the Central-Western Catalogue would serve as 
a basis for reviewing, evaluating and approving foreign investment projects and 
enterprises (MOFCOM 2000).
The Guiding Catalogue is a nationwide directory for foreign investments. 
It sets up three categories of industries: encouraged, restricted and prohibited. 
Those  not included in the catalogue fall into a default fourth category: 
‘permitted’ industries.19 Since its publication in 1995, the Guiding Catalogue 
has been revised six times—in 1997, 2002, 2004, 2007, 2011 and 2015. Looking 
at these amendments, the restricted industries have gradually been reduced and 
the encouraged industries have increased.
The Central-Western Catalogue was first published in 2000 for the implementation 
of the Western Region Development Strategy of the State Council, and has 
been revised three times, in 2004, 2008 and 2013. It was meant to improve the 
quality of the overall economic development of the central and western regions. 
The industries listed in this catalogue are those that are seen to have significant 
advantages in each province in terms of the environment, natural resources, 
human resources, production, technology and markets, and which may enjoy 
preferential treatment as industries in which foreign investment is encouraged.20 
The Central-Western Catalogue will not be discussed further in this chapter, 
as it is not applicable nationally.
Policies
The development of foreign investment laws in China is closely related to 
and results from changes in Chinese foreign investment policies. The Chinese 
Government has adopted a progressive opening-up policy since the beginning 
of the reform period. Two recent policy documents of significant guiding effect 
are the Twelfth Five-Year Economic and Social Development Plan (Twelfth Five-
Year Plan 2011–15)21 and the Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist 
Party of China on Some Major Issues Concerning Comprehensively Deepening 
the Reform (CCCPC Decision 2013).22 The key points of these two documents 
are to advance and deepen China’s opening-up policy, to reduce limitations 
17  Article 3.2 of the Interim Provisions on Guiding Foreign Investment Direction (promulgated on 
20 June 1995; expired). 
18  Article 17 of Provisions on Guiding Foreign Investment Direction (promulgated on 11 February 2002).
19  Article 4 of Provisions on Guiding Foreign Investment Direction.
20  Article 11 of Provisions on Guiding Foreign Investment Direction.
21  Adopted by the fourth meeting of the Eleventh National People’s Congress on 14 March 2011.
22  Adopted at the Third Plenary Session of the Eighteenth Central Committee of the Communist Party 
of China on 12 November 2013. 
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on foreign investment and to promote the unification of laws and regulations 
regarding foreign and domestic investors in China.23 They have sent positive 
signals to foreign investors aiming to invest in China.
Foreign investment laws and policies in 
the SPFTZ: Framework and innovations
The economy in the SPFTZ has been performing well since its establishment 
(SPFTZ 2014b); however, developing the economy is not the ultimate goal of the 
establishment of the zone. The ultimate goal is to foster China’s openness and 
internationalisation by testing reforms on a small scale before applying them 
nationally (SPFTZ Framework Plan). This section will focus on law and policy 
innovations in the SPFTZ after introducing the framework therein.
Framework
A series of laws and policies has been published or modified by authorities such 
as the National People’s Congress Standing Committee (NPCSC), the State Council 
and the Shanghai Municipal Government to accommodate the operation of the 
SPFTZ (SPFTZ n.d.). The following are some of the most important examples. 
1. The NPCSC adopted the Decision of the Standing Committee of the National 
People’s Congress on Authorising the State Council to Temporarily Adjust 
the Relevant Administrative Approval Items Prescribed in Laws in China 
(Shanghai) Pilot Free Trade Zone (Decision of NPCSC on Temporarily 
Adjusting Administrative Approval Items),24 authorising the State Council to 
temporarily adjust the relevant administrative approval items prescribed in 
the three investment laws.
2. The State Council approved and published the Framework Plan for China 
(Shanghai) Pilot Free Trade Zone in 2013 (SPFTZ Framework Plan),25 having 
identified five critical missions for the SPFTZ: speeding up transformation of 
government functions; expanding areas for investment; fostering change in 
trade development modes; deepening the opening-up and innovation in the 
financial sector; and improving safeguard measures in the legal field.
3. The Shanghai Government issued Measures for the Management of China 
(Shanghai) Pilot Free Trade Zone (Measures for Management of SPFTZ) 
23  Twelfth Five-Year Plan 2011–15 and CCCPC Decision 2013.
24  Adopted by the fourth meeting of the Twelfth NPCSC; came into force on 1 October 2013.
25  Issued on 18 September 2013.
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in 2013,26 listing clearly the management institutions and investment 
management measures.
4. The Shanghai Government issued Special Management Measures for the 
Access of Foreign Investment in China (Shanghai) Pilot Free Trade Zone 
in 2013 (the Negative List 2013),27 and the subsequent amendment in 2014 
(Negative List 2014 Amendment),28 having clearly listed foreign investment 
projects and enterprises that are not subject to filing management.
5. To implement the filing management system in the SPFTZ Framework Plan, the 
Shanghai Government issued two sets of administrative rules: Administrative 
Measures for the Filing of Foreign Investment Projects in China (Shanghai) 
Pilot Free Trade Zone (Measures for Project Filing in SPFTZ);29 and the 
Administrative Measures for the Filing of Foreign-Investment Enterprises 
in China (Shanghai) Pilot Free Trade Zone (Measures for Enterprise Filing 
in SPFTZ)30 on 29 September 2013. The former has provided details for the 
filing of foreign investment projects outside the negative list in the SPFTZ. 
The latter has provided details for the filing of foreign investment enterprises 
outside the negative list in the SPFTZ. For those foreign investment projects 
and enterprises that are listed in the negative list, approval is needed unless 
otherwise provided by the State Council (Information Office of the State 
Council 2014).
6. The State Council published the Decision of the State Council on Temporary 
Adjustments to the Administrative Approval Items or Special Administrative 
Measures on Access Prescribed in Relevant Administrative Regulations or 
State Council’s Documents in China (Shanghai) Pilot Free Trade Zone (Decision 
of the State Council on Temporary Adjustments to Administrative Approval 
Items),31 and the Decision of the State Council on Temporary Adjustments to 
the Administrative Approval Items or Special Administrative Measures on 
Access Prescribed in Relevant Administrative Regulations or Rules Approved 
by the State Council in China (Shanghai) Pilot Free Trade Zone (Decision 
of the State Council on Temporary Adjustments Special Administrative 
Measures)32 in 2013 and 2014 respectively, having temporarily adjusted the 
scope for administrative approvals and special administrative measures with 
regard to the administrative approval process, qualification requirements, 
share proportion restrictions and business scope.
26  Issued on 29 September 2013.
27  Issued on 29 September 2013.
28  Issued on 30 June 2014.
29  Issued on 29 September 2013; came into force on 1 October 2013.
30  Issued on 29 September 2013; came into force on 1 October 2013.
31  Issued on 21 December 2013.
32  Issued on 4 September 2014.
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7. In accordance with the SPFTZ Framework Plan, 18 measures have been 
taken for further opening-up in six service industries, including finance, 
shipping, trade, professional services, culture and social services in the 
SPFTZ. To implement these measures, authorities such as the China Banking 
Regulatory Commission, the People’s Bank of China (PBC) and the Ministry 
of Transport have subsequently issued a series of rules to trial innovation 
measures in those areas.33
The laws, regulations and policies listed above are essential in at least two 
aspects: clearly outlining the ultimate goal for the establishment of the SPFTZ 
and listing details for the implementation of the trial measures.
Innovations
Pre-establishment national treatment plus negative list
One innovation highlight in the SPFTZ is the adoption of the pre-establishment 
of national treatment plus the negative list, which is a fundamental change to 
the management of foreign investments in China. This management mode is 
confirmed by CCCPC Decision 2013, which has provided that a ‘uniform market 
access system will be established. On the basis of the negative list system, all 
market players can equally enter areas outside the negative list. The mode of 
pre-establishment national treatment plus negative list for the management of 
foreign investment will be explored.’
In principle, this gives foreign investors no less favourable treatment than 
domestic investors at the admission stage in investing in the host country, 
except as otherwise listed on the negative list. In other words, for areas on 
the negative list, foreign investors are given not national treatment, but special 
administrative treatment. In contrast, for those areas not on the negative list, 
foreign investors are given national treatment.
The Negative List 2013, as the first negative list in China, has attracted great 
attention at home and abroad since its publication. The filing system used for 
the management of foreign investment has greatly shortened the time required 
for approval and improved the degree of investment enhancement (Information 
Office of the State Council 2014).
33  For instance, Announcement of the Ministry of Transport on the Implementation on a Trial Basis 
in the China (Shanghai) Pilot Free Trade Zone of Implementing Measures for Increasing the Foreign 
Investment Measures for Increasing the Foreign Investment Percentage in the International Shipping 
and International Shipping Management Businesses, promulgated on 27 January 2014.
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In 2014, the Shanghai Government amended the Negative List 2013 in order to 
further enhance opening-up, increase transparency and converge with generally 
accepted international rules (Information Office of the State Council 2014). 
Compared with the Negative List 2013, the Negative List 2014 Amendment has 
the following four features. First, it has further eased market access restrictions, 
through expanding the scope for the items to be filed and reducing restrictions 
on the entry of foreign investment. For example, it has removed the item 
that restricts foreign investment in cotton (seed) processing, and removes the 
requirement of adopting contractual joint ventures or equity joint ventures when 
investing in the development and application of new or related technologies to 
improve crude oil extraction efficiency. Second, it has increased transparency 
by providing more details in the negative list. For example, it has provided that 
prohibited foreign-invested special teas include ‘white tea, yellow tea, oolong 
tea, dark green tea, compressed tea and others’. In contrast, in the Negative 
List 2013, special teas referred to the vague ‘famous tea and dark green tea 
and others’. Third, it has further detailed the meaning of national treatment. 
For instance, since domestic investors are prohibited from investing in areas 
such as the sex industry and gambling, national treatment logically means the 
same thing for foreign investors in those areas. Fourth, it has clearly stated that 
different administrative measures apply to investments within or outside the 
negative list.34
Foreign investment projects and the enterprise filing system
The SPFTZ Framework Plan states that the management mode of foreign 
investment will be reformed. More specifically: 
[F]or areas outside the negative list, in line with the principle of 
consistency in policies for both foreign-investment enterprises and 
domestic enterprises, the approval system for foreign-investment 
projects will be replaced with the filing system unless the State Council 
maintains that approval is required also for domestic investment projects, 
which will be administered by Shanghai Government. The approval of 
contracts and bylaws of foreign-investment enterprises will be replaced 
with the filing system and administered by Shanghai Government. 
The afterwards formalities will be followed according to the relevant 
national provisions. (SPFTZ Framework Plan) 
Therefore, the filing system includes two categories: foreign investment projects 
and foreign investment enterprises.
34  The Negative List 2013 only identifies that the filing system applies in fields outside the list. It does not 
clarify whether the approval system still applies in fields in the negative list.
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The filing system is a breakthrough in China’s existing foreign investment laws 
and regulations. To ensure the legitimacy and effectiveness of the filing system, 
the NPCSC formulated its Decision to Temporarily Adjust Administrative 
Approval Items before the establishment of the SPFTZ, authorising the State 
Council to temporarily adjust relevant administrative approval items prescribed 
in the three investment laws, which have expanded the legislative power of the 
State Council. Accordingly, the State Council successively issued its Decision 
on Temporary Adjustments to Administrative Approval Items in December 
2013 and on Temporary Adjustments to Special Administrative Measures 
in September 2014, which have together temporarily adjusted a series of 
administrative approval items and special administrative measures on access, in 
respect to qualification requirements and restrictions on share proportions and 
business scope in 23 administrative regulations approved by the State Council. 
For the establishment of or changes in foreign investment enterprises, the 
management mode provided in China’s foreign investment laws requires approval 
from relevant commerce departments before registering at relevant industrial 
and commercial administration departments. The periods for approval are 
three months, 45 days and 90 days respectively in the three investment laws.35 
In  contrast, the SPFTZ has substituted the approval requirement for items 
outside the negative list with the filing system and greatly shortened the time 
required. In accordance with Article 7 of the Measures for Enterprise Filing in 
the SPFTZ, ‘the filing management agency shall conduct filing within 1 working 
day after the investor (or foreign-investment enterprise) having completed the 
online application’. That is, only one day is needed for such items to be filed.
Reform and innovation in dispute-resolution mechanisms 
Judicial system
Since a judicial institution with high-quality professionals is needed to deal 
with disputes within the SPFTZ, the Free Trade Zone Court (the FTZ Court) 
under the Shanghai Pudong New District People’s Court (the Pudong Court) 
was established with the approval of the Shanghai Higher People’s Court on 
5 November 2013 (Wei and Li 2013). The FTZ Court has jurisdiction over 
commercial, intellectual property and real estate cases that are related to the 
SPFTZ and is under the jurisdiction of the Pudong Court. Its jurisdiction might 
be adjusted in accordance with the development and operation of the SPFTZ 
35  Article 3 of Equity Joint Ventures Law; Article 6 of Foreign-Invested Enterprises Law; and Article 5 
of Contractual Joint Ventures Law.
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(Tian 2013).36 In addition to dispute resolution, the FTZ Court is also responsible 
for researching the application of the law in cases regarding the SPFTZ (Wei and 
Li 2013).
On 27 May 2014, Pudong Court launched ‘a dispute resolution mechanism 
(DRM) on commercial cases linking litigation with non-litigation DRMs in the 
SPFTZ’ (commercial DRM in SPFTZ) (Wang 2014). This means that for cases 
under the jurisdiction of the FTZ Court—with the consent and selection of 
the parties—the Pudong Court may designate a mediation agency before the 
case is accepted or authorise a mediation agency after the case is accepted to 
mediate before hearing, and examine and ascertain the enforceability of the 
mediation agreement. Mediation agencies that can be designated or authorised 
include commercial mediation organisations, industry associations, chambers of 
commerce or other organisations with mediation functions (Wang 2014).
The commercial DRM in the SPFTZ has the following special features (Wang 
2014): first, the whole process of mediation is based on the full autonomy of the 
parties—that is, the parties can choose to start or continue the mediation process, 
to reach a mediation agreement and to apply for judicial confirmation of the 
mediation agreement. Second, the mediation is authorised by the Pudong Court 
and performed by specialised commercial mediation organisations with abundant 
experience and knowledge in areas of investment, trade, finance and intellectual 
property. Third, the rules applied during the mediation are professional rules of 
the respective mediation organisations. Fourth, the mediation process is formal, 
as the Pudong Court and the mediation organisations together have clearly 
defined a series of procedures such as the implementation period, judicial 
confirmation, challenges and confidentiality. Fifth, the mediation and trial 
processes are separate and independent procedures which means the mediation 
record will not be transferred to the FTZ Court and the compromises reached 
during the mediation process will not become the basis for the decisions of 
the FTZ Court. Sixth, it can save time and litigation fees, as the participation 
of mediation organisations can speed up solutions, and the Pudong Court can 
provide a discount on litigation fees. 
Arbitration system
On 22 October 2013, the Shanghai International Arbitration Centre (SHIAC) 
established the SPFTZ Court of Arbitration, in order to provide convenient 
arbitration services, consultation, filing and hearings relating to arbitration 
(Liu 2013). The first hearing by the SPFTZ Court of Arbitration took place on 
26 November 2013 (Yao 2013). 
36  The FTZ Court has received 380 cases a year since its establishment on 5 November 2013 (SPFTZ 2014a).
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In January 2014, SHIAC started the formulation of the SPFTZ Arbitration Rules, 
which were issued on 8 April 2014 and came into force on 1 May that year. As the 
first set of arbitration rules in the SPFTZ, they represent another breakthrough 
in the improvement of the legal environment in the zone (Ye 2014). The SPFTZ 
Arbitration Rules, made according to generally accepted international practices 
and the Arbitration Law of the People’s Republic of China, consist of 10 chapters 
and 85 articles (Wen 2014). The innovative points of the SPFTZ Arbitration 
Rules include the following. They have:
• improved the use of provisional measures and introduced an emergency 
arbitration mechanism
• established an open roster system, so parties can choose people outside the 
list
• linked arbitration with mediation by providing mediators before the 
arbitration tribunal is formed
• added procedures for small claims, which apply to disputes involving no 
more than RMB100,000
• provided details with regard to consolidation of arbitration, joinder of other 
parties under the same arbitration agreement and joinder of third parties
• emphasised the system of evidence during arbitration
• included an amiable arbitration system (Ye 2014).
Special taxation policy 
The innovation in taxation monitoring policy in the SPFTZ can be summarised 
as an ‘easing [of] control on the first line, effective and efficient control on the 
second line and full freedom inside the SPFTZ’. The first line refers to the border 
to entry into the SPFTZ; the second line refers to the border between the SPFTZ 
and other regions of China (Information Office of Shanghai Government 2013). 
‘Easing control on the first line’ means easing controls on goods imported and 
exported across the borderline—using the clearance mode called ‘entering the 
SPFTZ before customs declaration’ (Information Office of Shanghai Government 
2013). ‘Effective and efficient control on the second line’ means imposing 
effective and efficient supervision on the border between the SPFTZ and 
other parts of China, including but not limited to improving inspection and 
quarantine measures, exploring measures of pre-filing for export and import 
goods, verification management and follow-up supervision, as well as levying 
import value-added tax and consumption tax (SPFTZ 2013b). ‘Full freedom 
inside the SPFTZ’ refers to a trial ‘allowing enterprises to deliver goods in 
batches and make a centralised customs declaration, and to transport their own 
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goods themselves’ (Information Office of Shanghai Government 2013). The aim 
of the trial of this policy is to transform Shanghai into an international hub port 
(Information Office of Shanghai Government 2013).
Though the main purpose of the SPFTZ is to trial innovations rather than the 
implementation of favourable policies, some preferential taxation treatments—
such as reductions in customs duty and permission for payment installations 
for corporate income tax—still exist for those enterprises inside the SPFTZ that 
meet the requirements.37
The breakthrough and impact of foreign 
investment law in the SPFTZ on China’s foreign 
investment legal system 
China has a uniform foreign investment legal system although there exist special 
rules or policies applicable to the Central-Western and other regions. The foreign 
investment laws in the SPFTZ, however, are quite different—not only because 
of their limited geographical application, but also because many new reform 
measures are being tried.
Breakthroughs
Guiding catalogue versus negative list
Both the Guiding Catalogue and the negative list identify the industries in which 
foreign investors can invest, but in different ways. There are four categories of 
industries in the Guiding Catalogue regime: permitted, encouraged, restricted 
and prohibited. The first three categories allow foreign investors to invest, 
although investments in restricted industries must be in line with conditions in 
the Guiding Catalogue. The negative list identifies the industries in a different 
way—while industries listed therein are either restricted or prohibited to 
foreign investors, those outside the list are accessible for foreign investment.
Although both the Guiding Catalogue and the negative list have the same 
function, as outlined above, they have several differences. First, the Guiding 
Catalogue has a broader scope of application than the negative list. The negative 
37  See Circular on Relevant Import Tax Policies for the China (Shanghai) Pilot Free Trade Zone (issued 
on 15 October 2013); Notice of the Ministry of Finance and the State Administration of Taxation 
on Enterprise Income Tax Policies for External Investment with Non-Monetary Assets and Other 
Asset Restructuring Activities of Enterprises in China (Shanghai) Pilot Free Trade Zone (issued on 
15 November 2013); and so on. 
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list applies only in the SPFTZ, while the Guiding Catalogue applies nationwide 
and excludes the SPFTZ. Second, they are different in form. The Guiding 
Catalogue lists encouraged, restricted and prohibited industries; those that 
are not included in these three fall into the category of permitted industries. 
In contrast, the negative list does not outline permitted or encouraged industries, 
nor does it distinguish restricted industries from prohibited ones. However, a 
close look at the Negative List 2013 and Guiding Category (2011 version) will 
find that the Negative List 2013 is almost a duplication of the restricted and 
prohibited industries listed in the Guiding Catalogue 2011 (Ding 2013). Third, 
the preconditions for the application of the Guiding Catalogue and negative 
list are different. While the negative list is based on giving national treatment 
to foreign investors and their investments before they enter the SPFTZ, the 
Guiding Catalogue does not have such a precondition. 
Approval system versus filing system
A series of approvals is needed during the establishment and operation of 
foreign investment enterprises. For instance, one category under the approval 
system is the approval of the articles of association and/or agreement for the 
foreign investment enterprise from the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM), the 
provincial commerce department and the National Economic and Technological 
Development Zone (collectively referred to as commerce departments). Another 
category is the approval of foreign investment projects by the National 
Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) and its delegated authority 
(collectively referred to as development and reform departments).
The filing system on trial in the SPFTZ is based on the negative list. In short, 
while for foreign investment projects or enterprises that are outside the negative 
list filing is required, for those within the negative list, approval is required 
(SPFTZ Framework Plan).
There are four major differences between the approval system and the filing 
system. First, the agencies approving foreign investment enterprises or 
projects are commerce departments and development and reform departments. 
In comparison, the agency in charge of filing for foreign investment enterprises 
or projects is the SPFTZ Administration Committee. Second, the timing and 
concept of supervision are different. The approval system intends to review 
whether foreign investors can enter the Chinese market, which is an ex 
ante approval, demonstrating the idea of control of market supervision. 
In comparison, the filing system largely eases the ex ante supervision but focuses 
on ex post supervision, reducing government control of the market. Third, the 
scope of the approval system is much broader than that of the filing system. 
For instance, under the approval system, any establishment of or changes in 
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foreign investment enterprises require prior approval.38 In contrast, only the 
establishment of or changes in foreign investment enterprises that are within 
the negative list require approval before investing in the SPFTZ. Fourth, as 
mentioned above, the filing system in the SPFTZ has greatly shortened the time 
required to complete the relevant procedures.
Post-establishment national treatment versus pre-establishment 
national treatment
After years of reform, foreign investment enterprises have gradually been given 
national treatment under China’s foreign investment legal system (Gao and 
Jiang 2014: 545–6). However, the national treatment mentioned here applies 
only when foreign investment enterprises have already been established. 
In contrast, the national treatment on trial in the SPFTZ extends to the phase 
before investment enterprises are established in China. There are some other key 
differences. First, the degrees of liberalisation are different. Pre-establishment 
national treatment implies a further commitment on investment liberalisation, 
as the discretion of the host country on investment review is reduced and the 
transparency of investment is increased. Second, the degrees of supervision are 
different. Post-establishment national treatment supervises foreign investors 
and their investment before and after they enter China, while pre-establishment 
national treatment reduces supervision on the entry of foreign investment but 
focuses more on the operation of foreign investment.
Impact
Expansion of the filing system
The SPFTZ changed the management mode for foreign investment projects from 
the blanket approval system to a combination of limited approval and a general 
filing system (Information Office of the State Council 2014). The promotion 
of this combination is highlighted by the NDRC in the Measures for the 
Administration of Confirmation and Recording of Foreign Investment Projects 
(Administration Measures),39 which have detailed the scope and mode of the 
approval and filing of foreign investment projects. The NDRC has revised the 
Administration Measures, but the management mode has been left untouched.40
38  See Notice of the Ministry of Commerce on Decentralising the Examination and Approval Power for 
Foreign Investment (issued on 10 June 2010).
39  Issued on 17 May 2014; came into force on 17 June 2014.
40  The Administration Measures are partly modified by the Decision of the National Development and 
Reform Commission on Amending the Relevant Clauses of the Measures for the Administration of the 
Confirmation and Recording of Overseas Investment Projects and the Measures for the Administration 
of the Confirmation and Recording of Foreign-Funded Projects (issued on 27 December 2014).
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On 28 December 2014, the NPCSC adopted its Decision on Authorising the State 
Council to Temporarily Adjust the Relevant Administrative Approval Items 
Prescribed in Laws and Regulations in China (Guangdong) Pilot Free Trade 
Zone, China (Tianjin) Pilot Free Trade Zone, China (Fujian) Pilot Free Trade 
Zone and Expanded Areas of China (Shanghai) Pilot Free Trade Zone (Xinhuanet 
2014). The State Council has therefore been authorised to temporarily adjust 
relevant administrative approval items regarding foreign investment enterprises 
provided in the three investment laws and the Law of the People’s Republic 
of China on Protection of Investments by Taiwan Compatriots in the regions 
mentioned above. This decision has replaced the approval system for foreign 
investment enterprises with the filing system, which has now been expanded 
in China. On 8 April 2015, the State Council published Special Administrative 
Measures for the Access of Foreign Investment in China’s Pilot Free Trade Zones 
(the Negative List), which applies to all the pilot free trade zones in Shanghai, 
Guangdong, Tianjin and Fujian.41
Replication of customs monitoring measures
Experience with these reforms has been gained since the establishment of the 
SPFTZ, and some are now mature enough to be replicated in Shanghai, other 
regions or even the whole country. In the first half of 2014, Shanghai Customs, 
with the authorisation of the General Administration of Customs (GAC), 
announced that 14 customs monitoring measures—including declaration after 
entering the zone and allowing enterprises to transport their own goods within 
the zone—could be replicated and used outside the SPFTZ (GAC 2014). In July 
2014, customs agencies in Tianjin, Chongqing and Xi’an launched a trial of these 
measures to identify any problems that may arise from their expansion (China 
Customs Statistics 2014). On 13 August 2014, GAC announced further expansion 
of these measures in three stages: replicated in 51 SCSAs in the economic belt 
along the Yangtze River from 18 August 2014; replicated in all the SCSAs in 
China from 3 September 2014; and replicated in regions that are not SCSAs from 
18 September 2014 (China Customs Statistics 2014).
Implementation of generally accepted international rules
The foreign investment management mode of pre-establishment of national 
treatment plus the negative list have become a trend in the development of 
rules for international investment. The trial of this mode in the SPFTZ is in 
line with this trend, and is also consistent with China’s reform of the approval 
system. In addition to the trial in the SPFTZ, there are many signs that this 
mode may become the future for China’s foreign investment management mode. 
41  Issued on 8 April 2015; came into force on 8 May 2015.
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For  instance, during the Fifth China–US Strategic and Economic Dialogue in 
July 2013, China agreed to negotiate with the United States on the basis of this 
mode (Sun et al. 2013). MOFCOM signed two free trade agreements, with Hong 
Kong and Macao special administrative regions, in December 2014, which for 
the first time adopted this mode on the Chinese mainland (Ma and Li 2014). 
In January 2015, MOFCOM issued a draft of the Foreign Investment Law of the 
People’s Republic of China, which has also adopted this mode (MOFCOM 2015).
The SPFTZ Arbitration Rules have done more towards adopting advanced systems 
in international commercial arbitration. For example, they have improved in the 
area of provisional measures, added an emergency tribunal system and adopted 
an open roster system of arbitrators.42
Conclusion
Responding to challenges arising at home and abroad and in order to improve the 
foreign investment legal system and deepen reforms of the market economy, the 
Chinese Government in September 2013 set up a pilot zone in Shanghai. Some 
generally accepted international rules have been implemented in the SPFTZ, such 
as the foreign investment management mode of pre-establishment of national 
treatment plus a negative list, a filing system for foreign investment projects and 
enterprises, and taxation monitoring policies. In addition, innovative DRMs 
have also been introduced, such as the launch of the commercial DRM in the 
SPFTZ, and the formulation of the SPFTZ Arbitration Rules in 2014. 
The systems adopted in the SPFTZ for foreign investment differ greatly from 
those applied previously in China, demonstrating the efforts of the Chinese 
Government to integrate into the international economic market and adopt 
generally accepted international rules. The SPFTZ, which has been established 
for just more than a year now, has achieved a great deal by creating many 
innovative systems that are to be replicated in other parts of the country. 
Some  of the systems have already been replicated in Shanghai and, in some 
cases, nationwide. This has demonstrated the value of the SPFTZ in exploring 
a new economic mode, and in leading reform in China. 
42  See more in the section regarding the reforms and innovations of the arbitration system; or see Ye (2014).
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